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.Indeed, when we say that we do not care for philosophy, what we
are likely to do is substitute an implicit, hence immature and uncon-
trolled philosophy for the explicit one.
Mario Bunge [12]
[N]o content can be grasped without a formal frame and [...] any
form, however useful it has hitherto proved, may be found to be too
narrow to comprehend new experience.
Niels Bohr [9]
[O]nly by renouncing an explanation of life in the ordinary sense do
we gain a possibility of taking into account its characteristics.
Niels Bohr [10]
.A word of warning
The frontiers of our research are lost in dazzling light. Plutarch,
writing of the fountain-heads of history, says that when we push our
investigations to extremes, they all fall into vagueness, rather like
maps where the margins of known lands are filled in with marshes,
deep forests, deserts and uninhabitable places. That explains why the
most gross and puerile of rhapsodies are to be found among thinkers
who penetrate most deeply into the highest matters: they are engulfed
by their curiosity and their arrogance.
The beginnings and the ends of our knowledge are equally marked
by an animal-like stupor: witness Plato’s soarings aloft in clouds of
poetry and the babble of the gods to be found in his works. Whatever
was he thinking about when he defined Man as an animate creature
with two legs and no feathers? He furnished those who wanted to
laugh at him with an amusing opportunity for doing so. For, having
plucked a live capon, they went about calling it ‘Plato’s man’.
Michel de Montaigne [40]
SHORT SUMMARY
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated
within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM there-
fore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible
to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general,
philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated
epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on
entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong pre-
dictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowl-
edge and potential knowledge, where the physical state S corresponds to the
potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges
from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities
are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that
the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of de-
scription, the physical state S is a subset of a state space S = {Z}, such that
S always contains several elements Z. These elements correspond to unattain-
able states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of S cannot be
determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements Z, unlike the
evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of S is described
in terms of sequential time n ∈ N, which is updated according to n → n + 1
each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential
time n can be separated from relational time t, which describes distances be-
tween events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each
n, in which t represents the knowledge at sequential time n about the temporal
relations between present and past events.
When a wave function Ψ is defined, its evolution can be parametrized with a
continuous evolution parameter σ that interpolates between two sequential times
n and n + m according to ddσΨ(r4, σ) =
ic2~
2〈E〉Ψ(r4, σ), where r4 = (r, ict), if
the observed object is known to be free. The parametrization of the evolution
is chosen to be ‘natural’ in the sense that ddσ 〈t〉 = 1, where 〈t〉 is the expected
time distance between the events that define n and n + m. The squared rest
mass m20 is proportional to an eigenvalue that describes a stationary state of
this equation. The Dirac equation follows as a ‘square root’ of the stationary
state equation from the condition that m20 has to be non-negative, which in
turn is related to the directed nature of sequential time n. The introduction of
n releases t, so that it can be treated as an observable with an uncertainty ∆t,
just like r. The full symmetry between the space-time of four-positions r4 and
the reciprocal space of four-momenta p4 is unleashed. As a consequence, the
spectrum of space-time may have both discrete and continuous parts, just like
the spectrum of momentum-energy.
The suggested epistemic formalism also sheds new light on physical concepts
and principles such as entropy, Pauli’s exclusion principle, the spin-statistics
theorem, and the gauge principle. A longer summary is found in Section 4.
PREFACE
The present work is the result of a growing feeling that there has to be some
clear-cut philosophical perspective from which we can see the structure of phys-
ical law clearly. In a sense, it is a return to the perspective of Bohr, Heisenberg
and Pauli. My aim has been to use their epistemic interpretation of quantum
mechanics as a starting point, and to continue as far as possible along this road.
The other clear-cut philosophical perspective is the purely ontic one. To
follow that road further is to continue the search for realistic physical models.
However, the hints that Nature gave us in the twentieth century clearly point in
the opposite direction. To construct models based on naive realism has become
like combing the hair the wrong way, against experimental facts. Consequently,
it seems to me, recent attempts in this direction have been contrived or vague
- or both.
Is there a third road? I cannot see one. Nevertheless, most people seems
to be hesitating to embark wholeheartedly on the epistemic road. They remain
where experiment left them, accepting the unavoidable, such as Heisenberg’s
uncertainty relations, but are unwilling to go any further.
Let me give an example. The acceptance of Heisenberg’s relations means
that the practical inability to measure position and momentum simultanesously
is transcended to the principle that we should reject models in which elementary
particles have well-defined positions and momenta at the same time. If the po-
sition is well-defined, momentum is described as a set of probability amplitudes,
one amplitude for each momentum value. However, it is practically impossible
to determine the momentum of an elementary particle except in certain exper-
imental contexts. Nevertheless, most physicists accept a universally valid wave
function, in which there is always a little probability amplitude flag attached
to each momentum value. To continue wholeheartedly along the epistemic road
would mean to reject models that use probabilities in the mathematical formal-
ism in situations where the quantity to which the probability refer cannot be
observed by anyone. It is only justified to say that God plays dice if we can
see the dice in his hand and make statistics of the numbers that turn up. This
may seem like an innocent observation, but it throws the Hilbert space out the
window as a candidate for a fundamental playground for physical law.
What does it actually mean to ”follow the epistemic road”? To me, it means
to use the basic distinctions of our perceptions as a foundation when physical
models are constructed. We can distinguish darkness from light, sight from
sound, two objects from each other, and a logically valid conclusion from one
that isn’t. We can also distinguish the past from the future, object from subject,
and me from you.
Physics is life, as my senior high school physics teacher Karin Sjo¨holm used
to say. To follow the epistemic road is to take that exclamation seriously. Let
me quote the beginning of Violeta Parra’s classic song Gracias a la vida 1:
1Translated by Joan Robertson (URL = http://jveronr.blogspot.se/2013/08/gracias-la-
vida-lovely-poem-and-song-by.html). The original recording of the song was released in Violeta
Parra’s album Las U´ltimas Composiciones (RCA Vı´ctor, Chile, 1966).
Thank you, Life, for giving me so much
You gave me two eyes and when I open them
I can distinguish between black and white
And the starry background of the sky above
And in the multitudes, the man I love.
Thank you, Life, for giving me so much
You gave me my hearing with all its power
To record, night and day, crickets and canaries
Hammers, turbines, barks, rain showers
And the tender voice of my beloved.
Some physicists seem to deny that the perceived categories of life have any-
thing to do with fundamental physics, trying to make them emerge from some-
thing else. Some of them emphasize the quest for ‘unification’ so much that
they seem to forget that we cannot get distinctions as an output from a model
without distinctions as input. The problem is just to decide which distinctions
are primary and which are secondary. Those who reject the physical significance
of the distinctions that are primary from a subjective point of view, such as that
between past and future, on the basis that they are just ‘mental constructs’ seem
to disregard that what they do, in effect, is to replace them with other, more
convoluted mental constructs, whose components often depend on the primary
subjective distinctions they set out to get rid of. We may imagine one of them
writing to a colleague: ”Last night I realized that time is not a necessary ingre-
dient in my physical model, today I am working out the mathematical details,
and tomorrow I will present my calculations at a seminar.” To me, this is just
nuts. We are stuck in the existence we are born into, and to understand it we
must use the categories of perception that we are given, including the categories
of thought.
Perhaps the clearest example of this predicament is the paradoxical nature of
all attempts to deny the existence of subjective experience. All these attempts
rely on the quality that is denied. As Peter Hankins puts it, as a motto for
his wonderful blog 2 about the philosophy of mind: ”If the conscious self is an
illusion - who is it that’s being fooled?”
It is not enough to point out the fundamental role of the subjective categories
of perception. We must find principles that give form to physical law, that limit
the possibilites. We can turn to epistemics for this purpose also, and I dare
say that all successful principles of this kind found in the twentieth century
have an epistemic root. For example, special relativity stems in part from the
criterion that the observations of all subjects are equally valid, regardless their
relative state of motion. Physical law is invariant to a change of perspective
from one to the other. Just as it does not play any role whose knowledge we
use to determine physical law, the overall amount of knowledge that we possess
should not play any role either. We do not have to know everything to be able
to say something true. Einstein’s equivalence principle can be seen in this light.
2P. Hankins, Weblog Conscious Entitites (URL = http://www.consciousentities.com/)
If knowledge about the surroundings of an elevator that accelerates upwards
is blanked out, the observations from within should still be valid. Then there
is no falling, just an apparent force that pushes you to the ground. A beam
of light is seemingly bent in response to this force. Thus gravity bends light
and space-time is curved. Another epistemic principle that we rely on is that
physical models that presupposes knowledge that is unattainable in principle,
distinctions that cannot be made, should spit out wrong answers. If we treat
the interchange of two identical elementary particles as a physical operaton
that gives us a new state, we get the wrong answer to problems in statistical
mechanics; we have to use Fermi-Dirac or Bose-Einstein statistics rather than
Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics. Here, I will use this principle to argue that we
must get some other result in a double-slit experiment than that that predicted
by a classical model in which the particles pass one slit or the other, if we have
prepared the experimental setup so that it is impossible forever to judge which
slit the particle actually passed. I will argue that the only consistent alternative
to such a classical model is interference and Born’s rule.
I cannot help the feeling that it has been very fruitful to follow the epistemic
road at some length. So much insight comes out easily and naturally, it seems to
me. However, even an epistemic approach to physics needs a coherent ontology,
the existence of something that transcends our own perceptions. The ontology
that emerges is sketched in section 4. I know that many people will not feel
comfortable with this ontology, since it does not contain ‘little billiard balls’
with well-defined positions that exist regardless whether anyone observes them
or not. I ask these people to consider the apparent effectiveness of the present
approach, at least.
In a certain sense, I have walked the epistemic road in the opposite direc-
tion as compared to the fathers of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics. They wanted to understand a given physical formalism, and arrived
at an epistemic interpretation. I start with a set of philosophical assumptions
of epistemic nature and try to use them to derive (or at least carefully moti-
vate) the physical formalism. The advantage of this reverse approach is that
the conceptually well-defined starting point enables a better understanding of
the components of the formalism, and its domain of validity. Another advan-
tage with the reverse approach is that it makes it possible to understand better
not only the meaning of quantum mechanics, but also some other physical con-
cepts and principles, such as Pauli’s exclusion principle, the gauge principle and
entropy.
All of these claims depend on the validity of my arguments, of course. If
a sufficient number of them hold water, then the suggested approach provides
more than just another interpretation of quantum mechanics. Such interpreta-
tions tend to be sterile in the sense that they cannot be distinguished experi-
mentally, and they offer no directions for further research that may lead to new
predictions. As a consequence, the adherents of different interpretations some-
times engage in philosophical discussions that cannot be resolved scientifically.
Instead, I am challenging opponents to the present approach to physics to show
that their own approach is even more effective, making it possible to motivate
an even larger chunk of physics using fewer or more natural assumptions. I also
encourage readers to find logical or mathematical flaws in my reasoning. That
is, I am hoping for technical rather than philosophical criticism.
The present text is a rather unusual animal, a mixed breed dog, or rather
a puppy. Judging the puppy by its size, it must have a Great Dane among
its forefathers. With its long legs, which are slightly out of control, the puppy
wants to explore the whole world at the same time, stumbling into things along
the way, breaking some of them. Leaving the metaphors aside, I feel the need to
say something about the aim, development, and final form of the present text.
Otherwise the reader may not know what to make of it.
First of all, despite its length, this text should be seen as a sketch - a detailed
sketch at some places, less detailed at others. I have worked on and off with
this material since early fall 2011. At that time, my friend Mi Lennhag was
about to go to Lithuania, Kaliningrad and Poland to make interviews for a
PhD-project about informal economy and everyday corruption in Post-Soviet
Eastern Europe. I embraced the idea to come along as a driver. I had decided
some months earlier to take seriously the growing feeling mentioned in the first
sentence of this preface, and to reserve time to think intensely about these
matters. This trip would give me the opportunity, undisturbed as I would be
by duties and distractions at home. My inner romantic loved the idea to walk
the same streets as Kant in Kaliningrad, thinking about what we can know and
what we can’t, and what that tells us about the world.
With me on our roadtrip I took the insight from childhood that subject and
object are equally fundamental aspects of the world, and that any proper model
must acknowledge this fact - not only at the philosophical level, but also at the
physical and mathematical one. (I have always had a hard time understanding
how people can think differently, but I know, of course, that many do. It is such
a primary insight that it is impossible to argue about it - either you agree, or
you don’t.) With me I also carried a problem that had nagged me ever since I
first came across quantum mechanics. In all accounts I read, spatially extended
wave functions were described as ‘unreal’ or as ‘spooky superpositions’, which
meant that only perfectly precise values were considered ‘real’. In such an
interpretation, the wave function has to collapse to a perfect delta spike as soon
as an observation of a continuous quantity is made. How could it be that an
observation with our imperfect senses, or with detectors with finite resolution,
could cause the value of a quantity to be defined with inifinte precision? As
I third item in my luggage I carried the idea, discussed above, that physical
models that presuppose knowledge that is unattainable in principle should be
in conflict with experiment.
In Kaliningrad, I used this idea to motivate Born’s rule in a sketchy fashion.
I also got the idea to regard the physical state S as an extended set consisting
of all states of complete knowledge of the world that are not excluded by the
present incomplete knowledge. This idea was complemented with the image
that a set of alternative outcomes of an experiment can be viewed as a set of
slices of this set S, a set of distinct subsets, like slices of a bread. This image
got rid of the troublesome interpretation that a wave function has to collapse
all the way down to a delta spike to be judged ‘real’. All that is required is that
the bread collapses to one of its slices. The bread and the slice are equally real,
all that happens in the observation is that the knowledge about the observed
quantity becomes more precise - but not infinitely precise!
With these simple ideas as a starting point, I aimed at writing an inspira-
tional paper, maybe 20-30 pages long, discussing an approach to understand
quantum mechanics better, without too much details, finishing it within a cou-
ple of months. I got off the ground during that trip, and I thank Mi for offering
me to join her, good companionship, and her sharing with me in the evenings
the experiences of the people she interviewed.
However, the more I worked with my paper, the more loose ends turned up,
together with more and more ideas how the basic ideas might be applied in
other areas of physics. The paper grew. It is not until now I feel that I have
something self-contained, something with enough detail to make it possible for
others to decide whether there is substance to the approach.
To make it easier for the reader to pass judgement in this respect, I have
highlighted crucial assumptions, definitions and statements. I felt it was nec-
essary to make the skeleton of the discussion visible in this way because of the
large amount of material. This skeleton hopefully makes it easier to spot mis-
takes and unclear points, to suggest alterations and improvements. I want to
emphasize that none of the presented assumptions, definitions or statements
aspire at mathematical or logical precision. They are not final, neither in form,
nor in content. Their only purpose is to help the reader to get through the text,
and to form an opinion about it.
The reader will notice that I make a number of definite statements, but no
numerical predictions or postdictions. For example, I state that the approach
leads to a positive cosmological constant, but I do not try to estimate its value.
I suggest some new equations, but I do not try to solve them to extract numbers
that can be compared with experiment. There are two reasons for this. The first
is that I have worked for so long with this material on my own that I felt it was
time to present something, in order to get input from others, as soon as I had
substantiated my ideas in each area in which I saw the potential to apply these
ideas. To go to the next level and do real physics in each area before I present
something would take too much time for me. The second reason is related to
the first. Since my analytical abilities are very limited, I thought it would be
better, and much more time-efficient, if I could inspire others to attack these
kinds of problems.
Even though I offer no numbers at this stage, I put forward at least two pre-
dictions. First, all elementary fermions should be massive. Second, there should
be no pairing of elementary fermions and bosons, as in supersymmetric theo-
ries. They emerge from the analysis as conceptually different kinds of entities. I
make the last statement without any detailed knowledge about supersymmetry.
As a physicist, I have worked only with classical non-linear dynamics, complex
systems, and with the application of these theories in different areas. I have
no more than undergraduate training in fundamental, modern physics. The
reader will probably notice this fact in my style of presentation, in the lack of
conventional notation. This lack of knowledge has made it impossible for me to
answer the question that I find most pressing, the question whose answer may
falsify my entire construction: can the picture of interactions and transforma-
tions of elementary particles I paint be made consistent with the vast body of
experimental facts that are so well explained by quantum field theory? The rest
mass concept appear very naturally in the present formalism, I think, as the
quantity in four-momentum space that corresponds to the Lorentz distance in
space-time. I have some hope that rest masses of elementary particles can be
extracted from eigenvalue equations, as discussed in Section 3.5. How does all
of this go together with the Higgs mechanism?
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Chapter 1
IDEAS AND CONCEPTS
1.1 Background and aim
The underlying meaning of quantum mechanics (QM) has been subject to de-
bate since the birth of the theory ninety years ago. A wide spectrum of in-
terpretations have been proposed, with radically different perspectives [50, 56].
Some theorists think that QM is incomplete or approximate. The suggested
changes may involve the introduction of hidden variables [21, 36], mechanisms
for objective state reduction [49], or other nonlinearities in the evolution [3].
Another view is that there is redundancy in the standard postulates of QM
[41]; the most radical example is the ’many-worlds’ interpretation of Everett
and DeWitt [22, 15], according to which linear evolution of superposed states
is all there is. Zurek tries to derive some postulates from the others [63, 62].
In recent years, several attempts have been made to derive the Hilbert space
formalism of QM from other principles, which are easier to interpret physically
[29, 14, 39]. One approach is to use as a foundation the concept of information
[13, 27, 1].
Already Bohr, Heisenberg and colleagues focused on information, or rather
knowledge. The Copenhagen interpretation stresses that the quantum state
encapsulates what can be known about a system, and that it is meaningless to
ask for anything else. This epistemic perspective has gained renewed interest.
Caves, Fuchs and Schack have introduced an interpretation of QM in which the
collapse of the wave function is an update of subjective, bayesian probabilities.
Fuchs and Schack have given the name Qbism to this approach [25]. In Anton
Zeilinger’s eyes ”the reduction of the wave packet is just a reflection of the
fact that the representation of our information has to change whenever the
information itself changes” [60]. This seems to be the only position to take
in order to understand some consequences of QM that have been confirmed in
recent experiments. For instance, the work by Dopfer [17, 58] made it clear
that the wave function of one part of an entangled system collapses even if no
measurement is made on the other part until a moment later. The potential
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to gain knowledge of the state of the other part is enough to collapse the wave
function. Nature does not risk future contradictions. The non-local character
of QM becomes less mysterious if the non-local character of knowledge itself
is considered: if it is known that two particles have opposite momenta, and
the momentum of one of them is measured, the momentum of the other is
immediately known. Distance has nothing to do with it. Time has nothing to
do with it either, considering the possibility to use memory and deduction to
gain knowledge of the future or the past.
Knowledge has an inevitable subjective side to it: someone has knowledge
about something. The association of quantum mechanical states with states of
knowledge therefore suggests that knowing subjects play a fundamental role in
the modern scientific world view. Nevertheless, the common drive behind many
attempts to understand or alter QM has been to explain away or suppress this
feature.
My aim is to confront the subjective aspect of knowledge face to face, turn
such an epistemology into symbolic form, and show that the formalism that
results provides a simple and coherent way to understand QM. No artificial
distinction will be needed between a quantum microscopic world and a classi-
cal macroscopic world, between system and apparatus, or between system and
environment. I will also try to demonstrate that the epistemic formalism pro-
vides a fruitful perspective in order to gain better understanding other aspects
of modern physics than just the core principles of QM.
1.2 The subjective and the objective
The traditional scientific perspective is to treat the objective, material world
as primary, and the subjective world as illusory or secondary - emergent from
the material world. This approach has had immense success. To do away with
gods, spirits, souls, and intent as basic components of, and active agents in,
the world was necessary for progress. However, I think that this one-sidedness
makes itself felt and prevents further development as science evolves and aims
to provide a complete world view.
Some would say that broadening the perspective would cause science to
deteriorate into obscurity and mysticism. In my view, the mysticism lies in the
method rather than the subject. I am convinced that it is possible to explore
the subjective aspect of the world, and its relation to the objective aspect, with
the scientific methods of experiment, logic and mathematics.
As a qualitative starting point, I formulate the following assumption.
Assumption 1.1 (Intertwined dualism). Material objects and aware sub-
jects are both fundamental components of the world. They emerge from each
other and cannot be considered in isolation from each other.
Consequently, any proper attempt to describe the world in a systematic,
scientific way should acknowledge this fact by treating the subjective and the
objective on equal footing.
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Figure 1.1: Schematic illustration of the outlined world view. There is nothing
objective independent of the subjective, and the subjective is completely em-
bedded in the objective. Since the body (including the brain) is regarded as
part of the world, fantasies and illusions are also considered as awareness of the
world. However, the outside world emerges from just a subset of awareness, just
as awareness emerges from just a subset of the world.
A materialistic person often argue as follows: vision is nothing more than
photons interacting with the rods and cones in the retina, causing electric signals
to be transmitted to the visual cortex, where they are interpreted, with the help
of many different areas of the brain, as images containing distinct objects. All
the other senses, thoughts and feelings can be explained in a similar way, as
they all correspond to electrical and chemical processes in biological structures
built, ultimately, by elementary particles.
This reasoning confuses correspondence and identification. The statement
‘vision is nothing more than...’ must be replaced by ‘vision corresponds to...’.
But when this replacement is done, the subjective sensations have not been
reduced to physical processes, just matched with them. In response to this, some
people maintain that the subjective part of the correspondence is non-existent
or illusory. In that case, there is only one element left in the correspondence,
and one might say that it reduces to an identification, as claimed. At this basic
level, it is hard to come up with arguments. Either it appears self evident that
there are subjective sensations, or it does not.
Nevertheless, let me try to illustrate why the latter viewpoint is self-contradictory.
If one maintains that physical processes in the brain are all there is, one must
realize that this viewpoint involves a mental image of small particles running
around in the brain. They must necessarily be assigned attributes such as color
and size, and one may add effects such as flashes when electric discharges take
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place. The point is that a mental image must be used to rule out the primary
existence of mental images. If one tries to avoid visualization, one have to use
a more abstract mental picture nevertheless.
This argument may give the impression that the subjective aspect of the
world should be regarded as primary, and that the objective, material aspect is
illusory or emergent. This is equally misleading. First of all: just as it is contra-
dictory to imagine a world without an imaginative observer, it is impossible to
imagine an observer being aware, without being aware of something. Awareness
in itself is a meaningless concept.
Still, it is possible argue that this objective aspect of the world is secondary
- nothing more than a mental image. To avoid a purely semantic discussion,
we must give an operational meaning to such a statement. To me, the proper
meaning is the hypothesis that we can choose freely what to be aware of, that
there are no physical laws, independent of our will, that limit the freedom of
choice. Apart from the fact that such a world view is in conflict with everyday
experience, you can argue against it in several ways.
For one thing, it implies solipsism. Assume that there are two aware beings
in such a world. From the perspective of being A, being B must be an object,
and consequently A is in total control over B, and can make her behave in any
way she wants. But if we turn the perspective around, we conclude that B
must be in total control over A, and we have a contradiction. Thus, in any
non-solipsist model of the world, there must be something ‘out there’, at least
in the form of physical law independent from both A and B, that limits the
freedom of perception.
Even if you accept solipsism, a world without physical law indepdendent of
your will would be absurd. Then you have to wish everything that happens
into existence. You cannot decide to go to a stream to look at the dancing
water - you have to wish every movement of each water drop into existence, and
before that, for each step you take in your promenade, you must wish the foot
to bounce back from the ground, and so on. An exhausting world indeed.
If you give up and wish things to happen by themselves, you introduce
independent law. You may wish to change the rules at a later time, but in the
meantime you have handed the world over to something else, something ‘out
there’, which is then implicitly assumed to exist. If you insist on omnipotence,
but assume that some things are harder to make happen than others, you assume
independent physical law in the form of a ‘resistance table’ telling which things
are hard to make happen in a given circumstance.1
Assumption 1.2 (Existence of physical law). The freedom of the evolution
of awareness is limited by rules independent of our will and of our conception
of such rules.
The independence of the rules from our conception of them is necessary to
1Note that the humoristic argument against the omnipotency of God is inapplicable, but
in any case superfluous: in the question ”Can God make a stone so heavy that he cannot
lift it?”, the existence of physical law in the form of weight - resistance to the wish to lift,
independent of the will of God - is already assumed.
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avoid a contradiction of the same kind as the one concerning omnipotent will.
In effect, what we have is an assumption of absolute truth.
Assumption 1.3 (Independent truth). There is a concept of truth indepen-
dent of our perception of truth.
In my attempts to express this truth, I will make extensive use of the word
object. Let me therefore specify the meaning of this word, as used in the follow-
ing discussions.
Definition 1.1 (Object). In composite states of awareness, each distinguish-
able part of the experience corresponds to a separate object.
In this way, two simultaneous emotions or two components of a composite
smell become two objects in the same way as two objects that can be visually
separated by the eye.
Definition 1.2 (Material object). An object whose appearance, disappearance
or evolution is governed by physical law, according to Assumption 1.2, at least
in part.
Note that this definition does not separate ‘real’ material objects from imag-
ined ones. Flawed perception of the outside world is as deeply rooted in the
material world as proper perception; the difference is that the former correspond
mostly to the state of material objects in the brain. To this end, we assume the
following hypothesis, supported by modern science:
Assumption 1.4 (Detailed materialism). Different states of subjective aware-
ness correspond to different states of material objects, and vice versa.
Loosely speaking, the assumption is that mental states cannot evolve inde-
pendently from material states; they are firmly rooted in the material world.
In a sense, this assumption follows from the assumption of intertwined dual-
ism, which forbids separation between the subjective and the objective world.
However, the materialistic assumption is stronger in the sense that it provides a
local correspondence in addition to a global one - each detail of a mental state
corresponds to a detail of the physical state.
If we accept Assumption 1.4, we have to conclude the following.
Statement 1.1 (All objects are material objects).
Therefore we drop the word ‘material’ when we speak about objects in all
discussions that follow.
Even if the assumption of detailed materialism may not appear as self-evident
as the previous assumptions, it is very natural. The conclusion that there is
subject-independent physical law is, in an operational sense, equivalent to the
statement that there is an objective world. The subject must then be regarded
as placed in this objective world, since its subjective experiences depend on
it. There must then be an interface between the subject an the world. If the
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subjective experiences are composite, the interface must be composite. This
is pure logic and corresponds to the existence of an extended body. Since the
body is extended and placed in the objective world, it must be seen as an
extended object itself, ruled by the same physical law as the objects around it.
Experiences have to correspond to interactions across the interface - between
the body and the outside world - so that each subjective experience should
correspond to a physical process or state.2
It would be very strange if this correspondence were limited in depth, so that
the materialism got lost at a given stage when we probe finer and finer details
of states of awareness and states of the extended body - ultimately the brain.
If we ask Nature more and more detailed questions about this correspondence,
it should continue to give answers, if it gives some answers to start with.
The above assumptions and definitions concerning the objective world and
material objects are quite allowing, but nevertheless the narrowest operational
ones I can think of. Any aware entity capable of interacting with the environ-
ment must follow the basic rules in this philosophical game - even hypothetical
ghosts or spirits. Therefore they must be regarded as material in the same sense
as any other aware being, even if the physical rules they operate under might
be of an unusual nature, giving them an elusive or transparent appearance.
In the same way, the suggestion that life, as we perceive it, is an illusion or
simulation created by some external operators (like in the movie The Matrix),
falls within the framework of intertwined duality. The only difference is that
our relation to the proper objective aspect of the world becomes more complex;
it becomes harder to unravel the proper physical law. The external operators
themselves manipulate the ‘true’ objective world to create the illusion. If there
are no such external operators fooling us, there is no operational way to distin-
guish the presumed illusion from interaction with a proper objective world, as
defined above, and the word illusion becomes nothing more than a label. The
concept of an illusion requires the existence of something real, and the concept
of a simulation requires an agent that performs the simulation with real tools,
such as a computer.
I have already used quite freely the words awareness, subjective experience,
perception, and consciousness. The common meaning of these words is described
in the most allowing definition of them all.
Definition 1.3 (Awareness). The existence of any subjective experience.
The word consciousness could have been chosen instead of awareness. Re-
gardless the choice of word, the concept is meant to cover the entire subjective
aspect of the intertwined duality.
Definition 1.4 (States of awareness). Subjective experiences that are sub-
jectively distinguishable.
2Note that it is not the surface of the body that shuld be considered the interface between
the subjective and the objective, but the body as a whole, and that it is the necessary extended
nature of the body that enables the close correspondence between its states and the spectrum
of subjective experiences.
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Thus, awareness of a ball is one state of awareness, awareness that the ball
is made of leather is a another state, awareness that one is aware of the ball
is third, awareness that the preceding two states are distinct is a forth state
of awareness, awareness that this was a wrong conclusion is a fifth state, the
insight that it is right after all is a sixth, and so on.
1.3 Knowledge and potential knowledge
By knowledge, I mean properly interpreted awareness. This interpretation may
have a component of deduction, using logic or physical law, in order to gain
knowledge about present, past or future states of the objective world, and also
about distant places outside the field of direct perception.
Definition 1.5 (Knowledge). Awareness with proper interpretation.
Even if all states of awareness are ‘proper’ in the sense that they correspond
to actual states of the objective world, they may be improper if an interpretation
”I see something in front of me” is added to the state of awareness, when, in
fact, the vision is all in your head. The mistake is simply that the material
objects that correspond to your state of awareness are not the ones you thought.
The assumed independent truth and physical law is the judge. From these
assumptions it follows that logic or physical law used in deductions can also be
proper or improper. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 1.2.
Definition 1.6 (State of knowledge). State of awareness consisting of two
other states of awareness: 1) a state of direct experience, and 2) a state of
proper interpretation.
The aim of the present text is to propose a way to identify epistemic facts
with physical law and physical states. But it would be impossible to use states
of knowledge as the only basis for such an enterprise. States of knowledge are
fleeting and momentary, and we know much more than that of which we are
momentarily aware. Therefore I introduce the concept of potential knowledge.
Definition 1.7 (Potential knowledge). The set of all candidates of knowledge
that may become knowledge, that is, may come into mind.
This definition is vague. To sharpen the idea, it is necessary to introduce
time and temporal order.
Definition 1.8 (State of potential knowledge at time t). The knowledge
obtainable in principle, at time t or any later time, from the possible subjective
experiences at time t.
The possible subjective experiences at time t are all physical processes which
take place in the body at time t, and which may correspond to an aware state.
It is often hard to decide whether you are aware of something or not; there is a
gradual scale in clarity of subjective experiences. They may become clearer at
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Figure 1.2: Knowledge is direct experience in combination with at least one
of the three components of interpretation. There must be no improper such
component involved. The component of interpretation called ‘context’ may,
for instance, be the distinction between external and internal experiences, or
between present and past experiences.
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a later time, as memories, or they will never be realized in your mind. All such
potential subjective experiences are seen as the basis of potential knowledge.
Even if you are clearly aware of something, interpretation may be delayed - you
may suddenly put things together in your mind - so that the transition from
awareness to knowledge is delayed. New information arriving at a later time
may also make a better interpretation possible, increasing the knowledge about
time t at a later time.
In contrast, if information about time t reach you later, at time t′, but this
information cannot be associated with any (potentially) aware memories of t,
this knowledge is not part of your potential knowledge at t. To exemplify,
imagine that you find an old newspaper a time t′, from a time t when you were
a small child, and reads about a blizzard. If the act of reading stirs up (proper)
memories of the snowfall, this proves that the blizzard is part of your potential
knowledge at t. On the other hand, if no memories come into mind, and you
furthermore realize that you lived in distant town at time t, then you can be
quite sure that the blizzard is not part of your potential knowledge at t. This
suspicion would become certainty if you suddenly realize that the article was an
account of a blizzard that took place before you were born.
What status should such deduced knowledge have in terms of potential
knowledge? Obviously, the aware physical act of reading the newspaper is part
of potential knowledge at time t′. But the information you get refers back to
time t. However, without personal experience, you can never be sure that the
newspaper properly reports the event. Nevertheless, each observation, such as
reading, give some rudimentary information of the past, by the use of logic and
physical law alone. Some alternatives are ruled out. In the same way, physi-
cal law gives information about the future, given the present state of potential
knowledge. Retrodictions at time t′ about a past time t, and predictions about a
future time t′′ are not considered part of potential knowledge at the target times
t and t′′, simply because that would introduce redundancy in the description.
We have assumed the independent existence of physical law, and by definition
that law specifies exactly what retrodictions and predictions can be made, for
any state of potential knowledge.
This does not mean that deductions are never part of potential knowledge.
But there must be an element of subjective experience involved. For instance,
imagine that you walk across a floor in your stockinged feet. Suddently, at time
t, something thorns your socket, but you hurry on. Later, at time t′, you return
and investigate the floor, finding just one nail sticking out. You conclude that
this nail did the job. Then it is part of the potential knowledge at time t that
that particular nail torn the socket.
It must be stressed that the exclusion of pure deductions in the state of
potential knowledge has only formal importance. Strictly speaking, only the di-
rectly experienced outcome of a physical experiment is part of potential knowl-
edge, such as a number on a display, a pointer that moves, and so on. The
quantities that are aimed to be measured are just necessary consequences, given
the known experimental setup and physical law. But nothing is risked by being
sloppy on this point, saying that the deduced information, such as the chemi-
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cal composition of a sample, the distance to a star, and so on, is also part of
potential knowledge.
The above discussions mostly concern the potential knowledge of a given
person. It is not specified in the definition of potential knowledge whether it
belongs to one subject or many. These matters are dealt with in section 1.6.
Even if it is virtually impossible to determine the limits of the potential
knowledge, it seems clear that such limits exist - a collection of finite beings
cannot potentially be aware of everything in the universe at any given time t
(see Section 1.7). Therefore potential knowledge appears to me to be a well-
defined, non-trivial concept.
The basic correspondence I want to establish in this text is that between the
potential knowledge at a given time and the physical state at that time.
Definition 1.9 (Physical state representation at time t). A symbolic ex-
pression that is a representation of the potential knowledge at t. The physical
state representation determines, via physical law that acts on the symbols, all
that can be said about the evolution of the world from time t.
Actually, this definition contains an assumption:
Assumption 1.5 (A physical state representation exists). It is possible
to construct a physical state representation, as defined above.
The interpretational ability to distinguish between the present and the past
is crucial in the definition of potential knowledge, and therefore becomes fun-
damental in a physical theory based on the above definition of physical state.
Definition 1.10 (Determinism). The world is deterministic if and only if,
given the potential knowledge at time t, physical law uniquely determines the
potential knowledge at any later time.
People supporting the realistic, deterministic world view often see knowledge
as a function of the physical state, but not vice versa. In other words, potential
knowledge is often still regarded to be limited, so that this knowledge is not
sufficient to determine the physical state, upon which the future depends. The
above definition of determinism will not be fulfilled, and is therefore too narrow.
However, this is a semantic problem. People taking this perspective could re-
define words and say that the possibility in principle to determine future physical
states perfectly corresponds to unlimited potential knowledge. Then the above
definition of determinism is saved. Such an implicit epistemic perspective was
taken by Laplace in his famous discussion of determinism, where he imagined
an intelligence with perfect knowledge of the physical state and of physical law
[35].
To illustrate the possible relation between potential knowledge and physics,
consider a double-slit experiment which gives rise to an interference pattern
on a screen [Fig. 1.3(a)]. In such a situation, the information which slit the
particle passes must be considered for ever outside potential knowledge. Oth-
erwise there is a risk of contradiction - interference is inconsistent with path
1.3. KNOWLEDGE AND POTENTIAL KNOWLEDGE 11
Figure 1.3: Potential knowledge in the double-slit experiment. The particle
passes the slits at time t and hits the screen at time t′. a) Interference pattern
and no path information. b) Perturbation that destroys interference pattern but
gives no path information. c) Detector that gives direct response the moment
the particle passes, providing path information at time t. d) Detector that gives
path information only when checked at a later time t′′. e) Detector that the
observer thinks is the same as in d), but actually sounds like a cat the instant
t the particle passes.
12 CHAPTER 1. IDEAS AND CONCEPTS
information. This is an example of the requirement of epistemic consistency
(Assumption 1.6). A perturbation that destroys the interference pattern may
or may not mean that there is a chance that path information becomes potential
knowledge. In other words, even if the possibility to gain path information nec-
essarily destroys interference patterns, the destruction of interference patterns
does not necessarily mean that there is a possibility to gain path information.
Consider a perturbation in the form of a gas in the experimental chamber
that may interact with the particle [Fig. 1.3(b)]. It is unlikely that the state of
the gas after the passing of the particle encodes path information that leaves a
trace in the observers’s body that corresponds to a specific aware state. Nev-
ertheless, the particle becomes entangled with the gas, leading to decoherence.
The loss of the interference pattern means that we no longer have any practical
means to decide that path information is forever outside potential knowledge.
Assume, on the other hand, that the perturbation takes the form of a de-
tector at one of the slits. Now there are two alternatives. The detector may
produce a macroscopic physical signal the instant t the particle passes (like a
Geiger counter), a signal that may be recorded by the senses of the experimenter
[Fig. 1.3(c)]. In this case, path information evidently becomes part of potential
knowledge at time t. Alternatively, the output of the detector is shielded and
becomes available only if the experimenter chooses to examine the detector at
a later time [Fig. 1.3(d)]. If the examination takes place at time t′′, path infor-
mation becomes part of potential knowledge at time t′′. Note that if t′ < t′′, it
is possible to gain partial path knowledge in advance, if the experimenter looks
where the particle hits the detector screen, in the form of increased probability
that it passed one of the slits. In any case, it is part of potential knowledge
at time t that the experimental setup is such that it is possible to gain path
information in the future. Therefore, to ensure that no contradiction follows at
time t′′, there can be no interference pattern.
What if the observer is ignorant about the experimental setup, so that she
cannot interpret what she experiences in the lab? For example, the detector
may be such that it sounds like a cat each time a particle passes [Fig. 1.3(e)],
while she thinks that she has to login to a computer to obtain path information,
as in Fig. 1.3(d). She hears the ‘miao’, thinks that a cat has sneaked in, and
then reads the computer record at time t′′, concluding that a particle passed at
time t. Is knowledge of the passing of the particle part of potential knowledge
at time t′′ referring back to t, or part of potential knowledge at time t referring
to the present? Since there is a potential for the observer to read the manual
of the strange apparatus at a still later time t′′′, and then recall the ‘miao’ she
heard at time t, we must conclude that the knowledge belongs to the potential
knowledge at t. Otherwise we get a contradiction: we cannot both lack path
information about the particle at time t and have it (acquired at a later time).
Assumption 1.6 (Epistemic consistency). The world cannot be properly
described by two different physical states at the same time. A proper retrodiction
at time t′′ about t < t′′ must be consistent with the physical state at time t, as
properly remembered at time t′′.
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This assumption can be seen as the physical counterpart to the assumption
of consistency of mathematics. The principle can be seen as a weaker form of
causality, and may mask lack of determinism: the potential knowledge at time
t constrains the state of potential knowledge at time t′′, excluding everything
that may lead to contradiction. So, when the observer who heard the ’miao’ log
into the computer at time t′′ to read the detector record, it is certain that it
will show that a particle passed at t, even if she is unaware of it herself. A state
of potential knowledge just before time t′′ without path information about the
particle would mean that it is possible that the detector record showed at time
t′′ that the particle was not detected at time t, which would be inconsistent
with the memory of the ’miao’.
Note that if the world were deterministic, there would be no need to require
epistemic consistency in this sense. The strict causality in such a world means
that there is no need to eliminate the risk of unexpected events that cause
contradictions.
Epistemic consistency is discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.
1.4 Composite knowledge
We know many things. The logical constant and must be used to describe most
states of knowledge.
In other words, knowledge usually consists of awareness of several objects
at the same time. We have defined the word object in a very general way
(Definition 1.1). But objects are not just objects, they have attributes making
it possible to distinguish objects with different qualities. This is the usual way
to talk about knowledge: Someone (the subject) knows something (attributes)
about something (the object). It seems impossible to talk about knowledge in
any other way.
Each attribute has a set of possible values. The attribute color can take
the values corresponding to all the colors in the visible spectrum. The crucial
aspect of attribute values is that they can be subjectively ordered.
Definition 1.11 (Attributes and their values). Values of attributes are a
set of qualities that can be associated with each other and ordered. Such a set
defines an attribute.
Thus, the word ‘value’ does not denote a numerical value in this context, but
a subjective quality that conforms with Definition 1.11. However, the possibility
to order the attribute values means that they can be represented by numbers.
Of course, this is what motivates the choice of term.
The ordering of values may be sequential, like the set of possible colors, or
multi-dimensional, like the set of possible flavors. Here, the axes are defined
by the basic flavors sweet, sour, salt, bitter, and umami. In the case of multi-
dimensional ordering, a set of attributes (the five flavors) can be associated with
each other to form a meta-attribute (flavor).
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Figure 1.4: Growth of knowledge via increased knowledge about internal at-
tributes A of objects O. Knowledge may increase in different ways along the
arrows. a) Knowledge that there is an attribute A1 of object O, b) increased
knowledge of the value of A1, c) knowledge that there is an an additional at-
tribute A2, d) knowledge that A1 has two values υ11 and υ12, which means that
O can be divided into two objects O1 and O2.
The statement that values can be ordered means that given an arbitrary
pair of values, it is possible to tell whether a third value is placed between the
first two values or not. Note that this conception of ordering says nothing about
direction, about which value comes after another. If an attribute has only one
or two values, the ‘ordering’ may be established as a matter of definition.
Attributes may be of two kinds. They may be internal, such as color or rest
mass, referring to the object itself, or relational, such as distance or angle, re-
lating two or more objects. The angular momentum of an object is a relational
attribute, since its direction relates the object to other objects. In contrast,
its magnitude can be seen as an internal attribute. Increase of knowledge can
always be described as increase of knowledge about internal or relational at-
tributes, as described in Figs. 1.4 and 1.5.
Knowledge increase often means that one object is realized to be composite.
For example, tasting wine, new flavors may reveal themselves after some time,
so that the one attribute (flavor) of the object (wine) turn out to have several
values. Then the object can be divided into several objects with one attribute
each. These new ‘smaller’ objects of course may share the values of other at-
tributes of the original ‘larger’ object, such as temperature and color in the case
of wine.
Definition 1.12 (Division of an object). An object which turns out to have
two different values of a given internal attribute, or a relational attribute refer-
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Figure 1.5: Growth of knowledge via increased knowledge about relational at-
tributes A connecting different objects. Knowledge may increase in different
ways along the arrows. a) Knowledge that there is an attribute A121 relating
objects O1 and O2. It is assumed that the objects have different values of some
internal attribute, so that they can be distinguished. b) increased knowledge of
the value of A121 , c) knowledge that there is an an additional (possibly different)
attribute A222 , relating object O2 with itself. This means that O2 can be divided
into two objects O2 and O3, related by the relabeled attribute A
23
2 .
ring to the object itself, can be seen as two different objects.
Definition 1.13 (Composite object). An object that can be divided.
Among conceivable relational attributes, distance is the primary example. If
we approach a pointlike object, we may appreciate that it actually is extended.
This means that it has a size, or a distance referring to the object itself. Then
it can be divided into smaller objects.
Definition 1.14 (Elementary object). An object which is impossible to divide
in the above sense.
For such an elementary object, the number of attributes must be fixed, and
so must the values of the internal attributes. If two values of a given attribute
were allowed, and more knowledge was gained about which of these applied for
a particular elementary object, it could turn out that both applied. Then it
could be divided and would not be elementary.
It is meaningless to talk about the size of elementary objects embedded in
physical space, since it is only defined if the relational attribute distance is
referring to the object itself, which is forbidden by definition.
To speak about a composite world, it is inevitable to define its constituent
parts or objects by the use of the concept of distinction. We make a distinction
between this and that. A distinction always has two ends - never
√
2 ends.
Such a process of distinguishing corresponds to object division, or distinguishing
between different attributes of a given object. Increase of knowledge can thus be
seen as a stepwise process in which objects may divide into integer numbers of
’smaller’ objects, for which an integer number of attributes can be distinguished.
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In this way a ‘foam’ of knowledge is successively built (Fig. 1.6). This line of
reasoning can be summarized in the following assumption.
Assumption 1.7 (Construction of knowledge). Any state of knowledge can
be constructed in a countable number of steps in which distinctions are made,
starting from the basic element of knowledge (Fig. 1.6).
The following statement follows.
Statement 1.2 (Countability of objects). There are at most countably many
objects, and none of these object can be divided into more than countably many
objects.
This definition allows division of an object ad infinitum. We adopt a stronger
atomistic assumption.
Assumption 1.8 (The depth of knowledge is finite). No object can be
divided more than a finite number of times.
The picture of knowledge painted above is discrete in the sense that it always
consists of objects and attributes that can be indexed. This fact does not mean,
however, that the values of the attributes have to be discrete. For example, the
value of the internal attribute mass may in principle take any real value, just as
the relational attributes distance and angle. The latter observation means that
physical space may very well be described as continuous.
The point is that the concept of continuity can be defined by a sequence of
mathematical propositions that consist of discrete set of symbols representing
distinct concepts - that is by a state of internal composite knowledge having the
structure described above.
The assumption that (potential) knowledge is in one-to-one correspondence
with the physical state of the world is fundamental in this text. Therefore it
becomes a basic hypothesis that the foam-like, partial discreteness of knowledge
is refleceted in the structure of the physical world.
There is a certain similarity between the construction of allowed states of
knowledge and the construction of allowed sets in the Zermelo-Fraenkel ax-
iomatic set theory [61, 24]. To exclude improper candidates, the proper ones
are created from already accepted sets via simple rules. Of course, set theory
has much richer structure, partly because it does not require that all sets are
built from the same basic set (c.f. Fig. 1.6). One set candidate excluded by the
procedure to create sets successively from simpler ones is that of Russell’s para-
dox: the set of all sets that do not have themselves as elements. Since states of
knowledge should correspond to physical states, such self-contradictory states
must be excluded. One example is the state of knowledge of Socrates, who knew
that he knew nothing.
1.5 Incomplete knowledge
Most often we must use the logical constant or to specify the state of (potential)
knowledge, apart from and. For example, we may know that the value of at-
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Figure 1.6: The foam picture of knowledge. There is a discontinuous jump from
the state of no awareness and no knowledge to ‘naked’ awareness, correspond-
ing to the basic state of knowledge ‘there is something’. This basic element of
knowledge can then grow by division to knowledge of many objects with dif-
ferent attributes. The identification of the state of potential knowledge with
the physical state implies that this state should have a discrete structure of the
same kind.
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tribute A1 of some object is υ11 or υ12 or υ13. The increase of knowledge about
A1 along arrow b in Fig. 1.4 means that the set of possible values shrinks. As
another example, we may know that an object we are aware of can be divided
into ten or more smaller objects. That is, the number of constituent objects is
ten or eleven or twelve or ...
Definition 1.15 (Defocused knowledge). Potential knowledge about an ob-
ject that can increase without causing object division.
In other words, an knowledge of an object is defocused when it is not known
how many attributes it has, when the values of its attributes are incompletely
known, or when it is not known how many objects the given object can be di-
vided into. Note that both composite and elementary objects may be defocused.
Definition 1.16 (Conditional knowledge). In a defocused composite object,
gain of knowledge about one constituent object may imply gain of knowledge
about another, and vice versa. Such knowledge is conditional.
For example, consider a sealed box of wine bottles. If you know that the
wine in all bottles is taken from the same barrel in the winery, then you also
know that if the wine in one bottle turns out to be sour, so will the wine in all
the other bottles.
1.6 Individual and collective knowledge
An object that is the body of a subject must have properties that distinguish
it from other objects, according to the requirement that all concepts that are
intended to be part of physical theory shall be operationally defined.
The only such property I can imagine is the following: if particles interact
with the senses of an object that corresponds to a subject, this fact immediatly
becomes part of potential knowledge. As long as we only consider the body
of one subject, this is just a repetition of the ideas already presented. But if
we explicitly consider several distinct subjects, new elements are added to the
picture.
Consider two subjects, let us call them the professor and the student. Figure
1.7(a) shows the same experimental setup as in Fig. 1.3(d). The professor goes
to the computer at time t′′ and learns that a particle passed the right slit at
the earlier time t. This fact becomes potential knowledge at time t′′ referring
back to t. Consider now Fig. 1.7(b), where the student sits in a room with
the computer and reads in real time possible detections of particles passing the
right slit.
Again, at time t′′ the professor knocks on the door and asks if the particle
passed at time t. If the body of the student is assumed to be an object just
like any other object, the room with the student and the computer is a detector
with sheilded output, just like in Figure 1.7(a). Consequently, the fact that the
particle passed the right slit again becomes potential knowledge at time t′′. In
contrast, if the body of the student is on equal footing with that of the professor,
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Figure 1.7: a) If the detector output is shielded from the experimenter until
time t′′, path information becomes potential knowledge at time t′′ (Fig. 1.3).
b) If a subject monitors the detector, it becomes potential knowledge already
at time t, even if the experimenter is shielded from the output.
the passing of the particle becomes potential knowledge already at time t, since
the student reads detections in real time.
Clearly, the former assumption corresponds to solipsism. In that case, there
is no operational difference between dead matter and other individuals, from
ones one perspective. And from the epistemic viewpoint this means that there
are no other subjects. Instead, we assume is the other possibility.
Assumption 1.9 (Many subjects). Physcical law allows more than one sub-
ject.
Apart from the fact that this assumption reflects our na¨ıve ideas about life
and matter, it is implicitly suggested by the principles of epistemic invariance,
as discussed in section 1.8. These are just reformulations of Einstein’s relativity
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principle and equivalence principle, which can be seen as expressions of observer
democracy; there is no special ‘I’ that has the final word when it comes to proper
perception of physical law.
As discussed above, the operational way to express the existence of many
subjects is the following.
Assumption 1.10 (Potential knowledge is collective). The potential knowl-
edge that corresponds to the physical state is the union of the potential knowledge
of all subjects.
The assumption is illustrated in Fig. 1.8. Natural as it may seem, it has
strange consequences. The student may be millions of light years away. The
observations that she makes immediately affects the range of possible observa-
tions the professor can make, since the observations of the student change the
state of potential knowledge, which is in one-to-one correspondence with the
physical state of the world. This state controls the evolution of awareness of the
professor as well as that of the student.
We run into contradictions if we want to keep the idea that there are many
subjects, but relax the idea that individual observations immediately affect the
common pool of potential knowledge. The operational meaning of the latter
relaxation would be that before the student and the professor meet, the obser-
vations of the student do not limit the possible observations of the professor,
and vice versa. But then they may tell each other contradictory memories when
they actually meet, in opposition to the assumption of epistemic consistency
(Assumption 1.6).
As discussed in relation to identifiable objects (Section 1.7), two subjects
may be potentially aware of the same object, so that the potential knowledge of
individuals often overlap (Fig. 1.8). Speculating that primitive organisms have
a small degree of awareness, it may well be so that the corresponding knowledge
is so tiny that it is contained by the knowledge of other beings, and does not
contribute at all to the collective potential knowledge that specify the state of
the world.
There is a deeper question hiding in these considerations: is there a funda-
mental difference between different subjects and different aspects of the same
subject? Put differently: is there a fundamental difference between different
bodies and different parts of the same body? What is the fundamental differ-
ence between ants in an ant colony and the cells in your body? If there is no
fundamental difference, then this section is superfluous. However, in Section
2.13 we will discuss the capability to make independent choices as a possible
identifier of separate subjects.
1.7 Limits of knowledge
In this section, possible limits to potential knowledge will be discussed. To say
that there is something we lack potential knowledge about, there must be a way
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Figure 1.8: a) Potential knowledge PK is the union of individual potential
knowledge PKk of subjects Sk. Individual potential knowledge may overlap,
which means knowledge of at least one common identifiable object Oj . b) The
fact that subject Sk knows a identifiable object Oj defines a relation r
k
j between
them. That one subject knows two objects defines a relation rkjj′ between the
objects. If two subjects know the same object, a relation rkk
′
j between the
subjects is defined.
to identify this ‘something’. It must be an object which we know exists, but
which we can learn more about.
To say that we learn something new about an object, or lose knowledge
about something else, we must be able to decide that the two states of (po-
tential) knowledge point to the same object, that it is possible to track. In
other words, there has to be a relation between a given observer and a given
identifiable object, that is maintaned during a period of time [Fig. 1.8(b)]. As
a consequence, it is possible to define a relation between two observers by the
fact that both are related to the same identifiable object.
To be able to track a specific object among all the objects in a state of
knowledge, at least one of three conditions must be fulfilled: 1) the objects are
related by relational attributes that stay constant or change continuously with
time. 2) they have different values of a given internal attribute, and these values
stay constant or change continuously. 3) they have different attributes.
If none of these condistions is fulfilled, there is no operational way to identify
with certainty two objects observed at different times as being the same (Fig.
1.9).
For example, playing billiards with identical grey balls, to identify the ball
you hit with the queue when all the balls start bouncing about requires that
their relational attribute distance changes continuously (criterion 1). However,
if you paint the ball you hit black, you may identify it as times goes even if the
game takes place on a strange billiard table forming a discrete lattice - assuming
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Figure 1.9: Identifiable objects must have a) attributes that change continuously
(like relative distance), or b) have internal attributes that differ, and are known
to stay constant (like colour). If none of these conditions is fulfilled, as in c), it
is impossible to keep individual track of them.
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knowledge that the color of a ball does not change with time (criterion 2).
If you listen to harmony singing during the game, the pitch of the voices must
change continuously to keep track of which voice belongs to which individual
(criterion 2). However, you can always distinguish the voices from the balls.
The two groups of objects have different internal attributes (criterion 3).
More formally, two objects have different internal attributes if there is an
attribute A1 of object 1, and it is part of potential knowledge that object 2
does not have attribute A1. In practice, such knowledge arises if you observe
attribute A2 of object 2, and there is a physical law telling that if an object has
attribute A2, it does not have attribute A1.
Definition 1.17 (Identifiable objects). Two objects are identifiable during
the time interval ∆t if and only if they fulfil at least one of the continuity con-
ditions 1) or 2), or there is an attribute A such that one of the objects have
attribute A while the other does not. One of these three facts must be part of
potential knowledge during ∆t.
If the identifiability is due to condition 1) or 2), then the exact value of
the attribute in question must belong to potential knowledge during the time
interval. Otherwise it is not possible to decide that it is constant or continuously
changing. These matters are discussed further in section 2.10.
Definition 1.18 (Independent objects). An identifiable object is indepen-
dent of another identifiable object if and only if physical law allows at least one
of its attributes to take several values even if the attributes of the other object
are completely known.
Definition 1.19 (Independent attributes). An attribute of an independent
object is independent if and only if physical law allows it to take several values
even if all other attributes of the given object are completely known.
Naively, the independent objects are the ‘real’ objects - we can keep track
of them and they possess their own degrees of freedom; they do not just mirror
the behavior of other objects.
Assumption 1.11 (Existence of independent objects). There are inde-
pendent objects, as defined above.
Having come so far, we may speak of those things we lack potential knowl-
edge about.
Definition 1.20 (The currently unknowable). The currently unknowable is
the attributes of those independent objects about which the potential knowledge
may increase in the future.
As potential knowledge changes with time, knowledge of some attributes
may decrease as knowledge of others increases. Increased knowledge may mean
that the currently known objects can be further divided. If there is something
currently unknowable, the logical constant or has to be used to specify the
state of current potential knowledge. In other words, potential knowledge is
incomplete.
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Figure 1.10: Knowledge of the world in terms of perceived objects, and the
physical state of the world in terms of mathematical objects. The tilted arrows
indicate the one-to-one correspondence between these (Assumption 1.12). The
knowledge of the world is encoded in the physical state of the body according
to detailed materialism (Assumption 1.4), so that there is also a vertical corre-
spondece. This correspondence is not object-to-object, since one object of per-
ception usually corresponds to many objects in the body. The vision of a black
dot involves the eye, the visual nerve and the visual cortex. The unmatched
mathematical objects in the top row illustrates our incomplete knowledge of the
body and of the world.
Statement 1.3 (Potential knowledge is incomplete). There is something
currently unknowable.
This statement can be motivated by contradiction. Assume that there is
nothing currently unknowable. That is, the potential knowledge includes perfect
knowledge about which independent objects can be divided, and the knowledge
about none of these objects is defocused - all attributes are perfectly known.
According to our epistemic approach, the state of the world is then perfectly
known.
The body is an identifiable object separate from the objects in the outside
world, since we assume the interpretational ability to properly distinguish in-
ternal from external experiences (Fig. 1.2). Referring directly to the definition
of identifiability, the known attribute A that the body has, but the objects in
the outside world have not, is simply ‘this is the body of a subject’. To see that
the body and the objects of the outside world have to be regarded as indepen-
dent objects, it is enough to contemplate the fact that we must leave room for
internal processes, such as interpretation, that do not just mirror the state of
the outside world. We conclude that the independent objects belonging to the
body are a proper subset of all independent objects in the world.
According to the principle of detailed materialism (Assumption 1.4), the
assumed perfect potential knowledge of all objects in the world has to be a
function of the physical state of the body, which is in one-to-one correspondence
to the assumed perfectly known objects of the body. Therefore, the perfect
potential knowledge becomes a proper subset of itself.
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Actually, to arrive at this conclusion, there is a need to clarify what is meant
by this one-to-one correspondence.
Assumption 1.12 (Correspondence between knowledge and physical
state). Potential knowledge of object Ok corresponds to a mathematical object
O¯k present in the representation of the physical state.
This correspondence is further explored in section 2.2.
The body consists of a finite number of objects according to Assumption
1.8, and we concluded that the objects of the body is a proper subset of all the
objects in the world. Thus it is impossible to put the objects of the body into
one-to-one correspondence with all objects in the world (Fig. 1.10). We have a
contradiction, and thus there is something currently unkowable.
Note that we have implicitly used the observation that the body is an inde-
pendent object in the world. If the physical state of the body was a function of
the physical state of the outside world there would be no contradiction.
Also, there would be no contradiction if we allow panpsychism. That is to
say, we have to exclude the possibility that all objects in the world belong to the
body of some perceiving subject. In the above motivation of Statement 1.3, we
used the fact that the body of one subject is always a proper subset of the world.
The natural world-view is that the union of all bodies is also a proper subset of
all the objects in the world. In that case, the argument goes through even if we
allow an arbitrary number of subjects. If the world is infinite in extension, we
may allow infinitely many subjects without destroying the argument. Problems
arise only if all the external objects that a given subject observe belong to the
body of another subject. Then the potential knowledge can indeed be complete.
We could help each other to complete the knowledge according to the principle
”I scratch your back if you scratch mine”.
Assumption 1.13 (No panpsychism). The union of the bodies of all subjects
in the world is a proper subset of the set of all objects in the world.
To summarize, we know that there is something we cannot know anything
about. At any time, it is part of potential knowledge that there is something
outside potential knowledge. This means that any state of potential knowledge is
defocused (Definition 1.15), and possibly conditional (Definition 1.16). This fact
must somehow be represented in the mathematical expression of the physical
state.
We can go a step further and conclude that potential knowledge of the
external world and of the body must both be incomplete; they mirror each
other (Fig. 1.11). Assume that potential knowledge of the external world is
incomplete. This incompleteness is mapped via detailed materialism to a ‘fuzzy’
physical state of the body where the number of objects it contains or their values
are not precisely determined. Thus potential knowledge of the body is also
incomplete. Going the other way around, assume that potential knowledge of
the body is incomplete. The corresponding fuzzy physical state clearly cannot
represent a perfectly perceived external world.
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Figure 1.11: The assumptions of intertwined duality and detailed materialism
imply that some parts of the body and some parts of the outside world are
currently unknowable. Compare Fig. 1.1.
The unmatched objects in the physical state in Fig. 1.10 correspond to the
currently unknowable, but knowable in principle (Fig 1.12). The assumption
of detailed materialism (Assumption 1.4) implies that all subjectively perceived
objects correspond to physical states of objects in the body. These bodily ob-
jects should themselves all be perceivable in principle. Each change of subjective
perception should in principle be possible to distinguish by mapping the activ-
ity of objects in the brain, e. g. in a PET scan. In this sense, the vertical
correspondence between perceived objects of knowledge and physical objects of
the body is assumed to be perfect (left side of Fig. 1.10).
A related conclusion, which follows from the motivation of Statement 1.3,
is that if there is some potential knowledge of the outside world, the potential
knowledge of the body (including the brain) is imperfect, that is, some parts of
it belong to the currently unknowable (Fig. 1.4).
Statement 1.3 can be seen as a rephrased Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
The motivation here is static, while the motivation is most often dynamic: if
an observer, a limited being embedded in the world, reach out for new knowl-
edge, she necessarily mess things up by the movement, losing some of her old
knowledge.
The epistemic world view presented so far can be summarized by the onion
of knowledge shown in Fig. 1.12.
Let me return to the question of determinism.
Statement 1.4 (Conditions for determinism). a) If there is something
currently unknowable, then the world is not deterministic. b) If there is nothing
currently unknowable, the world may or may not be deterministic.
To establish a), it is enough to notice that the premise means that there
are attributes whose values υ are outside potential knowledge at current time
t (incomplete knowledge), and these can vary independently from the values υ′
of the known attributes. Since we can learn to know υ at a later time t′ (they
are just currently unknowable), and there is no way these can be deduced from
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Figure 1.12: An onion of knowledge. The current knowledge corresponds to
the properly interpreted current state of awareness. The potential knowledge
represents those things that are knowable in principle at a given moment. It is
part of potential knowledge that there is something currently unknowable. The
solid boundary of the outermost layer of knowability corresponds to boundary of
the world. There is such a boundary since the existence of proper and improper
interpretation of awareness is assumed (Fig. 1.2). In other words, not everything
that is conceivable is part of the world.
the potential knowledge at t represented by υ′ (independent objects), the world
is not deterministic. Statement a) can of course be turned around: if the world
is deterministic, then there is nothing currently unknowable.
To motivate b), imagine a world governed by Newton’s laws where a stochas-
tic term with white noise is added. This term cannot represent states of hidden
independent objects that we could follow through time and learn more about,
because of the lack of temporal correlations. In other words, it cannot represent
something currently unknowable.
From statements 2 and 3 we conclude the following.
Statement 1.5 (Absence of determinism). The world is indeterministic.
No group of subjects can ever determine its future exactly, even in principle.
The motivation of this statement was based on the existence of the currently
unknowable. A reasonable assumption is that all apparent randomness in na-
ture is due to this unavoidable lack of knowledge, rather than the existence of
stochastic noise at a fundamental level of description.
Assumption 1.14 (Noiseless physical law). Physical law is such that if
knowledge is complete, evolution is deterministic. The number of objects and
their attributes will be completely known at all times.
This assumption requires that all objects are identifiable. To pinpoint the
form of physical law more exactly, the following assumption is helpful.
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Assumption 1.15 (Mathematical physical law). The evolution of objects
with time, as dictated by physical law, can be expressed as mathematical opera-
tions on number schemata that describe the potential knowledge of these objects.
This potential knowledge includes lists of objects, and lists of attributes and
numerical representations of their values. It may also include lists of probabili-
ties that a given attribute value will be found if knowledge about it increases.
In relation to physical law and the incompleteness of knowledge (Statement
1.3), let us return to elementary objects (Definition 1.14). It is natural to
consider the possibility that such objects exist. However, to be certain that
an object is elementary, potential knowledge of this object must be complete.
Given the unavoidable incompleteness of knowledge, we can never be sure that a
candidate of an elementary object is indeed elementary. Their existence can nei-
ther be proved, nor disproved, in any operational sense. From a strict epistemic
perspective, we should therefore not refer to elementary objects in expressions
of physical law. More precisely, this follows from the assumption of epistemic
minimalism (Section 1.9).
The explicit form of epistemic minimalism (Assumption 1.19) says that the
introduction in a physical model of elements that cannot be verified or refuted
should give rise to wrong predictions. If we introduce elementary objects as the
basic building blocks in a physical model of the world, then the world functions
as if there were a fixed number of such elements present. Each perceived ob-
ject could be divided into a given set of these elementary objects. But since
we cannot know exactly how many elementary objects there are in a macro-
scopic object, and we cannot verify or refute the hypothesis that their number
stays fixed, the world cannot function as if this was the case, according to the
principle of explicit epistemic minimalism.
Nevertheless, it is possible to introduce a weaker form of elementarity that
is epistemically acceptable.
Definition 1.21 (Minimal setM of objects). LetM be a set of distinguish-
able independent objects defined exclusively by their internal attributes. Then
M is a minimal set if and only if it fulfils the following conditions. 1) The
number of objects in M is finite. 2) Division of any object in M gives rise to
objects that are elements in M themselves. 3) There is no subset of M that
fulfils condition 2).
Each object in M has to be defined by the same set of attributes, and the
sets of allowed attribute values for each object must be distinct from the sets of
values that belong to the other objects in M.
Definition 1.22 (Minimal object Ml). An object that belongs to a minimal
set M of objects.
Just like elementary objects, minimal objects form a basic object layer, but
in contrast to elementary objects, they can be divided. Needless to say, these
minimal objects correspond to elementary particles, as perceived in current high
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energy physics, particles that may transform according to the allowed Feynman
diagrams, creating other elementary particles in the process.
Just like for elementary objects, it is meaningless to assign a size to a minimal
object Ml ∈ M. A minimal object Ml with a size attribute must always be
considered to consist of at least two other objectsMl′ andMl′′ , since size requires
a measure of distance, and distance relates two objects. According to property
2), we must have Ml′ ∈M and Ol′′ ∈M. Then it is sufficient to consider these
two objects as minimal, not Ml. Thati is, to fulfil property 3), Ml must be
excluded from M.
Let us reformulate Assumption 1.8 using the concept of minimal objects.
Assumption 1.16 (The depth of knowledge is finite). Any object can be
divided into minimal objects in a finite number of steps.
If the world Ω as a whole is regarded to be an object, then it can only
contain a finite number of minimal objects. This is too restrictive. We want to
allow the world to be infinite in size, so that we can come across a (countably)
infinite number of objects if we travel along a straight line forever. To make
this possible we have to make a distinction between the division of an object
and the appearance of new objects among those already perceived. Even if the
depth of knowledge is finite, we do not want to put boundaries to the scope of
knowledge by assumption.
Definition 1.23 (The complement to an object). Let O be an object. Then
the world Ω consists of O and the complement ΩO to O, where ΩO may or may
not contain a countably infinite number of minimal objects.
Thus the complement to an object is not an object itself. The world contains
at least one object. The complement to this object is defined, and the option
that this complement can be divided into infinitely many minimal objects is left
open. This means that the world may contain infinitely many objects.
There is another sense in which the world cannot be regarded as an object.
By definition, the world lacks a complement. In contrast, all objects have a
complement which contains at least one other object. Each perceived object
corresponds to another object in the body of the perceiving subject according
to the assumption of detailed materialism (Assumption 1.4).
Statement 1.6 (All objects have a complement). To each object O is
associated a complement ΩO that contains at least one object.
Statement 1.7 (The world is not an object). The world Ω is allowed to
contain a countably infinite number of minimal objects. We cannot associate
any complement to Ω that contains any objects.
Let me give a second motivatation of the first part of this statement as
follows. To say that the world is an object is to state a priori that it contains
a finite number of objects. But we can never be sure about that. We cannot
exclude all hypothetical states of the world that contains an infinite number
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of objects; such states do not necessarily contradict our potential knowledge.
To be able to acommodate such states, the world itself must be described as
something else than an object.
In contrast, our actual potential knowledge of the world may correspond to
a (composite) object. This knowledge corresponds to an object if and only if
the number of aware subjects is finite. This is so since each of the finite bodies
of these subjects can only perceive a finite number of objects.
Statement 1.8 (The potential knowledge of the world may correspond
to an object). The potential knowledge PKΩ corresponds to an object OΩ if
and only if the number of subjects is finite.
Of course, any individual subject is unable to decide whether there are in-
finitely many other subjects or not. Therefore the question whether the knowl-
edge of the world represents an object is probably undecidable.
1.8 Epistemic invariance
Previously, we assumed that physical law is independent of our conception of
physical law (Assumption 1.2). Now, we assume that it is independent of our
knowledge.
Assumption 1.17 (Epistemic invariance). The evolution of a set of objects,
as given by physical law, is independent of the potential knowledge of these
objects and their surroundings.
Physical law acts on the objects and their attributes; there is nothing else to
act on. The attributes may take different values, and they may be more or less
known. The meaning of Assumption 1.17 is thus twofold: the evolution given
by physical law depends neither on the content of potential knowledge, nor on
the amount of potential knowledge.
Generally speaking, the existence of physical law means that for each state
of potential knowledge PKj , there is a rule Rj that limits its evolution in time
[Fig. 1.13(a)]. To formulate a universally valid law, in a worst case scenario,
it would be necessary to list the rules (R1,R2, . . .) for each of the potentially
infinitely many allowed states (PK1, PK2, . . .).
The assumption that physical law is independent of the content of knowledge
means that it is possible to contract this list to a single rule R, consisting of
a finite number of logical and mathematical symbols. This corresponds to the
Newtonian paradigm that there is a clear division between physical state and
physical law. The law acts on the state to make it change with time, whereas
the law itself is independent of state and time.
Lee Smolin [54] has challenged this paradigm from a cosmological perspec-
tive, proposing a model where the state and a slowly varying law is merged into
a metastate, acted upon by a metalaw. This metalaw must itself be independent
of the metastate to avoid infinite regress, but it is argued that the metalaw can
be much simpler than the slowly varying law. In the formalism developed here,
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Figure 1.13: Epistemic invariance with respect to a) content and b) amount of
potential knowledge. a) The same evolution rule R applies to all states PK.
b) This rule is such that if one state of potential knowledge is contained in
another, then this fact stays true at all subsequent times. This is an alternative
formulation of the principle of reductionism.
32 CHAPTER 1. IDEAS AND CONCEPTS
these considerations make no difference, since we make no specific assumptions
about the form of physical law R that distinguish law from metalaw. If a met-
alaw exists, R will correspond to the combined law and metalaw, acting on the
state PK.
A more traditional way to allow for laws that change with time is to regard
time as a parameter whose value is part of the state. We merge state and time,
instead of state and law. However, such explicit time dependence is in opposition
to the strict epistemic perspective I strive to adopt. There is no operational way
to distinguish two points in time if the states of potential knowledge at the two
instants are identical, including identical potential memories of the past. We
arrive at the following conclusion.
Statement 1.9 (Physical law is independent of time). Physical law is
invariant under time translations.
Let us turn to the second part of the meaning of Assumption 1.17. A state
of potential knowledge PK1 is a subset of another state PK2 when at most the
same independent objects are known in PK1 as in PK2, and there is at most
the same knowledge of all the attributes of these objects in PK1 as there are
in PK2.
The assumption is then that if PK1 is a subset of PK2 at some time t,
then the same is true for the corresponding evolved states of knowledge at any
subsequent time t′ [Fig. 1.13(b)].
There is a potential problem with this way to describe the assumption that
physical law is independent of the amount of potential knowledge. If subjects
can search for new knowledge in such a way that their choices are not entirely
dictated by physical law, then the state of affairs expressed in Fig. 1.13(b) is
not waterproof. The subjects possessing potential knowledge PK1 may then
choose to look for new knowledge that is not part of PK ′2, and find before time
t′. If this freedom of choice is real, the qualification that no such choices are
made in the time interval [t, t′] must be added.
The time independent relation that PK1 is a subset of PK2 corresponds to
the principle of reductionism. The statement ‘the behaviour of the whole can
always be understood in terms of the behaviour of its parts’ can be translated
into our language as ‘the evolution of a state of less potential knowledge is
always consistent with the evolution of states of more potential knowledge’. The
reductionistic principle follows since the additional knowledge may, of course,
be gained by object division, that is, by identification of the parts of a system.
In other words, according to Assumption 1.17, the world is not holistic in the
sense that the avoidance of additional knowledge enables new behaviour.
Any state PK2 is embedded in the currently unknowable (Fig. 1.12), so that
it is always possible to choose another state ˜PK2 of which PK1 is a subset [Fig.
1.14(a)]. Thus, according to Assumption 1.17, the evolved state PK ′1 must stay
a subset of both the evolved states PK ′2 and ˜PK
′
2. It follows that if two states
of potential knowledge contain common knowledge, they will continue to do so.
Einstein’s equivalence principle provides a neat illustration [Fig. 1.14(b)].
Let PK1 correspond to a state of potential knowledge when all observers are
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Figure 1.14: a) A corollary of the epistemic invariance expressed in Fig. 1.13
is that if two states of potential knowledge PK2 and ˜PK2 overlap, they do
so at all subsequent times. b) The idea is illustrated by Einstein’s equivalence
principle. Potential knowledge grows along arrows a and b, just as in Figs. 1.4
and 1.5.
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Figure 1.15: Illustration of Statement 1.10. If potential knowledge PK(E) of
the external objects shrinks from PK
(E)
2 to PK
(E)
1 , the potential knowledge
PK(I) of the internal objects of the observing subjects changes in such a way
that PK
(I)
1 is not a subset of PK
(I)
2 . The state of the body becomes knowably
different. It takes a different state of the brain to encode a fuzzier visual image,
not just less knowledge of the state that encoded the sharper image. The state
of potential knowledge PK is the union of PK(E) and PK(I). Therefore two
states PK and PK ′ are never subsets of each other in practice.
stuck inside an elevator, and assume that its walls do not let any physical
information from the outside reach the senses of the observers. Let PK2 be a
state where there are outside observers noting that the elevator is standing on
a gravitating body, and let ˜PK2 be a state where there are outside observers
noting that the elevator is accelerating in free space. The evolution of PK1 must
be consistent with the evolution of both these states of enlarged knowledge.
In other words, if the evolution rule R is such that it is impossible to tell
from the inside whether the elevator is accelerating or affected by gravity (or a
combination of both) at a given time, it will remain impossible forever.
It must be stressed that the assumption that the physical evolution rule
does not depend on the amount of potential knowledge is a purely theoretical
statement about the structure of physical law. It is not possible in practice to
have two states of potential knowledge such that one is a subset of the other (Fig.
1.15). It is, of course, possible to have different amounts of knowledge of a given
set of external objects. But such a difference must be encoded as different states
of the internal objects in the bodies of the knowing subjects, simply because
it corresponds to a different perception. This conclusion follows from detailed
materialism (Assumption 1.4). The corresponding states of knowledge of the
internal objects therefore have different content, to some extent, and are not
subsets of each other. Since the state of potential knowledge is the knowledge
of all objects, both external and internal, two such states are never subsets of
each other. If our eyesight becomes fuzzier, we know someting we did not know
before: either we have changed accomodation, our eyes have deteriorated, or we
have lost our glasses.
Statement 1.10 (If potential knowledge changes size, it changes con-
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tent). If the state of potential knowledge is PKa at time t
′, there is no past
time t or future time t′′ such that the state of potential knowledge PKb at that
time fulfils PKa ⊂ PKb or PKb ⊂ PKa.
Just as the evolution rule is assumed to be the same regardless the amount
and content of potential knowledge, we also assume that it is the same for all
subjects.
Assumption 1.18 (Individual epistemic invariance). The evolution of a
set of objects, as given by physical law, is independent of who posseses the po-
tential knowledge of these objects and their surroundings.
According to Assumption 1.10, potential knowledge is the union of the indi-
vidual potential knowledge of all subjects. The elements in a union commute,
so that there is complete democracy among subjects. No ‘master subject’ ex-
ists. The attributes of the objects in the state of potential knowledge are the
attributes that the individual subjects perceive. Different subjects may as-
sign different values to these attributes, for example spatio-temporal distances.
Therefore, since the evolution rule R is assumed to be common to all subjects,
and since it acts upon these attributes, we run into contradiction if it acts upon
them in such a way that the evolved state becomes different depending on whose
individually perceived attribute values we let it act on. (We need to bother only
about identifiable, independent objects according to Definition 1.18. It is only
for such objects it is meaningful to say that two subjects refer to the same ob-
ject, and agree or disagree about its attributes. Only then can a relation rkk
′
j
between two subjects k and k′ be defined according to Fig. 1.8.)
Statement 1.11 (Individually invariant evolution rule). Let R be the
common evolution rule for each state of potential knowledge and each subject
according to Assumptions 1.17 and 1.18. Then R acts upon individually per-
ceived attribute values in such a way that the evolved state of potential knowledge
is the same regardless whose perceived attribute values we let R act upon. If {υki }
is a set of attribute values perceived by subject k and {υk′i } = T{υki } is the cor-
responding set perceived by k′, then we must have R{υk′i } = TR{υki }, that is
[R, T ] = 0.
Another way to express the same conclusion, without referring to attributes,
is the following.
Statement 1.12 (Individually invariant evolution rule 2). Let R be the
common evolution rule for each state of potential knowledge and each subject
according to Assumptions 1.17 and 1.18. Then R(PKk ∩ PKk′) = RPKk ∩
RPKk′ , where PKk and PKk′ are the states of potential knowledge of subjects
k and k′, respectively.
In words, the evolution of the common part of the potential knowledge of
two subjects is the same regardless which of them use physical law to determine
this evolution - it is objective in the sense that it transcends the individual.
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1.9 Epistemic closure
History of physics teaches that it is a dead end to introduce objects that are
epistemically unreachable, such as the aether, or make use of attributes that
cannot be operationally defined or measured, such as positions in absolute space.
Physical law is epistemically picky. This principle may be called epistemic
minimalism. We will see below that it is possible to identify two levels of this
principle: implicit and explicit minimalism.
Even though it is a standard conclusion, it may be instructive to argue,
using the vocabulary introduced above, that the concept of absolute speed is
epistemically empty. To speak of absolute speed, there has to be at least one
observable point in space with special status, in relation to which absolute speeds
can be defined. With our general definition of an object, this point becomes
an object Oo, and its special status as reference becomes one of its internal
attributes. The absolute speeds of all other objects becomes relational attributes
relating these to Oo. However, in such a state of knowledge, the speed v of Oo
remains undefined. To define it, there has to be another object Oo′ in relation
to which the speed of Oo can be determined. We end up in infinite regress.
In the same way, it is impossible to define absolute acceleration epistemi-
cally. In other words, the perspectives where an object accelerates in relation
to a background of other objects, and where the background accelerates in the
opposite direction in relation to the given object, correspond to the same state
of knowledge of spatial and temporal relational attributes. It is an elementary
fact, however, that we can feel acceleration, but this subjective feeling cannot be
used to define absolute acceleration from the spatio-temporal attributes alone.
Definition 1.24 (Implicit epistemic minimalism). Physical models can be
expressed without the introduction of distinctions that cannot be subjectively
perceived as such, or deduced from such perceptions. This is true, in particular,
when it comes to the introduction of objects, attributes and attribute values. It
is also true with regard to discriminations between attribute values in a model
of the physical state.
The primary example is Galilean invariance. There is no need to use the
attribute absolute speed to formulate physical law: it is invariant under the
transformation x→ x+ vt for any constant v.
Even if physical law does not need the idea of absolute speed, it is neverthe-
less compatible with Galilean invariance. Therefore Newton could uphold the
idea of absolute space. This is the reason I call this level of epistemic minimalism
implicit.
A second, important, application of implicit epistemic minimalism is that
physical law should not depend on the concept of elementary objects (Defi-
nition 1.14), as discussed in section 1.7, since it is in principle impossible to
determine whether an object is elementary, given the fundamental incomplete-
ness of knowledge (Statement 1.3). Their role may instead be played by minimal
objects (Definition 1.22), which are epistemically more appropriate.
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We argued above that the attribute absolute acceleration is impossible to
define epistemically, just as absolute speed. Thus, according to epistemic mini-
malism, it should be possible to formulate physical law without referring explic-
itly to the acceleration of a given object. To this end, there has to be another
physical circumstance that gives rise to the same feeling, so that the physical
law that accounts for this feeling does not need to refer explicitly to accelera-
tion. This other circumstance is gravity, of course, and we again arrive at the
equivalence principle.
Going from the equivalence principle to general relativity, we need special
relativity, and to arrive at special relativity, we need the stronger version of
epistemic minimalism.
Assumption 1.19 (Explicit epistemic minimalism). The introduction in
a physical model of entities or distinction that cannot be subjectively perceived,
or deduced from such perceptions, leads to conflict with physical law. The model
gives rise to wrong predictions. This is true, in particular, when it comes to the
introduction of objects, attributes and attribute values. It is also true with regard
to discriminations between attribute values in a model of the physical state.
This principle constrains the form of physical law further. It means that
Nature explicitly answers ”yes” or ”no” if we ask her whether a proposed object
or attribute has epistemic meaning.
To obey explicit epistemic minimalism, physical law must be inconsistent
with the notion of absolute speed, since we concluded above that this concept
is epistemically empty. The notion of absolute speed implies the addition law
for velocities, and whenever the addition law holds it is possible to uphold the
notion of absolute speed. A bit more generally, we may say that the notion of
absolute space and time can be kept alive if and only if the addition law for
velocities always holds.
The addition law may expressed as follows. Consider any three objects O1,
O2 and O3. Let u12 be the relative velocity of O1 and O2, as judged in the rest
frame of O1. In the same way, let u23 be the relative velocity of O2 and O3, as
judged in the rest frame of O2. Then the relative velocity of O1 and O3 is
u13 = u12 + u23, (1.1)
as judged in the rest frame of O1.
To rule out the notion of absolute speed, it is thus necessary and sufficient
that physical law sometimes break Eq. (1.1). One way to do this is to intro-
duce a maximum speed c that no object ever exceeds. To give such a concept
epistemic meaning, all subjects must agree that a given type of object, under
given circumstances that all agree upon, always travels at speed c in their own
reference frame. Of course, this ansatz leads to the Lorentz transformation. In
the limit c→∞ we get √1− (v/c)2 → 1, and we get back the Galileo transfor-
mation, for which Eq. (1.1) holds. Thus, the introduction of a maximum speed
is the only possible way to break Eq. (1.1). In other words, the finite speed
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of light and special relativity can be seen as an expression of explicit epistemic
minimalism.
To reach this conclusion, we made some crucial assumptions, though. To say
that the Lorentz transformation contradicts Eq. (1.1), we allowed the bodies
of any two subjects 1 and 2 to constitute two of the three objects, say O1
and O2. Further, the relative speed u13 is taken to be the speed of object O3
relative to subject 1, whereas the relative speed u23 is taken to be the relative
speed of object O3 relative to the other subject 2. If, instead, u23 is taken to
mean the relative velocity of object O3 relative object O2 as seen by subject 1,
Eq. (1.1) would still hold for all three objects in the reference frame of subject
1. In effect, we have assumed that the addition law for velocities should hold
regardless which subjective reference frames we choose to measure the three
relatives velocities.
This is an application of individual epistemic invariance (Statement 1.11).
Thus, the finite speed of light and the Lorentz invariance of physical law, can
be seen as consequences of explicit epistemic minimalism and epistemic invari-
ance. Conversely, the well-established fact that physical law indeed has these
properties gives a strong hint that the idea of an epistemically invariant ‘sub-
ject democracy’ and collective potential knowledge is correct. In a solipsistic
world-view, these properties of physical law would not be necessary.
The statistics of identical particles is another example of explicit epistemic
minimalism. Since it is epistemically meaningless to treat permutations of iden-
tical particles as different states, the principle implies that it must lead to wrong
statistics if such permutations are included as distinct states in the calcultation
of statistical weights. And, of course, it does, since it gives rise to Maxwell-
Boltzmann statistics, which in many experimental situations is physically very
different from the correct Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics of bosons and
fermions, respectively. In contrast, if the minimalism would have been implicit,
it would have made no physical difference whether permutations of identical
particles were included or not.
We will argue that all minimal objects that are building blocks to perceivable
objects are fermions and obey the Pauli exclusion principle. (This picture is
developed gradually, and is summarized in section 3.10). The simple reason
is that it does not make epistemic sense to say that two objects are found in
the same state. To be able to determine in practice that we are dealing with
two objects, they must be divided; there must be some knowledge that tells
them apart, be it that their spatio-temporal positions are different or that their
internal attributes differ. From this perspective, the fact that electrons and
other building blocks of matter follow Fermi-Dirac rather than Bose-Einstein
statistics is an expression of explicit epistemic minimalism.
As a fourth example of this principle, we may take the fact the orbital
angular momentum of a possibly rotating object has to be set to zero if we have
no potential knowledge at all where in its orbit the object is positioned at a
given time, that is, if the probability distribution of its position is spherically
symmetric. Allowing for non-zero angular momentum in such a case gives rise
to erroneous physical predictions, making the minimalism explicit.
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A central idea in the upcoming attempt to motivate quantum mechanics from
epistemic principles is that the double-slit experiment should be looked at in
the light of explicit epistemic minimalism. Consider Fig. 1.16, and assume that
it is forever outside potential knowledge which slit the particle actually passes.
However, there is (potential) knowledge that it passes slit 1 with probability
p1 and slit 2 with probability p2. Implicit epistemic minimalism would mean
that it does not matter for the evolution of the system whether we assume
that it actually takes one of the paths, even if we can never know which. The
only option is then to combine probabilities as if events 1 and 2 are mutually
exclusive. That is, for any pair of probabilities pk and prk we must have
pr = p1pr1 + p2pr2, (1.2)
where pr is the probability that the particle finally hits the point r on the detec-
tor screen, pk is the probability that it passes slit k, and prk is the probability
that it hits r given that it has passed slit k.
In contrast, explicit epistemic minimalism means that physical law must
contradict the possibility that there is (unknowable) path information. The
only way to get the message through is to let
pr 6= p1pr1 + p2pr2 (1.3)
for some choice of probabilities. In Section 3.4.2 we discuss how this condition
leads to Born’s rule and contributes to the fact that physical states can be seen
as elements in a Hilbert space.
Loosely speaking, what explicit minimalism does in this case is to let Nature
give a clear answer ”no” to the question ”If a tree falls in the forest and no
one sees it, does it then fall?”. The question ”Does this mean that it does
not fall?” would also get a negative answer. The tree neither falls or does not;
the question is ill-posed, it has no knowable answer. In contrast, in a world
described by classical mechanics, Nature would be unable to answer anything
at all.
The previous discussion concerned the fact that physical law seems to make
use of no more than what can be perceived and distinguished in principle.
Turning the perspective around, we may argue that physical law should make
use of everything than can be perceived and distinguished from something else.
Loosely speaking, if two things can be distinguished, there will be a correspond-
ing distinction in physical law.
Statement 1.13 (Epistemic completeness). All subjectively perceived dis-
tinctions, or distinctions deduced from such perceptions, correspond to distinc-
tions in proper models of physical law and of the physical state. This is true, in
particular, when it comes to objects, attributes and attribute values.
Comparing Assumption 1.19 and Statement 1.13, the former basically says
‘everything physical is epistemic’, while the latter says ‘everything epistemic is
physical’. Statement 1.13 can be seen as a consequence of detailed materialism
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Figure 1.16: Probabilities that can be used to illuminate the difference between
implicit and explicit epistemic minimalism in the double-slit experiment. See
text for further explanation.
(Assumption 1.4), the hypothesis that every detail of subjective perception has
a physical description.
Since we can deduce that there is a distinction between potential knowledge
and the currently unknowable (Fig. 1.12), a corresponding distinction should
be made in physical law. This is accomplished by the distinction between Eqs.
[1.2] and [1.3].
We concluded above that gravity is envitable given the possibility to feel ac-
celeration, since there has to be another interpretation of this feeling, according
to implicit epistemic minimalism. Actually, we jumped to conclusion. We also
have to assume epistemic completeness to be sure that the subjective distinc-
tion between feeling and no feeling of acceleration corresponds to a distinction
in physical law. This distinction is expressed by the fact that the evolution of
the physical state depends on whether or not there is acceleration (or gravity).
The acceleration dependence is formulated in Newton’s second law.
Another application of epistemic completeness is time. In the next section
the distinction between relational and sequential time is elaborated. The former
aspect of time is an attribute relating two objects, just as distance, whereas the
latter aspect corresponds to our ability to order objects or events into the past,
the present and the future. The distinction between the two is at the core of our
perception of time. Statement 1.13 thus dictates that this distinction should be
respected in equations that express physical law. Such an equation is suggested
in Section 3.4.8.
The ability to construct and give meaning to mathematical concepts is often
imagined to be independent of physical law. However, if detailed materialism
is taken seriously, the perceived mathematical world cannot ‘hover’ above the
physical world, but must be related to it in every detail. For example, it should
be possible to relate all aspects of the mathematical representation of physical
space to the behaviour of attributes of objects. In other words, it must be
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Figure 1.17: Relations between objects in physical space can be described by
distances r, angles θ, and orientation. Our ability to perceive such a space is
reflected in physical law as dependencies on a) distance and b) angle, and the
fact c) that parity violation occurs.
possible to relate the defining properties of R3 and Riemannian manifolds to
distinctions made by physical law.
The ability to distinguish different distances from each other is reflected by
the distance-dependence present in physical law (Fig. 1.17). The strength and
the time delay of the interaction between two objects Oi and Oj both depend
on a variable r ≥ 0 that we interpret as distance, and so does wave diffraction.
Using these dependencies to determine the distances {rij} in a collection of
objects, it is a priori impossible to exclude any set {rij} as a possible outcome.
However, it is a basic fact that the triangle inequality is always fulfilled. This
condition is reflected by physical law if we assume that interactions between Oi
and Oj depend on the shortest distance between the two objects, and that
it is this distance that we denote by rij . Introducing the concept of shortest
path implies that there are other possible paths. The only meaning that can
be attached to this statement is that there are paths from Oi to Oj via other
objects Ok. Breaking the triangle inequality means that there is an Ok such
that rik + rjk < rij , i.e. that the path via Ok is shorter than dij , and we have
a contradiction.
Of course, the set of distances fulfill a much more restrictive constraint than
the triangle inequality. It is an experimental fact that distances seem always to
be related in such a way that locally, the objects and distances can be embedded
in a Euclidean, three-dimensional space.
Does the distance-dependence of physical law provide enough information
to construct physical space? The angle θijk is uniquely defined by the three
distances rij , rik and rjk, given that space is Euclidean and three-dimensional
(Fig. 1.18). However, as Einstein pointed out, the equivalence principle implies
that the apparent trajectory of a light beam is bent by gravity, like the trajectory
of any other object. Therefore, since the shortest path between two objects must
be operationally defined by some interaction of objects, it cannot be described
by a straight line (in the Euclidean sense) in the presence of gravity. Then the
angles θijk are not uniquely given by the distances (except in the limit where
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Figure 1.18: If curvature is allowed, it is necessary to define angles to specify
the space. Even if all distances are equal, the angles may differ.
Figure 1.19: It is possible to define mirror images in a minimal space defined
just by distance, even if the objects are identical. But the space nevertheless
lacks orientation.
the distances go to zero), but must be determined independently. To do so, and
thus to define space unambiguously, there have to be physical processes that
depend explicitly on angle (Fig. 1.17). And of course there are such processes,
such as scattering.
Still, one basic ingredient is missing before we can define space as we know
it, namely orientation. The concept of reflection cannot be introduced using
the relational attributes distance and angle only. The reason why we appear to
be able to construct the mirror images of the triangles in Fig. 1.18 is just that
they are embedded in a larger oriented space, our own.
Nevertheless, it is possible to define mutual mirror images. The correspond-
ing objects in the mirror triangles in Fig. 1.19 can be identified since these have
identical distance relations to the other two objects in the triangle (solid lines).
Proper mirror images can be distinguished from rotated images, since in the
first case it is impossible to make them coincide by continuously decreasing all
distances relating the two images to zero (dotted lines), without violating the
constraint imposed by the dimensionality of the space.
To be able to define orientation, it is necessary to introduce an internal
attribute that is coupled to distance, in the sense that it defines a direction
in relation to the distance between two objects. In addition, there has to be
a physical law that depends on this direction. Spin and spin-dependent weak
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Figure 1.20: Distinction between left and right. A subject (large circle) views
an object (small circle). a) If the body halves are mirror images (Fig. 1.19),
the state where the object is seen to the left is identical to the state where it
is moved to the right. No distinction between left and right is possible. b) If
the body halves are asymmetric, subjective distinction between left and right
is possible even if the space in which subjects live lacks orientation. c) Parity
violation makes the space oriented and defines a distinct mirror image. d) If
the parity operation P is applied to the perceived object but not to the body,
subjective distinction is possible if and only if the particular object violates
parity. e)-f) If the body halves are asymmetric and there is parity violation,
distinction between left and right is always possible.
interactions fulfil these tasks. In other words, the possibility to distinguish left
from right correponds to the existence of parity violation in physical law.
Mathematically speaking, spin and parity violation makes it possible to de-
scribe a Euclidean space as a vector space, since for each vector v it makes
the reflected vector −v a meaningful concept. It becomes appropriate to assign
a position vector to each object, to embed the space in a coordinate system.
Of course, this procedure introduces redundancy in the representation, since
any translation, rotation or motion of the coordinate system relative to the set
of objects and attributes that constitutes the physical state cannot be defined
from within this state itself. Keeping this in mind, the representation provides
a great simplification as compared to working explicitly with the distances {rij}
and spins si.
This story is too good to be the true, or at least to be the whole truth. It
is possible to enable subjective distinction between left and right by means of
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less fundamental physical facts than parity violation (Fig. 1.20). Namely, since
the two hemispheres of the brain are different, the physical state of the brain
as it processes a sensory input will be different depending on whether the input
comes from the left or the right [Fig. 1.20(b)]. This physical difference enables
a difference in state of awareness, a subjective sense of left and right, according
to the assumption of detailed materialism.3
But why has the left-right asymmetry of the brain (and other internal organs)
evolved in the first place? There seems to be no consensus on this matter
[37]. Of course, the ability to distinguish left from right, possibly with the
help of distinct hemispheres, has significant evolutionary value. It makes it
much easier to repeat a path that leads to a certain goal, based on the memory
of this path. It also makes it possible to find or avoid hidden objects in an
apparently symmetric environment based on the memory of the location of
these objects. One may speculate that the fact that sensory input from left is
always processed in the far right of the brain, and vice versa, has evolved as
a way to magnify the difference between these physical states. A nerve signal
travelling through the entire brain has the potential to make clear footprints
in the distinct hemispheres, and in turn be affected by them in distinct ways.
In this manner, the subjective distinction between left and right might become
more robust.
The appearance of back-front and top-bottom asymmetries is easier to un-
derstand. The evolutionary drive to develop a back-front asymmetry is the need
for an animal to move in order to find food. Thus its velocity vector corresponds
to the vector defined by the alimentary canal. The top-down asymmetry is an
adaptation to life on the ground of earth. (For stationary plants, this is the only
inherent asymmetry axis.)
There have to be seeds to develop these asymmetries. The attachment of the
embryo to the placenta (the birth cord) defines a back-front axis, and gravity
defines a top-bottom axis. However, the seed for the development of left-right
asymmetry is poorly understood. It might be the result of spontaneous symme-
try breaking from a random fluctuation, like the direction of magnetization in
the absence of external fields [19]. But since almost all bodies of a given species
are oriented in the same way [37], there must be a preferred direction.
Such a seed of chirality is provided by the fact that only L-amino acids and
D-sugars are present in the biological world. Several hypotheses have been put
forward to explain this fact. Some involve polarized cosmic radiation or parity
dependent binding energies. Thus spin and parity violation might be at the
root of matters after all. However, since the parity-dependent energy shifts are
minuscule, there has to be some magnifying process involved [33, 23].
It is important to note that regardless the biological basis for left-right asym-
metry, only parity violation can motivate the use of an oriented space with po-
sition coordinates to describe the entire physical world of external objects and
3Similarly, the ability to decide whether an image is upside down in the absence of reference
points must be attributed to the top-down asymmetry of the brain. Or, more properly, to
asymmetry with respect to the corresponding plane defined by the projection of the image on
the visual cortex.
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Figure 1.21: The evolution of potential knowledge of a given subject k. At time
m, the potential knowledge PKkm consists of knowledge PKN
k
m of the present,
and knowledge M(PKkm−1) of the past, in the form of potential memories M .
This part of PKkm points to its predecessor, and makes it possible to order the
states of knowledge into a sequence corresponding to the flow of time.
bodies of subjects.
Let me conclude this long section with its moral. Explicit epistemic min-
imalism means that any entity or distinction introduced in a physical model
should correspond to a knowable entity or distinction. Epistemic completeness
means that any knowable entity or distinction chould have a counterpart in a
physical model. We get a one-to-one correpondence.
Assumption 1.20 (Epistemic closure). There is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between knowable entities and distinctions, and entities and distinctions
in proper physical models.
1.10 Time
The concept of distinction was used to argue that any given state of potential
knowledge consists of a discrete set of objects. In the same way, from the epis-
temic perspective, to say that time has passed, it must be possible to make a
distinction between now and then. Something must have changed subjectively.
Hence the evolution of potential knowledge can be described as a discrete se-
quence {PK(n), PK(n+ 1), PK(n+ 2), . . .}.
Any perceivable change defines a new state of potential knowledge. It may
be a bird appearing in the sky, or the appearance of the thought ‘nothing has
changed in the sky’ in the head of the skywatcher. In the latter case an internal
object has appeared, corresponding to a changed physical state of the brain.
The characteristic aspect of time is that it flows. Time is directed, the
ordering of states of knowledge is essential. The two sets {PK(n), PK(n +
1), PK(n+ 2), . . .} and {PK(n), PK(n+ 2), PK(n+ 1), . . .} are different.
This primary fact corresponds to the interpretational ability to distinguish
the present from the past (Fig. 1.2). More precisely, most states of knowledge
consist both of objects that correspond to (potential) memories, and of objects
that correspond to the present. The ability to tell which objects are which has
to be assumed. In this way, for a given subject, a predecessor of each state
of individual potential knowledge is defined, and the ordering is established
(Fig. 1.21). This procedure may be compared to the Peano axioms, where each
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Figure 1.22: The part PKNkm of personal potential knowledge PK
k
m that cor-
responds to the present, and the part M(PKkm−1) that corresponds to the past,
each consist of a number of objects (c.f. Fig. 1.21). Present objects are assigned
‘presentness’ attribute Pr = 1, and past objects are assigned Pr = 0. The rela-
tional attribute t can be defined between any two objects. It must be chosen such
that the numbers sum to zero when added in a circle, e.g. t13+t12+t24+t34 = 0.
If Pri = 1 and Prj = 0, the only available knowledge of tij is that it is positive.
Its magnitude is completely unknown.
natural number is assumed to have a successor, making the natural numbers an
ordered set.
We cannot take for granted that memory is perfect; it is not certain that
M(PKkm−1) equals PK
k
m−1, provided the proper interpretation, indicated by
M , that the former state corresponds to the immediate past is removed. If
this would be the case, potential knowledge would grow without bound as time
passes. This seems to contradict the fact that potential knowledge is limited.
The matter is further discussed in Section 3.14.
In fact, we cannot be sure even that knowledge of the temporal ordering of
memories is always preserved. A preserved ordering means that we can write
M(PKkm−1) = M({M(PKkm−2), PKNkm−1}) = {M(M(PKkm−2)),M(PKNkm−1)}.
If this relation always applies, the memories PKNkm−u of time m− u enter the
state of potential knowledge as Mu(PKNkm−u), where the position of PKN
k
m−u
in the chain of memories is identified by the superscript u in Mu.
Nevertheless, the basic ability to order experiences in present and past is
assumed. The fact that an object in a state of knowledge belongs to the past,
to the set of memories, can be thought of as an internal attribute of that object.
We may define a ‘presentness’ attribute Pr, with possible values Pr = 0 (past)
and Pr = 1 (present).
Definition 1.25 (The presentness attribute Pr). The internal attribute
Pr is defined for any object O. It has two possible values, zero and one. We
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have PrO(n) = 1 if and only if O ⊆ PKN(n), and PrO(n) = 0 if and only if
O ⊆M(PK(n− 1)).
In an individual state of potential knowledge PKk, the distance in time tij
between any two objects i and j can be defined as a relational attribute that
fulfils tij ≥ 0 whenever Pri = 1, and tij = −tji (Fig. 1.22). These relations
reflect the directed nature of time, and can be generalized to the statement that
the sum of time differences in a closed loop of objects is zero. They make the
time distances different from spatial distances rij , which are non-negative and
invariant under index exchange.
Knowledge of the temporal attributes t may be incomplete (defocused or
conditional) in the same way as knowledge of any other attribute. In fact,
if Pri = 1 and Prj = 0, the only knowledge we have about tij is that it is
positive. The reason is the following. Given any two objects Oi and Oj , the
realization that they are related by the number tij is a perceived change of
potential knowledge. Thus it corresponds to a temporal update n → n + 1.
Even if Prj(n) = 1, we have Prj(n + 1) = 0 by definition. Since we do not
have any knowledge of the magnitude of tij until time n+ 1, we conclude that
such knowledge can only exist in states for which Pri = Prj = 0. (A trivial
exception is the case where Pri = Prj = 1 and tij = 0 by definition.)
If knowledge of tij is perfect for all objects belonging to the past, the relations
described above mean that these objects can be represented as points on a
directed time-axis (where the location of the origin is arbitrary). If knowledge
of some tij is defocused, temporal knowledge necessarily becomes conditional,
due to the rule that time differences added in a loop must be zero. They cannot
be independently chosen; if knowledge of one temporal attribute increases, so
does knowledge of the others. Actually, the same is true for spatial distances
rij . The empirical fact that they can be embedded in a three-dimensional space
means that they cannot be independently chosen either. (Numerical knowledge
of rij is only available if Pri = Prj = 0, for the same reason as for tij .)
In the context of relativity, objects described in this way are called events.
Relations between these objects or events are described by the attribute pair
(r, t), which makes it possible to embed them in Minkowski space-time. Each
state of potential knowledge PK(n) can therefore be (partially) represented
by a map of objects spread across space-time, a map that is updated each time
potential knowledge is updated. This picture resolves the apparent contradiction
between a ‘frozen’ space-time and a flowing time. What we get is a sequence of
frozen space-times.
This twofold nature of time should be manifest in evolution equations. In
fact, it is well known that we run into problems when the sequential and rela-
tional aspects of time are described by a single variable t. In the field of quantum
gravity, it is difficult to formulate evolution equations in a frozen, curved space-
time. Due to the general covariance, there is no way to single out a temporal
direction in this manifold. This is known as ‘the problem of time’.
The need to separate the two aspects of time can be seen already in the
double-slit experiment. Let us add a vertical time axis to the standard picture
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Figure 1.23: The double-slit experiment not only demonstrates interference of
spatially separated paths, passing the slits at x1 or x2, but also interference of
temporally separated paths, starting from the source at two different times t1
and t2.
(Fig. 1.23). Assume 1) that a single object hits the detector screen at a point p
off the symmetry axis of the experimental setup (to the left or to the right), 2)
that the speed of the object on its path from the source to the screen is known
(such as the speed of light in the case of photons), and 3) that information about
which slit the object passed is outside potential knowledge. Then, according to
Eq. 1.3, there is interference between the two alternative paths. But the two
paths correspond to two different departure times from the source. Thus there is
not only spatial interference between paths departing from the two slits located
at positions x1 and x2, but also temporal interference between paths departing
from the source at times t1 and t2. Furthermore, the Lorentz transformation
partially transforms the distances t21 = t2 − t1 and x21 = x2 − x1 into each
other when the state of motion of the observer changes.
Temporal and spatial interference must therefore be treated on an equal foot-
ing in proper evolution equations. In each state, different relational attributes t
must be allowed. This is not the case, for instance, in the Schro¨dinger equation,
where the wave function Ψ(x, t) is distributed in space, allowing an uncertainty
∆x > 0 of spatial position, but is perfectly localized in time (as a delta spike),
corresponding to a perfectly known relational time ∆t = 0.
This is not a problem if the state described by the Schro¨dinger equation is
stationary. In the double-slit experiment this corresponds to a periodic wave
source, or a time-independent probability of object emission from the source.
Then the detection probability densities at the screen are also independent of
time. From an epistemic perspective, this corresponds to a complete lack of
knowledge when the object is emitted from the source, implying that t12 can
take any value so that ∆t =∞.
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Figure 1.24: The potential knowledge PK(n) is updated each time any of the in-
dividual states of knowledge PKkmk is updated. For example, PK(2) is the union
of PK11 , PK
2
2 , and PK
3
1 . This state is updated to PK(3) when PK
1
1 → PK12 .
If two individual updates have space-like separation, they must be considered to
occur simultaneosly, as the updates PK12 → PK13 and PK22 → PK23 . Overlaps
between individual states of potential knowledge typically occur (Fig. 1.8), but
this is not shown here for clarity.
In any physically and epistemically relevant situation, however, there is some
knowledge of the timing of the particle emission. For instance, it cannot take
place before the experiment starts. In other words, the state is never stationary.
Then, to calculate the time dependent detection probabilities at the screen,
the probability amplitudes of emission at all times t12 must be known, due to
temporal interference, in the same way as the spatial part of the wave function
must be completely known to calculate its evolution in the Schro¨dinger equation.
In other words, at each sequential time instant we must allow a Ψ(x, t) with both
∆x > 0 and ∆t > 0 to be able to determine the physical state at the next time
instant.
Let us return to the sequential aspect of time, and the problem how to treat
the existence of several subjects. Since the potential knowledge PK(n) is the
union of the states of individual potential knowledge PKkmk of subjects k, the
time indicator n is updated each time any of the individual time indicators mk
are updated (Fig. 1.24). In such a schema, it is necessary to be able to tell in
which temporal order mk and mk′ are updated. Otherwise the ordering in the
sequence {PK(n), PK(n+1), PK(n+2), . . .} becomes ill-defined, which means
that the evolution of the physcial state becomes ill-defined.
In case the updates mk → mk+1 and mk′ → mk′+1 correspond to updates
of two objects with time-like separation, the ordering is unambiguous. If the
separation is space-like, no ordering that all subjects are certain to agree on
can be assigned. The resolution to this problem is to say that the events occur
‘at the same time’. This means that the updates of the individual potential
knowledge of subjects k and k′ that are reflected in the updates mk → mk + 1
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Figure 1.25: Illustration of the rule that governs temporal updates in the pres-
ence of several subjects (Definition 1.26). We define events as perceived ap-
pearances or changes of objects O that are placed along wold-lines of subjects.
Object O2 perceived by subject 1 defines a temporal update since it is located
within the lightcone of object O1 perceived by the same subject. Object O3, on
the other hand, does not correspond to a temporal update. Object O4 again
defines a temporal update. We may say that the set of events {O1} belongs to
time n, the set {O2, O3} to time n+ 1, and the set {O4} to time n+ 2.
and mk′ → mk′+1, correpond to a single update of potential knowledge PK(n),
reflected in a single update n → n + 1. An example is shown in Fig. 1.24, in
the update PK(3)→ PK(4).
Note that we always consider updates of objects that are placed along the
world line of some subject who actually observes this object. That is, we may
equally well say that we are trying to order all subjective changes of percep-
tion. These subjective changes correspond to objects placed at the same spatial
location as the subject itself.
Definition 1.26 (Temporal updates). If a subject k observes the change of
an object O in its immediate vicinity, this event belongs to time n + 1 if and
only if it is place inside the light cone of another event that belongs to time n,
and it is located along the world-line of k, or of another subject k′.
This definition is illustrated in Fig. 1.25. It means that a subjectively per-
ceived event defines a temporal update if and only if an immediately preceding
event of the same kind can influence it causally.
Definition 1.26 avoids the problem that the ordering of two objects or events
with space-like separation is ambiguous depending on the state of motion of the
observer. In that case we presuppose observers that move with different speeds
in relation to the two objects or events. They are not placed where the two
events actually happen. Therefore they have to deduce the timing upon which
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they disagree. We can disregard their deductions since they does not correspond
to direct perceptions. (This point is further discussed in section 3.8).
To summarize, in the present description, the perceived flow of time is repre-
sented by a discrete sequence of states of potential knowledge. The continuous
time parameter t loses its global, absolute status, and are replaced by continuous
relational attributes tij , connecting pairs of objects Oi and Oj in any given state
of knowledge. In this manner, relational time enters the physical description in
the same way as distance, as attributes relating object pairs.
Assumption 1.21 (The concept of time has two components). 1) A
sequential ordering of states of potential knowledge PK(n), PK(n+ 1), PK(n+
2), . . ., and 2) a relational attribute tij that relates any pair of objects Oi and
Oj in each state PK(n). These objects in PK(n) may belong to the present,
PKN(n), or past, M(PK(n − 1)). If Oi belong to the present and Oj to the
past, then tij = −tji > 0 If Oi and Oj both belong to the present, then tij = 0.
Physical law becomes a rule that relates PK(n) and PK(n + 1). More
precisely, given PK(n) a rule is assumed to exist that constrains the set {rij , tij},
as well as other attributes, that are perceivable in any updated state of potential
knowledge PK(n+ 1).
In the vocabulary of this section, the assumption that physical law only
depends on independent (identifiable) objects, means that it only depends on
objects that can belong both to the present and past part of a given state of
potential knowledge. To elaborate on this point, any object O ⊆ PKN(n)
that we need to consider must have a chance to persist in the updated state of
knowledge: O ⊆ PKN(n + 1). This statement only have meaning if there is
also a memory of O from time n in PK(n+1), that is O ⊆M(PK(n)). In other
words, apart from O ⊆ PK(n+1) with PrO = 1, there must be a related object
O′ = M(O) ⊆ PK(n + 1) with PrO′ = 0. Simply put, any relevant object is
possible to trace in some sequence of states PK(n).
To me, there is one situation in which the present two-fold picture of time
appears to be the only reasonable one. It is when we listen to music. The
appreciation of harmonies, and the emotional response they give rise to in the
present, depends crucially on memories of sounds in the immediate past, to the
extent that the music would cease to exist without these memories. That is,
each present state of the listener contains both the present and the past; each
fleeting ‘now’ can be unfolded to an entire space-time. At the basic level of
physical desciption, the very perception of a sound relies on memories of the
past, since an extended period of relational time t is needed to determine the
frequencies that define the sound that we hear at a given moment.
1.11 Interaction between subject and object
The traditional scientific view is that the aware state is a function of the physical
state, and that the evolution of the physical state is determined by the physical
state itself. Consequently, the outcome of a subjective choice is regarded to be
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Figure 1.26: If the physical state determines the aware state, but the aware
state cannot affect the physical state, the objective aspect of the world becomes
more fundamental, contrary to the spirit of intertwined dualism. O stands for
the observation of events that are determined by physical law, and A stands for
an action that is not determined by physical law, but may be constrained by it.
Compare Figs. 1.1 and 1.10.
a function of the physical state of the body just before the choice is made. This
means that the subjective aspect of the world is a slave under the objective
aspect (Fig. 1.1). Philosophers have given the name epiphenomenalism to the
hypothesis that the subjective aspect of the world exists, but that it just mirrors
the objective one.
I want to conclude this introductory section by noting that from a purely
aesthetic perspective, this hypothesis is unsatisfactory if intertwined dualism is
accepted as a proper basis for scientific understanding (Assumption 1.1). In this
picture, the subjective and objective aspects emerge from each other, and one of
them cannot be regarded as more fundamental than the other. In contrast, in the
epiphenomenalistic picture the objective aspect becomes more fundamental. A
more symmetric picture is that the subject can passively ‘observe’ the evolution
of objects, but that it can also actively affect them by some ‘action’ A (Fig.
1.26). These matters are further discussed in Sections 2.13 and 3.2.
The main point is that there are situations in which the conditions that
determine the update PK(n) → PK(n + 1) cannot be completely described
in terms of causation and probability. This fact consititutes a ‘white hole’ in
physical law, in which there is playground for the action A. However, such a
free action can only be defined in negative terms, as an event that is neither the
result of a deterministic law, nor a probabilistic one. Furthermore, the hole has
limits, meaning that physical law constrains which free actions are possible.
Most often the lack of determinism of quantum mechanics is discussed in
terms of the probabilities encoded in the amplitudes of the wave function. Can
these probabilities be described in terms of the deterministic evolution of hidden
variables, or are they fundamental? However, there is an even deeper indeter-
minism, which is less often discussed, for some strange reason.
To define the probabilities, we must first choose which experiment we are
going to do, which variable we are going to observe. The formalism tells us
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nothing about how this choice comes about, not even in a probabilistic sense.
Nevertheless the choice makes a clear physical difference when it comes to the
future state of the observed system, and the future state of the world at large.
This is an example of the ‘white hole’.
To circumvent the problem we might argue that there is a meta-experiment
going on in our brain, in which the outcome is the decision to do this or that
experiment, and that there are well-defined probabilities in a meta-wavefunction
associated with each possible experiment. However, this idea just moves the
white hole to the level of the meta-experiment. We end up in infinite regress.
54 CHAPTER 1. IDEAS AND CONCEPTS
Chapter 2
EPISTEMIC FORMALISM
In this chapter, the ideas and conclusions presented above are given a tighter
symbolic form. I aim to present a formal skeleton that can be transfomed into
a mathematical formalism of an extended quantum mechanics. The reader is
referred back to the previous sections to add more conceptual flesh to the formal
bones.
2.1 The structure of knowledge
We let Kkm be the aware knowledge of subject k ∈ N at individual time instant
m ∈ N. We let PKkm be the potential knowledge of k at individual time instant
m, that is, all candidates of knowledge that may become knowledge Kkm′ at any
later time m′ > m, properly interpreted by k as her own memories of time m.
PKkm can be expressed as the union of the potential knowledge PKN
k
m of
potentially perceived objects belonging to the present (time instant m), and the
knowledge M(PKkm−1) of objects that are memories of all past times m
′′ < m,
potentially perceivable at time m:
PKkm = PKN
k
m ∪M(PKkm−1). (2.1)
The state of potential knowledge that corresponds to the physical state is
the union of the potential knowledge of all subjects. The sequential time n is
updated each time one of the individual times m is updated, corresponding to
a subjective change in subject k (Fig. 1.24).
PK(n) =
⋃
k PK
k
mk
mk → mk + 1⇒ n→ n+ 1 (2.2)
Individual potential knowledge often overlap, corresponding to different subjects
being potentially aware of the same objects (Fig. 1.8). Dividing PK(n) into
present and past parts as in Eq. 2.1, we may write
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PKN(n) =
⋃
k PKN
k
mk
M(PK(n− 1)) = ⋃kM(PKkmk−1) , (2.3)
leading to
PK(n) = PKN(n) ∪M(PK(n− 1)). (2.4)
Instead of using the letter M to label memories, we may assign a presentness
attribute Pr ∈ {0, 1} to any object O potentially perceived by any subject, with
Pr = 1 if it belongs to the present, and Pr = 0 if it belongs to the past. Then
we may write
PK(n) =
⋃
l
Ol, (2.5)
A description of the knowledge of all attributes of Ol (including Pr) is assumed
to be contained in the symbol O:
Ol =

{pkl(Ai)}i
{pkl,l′(Aj)}j,l′
{pkl,l′,l′′(Ak)}k,l′,l′′
...
 . (2.6)
Here, Ai is the i:th internal attribute of object Ol (such as presentness or spin).
The ordering of the attributes is arbitrary but fixed. Aj is the j:th relational
attribute relating two objects Ol and Ol′ (such as distance or time). Ak is the
k:th relational attribute relating three objects Ol, Ol′ , and Ol′′ (such as angle).
As far as I am aware, no fundamental relational attribute relating four or more
objects is needed in today’s physics, but the option must be left open. pkl(Ai)
is the potential knowledge of the internal attribute Ai, and correspondingly
for pkl,l′(Aj) and pkl,l′,l′′′(Ak). Defocused and conditional knowledge must be
allowed for.
Beside direct experiences of the present or memories of the past, deduced
knowledge also have an important role to play (Fig. 1.2). Many objects used
in scientific descriptions are deduced. For instance, analyzing the chemical
composition of a sample, we observe objects in the form of digits appearing on
a display of a measuring apparatus, and we remember the experimental setup.
But the actual chemical compounds are just deduced objects, arrived at with the
help of logic and physical law from memories O1 belonging to M(PK(n − 1)),
and observations O2 belonging to PKN(n).
Definition 2.1 (Quasiobject O˜). An object that is not directly perceived, but
deduced via physical law.
To each quasiobject O˜ corresponds exactly one real objectO ⊂ PKN namely
the object of insight about O˜. For a general deduction we may write
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O1 ⊂M(PK(n− 1)) ∪O2 ⊂ PKN(n)
⇓
O3 ⊂ PKN(n+ 1)↔ O˜3,
(2.7)
where O˜3 is the deduced quasiobject. Note that time is updated from n to n+1
when the deduction is made; we can distinguish the states before and after we
have had an insight.
Just as the ability to distinguish the present from the past is taken to be a
basic fact, treated like an assumption, we assume the interpretational ability to
distinguish direct experiences from deductions (Fig. 1.2):
PKN(n) = PKNe(n) ∪ PKNd(n), (2.8)
where the subscripts e and d stand for experience and deduction, respectively
(Fig. 2.1). We may therefore rewrite Eq. 2.7 as
O1 ⊂M(PK(n− 1)) ∪O2 ⊂ PKNe(n) ∪O3 ⊂ PKNd(n)
⇓
O4 ⊂ PKNd(n+ 1)↔ O˜4.
(2.9)
where an old deduction O3 ↔ O˜3 is allowed as input for a new one, O4 ↔ O˜4 ,
beside memories O1 and observations O2.
A given identifiable object (Definition 1.17) may be a quasiobject at one
time n, but be directly perceived at another time. A classic example is the sun:
it does not cease to exist after sunset, we know that it must still be there. But if
there is only one subject on earth, or if all subjects live on the same hemisphere,
no one has the potential to see it directly. Some quasiobjects are expected to
be quasibjects at all times, however. It is hard to imagine aware beings that
can ever perceive electrons or other elementary particles directly.
Statement 2.1 (There may be temporary quasiobjects). An identifiable
object O may be a quasiobject at time n, that is, O ⊂ PKNd(n) ↔ O˜, but be
directly perceived at another time n′, that is, O ⊂ PKNe(n′).
The quasiobjects may refer to the past (retrodictions), to the present or to
the future (predictions). This mean that the presentness attribute Pr take a
third value, say 2, for quasiobjects, corresponding to a predicted object. The
range of Pr is thus {0, 1, 2} for quasiobjects and {0, 1} for objects.
Let ˜PK(n) be the state of potential ‘quasiknowledge’, the state of all possible
deductions from PK(n − 1). Since there corresponds one object of potential
insight to each potential quasiobject, we may write
˜PK(n)↔ PKNd(n). (2.10)
This relation expresses the fact that since ˜PK(n) exhausts the possible deduc-
tions from PK(n− 1), it is a function of PK(n). Therefore, it is redundant to
include it as part of PK(n). But in some cases it is convenient to include it in
an extended state ˆPK(n) of potential knowledge (Fig. 2.1). We have
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Figure 2.1: The present part of potential knowledge PKN(n) can be divided
into the present experiences PKNe(n) and the presently made deductions
PKNd(n), that use the memory M(PK(n − 1)) of the previous state of po-
tential knowledge as premise. Each object of deductional insight in PKNd(n)
point to a quasiobject, an object that is deduced to exist at some time, but of
which we may have direct experience. ˜PK(n) is the union of all quasiobjects.
The extended potential knowledge ˆPK(n) = PK(n) ∪ ˜PK(n) is a function of
PK(n) and it is inappropriate to say that it is larger than PK(n). Compare
Figs. 1.12, 1.21, and 1.22.
ˆPK(n) = PKN(n) ∪M(PK(n− 1)) ∪ ˜PK(n). (2.11)
In the picture of extended potential knowledge (Fig. 2.1), we may lift out
the ‘belt’ of quasiobjects in ˜PK and place it at safe distance, as an opposing
pole that represent ‘physical objects’, as opposed to the percevived objects,
representing ‘subjective experiences’. It must be remembered, however, that
the quasiobject represent the ‘objective world’ only to the extent that they are
necessary objects in the mathematical representation of the physical law that
governs the evolution of the subjective experiences. In this way we get back
the original picture of intertwined duality (Fig. 1.1) with renamed aspects (Fig.
2.2).
Potential knowledge about the past in the form of memories can never in-
crease as time goes. However, extended potential knowledge including quasiob-
jects may increase. We may have experiences today that were not precisely
dictated by physical law (no determinism), which make it possible to deduce
something new about the past, something that was not part of potential knowl-
edge back then. We have to require, though, that the new knowledge about the
past does not contradict the previous knowledge about the past, and does not
lead to predictions about the present that contradicts what we observe now.
For example, astronomers may construct a telescope with wich they observe
a distant interstellar gas cloud. Due to the finite speed of light they observe its
properties as they were a long time ago. There were no aware subjects in the
gas cloud at that time who formed memories of its properties, and before the
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Figure 2.2: The same illustration of the idea behind ‘intertwined dualism’ as
in Fig. 1.1, where potential knowledge PK is identified with the subjective
aspect, and potential ‘quasiknowledge’ ˜PK consisiting of deduced quasiobjects
is identified with the objective aspect. Compare also Fig. 1.10.
telescope was built, the radiation from the cloud that reached the earth was too
faint to leave traces in the bodies of terrestial subjects that have the potential
to become aware experiences. Therefore, we may observe all kinds of properties
of the gas cloud that were not fixed before the observation, without running the
risk of contradiction.
This discussion about extended potential knowledge has brought us back to
the question of epistemic consistency (Assumption 1.6). This is natural, since
consistency is all about deduction. We divide the consistency requirement into
two parts.
First, the present is not allowed to contradict the past, given physical law.
(In contrast, one cannot say that two objects that both are part of the present
contradict each other.)
Assumption 2.1 (Epistemic consistency 1). Assume that O is an iden-
tifiable object (Definition 1.17) that can be both directly perceived and deduced
(Definition 2.1). Physical law must be such that for any state of potential knowl-
edge PK(n), ˜PK(n) does not contradict M(PK(n − 1)) in the sense that the
properly deduced quasiobject O˜ ∈ ˜PK(n) is never described by deduced attribute
values that are knowably different from those of the same remembered object
O ∈M(PK(n− 1)).
One may want to add the condition that memories experienced at time n′
that refer back to time n must be consistent with PKN(n). However, this
is included in the notion of ‘proper memories’ that is implicit in the state
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M(PK(n′ − 1)).
Second, the present must also conform with the past in the following sense.
Assumption 2.2 (Epistemic consistency 2). Let ˜PKnew(n;n
′) be the new
potential knowledge about time n that physical law make it possible to deduce at a
later time n′ > n. That the deduced knowledge is new means that ˜PKnew(n;n′)∩
ˆPK(n) = ∅. Let ˆPKnew(n) = ˆPK(n) ∪ ˜PKnew(n;n′). Then, for any time
n′′ > n, we have ˆPKnew(n′′) = ˆPK(n′′) for any (extended) potential knowledge
ˆPKnew(n
′′) that may follow from ˆPKnew(n) via physical law.
The idea is illustrated in Fig. 2.3. This more subtle kind of consistency
is the one we discussed in relation to the interstellar gas cloud. The same
line of reasoning was used in Section 1.3, in connection with the discussion
of the double slit experiment, and led to the first attempt to formulate the
meaning of epistemic consistency (Assumption 1.6). Suppose that we see an
interference pattern. If it were possible after that to gain knowledge that make
it possible to retrodict which slit the particle actually passed, then the future
state that would follow if this knowledge were there at the time of passing would
contradict the state that we actually perceived and remember now. We would
get no interference pattern. This is an expression of the well-known quantum
mechanical rule that interference patterns only appear when it is impossible in
principle to gain path information at a later time, be it via regained memories,
later deduction from memories, or deduction from knowledge acquired later.
If we recall Eq. 2.10, and refer to Fig. 2.1, then we see that Assumption 2.2
can be seen as a requirement of self-consistency for PK(n). The retrodictions
that are possible to make must point to quasiobjects ˜PK(n) that correspond
to real objects of a past physical state that can evolve, together with objects
corresponding to potential memories of this past time, to the same physical
state we started out with, with its retrodictions (Fig. 2.3). The circle must
close.
The actual deductions made by any group of subjects is of course a much
smaller state of quasiknowledge than ˜PK(n), due to lack of intelligence, lack
of knowledge of physical law, or simply because the analytical mind is resting.
Therefore the above strict requirement of consistency is never put to a com-
plete test, and one may argue that it might be loosened. But because of the
lack of determinism (Statement 1.5), Nature can never be sure about the fu-
ture intellectual capabilities and activities of its creatures, and cannot risk any
contradiction by underestimating their intelligence.
The notation Ol ⊂ PK has already been used for an object being part of a
state of potential knowledge. As expressed in Eq. 2.6, the state of knowledge
of the attributes is implicit in the symbol Ol. More generally, we may write
PK ′ ⊆ PK (2.12)
if PK contains at least the same objects as PK ′, and the potential knowledge
of the attributes of the shared objects is at least as great in PK as in PK ′. This
means that at least the same attributes are known, and that the knowledge of
the value of each attribute is at least as exact.
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of Assumption 2.2. Anything that can be deduced about
time n from any possible future state of potential knowledge PK(n′) must be
insignificant enough, so that it does not cause a future state PK ′(n′) that is
different in any way from the state PK(n′) we actually see. Such a forbidden
difference might be an outright contradiction, but it might also amount to more
(or less) focused knowledge, or more or less conditional knowledge.
62 CHAPTER 2. EPISTEMIC FORMALISM
2.2 The physical state
According to the tentative Definition 1.9, the physical state representation is
a specification in symbolic form of the state of potential knowledge PK. Let
us call such a schema of symbols S¯. The fact that S¯ represents PK may be
expressed as
S¯ ↪→ PK. (2.13)
We require that a given representation S¯ corresponds to at most one state
of potential knowledge PK, but we do not exclude the possibility that several
representations S¯ may correspond to the same state PK:
S¯ ↪→ PK
S¯′ ↪→ PK. (2.14)
In other words, we allow the symbolic representation of PK to have re-
dundant degrees of ‘symbolic freedom’ that do not reflect degrees of ‘epistemic
freedom’ in PK.
The hypothesis that all kinds of knowledge can be described by sets of ob-
jects, with attributes and attribute values (Assumptions 1.5 and 1.7), suggests
that it is indeed possible to represent PK as a symbolic schema S¯. But it is not
self-evident that there is a sensible way to represent it uniquely. This is why we
allow the symbolic elbow-room expressed in Eq. [2.14].
Definition 2.2 (Exact knowledge representations Z¯). The symbolic schema
Z¯ is exact if and only if it represents a state of knowledge κ for which the po-
tential knowledge of all independent objects and attributes is complete.
Symbolically,
Z¯ ↪→ κ (2.15)
In order to obtain a clear definition of a physical state, and of physical law
that acts on such states, we would like to define physical states S and exact
states Z so that they do not refer to specific symbolic representations. Later
on, the distinction between the physical state S and a particular representation
S¯ ↪→ S (2.16)
of this state will be essential.
The incompleteness of any actual state of knowledge PK is expressed by the
use of the logical constant or, as discussed in section 1.5. This or that object
may exist, and that attribute may have this or that value, possibly conditional
on the value of other attributes or the existence of other objects.
Let κi be a state of complete knowledge. Then there is a set {κi}PK such
that PK could turn out to be κi if it were possible to remove the incompleteness
of knowledge inherent in PK, as if you put on perfect glasses. We may write
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PK = κ1 or κ2 or κ3 or . . . , κi ∈ {κi}PK . (2.17)
Even conditional knowledge is contained in this simple description, in the
form of exclusion of states κi that do not fulfil the relevant conditions. (For
simplicity we use an index i to distinguish different states of complete knowledge
even if we have not decided whether they form a countable set or not.)
We may simply identify κi with a point Zi in a state space S.
Definition 2.3 (The state space S). To each κi we associate exactly one
‘point’ Zi ∈ S. The state space S is the set of all possible exact states Zi.
The space of possibilities is limited by a given a set of independent attributes
that describe any object, a given range of possible values of each attribute, and
a lower bound on the number of objects, given by the necessary existence of
an observer who observes at least one object. The properties of state space are
further discussed in section 2.5.
The physical state S can then be defined as the union of all exact states Zi
that correspond to a state of complete knowledge κi that is not excluded by the
actual potential knowledge PK.
Definition 2.4 (The physical state S). We have S =
⋃
i Zi, where Zi ↔
κi ∈ {κi}PK for each i. The set {κi}PK is defined by Eq. [2.17].
Note that even if the physical state S is never given by an exact state Z
(Statement 1.5), these states are nevertheless well-defined, since the concept of
complete knowledge is needed to define our actual incomplete knowledge.
Since Z has no specific symbolic form, S has no specific symbolic form either.
In this way we get rid of any redundancy of representation. The relations
between Z and κ, and between S and PK, become one-to-one correspondences:
Z ↔ κ
S ↔ PK. (2.18)
In relation to Definition 2.3 we noted that the extent of state space S was
limited by the number of independent attributes, the number of possible values
of these attributes, and a minimum number of objects. These limitations define
an outer boundary of S. The minimal state of potential knowledge PK0 is
mapped to this boundary (dash-dotted closed curve in the left panel of Fig.
2.4).
S ↔ PK0 (2.19)
Note that there is only one such state PK0, corresponding to the ‘naked’
awareness ‘I am’ or ‘there is something’ (Fig. 1.6).
At the other side of the coin, the extent of knowledge space K is limited by
the outer boundary of the currently unknowable (Figs. 1.12 and left panel of Fig.
2.4). Attributes or values of attributes that cannot be perceived or determined
even in principle are not part of any state κ of complete knowledge. We may
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Figure 2.4: The state space S has exact states Z as elements. Larger states
of knowledge PK are mapped to smaller physical states S and vice versa. In
particular, the aware knowledge K is contained in the potential knowledge PK,
whereas the corresponding ‘aware physical state’ AS contains the physical state
S. Since knowledge is always incomplete (Statement 1.3), S never shrinks to a
point Z. Compare Figs. 1.12 and 2.10.
say that each such state κi fills the entire knowledge space K consisting of the
potential knowledge and the currently unknowable (but knowable in principle).
Consequently any exact state Zi is mapped to the entire knowledge space
∀i : Zi ↔ K (2.20)
More generally,
PK ′ ⊂ PK ⇔ S′ ⊃ S. (2.21)
For the aware state of knowledge K we have K ⊆ PK. Let AS ↔ K be the
corresponding ‘aware physical state’. Then AS ⊇ S, according to Eq. 2.21.
This relation is illustrated in Fig. 2.4.
The sizes of the knowledge state and the physical state behave like infor-
mation content and entropy, respectively. Larger information content means
smaller entropy, and vice versa. The entropy concept is discussed further in
section 3.14.
We may say that the knowledge states PK correspond to the subjective
component of the world, whereas the physical states correspond to the objective
component. Compare Figs. 1.1 and 1.10.
Any actual state of potential knowledge is larger than PK0 (Fig. 2.4). There
are always some states κi of complete knowledge that contradict our knowledge.
If all we perceive is a grayish haze and a humming noise, we can exclude all κi
corresponding to a clear blue sky, all κi corresponding to a barking dog being
in the neighborhood, and so on.
This means that for any physical state S there are exact states Zi such that
Zi /∈ S. The maximal set of such states form a non-empty complement SC to
S such that
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Figure 2.5: (a) The physical state S, its boundary ∂S, and its complement Sc,
consisting of all exact states Z that contradict the potential knowledge PK
corresponding to S. By convention, Sc is a closed set with ∂S ⊆ Sc. (b) It is
easier to determine Sc by exclusion of impossible alternatives, than to find all Z
in S that are consistent with PK. If a grayish haze is perceived, all Z with too
high or too low light intensity can be excluded. Light intensity is an attribute
A, and the potential knowledge pk(A) of its value corresponds to the middle
interval Υ of the line.
S ∪ Sc = S
S ∩ Sc = ∅ (2.22)
If the elements in S are ordered in a predefined manner, e.g. according to
the values of their attributes, a boundary ∂S between S and Sc can always be
defined. (One of the sets must be defined to be open, the other closed.) If
light intensities are ordered along a line, both extreme light and almost no light
contradict the perception of the grayish haze (Fig. 2.5).
Each individual set S, Sc or ∂S can be used as a description of the physical
state. From an epistemic point of view, it is preferable to define it with the help
of Sc. Then we don’t have to refer to individual exact states Z, which we can
never pinpoint since potential knowledge is always incomplete (Statement 1.3).
In the grayish haze, we can immediatley exclude all exact states with too low or
too high light intensity from S, but we cannot include all exact states with light
intensity in the allowed middle interval. Some of them may have values of other
attributes that are forbidden, or may contain forbidden attributes or objects.
For this reason, I choose to define Ss to be the closed set, so that ∂S ⊆ Sc.
From a mathematical point of view, this has no significance.
Figure 2.6 shows how composite states of knowledge relate to composite
physical states. The logical constants OR, AND and NOT are replaced by the
set theoretical binary operations ∪, ∩, and \. The two states of knowledge K˜1
and K˜2 may refer to the individual potential knowledge PK
1 and PK2 of two
subjects, to two objects O1 and O2, to the knowledge pk(A1) and pk(A2) of two
attributes of the same object, or to two elements of knowledge about the value
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Figure 2.6: The relation between composite states of knowledge and the physical
state. The knowledge element K˜i corresponds to the physical state S˜i. Given
knowledge K˜1, the addition ‘OR K˜2’ reduces the amount of knowledge and
makes the physical state grow (becoming more defocused). The additions ‘AND
K˜2’ and ‘NOT K˜2’ increases the amount of knowledge and make the physical
state shrink.
of a single attribute, or any other pair of knowledge elements.
The knowledge elements K˜1 and K˜2 are shown as non-overlapping. This
is always true for a pair of objects or a pair of attributes, which are distinct
by definition. It may not be true for a pair of individual states of knowledge
(Fig. 1.8), or a pair of knowledge elements about the value of some attribute.
However, this does not affect the symbolic translation to the physical state.
As long as K˜1 and K˜2 do not contradict each other, S˜1 and S˜2 will overlap.
If they would contradict each other, K˜1 OR K˜2 and K˜1 AND K˜2 would be
improper states of knowledge. The state of knowledge K˜1 NOT K˜2 would be
improper if K˜1 and K˜2 overlapped.
Let us complete the dictionary translating elements of PK to symbols that
can be used to specify S:
1. Object O ↔ SO.
2. Potential knowledge pk(A) of attribute A ↔ Υ.
3. OR ↔ ∪
4. AND ↔ ∩
5. NOT ↔ \
Here SO is the state of an object, and Υ is a set of values of A not excluded
by the potential knowledge pk(A) (Fig. 2.5). Let us elaborate on the object
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state SO, since we will use this concept frequently in what follows. The concept
is meaningful when we consider a physical state S that corresponds to potential
knowledge PK of at least two objects. If we choose one object O among these,
SO is the physical state that would result if the knowledge about all the other
objects was erased.
Definition 2.5 (The state SO of object O). SO is the union of all exact
states Z in state space that do not contradict the fact that O exists, or the
potential knowledge of its internal attributes.
Let the corresponding state of potential knowledge be PKO. We have defined
ΩO as the complement to O (Definition 1.23). Generally, S ⊆ SO∩SΩO , referring
to the middle panel in Fig. 2.6.
Definition 2.6 (The state of the environment SΩO to object O). SΩO is
the union of all exact states Z in state space that do not contradict the existence
of any of the perceived objects in the complement ΩO to O, or the potential
knowledge of the attributes internal to this complement.
If there would be no knowledge PKR about the relational attributes that
relate O to its environment ΩO, and if there would be no conditional knowledge
PKC that relates O and ΩO, then we would have PK = PKO ∪ PKΩO . This
is the same as to say S = SO ∩ SΩO . However, whenever SO is defined, there
is also some knowledge about the relation between O and its environment. We
must therefore always write PK = PKO ∪PKΩO ∪PKR. This means that PK
is larger than PKO ∪ PKΩO , or that S ⊂ SO ∩ SΩO .
Statement 2.2 (Any object is related to its environment). For any
perceived object O we have S ⊂ SO ∩ SΩO .
There may also be conditional knowledge relating object O and its comple-
ment ΩO. In that case we should write
PK = PKO ∪ PKΩO ∪ PKR ∪ PKC . (2.23)
In the scientific modelling of the behavior of an object we often assume
that it is isolated. In our terminology this approximation corresponds to the
assumption that S = SO ∩ SΩO . We know, of course, that this is never quite
true, as expressed in Statement 2.2. It is impossible in principle to make S fill
the entire intersection between SO and SΩO , even if we may come close.
Definition 2.7 (An isolated object). An object O is isolated if and only if
S = SO ∩ SΩO .
The set-theoretic relations expressed in Statement 2.2 and Defintion 2.7 are
illustrated in Fig. 2.7.
If we do not involve quasiobjects in the description of PK, then the number
of objects, and the number of attributes of each object, is always precisely known
at each sequential time n, given by the distinctions that are possible to make in
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Figure 2.7: SO is the state corresponding to knowledge of object O. SΩO is the
state corresponding to all other objects in a state S of composite knowledge.
SO is shown large since it corresponds to ‘small’ knowledge of a single object
(c.f. Fig. 2.4). The state S is a proper subset of the intersection between SO
and the environment SΩO whenever O is related to its environment.
the potential perception. If we involve quasiobjects such as elementary particles
in the description, the number N of objects in the specification of the state is
typically not precisely known, since many values of N may be consistent with
the potential knowledge of the system under consideration. In this case we may
re-express 2.23 as
PK =
 J⋃
j=1
PKOj
 ∪ PKR ∪ PKC . (2.24)
In terms of the physical state we get
S =
 J⋂
j=1
SOj
 ∩ ΣR ∩ ΣC . (2.25)
Let us discuss the role of conditional knowledge in this kind of expression.
It is possible to divide this knowledge into K distinct conditions Ck, so that we
may write
ΣC =
K⋂
k=1
ΣCk, (2.26)
where ΣCk is the set of exact states Z for which condition Ck is fulfilled. Often,
it is more straightforward to remove the exact states for which the conditions
are not fulfilled, than to check for consistency with all the conditions, as will be
exemplified below. From this perspective,
S =
 J⋂
j=1
SOj
 ∩ ΣR \ ΣcC1 \ ΣcC2 \ . . . \ ΣcCK , (2.27)
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where ΣcCk is the set of exact states Z for which a given condition Ck is not
fulfilled.
It may be instructive to be a litte more concrete. To this end we note first
that SOj is just an array of the internal attributes Aij of object Oj , which can
be specified as a list of the sets Υij of allowed values:
SOj =

Υ1j
Υ2j
...
Υnj
 , (2.28)
where we may have n = n(j).
Conditional knowledge is a set of conditions that relate the values of at-
tributes - either different attributes of the same object, or attributes of different
objects. In the simplest case,
Ck : υij ∈ ∆ij ⇒ υi′j′ ∈ ∆i′j′ , (2.29)
where ∆ij ⊂ Υij , and ∆i′j′ ⊂ Υi′j′ . In words, if the value υij of the attribute
Ai of object Oj belongs to some subset ∆ij of the allowed values Υij , then the
value υi′j′ of the attribute Ai′ of object Oj′ belongs to a subset ∆i′j′ of the
allowed values of this attribute. More complicated conditions can of course be
formulated, for example υij ∈ ∆ij OR υi′j′ ∈ ∆i′j′ ⇒ υi′′j′′ ∈ ∆i′′j′′ .
To illustrate, consider a state consisting of two objects with two attributes
each, and one condition C:
S =
[
Υ11
Υ21
]
∩
[
Υ12
Υ22
]
∩ ΣR \ ΣcC
C : υ21 ∈ ∆21 ⇒ υ12 ∈ ∆12
(2.30)
Writing Υ21 = ∆21 ∪∆c21, and Υ12 = ∆12 ∪∆c12, we get
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S =
[
Υ11
∆21 ∪∆c21
]
∩
[
∆12 ∪∆c12
Υ22
]
∩ ΣR \ ΣcC
=
([
Υ11
∆21
]
∩
[
∆12
Υ22
])
∪
([
Υ11
∆c21
]
∩
[
∆12
Υ22
])
∪
([
Υ11
∆21
]
∩
[
∆c12
Υ22
])
∪
([
Υ11
∆c21
]
∩
[
∆c12
Υ22
])
∩ ΣR \ ΣcC
=
([
Υ11
∆21
]
∩
[
∆12
Υ22
])
∪
([
Υ11
∆c21
]
∩
[
∆12
Υ22
])
∪
([
Υ11
∆c21
]
∩
[
∆c12
Υ22
])
∩ ΣR.
(2.31)
The third set within curved brackets on the right hand side of the second equal-
ity equals ΣcC , and is simply removed in the last equality. The presence of a
condition means that it is no longer possible to separate all objects and write
S = SO1 ∩ SO2 ∩ . . . SOJ ∩ ΣR, even if the sets Υij of allowed values of the
attributes are modified.
Statement 2.3 (Conditional knowledge leads to non-separable states).
Suppose that ΣcC 6= ∅. Then S 6=
(⋂
j S
′
Oj
)
∩ ΣR whenever S′Oj is a state that
is defined exclusively in terms of the internal attributes of object Oj.
If quasiobjects are allowed in the specification of the state, their number
N is not be fixed by PK. Then conditions must be allowed that relate the
number of quasiobjects with values of attributes, or the number of quasiobjects
of different types with each other.
We introduced the extended state of potential knowledge ˆPK that includes
quasiobjects in Fig. 2.1. The corresponding physical state Sˇ may be called the
reduced state (Fig. 2.8). We my write
ˆPK ↔ Sˇ. (2.32)
Regarding the reduced state for a particular object O, or quasiobject O˜, we
may correspondingly write
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Figure 2.8: The extended potential knowledge ˆPK includes deduced quasiob-
jects (Fig. 2.1). The corresponding physical state Sˇ may be called the reduced
state, and is a function of S.
ˆPKO ↔ SˇO
ˆPKO˜ ↔ SˇO˜
(2.33)
Since S and Sˇ are basically equivalent, it is not always necessary to be strict
and repeatedly use the word ‘reduced’ or the diacritic sign above the symbol S
when we speak about a state that involves quasiobjects.
2.3 Knowability of the physical state
We have argued that the exact state Z of the world is not knowable. Accordingly,
we describe the physical state as a set S that contains all those Z that are not
excluded by the actual knowledge. But is the state S itself exactly knowable?
In any state of knowledge, there is something we can exclude as being in
conflict with our perception. To perceive something always means that there
is something else that we do not perceive. Referring to Fig. 2.5, if we see just
a grayish haze, we know that we do not perceive a pink haze, or an elephant.
This means that for any physical state S (or state of any object SO), there
are always some parts of state space that we know do not belong to S (or
SO). The situation is illustrated in Fig. 2.9, where the regions bounded by
the staright dashed lines are assumed to be knowably outside S. However, this
leaves considerable freedom to choose a state S within these limits, as illustrated
by the three sets S′, S′′ and S′′′.
To determine S exactly means to locate its boundary ∂S exactly. To do
this, we have to be able to compare pairs of exact states (Z,Z ′) on either side of
∂S that are arbitrarily close in state space, and judge, based on our knowledge,
that one of them belong to S while the other one does not. In a sense, this
corresponds to a precision of knowledge equivalent of the knowledge of the exact
state Z itself. Since the incompleteness of knowledge (Statement 1.3) implies
that we don’t have such a precision, the boundary ∂S is not exactly knowable.
Admittedly, this is heuristic reasoning. We nevertheless formulate the following
statement.
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Figure 2.9: The visual perception of nothing but grayish haze exludes those
regions of state space in which everything is pink, those in which there are
elephants, and those in which everything is dark. Accordingly, the state S must
be located in the complement to these regions, defined by the dashed lines.
But we cannot say which set S′, S′′ or S′′′ is the actual physical state S. To
determine S exactly, we need to discriminate between two arbitrarily close exact
states Z and Z ′ at either side of ∂S. This is not possible when knowledge is
incomplete. Compare Fig. 2.5.
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Statement 2.4 (The physical state S is not exactly knowable). Assume
that some object attributes can take values that are dense. Then the state of
potential knowledge PK is not sufficient to determine the boundary ∂S exactly.
We could try to introduce a ‘metastate’ MS that expresses the actual knowl-
edge of the physical state S in the sense that it is a collection of all states
S′, S′′, S′′′, . . . that we cannot exclude as candidates:
MS = {S′, S′′, S′′′, . . .}. (2.34)
But MS is not precisely knowable, since we cannot locate ∂MS exactly
for the same reason as we cannot locate ∂S exactly. In other words, we cannot
decide exactly which states S′, S′′, S′′′, . . . we should include in MS. Introducing
a ‘meta-metastate’ MMS does not help either. We end up in infinite regress if
we proceed further along this road.
To pinpoint the knowledge of the physical state, it does not help, either, to
try to define a ‘maximal state’ Smax that exludes only those regions of state space
that we know contradict our perceptions (e.g. those containing pink elephants).
The boundary ∂Smax defined by these regions is not exactly knowable for the
same reason as ∂S is not exactly knowable.
There is a minimum size of S - it cannot be allowed to shrink towards an
exact state Z. This allows us to talk about the ‘minimal state’ Smin, just as we
talked about the maximal state Smax. But again, it is impossible to determine
the boundary ∂Smin. Fuzziness is omnipresent. All we can say is that there
exist two non-trivial sets Smin and Smax such that the physical state S fulfils
Smin ⊆ S ⊆ Smax. (2.35)
We say that the two sets are non-trivial since Smin contains several exact states
Z, and Smax is a proper subset of state space.
The ‘known physical state’ thus appears to be an inherently fuzzy concept,
escaping our hands like a slippery soap. However, the physical state itself is well-
defined, since an exact state Z is either consistent with our potential knowledge
PK, or it is not. There are no alternatives in between, no fuzziness. The state
S is just the set of all Z that are consistent with PK. Therefore we have to
distinguish between knowability and existence in the case of physical states.
They are epistemically well-defined, even if they are unknowable in their details
(Fig. 2.10).
The distinction between the physical state and the ‘known physical state’
plays little role in what follows. We will come back to it, however, in section 3.1,
where we introduce the continuous evolution parameter σ, and also in section
3.14, where we discuss entropy.
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Figure 2.10: The state of potential knowledge PK does not determine the phys-
ical state S completely. This means that there are always exact states Z such
that it is not possible to decide whether Z is consistent with PK or not. In
other words, the boundary ∂S is fuzzy. In contrast, it has no meaning to say
that it is impossible to decide whether an element of knowledge is part of PK
or not. Either we potentially know someting, or we do not. The boundary ∂PK
is precisely defined. Compare Fig. 2.4.
2.4 Physical law
Any physical law allows us to define an evolution operator u that acts on any S
and gives another physical state uS such that the next physical state is a subset
of uS:
S(n+ 1) ⊆ uS(n). (2.36)
In other words, given the present physical state, any physical law limits the
possibilities of the future.
Definition 2.8 (The evolution u1). The stepwise evolution operator u1 is
defined by the condition that u1S(n) is the smallest possible set C ⊆ S such
physical law dictates that S(n+ 1) ⊆ C.
The above definition is very general - it should hold for any conceivable
evolution operator u1. We will also make use of the more specific properties of
u1.
Assumption 2.3 (Evolution u1 is unique and invertible). Two states S
and S′ are distinct if and only if u1S and u1S′ are distinct: S ∩ S′ 6= ∅ ⇔
u1S ∩ u1S′ 6= ∅.
That S and S′ are distinct means that they do not overlap. If that is the
case, then u1S and u1S
′ does not overlap either (Fig. 2.11). On the other hand,
if two states S and S′ do overlap, so do u1S and u1S′. The former statement
can be regarded as an assumption of ‘subjective’ invertibility: two subjectively
distinct states cannot evolve into states which are subjectively indistinguishable.
The latter statement is an assumption that the evolution u1 is a function in a
subjective sense: two states that are subjectively the same cannot evolve into
states that are subjectively different.
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Figure 2.11: Physical law as expressed by u1 is analogous to an invertible func-
tion. Evolution of two states S and S′ according to cases a) and b) are allowed
by Assumption 2.3, whereas evolution according to c) and d) are forbidden.
Statement 2.5 (The evolution u1 is a mapping from the power set
P(S) of state space to itself). We may write u1 : P(S) → P(S), where the
domain Du ⊂ P(S) of the mapping is the set {Σ} of those sets Σ ⊂ S that may
correspond to a physical state S(n) or a physical state SO of an object O.
We know that Du is a proper subset of P(S) since exact states Z are elements
of both S and P, and these can never correspond to physical states S(n) or
SO, due to the incompleteness of knowledge (Statement 1.3). The range Ru
of the mapping must also be a proper subset of P(S), since we cannot have
u1S(n) = Z for some exact state Z at the same time as we fulfil the defining
property S(n + 1) ⊆ u1S(n) of u1. We do not attempt, here, to determine the
relation between the domain Du and the range Ru of u1. We cannot be sure
that the set u1Σ corresponds to a possible physical state S or SO just because
Σ does. All we know is that there is a subset of u1Σ that corresponds to such
a physical state whenever Σ does. Therefore we cannot be sure that Ru ⊆ Du.
On the other hand, we cannot be sure that Ru ⊇ Du at this stage either.
The sequence of time instants is defined by the fact that we can tell the
corresponding states apart. They are manifestly distinct; it is not possible for
one exact state Z to be consistent with both S(n) and S(n+ 1):
S(n+ 1) ∩ S(n) = ∅. (2.37)
It follows that S(n) ∩ u1S(n) = ∅ (Fig 2.12).
Definition 2.9 (Determinism). Physical law is deterministic if and only if
S(n+ 1) = u1S(n) for all states S(n).
Definition 2.10 (State determinism). Let u2 ≡ u1u1, u3 ≡ u1u1u1, and so
on. The evolution of the state S(n) is deterministic if and only if S(n + m) =
umS(n) for all m ≥ 1.
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Figure 2.12: Since S(n+ 1) ⊆ u1S(n) must be distinct from S(n), by definition
of successive states, we can define the evolution operator u1 such that S(n) and
u1S(n) are always distinct.
Statement 2.6 (Exact states evolve deterministically). The evolution of
a state S(n) is deterministic if and only if S(n) is exact, that is, S(n) = Z for
some exact state Z.
To motivate Statement 2.6, recall that u1 is assumed to be noiseless (As-
sumption 1.14); it depends on independent objects, and independent attributes
of these (Definitions 1.18 and 1.19), but on nothing else. If the evolution is
not deterministic for an exact state Z, there must be a stochastic term in u1,
contrary to Assumption 1.14. Conversely, if the evolution is deterministic for
an inexact state S, the lack of knowledge of the attributes in this inexact state
would not affect their evolution, and hence the unknown attributes cannot vary
independently.
This means that in the absence of noise, complete knowledge and determin-
istic evolution goes hand in hand. Therefore we could equally well define an
exact state Z as a state that evolves deterministically, according to Definition
2.10.
Definition 2.11 (An exact state Z). A state S is exact if and only if it
evolves deterministically.
This definition is more restrictive than to say that S is exact if and only
if knowledge is complete, since it rules out exact states in a world with noisy
physical law.
Since knowledge is incomplete, the true state S(n) is never exact. Therefore
there is a time n+m such that S(n+m) ⊂ umS(n).
Definition 2.12 (State reduction). A state reduction occurs at time n+ 1 if
and only if S(n+ 1) ⊂ u1S(n).
Statement 2.7 (State reductions do occur). There are times n such that
a state reduction occurs at time n+ 1.
After these considerations, we can state what we mean by physical law.
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Figure 2.13: A process where the first of two alternatives S1 and S2 conceivable
at time n turns out to be true at time n + m. The distinction separating S1
and S2 must correspond to objects that are identifiable in the time interval
[n, n+m].
Definition 2.13 (Physical law). The evolution u1 together with a rule that
tells which states S(n + 1) ⊆ u1S(n) are allowed, given S(n), define what can
be said about physical law.
Note that we do not, in this definition, refer to probabilities for different
outcomes S(n + 1) ⊂ u1S(n) after a state reduction. Probabilities will be
treated as deduced quantitites rather than fundamental components of physical
law, as discussed in section 3.2.
Given any inexact state S we can imagine a set of alternative states that
result if additional knowledge is gained. For instance, if we see a raptor in the
sky but cannot decide which kind, an exhaustive set of alternatives consists
of all species of raptors that live in our country. Any such set of alternatives
divides S into distinct subsets Sj such that
S =
⋃
j Sj ,
Sj ∩ Sj′ = ∅ for all j 6= j′. (2.38)
If the list of alternatives is not exhaustive to begin with, it can trivially be
completed by a last alternative ‘not any of the above’. For instance, the bird
may be ‘a golden eagle, a white-tailed eagle, or some other raptor’. Formally,
an incomplete set {Sj} is completed by adding S \
⋃
j Sj as the last alternative.
A partition of the state into alternatives may represent knowledge that can
be gained at a later time, given the present state S(n), or it may be an imagined
list of alternatives, where it is forever impossible to decide which is true. In the
first case, let S(n) =
⋃
j Sj(n), and assume that one alternative turn out to
be true at some later time n + m. This statement is only meaningful if the
objects corresponding to the alternatives are identifiable, possible to trace from
time n to time n + m (Definition 1.17). This is no restriction since we have
assumed that all objects relevant to physics are identifiable (Assumption 1.14).
The process is illustrated in Fig. 2.13.
For any such partition into alternatives, we have
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Figure 2.14: The evolution of alternatives S1 and S2 in state space is indepen-
dent. The evolution of objects O1 and O2 in knowledge space is not independent
in general, since objects are interacting. SO is basically the state that corre-
sponds to knowledge PKO of O only. Ignoring relational and conditional knowl-
edge, S = SO1 ∩ SO2 . Realization of one alternative Sj means that knowledge
of O1 or O2 increases.
u1S = u1
⋃
j
Sj
 ⊇⋃
j
u1Sj (2.39)
whenever the evolution u1Sj is defined for each Sj , that is, Sj ∈ Du according to
Definition 2.5. This relation must hold since the sets Sj represent alternatives.
If it would not hold, the alternatives Sj would behave as interacting objects.
This would represent a confusion of the state space with the knowledge space
(Fig. 2.14). The interaction of objects can be expressed in state space as
u1
(⋂
l
SOl
)
6⊇
⋂
l
u1SOl . (2.40)
Equation 2.39 can also be seen as an expression of epistemic invariance
(Assumption 1.17). Physical law depends neither on the content, nor the amount
of potential knowledge. In state space, these conditions can be expressed as
Assumption 2.4 (Epistemic invariance). u1 is independent of S, meaning
that it can be represented in a single closed form u¯1 that applies to all state
representations S¯. Also, S′ ⊆ S ⇒ u1S′ ⊆ u1S for any two states S and S′.
As emphasized in section 1.8, this is a purely theoretical statement of the
structure of physical law. In practice, no pair of states S(n) and S(m) can be
subsets of each other. We express this below as the ‘irreducibility of physical
state’ (Statement 2.9).
It is important to note that any set {Sj} that correspond to alternatives that
can be realized constitute a discrete set. This is true regardless the structure of
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the underlying exact states Z. The concept of distinction is again essential; the
alternatives must be possible to distinguish subjectively from each other. This
fact in itself implies that the set contains a countable number of elements. This
conceptual reason for discreteness is mirrored by a physical reason. Consider, for
example, an experiment that measures the distance between two objects. Even
if distance in itself may be a continuous attribute, the result always depends
on an apparatus with finite precision. That apparatus may be the eye, with its
discrete array of rods and cones.
It is not possible to let the division [2.38] into alternatives be a division all the
way down to the exact states Z, and still write down Eq. (2.39). Since we know
that we can never know the exact states (Statement 1.3), physical law should
not refer to Z; we should not be able to write u1Z. In fact, explicit epistemic
minimalism (Assumption 1.19) requires that we fail if we try to express physical
law as if it were acting on the exact states. We conclude the following.
Statement 2.8 (Physical law is irreducible). Let S = ∪jZj. It is not
possible to define an exact evolution operator uZ such that u1S = ∪juZZj holds
true for all states S.
This statement can also be related to Statement 1.10. The fact that two
states of potential knowledge are never subsets of each other is equivalent to
the fact that two physical states S(n) and S(n + m) are never subsets of each
other. The state S(n) is what it is, it cannot be ‘reduced’ by physical action to
be better focused on some Z ∈ S(n).
Statement 2.9 (Physical state is irreducible). Given a physical state S(n),
we never have S(m) ⊂ S(n) at some earlier or later time m.
This statement can be strengthened. Not only are two subsequent states
never subsets of each other, they cannot even overlap.
Statement 2.10 (No partial recurrence). Given a physical state S(n), we
never have S(m) ∩ S(n) 6= ∅ at some earlier or later time m.
The motivation is a bit different than for Statement 2.9, and less funda-
mental. That two states overlap means that they cannot be subjectvely distin-
guished. To say that the state at some time m > n cannot be distinguished
from the state at time n means that sequential time breaks down. The very
statement m > n loses its meaning, since the set of memories associated with
S(m) cannot be distinguished from those associated with S(n). No temporal
comparisons can be made. This fact is discussed in a cosmological context in
Section 3.14, in relation to Fig. 3.99.
Even if two states S(n) and S(m) can never overlap in physical practice, we
can still imagine overlapping states in the formulation of theoretical properties of
these states. It may concern the action on these states of the evolution operator
u1, like the invertibility expressed in Assumption 2.3, or the unknowability of
the details of the boundary ∂S, as discussed in Section 2.3.
The irreducibility of physical law means that the state S does not evolve
as en ensemble of states in the phase space of classical mechanics, or as an
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Figure 2.15: The state boundary ∂S as a membrane. The evolution of the ‘center
of mass’ of the state is subtracted to emphasize the vibrations of ∂S. The exact
states Z ∈ ∂S do not evolve like independent points in an ensemble, just like
the evolution of the points x on a membrane do not evolve independently. In
that case, the evolution of x depends on an entire neighbourhood of x, defining
the tension at x.
ensemble of states in the Hilbert space of quantum mechanics. The evolution is
not pointwise. The interior of S has no structure, there is no measure defined on
it; it is just a set of exact states not excluded by potential knowledge. Therefore,
the only way to avoid pointwise evolution is to let it depend in a non-local way
on the boundary ∂S.
This reminds us of a membrane, where the evolution of the position of one
point on the membrane does not only depend on its present position, but also on
the present position of neighbouring points, defining tension by spatial deriva-
tives (Fig. 2.15).
Statement 2.11 (The state boundary ∂S is a membrane). We may write
u1S = u1∂S = f(∂S), but there is no operator g1 acting on exact states Z∂ ∈ ∂S
such that ∂S = {Z∂} and u1∂S = {g1Z∂}.
In practice, we only need to consider the evolution of actual physical states
S, or actual states of objects SO. The evolution of exact states Z may, at the
most, have a theoretical significance as a basis for expressions of physical law
in symbolic or mathematical form. But the irreducibility of physical law means
that such expressions are not possible. Therefore, we may restrict the domain
Du of u1 to states S that may correspond to actual potential knowledge PK,
or states of objects SO that may correspond to actual potential knowledge of
an object O.
Statement 2.12 (The domain of the evolution operator is the set of
observable states). The domain Du of the evolution operator u1 is the set of
all states S that may correspond to an actual state of potential knowledge PK
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together with the set of all object states SO that may correpond to a state of
potential knowledge PKO about an object O.
Note that we have to distinguish between states S and states of objects SO.
Total states S necessarily involve a subject that has knowledge, and an object O
that corresponds the body of this subject. A state SO may correspond to a tiny
part of knowledge, say of a grain of sand O, without the explicit involvement
of a perceiving subject. In reality, the evolution of an object O depends on its
surroundings, but we nevertheless let u1 be defined for the states of hypothetical
isolated object O.
Since we have introduced the notion of quasiobjects O˜, such as electrons
or atoms, we have to be able to speak about the evolution of the state SˇO of
such deduced objects, given that the state corresponds to extended potential
knowledge ˆPKO that is attainable in principle (Fig. 2.8). Since the use of
deduction via physical law introduces no new knowledge, we have Sˇ{O˜} ↔ SO,
where the object O is deduced to consist of a set {O˜} of quasiobjects.
Definition 2.14 (The evolution uˇ1 of quasiobjects). Given that S
′ = u1S
and that Sˇ ↔ S and Sˇ′ ↔ S′, we define uˇ1 by the relation Sˇ′ = uˇ1Sˇ. A
corresponding statement holds if we apply uˇ1 to a state SˇO˜ of a quasiobject O˜.
It is assumed to be possible to divide any object into minimal objects (As-
sumption 1.16). We will discuss below why at least some of these minimal
objects have to be quasiobjects (Statement 2.30). Epistemic invariance (As-
sumptions 1.17 and 2.4) implies that increased potential knowledge in the form
of object division does not change the evolution of the system (Fig. 1.13). As
discussed in section 1.8 this corresponds to reductionism. It follows that the
evolution of any state S or SO can be expressed in terms of the evolution of
the corresponding states SˇM or SˇOM expressed in terms of minimal objects OM
only.
Statement 2.13 (The evolution u1 expresses reductionism). Suppose that
S′ = u1S, and that S ↔ SˇM . Then S′ ↔ uˇ1SˇM . A corresponding statement
holds for states of objects SO ↔ SˇOM .
What form does the state SˇM take? Let
Sˇj =
⋂
j
SˇMj
 ∩ ΣˇR ∩ ΣˇC . (2.41)
This is a state of a set of minimal objects Ml with states SˇOj related by a
web of relational attributes corresponding to the set ΣˇR ⊂ S, and by a set of
conditions corresponding to the set ΣˇC ⊂ S (compare Eq. [2.25]). It is chosen
such that Sˇj is consistent with S. In other words, the minimal objects present
in Sˇj , with their states and relations, can account for S. Since the minimal
objects may be quasiobjects, several such arrangements, containing a varying
number of minimal objects, may be consistent with or account for S. We have
to write
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Figure 2.16: Illustration of Statement 2.14 and Eq [2.43]. The evolution of the
whole is the union of the evolution of the parts. This holds for all partitions
{Sj} for which the evolution u1 can be applied tp each Sj . Since u1 cannot
be applied to exact states Z, the irreducibility of physical law is not violated
(Statement 2.8).
SˇM =
⋃
j
Sˇj . (2.42)
This is a partition of the state S ↔ Sˇ into alternatives just like in Eq. [2.38],
evolving according to Eq. [2.39]. It should be noted, however, that these alter-
natives are just imagined, in the sense that it can never be decided by means of
an observation which is true.
Let us clarify the evolution [2.39] further (Fig. 2.16).
Statement 2.14 (Linear evolution u1). Assume that S =
⋃
j Sj, and that
Sj ∩ Sj′ = ∅ for all j 6= j′. Whenever u1Sj is defined for each j, the following
equation holds. The same equation holds for quasiobjects, if we put check-marks
above all symbols.
u1S =
⋃
j u1Sj
u1Sj ∩ u1Sj′ = ∅ for all j 6= j′. (2.43)
To motivate this statement, we start by referring back to Eq. [2.38]. We have
already motivated Eq. 2.39. The invertibility of evolution (Assumption 2.3) fur-
ther implies that u1Sj∩u1Sj′ = ∅. Thus we may write u1S =
(⋃
j u1Sj
)
∪Σrest,
where all sets on the right hand side are disjoint, and Σrest is a hypothetical
‘rest set’. Suppose that Σrest corresponds to the evolution of an observable
state. Then the state Σ−rest ≡ u−11 SR is defined according to the invertibility of
u1. We must then have Σ
−
rest ∩ Sj = ∅ for each j according to the uniqueness
of u1. This is the same as to say Σ
−
rest ∩S = ∅. But then invertibility demands
that u1Σ
−
rest ∩ u1S = ∅, that is, Σrest ∩ u1S = ∅. We have a contradiction
if ΣR is not the empty set. Thus, if ΣR is non-empty, then it cannot be the
evolution of a state for which u1 can be defined. Since u1 can be defined for all
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1 The alternatives can never be realized, they are not observable states.
2 There is a time nˆ > n such that it is possible that one alternative Sj
is realized at some time n′ ≥ nˆ, i.e. S(n′) = Sj(n′), but it is not
dictated by physical law that this will happen. We let nˆ be the
smallest possible such time.
3 There is also a time nˇ > n such that physical law dictates that one
alternative Sj will be realized at some time n
′ ≤ nˇ, i.e. S(n′) = Sj(n′).
We let nˇ be the smallest possible such ‘deadline for decision’.
Table 2.1: Three knowability levels of alternatives.
observable states of objects, ΣR must be an unobservable state, which can be
disregarded since it lacks meaning from the epistemic point of view.
Since the reduced evolution uˇ1 is defined for states SˇO of minimal objects
that are observable in principle, we may use Statement 2.14 to write
uˇ1SˇM =
⋃
j
uˇ1Sˇj . (2.44)
Let us try to classify levels of possiblity for realization of the alternatives
in a given set (2.38). Note first that, by definition of potential knowledge, it
can never be known which alternative is true in the present state S(n), the
very state we use to define the alternatives. If it could, by direct perception or
later deduction, the present state would not be S(n) but one of the alternatives
Sj ⊂ S(n). This leaves us three levels of knowability of the alternatives, as
described in Table 2.1.
The present state S(n) and the nature of the set {Sj} determine which level
applies. It has to assumed that the objects involved in the alternatives are
identifiable during the relevant time span (Fig 2.13). At level 2, each Sj(n)
must have a chance to be identifiable at least in the time interval [n, nˆ]. At level
3, each Sj(n) has to be identifiable at least in [n, nˇ]. If these conditions are not
met, the level 2 candidate is degraded to level 1, and the level 3 candidate is
degraded to level 2.
As an example of alternatives at level 1, the question whether the electron
in your liver with the highest speed at time n has spin pointing towards the
head or the feet at some later time n′ > n, will most probably be impossible
ever to answer.
The question whether a raptor in the sky is a golden eagle, a white-tailed
eagle or some other species corresponds to alternatives at level 2. The question
can clearly be answered later, but not necessarily so. It requires that a nearby
friend has binoculars at hand, or that you track it until you come close enough
to be able to resolve its features with your naked eye. It is necessary to track
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Figure 2.17: Sequences of states in which changes occur in the knowability
level, or among the numbers nˆ and nˇ that are associated with alternatives at
knowability levels 2 or 3. A dashed vertical line that separates the alternatives
represents level 2, an absent line represents level 1, and a solid line level 3. The
set S, the alternatives {Sj}, the knowability level and possibly the numbers nˆ
and nˇ together represent the reduced state Sˇ. See text for further discussion.
it continuously to be sure that it is the same bird you finally speciate as you
observed to begin with. This is the condition of identifiability.
Alternatives at level 3 typically arise in prepared states, designed to answer
specific questions. An experimental setup where the experiment has started
is one example. Nature is challenged to show its cards. In some cases the
necessity to get an answer follows trivially from the question. At time n you
may ask whether it will rain at time nˇ. The alternative S1(n) is the union of
the weather conditions at time n that will lead to rain at time nˇ, and S2(n) is
the complementary set. At time nˇ we will know whether we live in state S1(nˇ)
or S2(nˇ). We might even know it a short time before that. The two states are
identifiable by defininition.
The question whether a given partition [2.38] belongs to knowability level 1, 2
or 3 is a function of the state S, and so are the numbers nˆ and nˇ. These numbers
and the knowability level can be said to be attribute values of quasiobjects that
are part of the extended potential knowledge ˆPK, contributing to the reduced
state Sˇ (Fig. 2.8). These attribute values may change with time, just like any
other attribute value.
This point is illustrated in Fig. 2.17. In panel a) we see a sequence of states
in which the knowability level is 2 to begin with. The associated number nˆ
changes in the first time step. In the second step the knowability level changes
to 1. In panel b) the knowability level changes from 2 to 3. Note that the
knowability level cannot change once it has reached level 1 or 3. However, the
pair of numbers [nˆ, nˇ] associated with knowability level 3) may change. In plain
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language, we may delay the inevitable, or get it over with.
Note also that it is meaningless to speak about alternatives at level 2 or 3
that intersect, so that Sj∩Sj′ 6= ∅ for some j 6= j′. Then it would be impossible
to decide which alternative is picked. Accordingly, if physical law includes a rule
that specifies how alternatives are picked, then this rule needs to be defined for
distinct alternatives only.
2.5 State spaces
In this section we characterize the state space S in which physical states S and
object states SO live. We also introduce the concept of an object state space
SO, in which we can embed object states SO, but not the entire physical state
S. Which of these two state spaces is more useful depends on the problem at
hand. Further, we introduce the volume measure V in these spaces. It will be
essential in the following discussions about probability (Section 3.2) and entropy
(Section 3.14).
Our epistemic formalism is based on the concept of identifiable objects, which
are characterized by a set of independent attributes {Ai}, each of which may
take values υij from a given range Υi. The characteristic quality of attribute
values is that they can be ordered (Definition 1.11).
These basic facts give some structure to the state space. An object state SO
is defined as those states of the world that are not excluded by the knowledge
about object O. This knowledge can be expressed as a set of intervals {∆i} ⊆ Υi
of values υij of attribute Ai that are not excluded by this knowledge. We can
therefore define one axis in state space for each attribute Ai, and points on these
axes that correspond to possible attribute values.
To represent the knowledge that correspond to the entire physical state S,
we will have to add one set of such axes for each object in the world, repre-
senting the set of internal attributes of these objects. We also have to add axes
that correspond to the relational attributes needed to describe all interrelations
between the objects.
We see that it is meaningful to speak of a dimension of the state space that
equals the total number of these axes. However, it is not possible to use the basic
epistemic concepts in order to define angles between these axes, or numerical
distances between points. There is no inner product, and no inherent metric.
Take the spatial distance r12 between two objects O1 and O2 as an example.
Knowledge of this distance may be part of the state of potential knowledge PK.
Thus it is a property of the corresponding physical state S that contains O1 and
O2, rather than a property of the underlying state space S. A physical state
S that contains a distance r12 also contains reference objects {Or12} which are
used to measure this distance by means of comparison. If such reference objects
are lacking in S, then the distance r12 is simply not defined - even if O1 and O2
are still there.
Let us try to formalize the above discussion about attributes, attribute values
and distances between these values.
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Definition 2.15 (Ordered attribute). Suppose that the set Υi = {υij} de-
fines the possible values of attribute Ai. Let (υij , υil) be a pair of different values
such that υij ∈ Υi and υil ∈ Υi. The set Υi is ordered if and only if, for each
possible pair (υij , υil), all values υik ∈ Υi such that υik 6= υij and υik 6= υil has
the quality of either being in between the members of (υij , υil) or not.
Definition 2.16 (Betweenness). Betweenness is a relation between three dif-
ferent values υij, υik and υil of the same attribute Ai. If υik is between the
members of the pair (υij , υil) we write υij  υik ≺ υil. Otherwise we write
υij 6 υik 6≺ υil.
When the values are permuted in these formal expressions, the following rules
hold. We have υij  υik ≺ υil if and only if υil  υik ≺ υij. If υij 6 υik 6≺ υil,
then υik  υij ≺ υil or υij  υil ≺ υik.
Suppose that there are more than three different values of Ai, and that
the betweenness relation is defined for each triplet picked from the quadruplet
{υij , υik, υil, υim}. Then the following transitivity rules hold. If υij  υik ≺ υil
and υik  υil ≺ υim, then υij  υik ≺ υim and υij  υil ≺ υim. If
υij  υik ≺ υil and υik  υim ≺ υil, then υij  υik ≺ υim.
In other words, the attribute values are ordered if and only if they are all
equipped with a binary ‘betweenness’ quality with respect to any other pair
of values. The idea is illustrated in Fig. 2.18(a). To be able to apply this
definition, there has to be at least three attribute values υij in the set Υi.
The concept of ordering says nothing about direction. We have not added
any arrows to the dashed attribute axes in Fig. 2.18(a). If we have a pre-
conceived notion about direction, we can say that Definition 2.15 is symmetric
with respect to a direction reversal. However, to make this statement clear, we
should first define explicitly what we mean by directedness and its relation to
ordering.
Definition 2.17 (Directed attribute). Suppose that the set Υi = {υij} de-
fines the possible values of attribute Ai. The set Υi is directed if and only if, for
each υij ∈ Υi, all values υik ∈ Υi such that υik 6= υij has the quality of either
being a successor to υij or not.
Definition 2.18 (Succession). Succession is a relation between two different
values υij and υik of the same attribute Ai. If υik is a successor to υij we write
υij < υik. Otherwise we write υij > υik.
The rule for value permutation in this formal expression is υij < υik if and
only if υik > υij.
Suppose that there are more than two different values of Ai, and that the
succession relation is defined for each pair picked from the triplet {υij , υik, υil}.
Then the following transitivity rules hold. If υij < υik and υik < υil, then
υij < υil.
In plain language, the attribute values are ordered if and only if they are
all equipped with a binary ‘succession’ quality with respect to any other value.
The idea is illustrated in Fig. 2.18(b). To be able to apply this definition, it is
sufficient that there are two attribute values υij in the set Υi.
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Figure 2.18: The attributes Ai can be regarded as axes that span state space. a)
The ordering of the attribute values along a given axis is determined from the
concept of betweenness. We assume that it is always possible to decide whether
a value υ1k is placed between another pair of values (υ1j , υ1l) or not. b) The
values of sequential time has an additional structure, namely direction. For such
an attribute A3, it is always possible to decide which value υ3k succeeds another
value υ3j . c) For attributes with only two possible values (like electron spin
projections), the betweenness quality cannot be defined. d) Circular attributes
are defined by the property that for any pair (υ6j , υ6l), all other values υ6k are
placed between the members of this pair.
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Definition 2.19 (The ordering of directed attribute values). Suppose
that Υi is ordered and directed. Then υij  υik ≺ υil if and only if 1) υij < υik
and υik < υil, or 2) υij > υik and υik > υil.
The inclusion of both alternatives 1) and 2) in this definition provides the
symmetry of the ordering with respect to a change of direction that we men-
tioned above.
The following statement follows directly from the above definitions.
Statement 2.15 (Directed attributes are ordered). All directed sets Υi
are ordered, but an ordered set Υi does not have to be directed.
We have introduced one inherently directed attribute, namely sequential
time n (Section 1.10). However, we do not require that attribute values are
directed, only that they are ordered. Since the definition of an ordered attribute
(Definition 2.15) requires three possible values, we have to make an exception
to allow for attributes with only two possible values, like the spin direction of
an electron [Fig. 2.18(c)].
Definition 2.20 (Attribute). An attribute Ai is defined as a set of values Υi
which can be subjectively associated with each other. If Υi contains more than
two elements, it must be an ordered set according to Definition 2.15.
To make possible a symbolic and numerical representation of the physical
state and of physical law within an epistemic approach to physics, we assume
the following.
Assumption 2.5 (All knowledge can be expressed in terms of objects,
attributes and their values.). To specify the physical state S, it is sufficient
to specify which sets of objects, and which sets of attribute values that describe
and relate them, are not excluded by potential knowledge.
This assumption implies the following statement about state space S.
Statement 2.16 (The attributes span state space.). All physical states
S can be embedded in a state space S spanned by axes defined by attributes,
according to Fig. 2.18. Each object that may be present in S must be allowed
its own set of attribute-axes.
How does the color attribute of quarks fit into the above description of at-
tributes and their values? There is clearly no direction of its three possible
values ‘green’, ‘red’, and ‘blue’. The concept of ‘betweenness’ becomes kind
of degenerate if there are only three possible values, since each value must be
considered to be placed between the other two. Each value has the betweenness
quality ‘yes’ with respect to every possible pair of other values. There is no
betweenness quality ‘no’ around. Nevertheless, this is not required in the defini-
tion of an ordered set of attribute values. We can even turn this degeneracy vice
into a virtue by regarding the color attribute as an example of an interesting
type of ordered attribute, namely the circular ones.
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Definition 2.21 (Circular attribute). An ordered set Υi = {υij} of attribute
values is circular if and only if, for any pair (υij , υil) of different attribute values
such that υij ∈ Υi and υil ∈ Υi, all the other attribute values υik have the quality
of being in between the members of (υij , υil), that is, υij  υik ≺ υil.
The idea behind such circular attributes is illustrated in Fig. 2.18(d). They
are naturally represented by complex numbers of modulus one. Since the defin-
tion of a circular attribute relies on that of an ordered attibute, it has to have
at least three possible values. The following statement is easily realized.
Statement 2.17 (Circular attributes cannot be directed). No set of at-
tribute values Υi can fulfil Definitions 2.15 and 2.17 at the same time.
An ordered attribute that is not circular may be called linear. It is possible to
introduce the notions of discrete and continuous linear attributes with the tools
that we have introduced. To be able to do the same with circular attributes, we
need to define new tools. Let us therefore start with the linear case.
Definition 2.22 (Discrete linear attribute). Suppose that the set Υi = {υij}
defines the possible values of the linear attribute Ai. The set Υi is discrete if
and only if, for each value υij ∈ Υi, there is another value υil ∈ Υi such that
there is no value υik ∈ Υi that has the quality of beeing in between the members
of the pair (υij , υil).
Definition 2.23 (Continuous linear attribute). Suppose that the set Υi =
{υij} defines the possible values of the linear attribute Ai. The set Υi is con-
tinuous if and only if there is no value υij ∈ Υi for which there is another value
υil ∈ Υi such that there is no value υik ∈ Υi that has the quality of beeing in
between the members of the pair (υij , υil).
A linear attribute that is netiher discrete nor continuous may be called
mixed.
Definition 2.24 (Mixed linear attribute). Suppose that the set Υi = {υij}
defines the possible values of a linear attribute Ai. The set Υi is mixed if, for
some but not for all values υij ∈ Υi, there is another value υil ∈ Υi such that
there is no value υik ∈ Υi that has the quality of beeing in between the members
of the pair (υij , υil).
The above three definitions are formal. At the same time, their aim is to
capture the essence of different kinds of physical attributes. Therefore, in an
epistemic approach to physics, there must be clearcut criteria to distinguish
between these three kinds of attributes by means of observation. The defini-
tions are only menaingful if an attribute can be knowably discrete, knowably
continuous, or knowably mixed.
Definition 2.25 (Knowably discrete linear attribute). Referring to the
terminology in Definition 2.22, suppose that the state of potential knowledge
PK contains an object Oj with value υij of attribute Ai and another object Ol
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with value υil of the same attribute. Then Ai is knowably discrete if for each
such object Oj there is a value υil for which there is no such corresponding object
Ol for which physical law allows the presence of a third object Ok in PK with
value υik of Ai such that υik has the quality of being in between the members of
the pair (υij , υil). The above is true also if some or all of the abovementioned
objects are quasiobjects, and the corresponding attribute values are deduced from
the attribute values of other, directly perceived objects.
Definition 2.26 (Knowably continuous linear attribute). Referring to the
terminology in Definition 2.23, suppose that the state of potential knowledge PK
contains an object Oj with value υij of attribute Ai and an object Ol with value
υil of the same attribute. Then Ai is knowably continuous if for each such pair
of objects, knowable physical law cannot exlude the presence of a third object Ok
with value υik of Ai that has the quality of beeing in between the members of the
pair (υij , υil). The above is true at least if we allow all of these three objects
to be quasiobjects for which the corresponding attribute values are deduced from
the attribute values of other, directly perceived objects.
The definition of a knowably mixed attribute is analogous. We may say that
an attribute is judged to be continuous whenever we cannot confirm by means
of experiment and theory that it is discrete (at least partially). Put differently,
it is continuous whenever we cannot exclude the possibility that it is indeed
continuous. This acceptance of everything that cannot be excluded is typical
of the epistemic approach used in this treatise. For example, the physical state
is defined as the set of all hypothetical exact states of the world that are not
excluded by the incomplete potential knowledge.
With the above definition of a continuous attribute, we cannot rule out
the possibility that the ordered sequence of continuous attribute values can be
represented by a sequence of rational numbers. That is, from a mathematical
point of view we should rather call this type of attribute dense. However, from
a physical point of view, we can never distinguish a dense attribute from a truly
continuous one, whose numerical representation requires irrational numbers.
Let us turn to circular attributes. It is clear that Defintion 2.22, which
specifies the meaning of discreteness, cannot be fulfilled by a circular attribute
(Definition 2.21). Using the concept of betweenness, Definition 2.22 introduces
the notion that two attribute values are close, that they are nearest neighbors.
This approach is impossible for circular attributes. Therefore we have to intro-
duce such a notion of closeness explicitly, as an additional primitive relation
between attribute values.
Definition 2.27 (Closeness). Closeness is a relation between two different
values υij, υik of the same circular attribute Ai. If υik is the nearest neighbor
to υij we write υij ./ υik, otherwise we write υij 6./ υik. We have υik ./ υij if
and only if υij ./ υik. If υij ./ υik and υik ./ υil, then υij 6./ υil.
Definition 2.28 (Discrete circular attribute). Suppose that the set Υi =
{υij} defines the possible values of the circular attribute Ai, and that the binary
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Figure 2.19: The pool of reference objects can be seen as a ruler chopped into
unit pieces, and then reassembled between the object Oj and Ol. In this exam-
ple, the distance between the values υj and υl of these objects is three, in the
unit defined by the pool.
closeness quality is defined for each pair of different values (υij , υik). Then the
set Υi is discrete if and only if for each value υij there is exactly one pair of
values (υik, υil) such that υij ./ υik and υij ./ υil.
Definition 2.27 is not quite satisfactory, since it is ad hoc. It makes it possible
to speak of discrete and continuous circular attributes, but it cannot be used for
anything else. In particular, I cannot see how it can be used to defined a mixed
circular attribute in analogy with a mixed linear attribute (Definition 2.24).
Definition 2.29 (Continuous circular attribute). Suppose that the set Υi =
{υij} defines the possible values of the circular attribute Ai, and that the binary
closeness quality is defined for each pair of different values (υij , υik). Then the
set Υi is continuous if and only if υij 6./ υik for each such pair.
We argued above that there is no inherent metric in state space. Since state
space is assumed to be spanned by the attributes (Statement 2.16), it would be
sufficient that such a metric tells us the distance between any pair of attribute
values. If all attributes were discrete, such a distance could actually be defined.
We could simply count the number of attribute values that have the quality
of being in between those in the pair (Definition 2.16). This procedure is not
possible for continuous attribute. We always get the answer infinity.
Statement 2.18 (State spaces are not metrical). It is impossible to assign
a metric to a state space spanned by a set of attributes among which at least one
is continuous.
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z
Allow me to make a digression at this point, to describe in the above vocab-
ulary what it means in practice to assign a distance between two values of the
same attribute. We assume that we have a state S that contains two objects
Oj and Ol with values υij and υil of attribute Ai, respectively (Fig. 2.19). To
be able to say that the distance between υij and υil is djl, the state S must
also contain a pool of N distinct reference objects {Ork} with values {υik} of
Ai that are all different. Then djl ≤ N is the number of objects in the pool
that have a value υrk between υij and υil. The pool of reference objects acts
as a ruler and their number N and values {υik} define the unit in which the
distance djl is measured.
To be generally valid, the above sketch of a definition of a state S that
contains a numerical value of a distance should allow values υi that are not
perfectly specified, but are known to be found within intervals ∆ij and ∆il for
the objects Oj and Ol, and within the intervals {∆ik} for the reference objects
{Ork}. The value intervals of the reference objects should be disjoint, that is
{∆ik}∩{∆ik} = ∅. Regarding the distance djl, we may say that the knowledge
encoded in such a state S is that N ≥ djl ≤ N + 1 in the unit defined by N and
{∆ik}.
Definition 2.30 (Interval betweenness). Interval betweeness is a relation
between three disjoint sets of values ∆ij, ∆ik and ∆il of the same attribute Ai.
The set ∆ik is between ∆ij and ∆il if and only if υij  υik ≺ υil for any
value triplet (υij , υik, υil) such that υij ∈ ∆ij, υik ∈ ∆ik, and υil ∈ ∆il. We
write ∆ij  ∆ik ≺ ∆il. The set ∆ik is not between ∆ij and ∆il if and only if
υij 6 υik 6≺ υil for any such value triplet. We write ∆ij 6 ∆ik 6≺ ∆il. If none
of the two above conditions is fulfilled, then the interval betweenness quality is
not defined. ∆ij does not possess the interval betweenness quality in relation to
the members of the pair (∆ij ,∆il).
Definition 2.31 (Distance between attribute values). Let ∆ij be the set
of values of attribute Ai not excluded by the potential knowledge about object Oj.
The distance djl between the disjoint set of values ∆ij and ∆il of attribute Ai of
two objects Oj and Ol that is contained in the physical state S is defined in the
following circumstances. The state S contains a pool of reference objects {Ork}
with disjoint sets of allowed values {∆ik}. The betweenness quality of each set
∆ik is defined with respect to the members of the pair of sets (∆ij ,∆il). Then
djl is the number of reference objects Ork for which ∆ij  ∆ik ≺ ∆il.
Note that knowledge about djl can be incomplete, just like knowledge about
the value υij of Ai. Incomplete knowledge about djl means that we are not sure
about how many reference objects can be fitted between Oj and Ol. We have
to define a set Djl of possible values of djl, just like we have defined a set ∆ij of
possible values υij . If Djl is a connected interval without holes (which is easy
to define using the concept of betweenness), we may write
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Djl = [djl − ∆djl
2
, djl +
∆djl
2
] (2.45)
for some interval of uncertainty ∆djl.
As an example of a distance djl, we may take the relational time tjl passed
between two events or objects Oj and Ol. The pool of reference object used
to determine this time interval may be a set of N heartbeats of a subject who
observes both Oj and Ol. If she can fit in T heartbeats between Oj and Ol,
then the time passed is T , expressed in the unit defined by the activity of her
own heart. These heartbeats may come at irregular intervals, as measured by
another pool of reference objects, but in terms of the original reference objects
{Ork} themselves, there is nothing with which to judge whether the unit of
measurement is uniform or not. All we can say is that {Ork} provides a unit.
We have defined sequential time n to be a collective attribute that can be
used to characterize the physical state S of the entire world. Therefore, all
subjects agree on which objects or events Ok occur between any pair Oj and
Ol of other events. In other words, everyone agrees whether tj  tk ≺ tl or
tj 6 tk 6≺ tl. This means that everone should agree on the measured time tjl as
long as they use the same set of reference events. We can try to generalize this
quality of time to a general statement about all attributes.
Assumption 2.6 (Universality of betweenness). Suppose that two subjects
agree that the range of values ∆ik of each reference object Ork in a pool {Ork}
possesses the binary interval betweenness quality in relation to the corresponding
ranges of objects Oj and Ol. Then, for each Ork, they agree whether ∆ij 
∆ik ≺ ∆il or ∆ij 6 ∆ik 6≺ ∆il.
Without this assumption, the entire construction of a generally valid state
space spanned by ordered attributes would collapse, since its structure would
become subjective.
Statement 2.19 (Agreement on measured distances). Suppose that two
observers use the same pool {Ork} of reference objects to measure the distance
of attribute Ai between objects Oj and Ol. Then they arrive at the same answer
provided they agree that the range of values ∆ik of each reference object Ork
possesses the interval betweenness quality in relation to the corresponding value
ranges of Oj and Ol.
How do these considerations go together with special relativity, which implies
that two subjects may measure different time intervals tjl and t
′
jl between the
same pair of events? There is no contradiction, since these two subjects use
different pools of reference objects to obtain the different distances tjl and t
′
jl.
In a typical example, each subject uses a pool of reference objects (a clock)
which is at rest in her own rest frame. Consider the twin paradox. Let Oj
be the event when one twin boards a space ship which takes her at high speed
into deep space, and let Ol be the event when she returns. If she measures the
number tjl of her own heartbeats, and compares this number with the number
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t′jl of heartbeats that her earthbound twin can fit in between the two events,
then they find that tjl < t
′
jl. But if they both decide to use the heartbeats of
the earthbound twin to measure the time interval, they will agree on the result:
tjl = t
′
jl. Of course, the same is true if they both decide to use the heartbeats
of the space traveller as a pool of reference objects.
z
We argued above that the number of heartbeats between two events is the
measure of the relational time passed between these events in the chosen unit
regardless whether these heartbeats come at regular intervals or not. Neverthe-
less, we need to discuss more thouroghly what meaning, if any, can be assigned in
the conceptual framework introduced so far to the statement that two intervals
are equal, or to the statement that one is larger than the other.
We certainly have the subjective ability to decide such issues, even if the
judgement may not be perfectly precise. We feel if a hearbeat is premature
even if we do not explicitly check it with a clock. An hour feels longer than a
minute even if we do not count heartbeats. We can decide roughly whether two
people are equally tall, and if not, who is taller. If two men and one woman
talk, it is most often evident that the pitch of the two male voices are more
similar than the pitches of the female voice and one of the male voices. In short,
we have an intuitive sense of scale. The question is whether the above formal
framework is sufficient to account for this sense of scale, or if it have to be
introduced explicitly.
To compare two distances, the only formal possibility we have at our disposal
at this stage is to use a pool of reference objects, some of which ‘fit’ between
the object pair used to define the first distance, and some other fit between the
objects pair used to define the second distance (Fig. 2.20). The two distances
are equal if and only if the number of reference objects in the first group equals
the number in the second group. Using this method, we conclude in the example
shown in Fig. 2.20 that djk < dkl.
The problem with this mode of comparison is that the outcome depends on
the the pool of reference objects we use, the unit we choose. The result is not an
inherent property of the attribute values of the two pairs of objects that define
the two distances. It is not a property of the world we observe, but depends on
the mode of observation.
If the attribute Ai is discrete we can nevertheless measure and compare
distances objectively. A properly measured distance djk can be operationally
defined as the maximum number of reference objects whose attribute values can
be fitted between those of the object pair (Oj , Ok). This is impossible if the
attribute is continuous. Then infinitely many reference objects can in principle
be fitted between any such object pair whenever υj 6= υk.
Even if we cannot measure a single distance in the continuous case and get an
objective pure number as a result, we might get the idea to choose equidistant
attribute values of all the reference objects in the pool (Fig. 2.20) in order to
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Figure 2.20: A single pool {Or} of reference objects can be used to compare
the distances djk and dkl between the two pairs of attribute values (υj , υk) and
(υk, υl). We get djk = 2 and dkl = 3 so that djk < dkl. However, the outcome
of this comparison depends on the pool chosen, so that this method cannot be
used to compare distances objectively. Compare Fig. 2.19.
compare two distances dij and dkl objectively. But this is circular reasoning, of
course. We make use of equidistance in order to define it.
The only way to account for the subjective ability to compare distances be-
tween values of continuous attributes is therefore to introduce scale as a primary
quality of state space.
Definition 2.32 (Relative distance). Relative distance is a primary relation
defined between any two pairs of values (υj , υk) and (υl, υm) of the same con-
tinuous attribute. This means that the distance djk between υj and υk and the
distance dlm between υl and υm are always defined in the sense that exactly one
of the following three relations always hold: djk < dlm, djk = dlm or djk > dlm.
If (υj , υk) = (υl, υm) then djk = dlm. These relations are not defined in the col-
lective potential knowledge PK, only in the personal potential knowledge PKm
of a subject m.
The reason why we have to say that distance comparisons are personal in
general is that they are indeed personal in the case of spatio-temporal distances.
Two subjects may judge relative spatial or temporal distances differently if they
are accelerating in relation to each other. For example, in the twin paradox,
the first time distance tij may be the time passed between the decision to test
Einstein’s prediction and the actual departure of the space ship. The second
time distance tjl is the time passed after that until the twins reunite after the
journey. The earthbound twin may have to wait a very long time for her sibling
to return, so that she judges that tjl > tij , whereas the space-travelling twin
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finds that his trip was very brief, so that t′jl < t
′
ij from his perspective (where
t′ij ≈ tij).
In contrast, if we would only take inertial relative motion of different sub-
jects into account, the judgement of relative spatio-temporal distances would
collective or universal, since the Lorentz transformation is linear and therefore
preserves such relations.
z
In order to apply the formal machinery introduced above to spatial relational
attributes, we first need to assign a spatial position rj to a given object Oj ,
and call that position the spatial attribute value of Oj . We cannot start with
spatial distances rjl between two objects Oj and Ol, since we describe distances
between attribute values of two objects as secondary to the values themselves.
On the other hand, we cannot presuppose a coordinate system in which rj is
defined by a numerical value. That would amount to an added content in the
physical state S that cannot be part of state space S itself, just like numerical
distances cannot be considered as a primary part of S, as discussed above.
If numerical values are forbidden, how can we possibly define rj? First, we
have to take special relativity into account, so that we should actually speak
of the spatio-temporal four-position r4.(Below, we will sometimes suppress the
index ”4” for notational simplicity, and we hope that this will not cause confu-
sion.) We have based our approach to attribute values on the idea of between-
ness. However, since spatio-temporal positions are four-dimensional, it is not
possible in general to assign a betweenness quality rj  rk ≺ rl or rj 6 rk 6≺ rl
to the position rj in relation to an arbitrary pair of positions (rj , rl). We are
forced to add another primary quality to physical space, namely straightness
(Fig. 2.21).
Definition 2.33 (Straightness). Straightness is a relation between three dis-
tinct objects Oj, Ok, and Ol, for which three different spatio-temporal positions
rj, rk, and rl can be defined. The quality is not defined in the collective poten-
tial knowledge PK, only in the personal potential knowledge PKm of a subject
m. If rj, rk, and rl are placed along a straight line as judged by m, we write
rj − rk − rl, otherwise PKm : rj 6 −rk 6 −rl. The straightness quality does not
depend on the ordering in these expressions.
The personal aspect of this quality means that we do not exlude the pos-
sibility that different subjects m judge the straightness of the same triplet of
objects differently. Just like betweenness and succession, straightness is a ba-
sic epistemic quality that we use to assign structure to attribute values, and
therefore to state space.
The existence of the quality of straightness will be used to derive the evo-
lution equation in Section 3.4.8. A free specimen whose evolution we want to
determine is defined as an object which travels along a straight trajectory. The
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Figure 2.21: a) The question whether the positions of three objects are placed
along a straight line may have different answers depending on which subject
you ask. If someone judges that they lie on a straight line, the question which
position is between the other two has a definitive answer. b) The combination
of three such straight lines makes it possible to define a triangle. If two of the
lines are orthogonal, and if the personal physical state of subject m is such that
the distances d0a and d0b are defined with the same kind of pool of reference
objects (ruler), then the angles φa and φb can be defined in the ususal way.
Compare Fig. 2.19.
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fact that straightness is not a collectively or universally defined quality means
that physical law must be insensitive to it. This fact will be taken into account
in Sections 3.4.9 and 3.13.
Is it really possible to judge whether a trajectory in space-time is straight
without any measurements? It is clear that we can judge in such primary way
whether a line is straight. But this judgement is immediate, it concerns a purely
spatial straightness. A trajectory also has a temporal component. We resort to
Einstein’s elevator (Fig. 1.14), epistemic invariance, and the primary feeling of
acceleration or gravitation.
Definition 2.34 (Straight trajectory). The trajectory rm4 (n) of a subject m
in space-time is straight, as judged from within her own state PKm of personal
potential knowledge, if one of the following two conditions is met. 1) She can
match her trajectory to a straight spatial line with the help of her memory of
previous positions along this line. She experiences no feeling of acceleration in
the direction of this line in so doing. 2) She has no outside reference points that
can define a straight line along which she moves (she is at rest as far as she
knows), and experience a constant feeling of acceleration or gravitation.
With the help of condition 1) she can also determine whether the trajectory
of an object that she observes is straight or not, by moving along with it.
We may say that the betweenness quality of rj in relation to the spatio-
temporal positions in the pair (rk, rl) is defined if and only if rj − rk − rl. In
this way we can assign an ordered structure to spatio-temporal positions, just
like we have done for any other attribute.
This approach means that the betweenness of positions, and their ordering,
becomes a subjective relation of three objects, since it relies on the subjec-
tive straightness quality. This fact does not contradict Assumption 2.6, how-
ever, since the presupposed collective agreement on the answer to the question
whether an attribute value is placed between two other values or not, relies on
the assumption that the betweenness quality is defined for these three values. In
short, for spatio-temporal positions, the subjectivity resides in the straightness,
not in the betweenness.
To make the presentation more comprehensive, let us account for incomplete
knowlege about spatio-temporal positions by introducing the concept of interval
straightness, just like we introduced interval betweenness in Definition 2.30.
Definition 2.35 (Interval straightness). Interval straightness is a relation
between three disjoint sets of values Rj, Rk and Rl of the spatio-temporal po-
sition r4. The quality is not defined in the collective potential knowledge PK,
only in the personal potential knowledge PKm of a subject m. The sets Rj, Rk,
and Rl are placed along a straight line as judged by m if and only if rj − rk− rl
for at least one position triplet (rj , rk, rl) such that rj ∈ Rj, rk ∈ Rk, and
rl ∈ Rl. In that case we write Rj −Rk −Rl.
Definition 2.36 (Interval betweenness of spatio-temporal positions).
Interval betweenness of spatio-temporal positions is a relation between three sets
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Rj, Rk and Rl of the spatio-temporal position r4 which can be defined in the
potential knowledge PKm of subject m if and only if Rj −Rk −Rl, as judged
by m. It is indeed defined in this case if and only if we can write Rj  Rk ≺ Rl
or Rj 6 Rk 6≺ Rl according to Definition 2.30.
In order to make it possible to measure angles, we introduce orthogonality
as a sixth and final primary epistemic quality that gives structure to sets of
attribute values. All these qualities are listed in Table 2.2. Angles are seen
as functions of measured distances rjl between a triplet of spatial positions
(rj , rk, rl). As such they are part of specific types of states S with appropriate
pools of reference objects rather than part of the structure of state space itself,
as discussed above.
Note that I speak about spatial positions here, not spatio-temporal four-
positions. As far as I understand, the primitive, subjective judgement whether
a pair of straight lines are orthogonal or not has to be instantaneous, so that
it lacks the temporal component. Another way to put it is to say that we
have to use different pools of reference objects to measure spatial and temporal
distances, different units. Therefore a presupposed orthogonality in space-time
becomes dependent on the choice of reference objects. It cannot correspond to
a primitive structure of attribute values in state space, since it depends on the
content of the state S that is embedded in state space.
Definition 2.37 (Orthogonality). Orthogonality is a relation between five
spatial positions, which we may call r±1, r0 and r±2. It is defined in the po-
tential knowledge PKm of subject m if and only if we can write r−1 − r0 − r1
and r−2 − r0 − r2. The two straight lines defined by these relations are either
orthogonal or not. If they are, we write (r−1, r0, r1)⊥(r−2, r0, r2), otherwise we
write (r−1, r0, r1) 6 ⊥(r−2, r0, r2).
We may now define angles by the construction of triangles from three straight
lines, two of which are orthogonal (Fig 2.21). Since the defintion relies on
straightness, angles are well-defined only for individual subjects. Therefore
they cannot be used to specify physical law in any fundamental representation
of these laws. We skip the definition of the ‘interval orthogonality’ that should
be used when the potential knowledge about the spatial positions is incomplete.
The reader should have grasped the idea already from the definition of the
‘interval betweenness’ and the ‘interval straightness’. If these ideas are pursued,
we get a set of angles Φ allowed by our knowledge, rather than the single angle
φ provided by the definition below.
Definition 2.38 (Angles). Consider Fig. 2.21. The line L1 is defined by
distinct objects with three spatial positions (r−1, r0, r1) such that r−1 − r0 −
r1 as judged by subject m, and r−1  r0 ≺ r1. The line L2 is defined by
distinct objects with three spatial positions (r−2, r0, r2) such that r−2 − r0 − r2,
r−2  r0 ≺ r2 and (r−1, r0, r1)⊥(r−2, r0, r2), as judged by the same subject
m. The line L3 is defined by three positions (ra, rb, rc) such that ra − rb − rc.
This triplet contains exactly one position from L1 and exactly one position from
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Quality Range of validity Applies to Definition
Betweenness Collective All attributes 2.16
Succession Collective Sequential time 2.18
closeness Collective circular attributes 2.27
relative distance Personal continuous attributes 2.32
Straightness Personal Spatio-temporal positions 2.33
Orthogonality Personal Spatial positions 2.37
Table 2.2: The epistemic qualities that we use as starting points to define the
structure of state space.
L2. None of the three positions that define L3 is r0. This means that we
need six objects to define the triangle enclosed by L1, L2 and L3. Suppose
that S is such that the two distances r0a and r0b are defined for subject m
according to Definition 2.31. The only knowable difference between the two
pools of reference objects (rulers) used to measure r0a and r0b should be the
spatial positions of each corresponding object pair. Then we can introduce the
angles φa ≡ tan−1(d0b/d0a), φb ≡ tan−1(d0a/d0b), and φ0 = pi (or some other
constant, depending of the choice of angular unit).
z
Our assumptions made it possible to conclude that the physical state S can
always be represented by a set of minimal objects when physical law is applied
to it (Statement 2.13). To determine the dimension D[S] of state space, it is
therefore sufficient to take into account the maximum number N of minimal
objects in the world, the number NAi of independent internal attributes that
are needed to specify each minimal object in an exhaustive set {Ml}, and also
the number NAr of independent relational attributes that is need to specify
the relations between N minimal objects. We have argued in Section 1.10 that
relational time t is an attribute that can vary independently among the objects in
the state S(n). Therefore there are four independent relational spatio-temporal
attributes which have to be specified to be able to deteremine the evolution
of S(n). In Section 3.4.8 we will see that these four attributes are matched
by the four relational attributes associated with reciprocal space-time, namely
momentum and energy. Thus NAr = 8N . All in all we get
D[S] = 8N ×NAi. (2.46)
In a personal state of knowledge PKm, there is a notion of orthogonality
(Definition 2.37), so that the values of the 8N relational attributes can be ar-
ranged in an orthogonal coordinate system. If the universe is infinite, or if the
answer to the question whether it is infinite belongs to the unknowable, then
we cannot exclude that N =∞, so that we get D[S] =∞. If it is knowable in
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Figure 2.22: The knowledge dimension DK in a two-dimensional state space,
spanned by attributes A1 and A2. There is knowledge associated with A1 in all
three cases, meaning that some of its values can be excluded, so that DK ≥ 1.
a) There is no knowledge associated with A2, so that DK = 1. b) There
is conditional knowledge associated with A2, so that DK = 2. c) There is
knowledge associated with A2, so that DK = 2.
principle that the universe is finite, on the other hand, we must have a finite
state space dimension according to Eq. [2.46], because of the assumption that
the depth of knowledge is finite (Assumption 1.16).
As a matter of principle, we may ask whether we can exclude the existence of
something we do not know anything about at the moment. Potential knowledge
can increase in the future. New objects may come into our field of vision, and we
may learn more about the objects we already see. Therefore it is questionable
whether we should assign a dimension D[S] to state space a priori, regardless
whether this dimension is finite or infinite. The epistemic approach is to focus
on what we know. In this spirit we introduce the following concept.
Definition 2.39 (Knowledge dimension of state space). The knowledge
dimension DK [S] of state space S equals the number of distinctions in the state
of knowledge PK that corresponds to the physical state S. Only distinctions
pertaining to directly perceived objects O count. Quasiobjects O˜ are disregarded.
That S contains N different objects may be said to correspond to N dis-
tinctions. Referring to the foam picture of knowledge (Fig. 1.6), the addition
of one object O correponds to the distinction of this new object from all the
objects that existed previously.
To each known attribute Ai of O corresponds the distinction between the
values of this attribute which conform with the knowledge about Ai, and those
which do not. Let Ai be color. If we see that O is grey, this perception means
that we can exclude some other colors. We have made a distinction. We con-
clulde that we can associate one distinction to each attribute Ai of O for which
we can exclude some values. Turning the argument around, if we cannot exclude
any values of Ai, then this attribute of O is not perceived at all.
Even so, we may have conditional knowledge pertaining to Ai. Say that we
know that the value of A1 is υ11 or υ12, but that we know nothing about the value
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of A2. Nevertheless, we know that A1 = υ11 ⇒ A2 = υ21. Already such indirect
knowledge about A2 lifts it from the darkness of complete ignorance. We may
therefore regard a condition involving Ai as a distinction associated with Ai,
since a condition picks an implication A⇒ B and drops the alternative A 6⇒ B.
Statement 2.20 (Specification of the knowledge dimension). We may
write DK [S](n) =
∏NO(n)
l=1 NAOl(n), where NO(n) is the number of distinct
objects O contained in S(n), and NAOl(n) is the number of distinct attributes
that can be associated with Ol at sequential time n. An attribute Ai of Ol is
distinct if and only if at least one of the following two condistions is fulfilled:
1) Ai is directly observed by some subject, or 2) there is conditional potential
knowledge that involves Ai.
This statement is illustrated in Fig. 2.22. Clearly,
D[S] ≥ DK [S](n), (2.47)
at each sequential time n.
We argue that even if D[S] is undetermined, this does not matter much. In
a sense, the important part of S is spanned by the DK [S] attributes we know
anything about. In fact, we claim that the evolved state u1S is completely
determined by the projection of S onto part spanned by the DK [S] known
attributes.
Statement 2.21 (The known parts of state space determine the evo-
lution). Let SK ≡ ΠKS be the projection of the state S onto the subset SK
of state space S spanned by the DK [S] known attributes specified in Statement
2.20. Then u1ΠKS = ΠKu1S.
This statement is almost self-evident, when you think about it for a minute.
We have identified the physical state which we are going to evolve with a state
of knowledge. Thus the evolution u1 must depend on this knowledge, and on
nothing else. We know nothing about the attributes in the part S \ SK of state
space. Therefore u1 cannot depend on these parts. It must depend on something
known, it cannot depend on nothing.
To be more concrete, consider Fig. 2.22 again. In panel a) there is no
knowledge associated with attribute A2. We can specfy the state S completely
by saying υmin1 < υ1 < υ
max
1 , where υ1 is the value of attribute A1. This fact
is the only thing the evolution u1 can depend upon. In relation to Statement
2.11 and Fig. 2.15 we put forward the idea that we can identify the state
boundary ∂S as the essential part of S, treat it like a membrane and write
u1S = u1∂S. The state boundary in Fig. 2.22(a) has two parts ∂S1 and ∂S2
which are specified by ∂S1 : υ1 = υ
min
1 and ∂S2 : υ1 = υ
max
1 . Again, we see that
the values υ2 of A2 play no role.
The situation is different in Fig. 2.22(b). Even if we have no knowledge of
the value υ2 of A2, there is conditional knowledge that relates the values of A1
and A2. To describe S and its evolution we need to take A2 into account. This is
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the same as to say that ∂S depends on A2 as well as on A1 The boundary has two
horizontal parts ∂Sh1 : υ2 = 0, υ
min
1 ≤ υ1 ≤ 0 and ∂Sh2 : υ2 = 0, 0 ≤ υ1 ≤ υmax1 .
In Fig. 2.22(c), we have direct knowledge about the valus of both A1 and
A2. Clearly, to specify S or ∂S we need to involve both A1 and A2. Again
there are horizontal parts of ∂S. In a heuristic notation, we may say that the
essential quality of S in panels b) and c) that forces us to take A2 into account
in the evolution is that there are points on ∂S at which d(∂S)/dυ2 6= 0.
Recall that Definition 2.39 and Statement 2.20 refer to directly perceived
objects, and to those attributes of these objects that we actually observe. This
direct knowledge is represented by the physical state S. We can model S with
deduced quasiobjects like minimal objects, and create a reduced state Sˇ. This
state will typically have more than DK [S] degrees of freedom, making it overde-
termined. Since S and any properly constructed reduced state Sˇ are equivalent
and represent the same potential knowledge, Sˇ cannot contain more than DK [S]
observables upon which its evolution depends. This means, for example, that
we should not associate probability amplitudes to the state of each elementary
particle in a quantum mechanical state representation in which different such
states are superposed. Matters related to this fact are discussed in section 3.4.5.
z
The distinction between the full state space S and the known part SK of this
state space might be interesting from a conceptual point of view, but we will
not make much use of it in what follows. In fact, we will not be concerned much
about the dimensionality of state space at all, and will continue to represent
states S as sets in state space without referring to any axes.
Let us introduce another distinction between two types of state spaces that
we will actually make us of. We will use one or the other depending on the
problem at hand, depending on what point we wish to make. The distinction is
that between the full state space S and the object state space SO.
We introduced the physical state S(n) as the union of all exact states Z
that do not contradict the potential knowledge PK(n) at time n (Definition
2.4). The state space S is the set of all possible exact states Z of the world
(definition 2.3). We further introduced the object state SO as the subset of S
that consists of the union of all Z that do not contradict the existence of object
O, with its known attributes (Definition 2.5).
We may, however, also consider the space SO of all possible exact states ZO
of an object rather than of the entire world. (Recall that we do not consider
the world to be an object, according to Statement 1.7.) Then we may embed
the object state in this object state space SO. Since this object state SOO is
a subset of another space, we have to give it a different name than SO. If we
describe SO as all exact states of the object O and the surrounding world ΩO
that is consistent with the knowledge about O, we may describe SOO as all
exact states of O that is consistent with the knowledge about O, ignoring the
rest of the world.
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Figure 2.23: The object state space SO and the state space S. If two object
states SOO1 and SOO2 overlap in SO, then they represent the same object.
Otherwise they represent different objects. In contrast, states of objects SO
perceived at the same time always overlap, even if they are known to be distinct.
What difference does it make? Consider two distinct objects O1 and O2
that are observed at the same time n. Clearly there is a physical state S(n)
that is consistent with the simultaneous existence of both these objects, and
therefore there are exact states Z that are consistent with these objects. In
other words, SO1 ∩ SO2 6= ∅. On the other hand, there is no exact object
state ZO that is consistent with both these objects. If there were, we would be
unable to distinguish them. This means that SOO1∩SOO2 = ∅. These relations
are illustrated in Fig. 2.23. The represention of object states in object state
space will be useful when we discuss object division (Section 2.16) and the Pauli
exclusion principle (Section 3.11). In short, it is useful to illustrate discussions
about the distinguishability of objects.
Definition 2.40 (The object state space SO). SO is the set of all exact
object states ZO allowed by physical law.
Definition 2.41 (The state SOO in object state space). SOO is the set of
exact object states ZO ∈ SO that are not excluded by the potential knowledge of
the attributes of object O.
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z
We have argued that there is no inherent metric in state space. It is neverthe-
less possible to define a volume measure. It will be essential in our discussions
about probability and entropy (Sections 3.2 and 3.14).
Definition 2.42 (Attribute value space S(A, υ)). Let A be an independent
attribute according to Definition 1.19. S(A, υ) ⊆ S is the set of exact states Z
for which there is at least one object for which A is defined, and for which the
value of A is υ. The attribute value space in object state space SO(A, υ) ⊆ SO
is the set of exact object states ZO for which A is defined, and for which the
value of A is υ.
Definition 2.43 (State space volume). The measure V [S] ≥ 0 is defined for
any state S ∈ S, and is such that V [S(A, υ)] = V [S(A, υ′)] for any independent
attribute A, and any pair of values (υ, υ′) of A allowed by physical law. Also,
V [S1 ∪ S2] = V [S1] + V [S2] − V [S1 ∩ S2] for any two states S1 and S2. For
any exact state Z we have V [Z] = 1. The volume V [SO] ≥ 0 of an object
state SO ⊆ S is defined in the same way. The measure VO[SOO] ≥ 0 is defined
analogously for any object state SOO ⊆ SO in object state space, replacing Z
with ZO.
The condition V [S(A, υ)] = V [S(A, υ′)] can be interpreted as a statement
that for each exact state Z for which the value of A is υ there is exactly one
exact state Z ′ for which the value is υ′. We thus compare state space volumes
in the same way as we compare the sizes of two sets Σ1 and Σ2 by putting ele-
ments of Σ1 into one-to-one correspondence with elements of Σ2. Nevertheless,
we avoid reference to the individual elements Z of the space S in this condition.
We do so because they lack physical or epistemic meaning if considered one by
one. We know, however, that they are there as a collective, since our knowledge
is incomplete (Statement 1.3). Such a statement requires an unknowable com-
pletion of knowledge, which is provided by the shadowy exact states Z. ‘We
know that there is something about which we cannot know anything.’
Nevertheless, we let V [Z] = 1 to indicate that a state consistent with at least
one exact state has positive volume, and that the exact state is a well-defined
concept. As such, it can be assigned a fixed unit volume. But this assignment
cannot be used to calculate the volume of actal physical states; the link between
V [Z] and V [S] is very weak. Instead we have to compare the volumes of different
states. Such a relative volume specification will be sufficient for our purposes.
Note that we do not say anything in Definition 2.43 about the structure of the
set of possible values υ. These values may be continuous or discrete (Definitions
2.22 and 2.23). In the case of continuous values one may object that two sets
Σ1 and Σ2 with continous elements may have different length, area or volume
even if each element υ of Σ1 can be put into one-to-one correspondence with
each element υ′ of Σ2.
An example is the mapping of the entire complex plane onto the Riemann
sphere. The area of the first set is infinite while that of the other is finite.
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However, this statement depends on a priori knowledge that allows us to cal-
culate areas without referring to each individual complex element. It depends
on a predefined two-dimensional grid of integers that is used as a standard to
compare the size of the plane to that of the sphere. Some elements are marked
as special, and all the others are interpreted to be placed between these special
elements.
However, in our case the value υ is just an arbitrary numerical encoding
or labelling of the ‘epistemic value’ of attribute A (section 2.2). There is no
justification a priori to regard some epistemic values as special and to label
them with integer numerical values. Therefore this measurement should not
appear in any proper definition of state space volume. It should be defined
from scratch.
Another way to put it is to say that the definition of a coordinate system in
state space requires that we place reference objects with a known distance from
each other, and measure other objects in relation to the reference objects. But
then we are using object states and observations to define state space (Definition
2.31 and Fig. 2.19). We have defined it the other way around, and describe all
objects and observations with the help of the state space.
Definition 2.44 (Continuous attribute interval space S(A,∆υ)). Let A
be a continuous independent attribute according to Definitions 2.23 and 1.19,
and let ∆υ be an interval of values υ. Then S(A,∆υ) is the set of exact states
Z for which there is at least one object for which A is defined, and for which
the value of A is an element of ∆υ.
The elements of two such sets or intervals ∆υ and ∆υ′ can be put in one-to-
one correspondence to each other. The condition V [S(A, υ)] = V [S(A, υ′)] in
the definition of state space volume means that the associated volume elements
in this one-to-one correspondece are equal. Summing them up, we conclude the
following.
Statement 2.22 (Equipartition of continuous attribute value intervals).
For any continuous independent attribute A, and for any two intervals ∆υ and
∆υ′ according to Definition 2.44, we have V [S(A,∆υ)] = V [S(A,∆υ′)].
Some consequences of these considerations are discussed in section 3.4.3
(Statement 3.30 and Fig. 3.29).
Despite the equality relation in Statement 2.22, the introduction of the at-
tribute value space S(A, υ) in Definition 2.42 makes it possible to define the
volume so that we respect some intuitive notions about relative size, such as
the statement that a two-dimensional plane is ‘bigger’ than a one-dimensional
line. This is not possible if we compare the size of sets using just one-to-one
correspondence of elements. To illustrate this point, consider a state space
spanned by the two attributes A1 and A2. The points on the A1-axis may be
said to correspond to the set S(A2, υ
0
2), whereas the entire state space can be
identified with
⋃
Σ(υ2)
S(A2, υ2), where Σ(υ2) is the set of all possible values
of A2, so that υ
0
2 ∈ Σ(υ2). From Definition 2.43 we get V [
⋃
Σ(υ2)
S(A2, υ2)] =∑
Σ(υ2)
V [S(A2, υ2)] > V [S(A2, υ
0
2)] whenever A2 can take more than one value.
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Figure 2.24: The property space P of a property P is the union of all states
for which there are objects such that P is defined. P = ⋃k Pj , where Pk is the
union of states for which P has value pj .
2.6 Properties and property spaces
Let us return to the concept of altervatives, discussed at some length in Section
2.4. Consider the property P that defines the set of alternatives {Sj}. This
property defines an abstract set P (Fig. 2.24).
Definition 2.45 (Property space). The property space P is the union of all
exact states Z for which there are objects such that the value p of the property
P can be defined. Each possible value pj defines a set Pj as the union of those
Z ∈ P for which the value of P is pj. We get P =
⋃
j Pj.
A property P is a statement about attributes of objects. It may concern one
attribute of one object, or several attributes of several objects. In general,
p = f({υil}), (2.48)
where υil is the value of attribute Ai of object Ol. Clearly, any attribute is a
property, but the opposite is not necessarily true. By definition, the values υi
of a given attribute Ai are always possible to order. In contrast, the values pj
of a property P cannot always be ordered. Ordering is impossible when pj is a
function of attribute values υil and υi′l belonging to different attributes Ai and
Ai′ . For example, the color of the tail feathers of a bird can be ordered according
to the spectrum. However, letting P represent bird species, the different species
pj cannot be ordered, since the classification depends on other attributes than
feather colors.
The following statement is a reformulation of the incompleteness of knowl-
edge (Statement 1.3):
Statement 2.23 (Simultaneously knowable properties). The values of all
properties cannot be known at the same time.
In other words, there are pairs of properties such that knowledge of the value
of one makes it impossible to know the value of the other at the same time.
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If P is the species of birds, then P is the union of all Z for which there is a
bird. We have S ⊂ P for any actual state S with birds, since in any situation
we know more than just ‘there is a bird’. We know the landscape in which we
see the bird, we have self-awareness, and so on.
Referring to Fig. 2.24, we may let p1 represent a golden eagle, p2 represent
a raptor that is not a golden eagle, and p3 a bird that is not a raptor. If we are
sure that we see some kind of raptor in the sky, then P3 ∩ S = ∅.
To give a physical example, consider the spin quantun number of electrons.
For the total spin there is only one possible value 1/2. P is the union of all Z
for which there is at least one electron, and P1 = P is the set of all states where
P1 = 1/2. Obviously, in this case, P is almost as big as state space S itself. If it
is assumed that electrons are necessary components in the body of any subject,
P = S, since subjects are necessary ingredients in any state of knowledge, and
thus in any physical state (Definition 1.9).
For the spin component in a given direction, P is the union of all Z which
contain electrons and one apparatus that defines the direction, and is capable
of measuring the spin in this direction. We have p1 = 1/2, p2 = −1/2, and
P = P1 ∪ P2. The word ‘apparatus’ must be understood in a general sense, as
a part of the physical state that makes it possible to deduce the spin direction
from the corresponding state of knowledge as an attribute of a quasiobject.
The property space P is a function of the property P only; it does not
depend on the present state, on time, or on anything else. All these details
are ‘summed over’, or rather ‘taken the union over’. Note also that for any
well-defined property P , it is possible to define the set P.
2.7 Present and future alternatives
We may use the concept of properties to describe and classify more clearly the
division of the state S into a set of alternatives {Sj}, as expressed in Eq. [2.38].
One should, for instance, distinguish between states that may have a property
now, at time n, say with value pj , and states that may have it if we investigate
the matter at some future time n+m.
We may divide property space P into two parts: Pj and Pcj , where Pcj is the
region in which the value of property P is not pj (Fig. 2.25). For states S that
are embedded in one of these regions, we know for sure whether the property
value at present is pj or not. For states that overlap both regions, we do not
know.
We may define the region FPj as the union
⋃
j Sj(n) of those states Sj(n) ⊂
Pcj for which there is a time n+m such that umSj(n) ⊂ Pj . That is, FPj is the
region of property space consisting of states that we know will have property
value pj at some future time, but which do not have it now. Further, we may
define NPj = Pcj /FPj as the union of those states for which we know that the
property value is not p1 now, and that it will never be.
A state S may overlap these three regions in various ways, as expressed in
Fig. 2.25. The state Sb will, by definition, be a subset of NPj forever. The
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Figure 2.25: Present and possible future properties. Each property value pj
spans the property space P in itself if we replace all other values by the com-
plement ‘not pj ’. The region FPj is the union of those states S which do not
have property value pj at present, but will have it at some future time. The
region NPj is the union of those states for which the property value is not, and
will never be pj . The state S may relate to the three regions in seven different
ways.
evolved states umSd, umSe and umSg will forever (for any m ≥ 1) at least
partially belong to NPj . However, physical law may or may not allow that
there is a time n+m such that S(n+m) ⊂ Pj given that S(n) belongs to one
of the classes Sd, Se or Sg. If it is allowed, then property pj is realizable.
Definition 2.46 (Realizable property). The property value pj is realizable
if and only if S(n) belongs to class Sd, Se or Sg (Fig. 2.25), and physical law
allows that S(n+m) ⊂ Pj for some m ≥ 1.
In this definition, we exclude the trivial cases when the state already have
property value pj , or will turn out to have it in the future with necessity.
Let
P˜j = Pj ∪ FPj (2.49)
be the region in which states have property value pj now, or will have it at
some future time. Even if two regions Pj and Pj′ never overlap, two regions P˜j
and P˜j′ may or may not overlap. If they do not overlap, the property values
are mutually exclusive. By this we mean not only that the two property values
cannot occur at the same time - they cannot occur in succession either.
Definition 2.47 (Mutually exclusive properties). Two property values pj
and pj′ are mutually exclusive if and only if P˜j ∩ P˜j′ = ∅.
Note again that even if two property values are not mutually exclusive, we
still have Pj ∩ Pj′ = ∅.
To examplify, the property values p1 and p2 that a given particle in a given
double slit experiment passes slit 1 and 2, respectively, are mutually exclusive.
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The setup is such that if the particle passes one of the slits, it cannot pass the
other at a later time. In contrast, if p1 corresponds to the fact that the distance
between two objects is x1 and p2 corresponds to the fact the distance is x2, the
property values can occur one after the other if the objects are moving, even if
they, of course, cannot occur simultaneously.
Definition 2.48 (Present alternative Sj). Let Sj ≡ S(n) ∩ Pj and u1Sj ≡
u1S(n)∩Pj. The alternative Sj is a present alternative if and only if u1Sj 6= ∅
and u1Sj ⊂ u1S(n). Further, physical law must allow that S(n+ 1) ⊆ u1Sj.
A present alternative can be immediately realized. This means that the
change of knowledge that corresponds to the realization that alternative Sj is
true may define the next temporal update n→ n+ 1. Two present alternatives
Sj and Sj′ may or may not correspond to mutually exclusive properties. Even
if they are not mutually exclusive, we still have u1Sj ∩ u1Sj′ = ∅ from the
invertibility of physical law (Assumption 2.3). A present alternative always
corresponds to a realizable property.
The condition that u1Sj is a proper subset of u1S(n) means that it should
be uncertain whether alternative Sj is or will ever become realized. We ex-
clude the trivial cases in Fig. 2.25 where S(n) belongs to class Sa, so that the
corresponding property is already realized, or to classes Sc or Sf , so that the
property is or will be realized by necessity.
Definition 2.49 (A complete set of present alternatives). A set of present
alternatives {Sj} is complete if and only if S(n) =
⋃
j Sj.
For example, if you are about to step up on the bathroom scale, a subset of
the range of weights that can be displayed make up a complete set of present
alternatives (if you are not too heavy). The alternatives are not mutually ex-
clusive, however, since you can gain or lose weight until the next time you step
up on the scale. It follows from the definition of a present alternative that a
complete set of such alternatives always contains more than one element (Fig.
2.26a).
Let us turn to alternatives that may be realized further into the future.
Definition 2.50 (Future alternative S˜j). Let S˜j = S(n) ∩ P˜j and u1S˜j ≡
u1S(n)∩P˜j. Then S˜j is a future alternative if and only if S˜j 6= ∅ and S˜j ⊂ S(n).
Further, physical law must allow that S(n+m) ⊆ S˜j for some m ≥ 2.
Just as a present alternative, a future alternative corresponds to a realizable
property. We want to define a complete set of future alternatives analogous to
a complete set of present alternatives. To do so, we must require that the sets
S˜j do not overlap. Otherwise the quality of completeness would be hard to use
effectively.
If the corresponding property values pj are mutually exclusive (Definition
2.47), the future alternatives S˜j are automatically disjoint. We may, however,
define disjoint alternatives S˜j even if this is not the case. Consider again the
property distance. Two different distances may be found in succession, so that
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Figure 2.26: Present and future alternatives. a) {S1, S2} is a complete set of
present alternatives at time n. At the next moment n + 1, the state may turn
out to have property value p1 or p2. b) {S˜1, S˜2} is a complete set of future
alternatives. At some time n + m, the state may turn out to have property
value p1 or p2. When one of the property values is realized, the other property
value is excluded forever if they are mutually exclusive. By definition of the sets
P˜j , the partition {S˜j} of the state S is then ‘locked onto’ these sets. In contrast,
the possible property values of the present alternatives may ‘float’ from value
to value, like the position of a ball rolling on the ground.
the property values are not mutually exclusive. But in a physical setup pre-
pared to measure the distance between the objects at a given time, the possible
outcomes nevertheless define disjoint future alternatives, defined as ‘the first
outcome of the measurement that we have prepared’.
Definition 2.51 (A complete set of future alternatives). A set of future
alternatives {S˜j} is complete if and only if S(n) =
⋃
j S˜j and S˜j ∩ S˜j′ = ∅ for
all j 6= j′.
Just as for present alternatives, a complete set of future alternatives always
contains more than one element (Fig. 2.26b).
A future alternative may be said to be invariant in time. We have S˜j ⊆ P˜j .
By definition of the region P˜j we also have u1S˜j ⊆ P˜j . If no state reduction
occurs at time n + 1, meaning that S(n + 1) = u1S(n), then the set {u1S˜j} is
also a complete set of future alternatives.
Statement 2.24 (The regions P˜j are invariant under evolution u1). If
S˜j ⊆ P˜j, then u1S˜j ⊆ P˜j .
Of course, when the value pj is actually observed there is a state reduction,
and after that the regions P˜j do not need to be invariant in time.
A complete set of present or future alternative belongs to knowability level
2 or 3 in the table given in Section 2.4. Two alternatives Sj and Sj′ (or S˜j
and S˜j′) in a complete set are subjectively distinguishable by definition. More
than that, once one alternative is realized, all future states are subjectively
distinguishable from those that would follow if another alternative was realized.
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This follows from the invertibility of physical law (Assumption 2.3), which means
that Sj ∩ Sj′ = ∅⇒ umSj ∩ umSj′ = ∅.
Statement 2.25 (A choice between alternatives is definitive). When one
present or future alternative is realized, each future state is subjectively distinct
from all future states that would have followed if another alternative from the
same complete set was realized.
The main concepts introduced in this section are present and future alterna-
tives. To summarize their meaning in plain language, present alternatives are
things that ‘may be about to happen’, whereas future alternatives are possible
outcomes of an investigation.
2.8 Realization of alternatives
By definition, present and future alternatives corresponds to the observation of
a realizable property (Definition 2.46). It is useful to be able to refer to such
alternatives as realizable.
Definition 2.52 (Realizable alternative). An alternative is realizable if and
only if it corresponds to a present alternative Sj (Definition 2.48) or a future
alternative S˜j (Definition 2.50).
Note that alternatives can be realizable only in an indeterministic world
with incomplete knowledge. An element of contingency is presupposed in the
definition of present and future alternatives.
In the defintions of present and future alternatives, we required that it is
possible that S(n + 1) ⊆ Sj and S(n + m) ⊆ S˜j , respectively. In practice, we
must always have equalitites in these relations. To say that S(n + 1) ⊂ Sj
is the same as saying that we gain some more knowledge at time n + 1 than
the knowledge that property P has value pj . This possibility is excluded by
definition, since each temporal update n → n + 1 is associated with a given
piece of new knowledge, a given change of perception.
Statement 2.26 (The size of the physical state when an alternative is
realized). Suppose that a present alternative Sj is realized at time n+ 1. Then
S(n+ 1) = u1Sj. Suppose that a future alternative S˜j is realized at time n+m.
Then S(n+m) = umS˜j.
Before a realizable alternative Sj or S˜j is actually realized, its evolution
is defined according to the prescriptions in Definitions 2.48 and 2.48. If no
realizable alternative pertaining to property P is ever realized, its evolution is
defined forever in the same way. If value pj is finally observed, the alternative
becomes identical to the physical state, whose evolution is always defined. If
another value p′j of P is finally observed, the alternative ceases to exist, so
that the question whether its evolution is defined is no longer meaningful. We
conclude that the evolution operator u1 can be applied an arbitrary number of
times to any realizable alternative.
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Figure 2.27: (a) Alternatives S˜1 and S˜2 with three levels of knowability. The
alternatives correspond to two values p1 and p2 of property P . No vertical line
means that the alternatives can never be realized (level 1), a dashed line means
that they may be realized (level 2), and a solid line means that one of them
will be realized (level 3). States at level 3 are given square shape to emphasize
that they are ‘prepared’. (b) Combinations of alternatives that correspond to
two different properties P and P ′, meaning that these properties are observed
in succession. Compare Fig. 2.17
Suppose that a present alternative Sj is realized at time n+ 1. Then we can
track-back its origin as an alternative, since the invertibility of the evolution
gives physical meaning to the expression Sj = u
−1
1 S(n + 1). In the same way,
if a future alternative is defined at time n and finally realized at time n + m,
then we can reconstruct its entire history in a physical sense according to S˜j =
u−1m S(n+ 1), u1S˜j = u
−1
m−1S(n+ 1), u2S˜j = u
−1
m−2S(n+ 1), and so on.
We may say that it is meaningful to talk about the evolution of a realizable
alternative since it has the potential to be physically track-backed (if the alter-
native is realized). On the other hand, if an alternative is not realizable, then
such track-back can never be performed. The evolution of such an alternative
cannot be given any physical meaning.
Statement 2.27 (Physical states and realizable alternatives are the
domain of the evolution operator). Let Σj ≡ S(n)∩Pj or Σj ≡ S(n)∩P˜j.
The expression umΣj is defined for any m ≥ 1 if and only if Σj = S(n) or Σj
corresponds to a realizable alternative Sj or S˜j.
In the remainder of this section, we will get aquainted with one graphical
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and one symbolic way to illustrate realizable alternatives at different knowability
levels (Table 2.1), and what happens when they are actually realized. We have
already discussed the realization of one alternative in a single complete set of
such alternatives, corresponding to the observation of a single property P . It
is more interesting to consider the sequential observation of several properties
P, P ′, P ′′, . . .. To get the main points, we discuss the simplest case where we
observe in succession two properties P and P ′ with two values each. We denote
these values (p1, p2) and (p
′
1, p
′
2), respectively. Curious situations may occur
when there is a priori conditional knowledge that relates the values of P and
P ′.
Figure 2.27 develops the graphic notation introduced in Fig. 2.17, and also
introduces a corresponding symbolic notation. Alternatives at level 3 are di-
vided by a solid line, level 2 alternatives are divided by a dashed line, whereas
alternatives at level 1 are not divided by any line. States at level 3 are given
square shape to express that they are ‘prepared’ or ‘designed’. Despite the
choice of words, this does not have to mean anything teleological. At knowabil-
ity levels 2 and 3, the lower time limit nˆ for decision is marked, and at level 3
the upper time limit nˇ is also marked.
The sets Σij represent the regions in state space in which P has value pi
and P ′ has value pj . In the examples shown in Fig. 2.27, these sets are not
realizable alternative since property P is never observed, so that the alternatives
that correpond to the values p1 and p2 have knowability level 1.
To make things simpler, we focus on complete sets of future alternatives
S˜j that extend into one or more property value spaces P˜j (Definition 2.24 and
Eq. [2.49]), which corresponds to mutually exclusive property values (Definition
2.47). This is convenient since it makes the description time independent, as
long as no observation is made. The reason is the invariance under evolution
that is expressed in statement 2.24. This invariance prevents the states and
alternatives from floating around in state space. Instead they are ‘nailed’ by
the property value division lines ∂P˜j .
Let us turn the attention to the corresponding symbolic notation. The right
state in Fig. 2.27(b) corresponds to an experiment in which property P is defined
but unknowable, and in which property P ′ will be observed with certainty sooner
or later. We write
Sˇ =
[
Σ11 Σ21
∣∣
nˆ′,nˇ′ Σ12 Σ22
]
. (2.50)
Assume instead that P may or may not be observed in the experiment, so
that the alternatives that correspond to the values p1 and p2 have knowability
level 2. This situation is shown in the left panel of Fig. 2.28). Assume further
that there is conditional knowledge such that the value of P ′ depends to some
degree on the value of P . Either knowledge of the value of P excludes some
values of P ′, or knowledge of P affects the probability to observe different values
of P ′. This situation may occur, for example, if the P is associated with an event
that is known to precede the event that is associated to P , and these two events
are causally connected (have a time-like separation).
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Figure 2.28: An experiment in which two properties P and P ′ are observed,
and we have conditional knowledge so that the value of P ′ depends on the value
of P . When the alternative values of property P are at level 2, and the values
of property P ′ are at level 3, the evolution of the state depends on whether
P refers to a time before P ′ is observed. If no (Case A), the state is reduced
when the value of P ′ is observed at time n′. If yes (Case B), the state is further
reduced at an earlier time. This takes place either by direct observation of the
value of P , or, if no observation is made, at time n′ − 1 by the requirement of
epistemic consistency.
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Let nˆ be the lower time limit for the observation of P , and let nˆ′ and nˇ′ be
the lower and upper time limits for the observation of P ′, respectively. Also, let
n′ be the time when the value of property P ′ is actually observed (nˆ′ ≤ n′ ≤ nˇ′).
We must treat the cases nˆ ≥ n′ and nˆ < n′ separately. Let us call them cases
A and B. In case A, it is impossible to know the value pj of P before the value
of P ′ has been observed at time n′. Thus the influence of P on P ′ cannot make
itself felt, so that this case is analogous to that represented in Eq. 2.50. For
n < n′ the state is
Sˇ(n) =
[
S˜11(n)
...nˆ S˜21(n)
∣∣∣
nˆ′,nˇ′ S˜12(n)
...nˆ S˜22(n)
]
. (2.51)
At time n′ the state reduces to
u1Sˇ(n
′ − 1)
↓
Sˇ(n′) =
[
S˜11(n
′)
...nˆ S˜21(n
′)
]
OR
[
S˜12(n
′)
...nˆ S˜22(n
′)
]
,
(2.52)
where Sˇ(n′ − 1) has the form (2.51).
In case B, it may be possible to learn the value pj before time n
′. The time
when we actually get to know pj does not matter; it may be before or after time
n′. If knowledge is gained before time n′, the state is reduced at this time to
one of the halves shown in Fig. 2.28, corresponding to p1 or p2. However, even
if no such observation of P is made, epistemic consistency (Assumptions 1.6,
2.1 and 2.2) requires that Sˇ is nevertheless reduced at time n′ − 1 from a state
of the form (2.51) to a state of the following form.
u1Sˇ(n
′ − 2)
↓
Sˇ(n′ − 1) = [ S˜11(n′ − 1) ∣∣nˆ′,nˇ′ S˜12(n′ − 1) ] OR[
S˜21(n
′ − 1)
∣∣
nˆ′,nˇ′ S˜22(n
′ − 1) ] .
(2.53)
Otherwise, if knowledge about pj is gained at some later time n
′′ > n′, it would
be possible to deduce at time n′′ that Sˇ(n′ − 1) had the above form. We would
have a knowable contradiction, since the evolution to time n′ from this reduced
state may be different than it actually was.
In the absence of direct observation of the value pj before time n
′, there is
no epistemic reason to say that the reduction takes place earlier than at time
n′ − 1. No observation and no consistency argument will ever be able to tell
whether it has happened earlier. Therefore such a ‘reduction by consistency’
can be defined to occur at time n′ − 1.
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At time n′, the state (2.53) is reduced further, to
u1Sˇ(n
′ − 1)
↓
Sˇ(n′) =
[
S˜11(n
′)
]
OR
[
S˜12(n
′)
]
OR
[
S˜21(n
′)
]
OR
[
S˜22(n
′)
]
.
(2.54)
To make case B more concrete, let us consider an example. Imagine a double-
slit experiment where the source emits two (entangled) particles in opposite
directions (Fig. 2.29). Property P represents the slit the particle has passed.
By definition, the property values p1 and p2 cannot be known before the time nˆ
of passage. Property P ′ is the position on the detector screen behind the slits.
The values of P ′ cannot be known before a time nˆ′ given by nˆ plus the shortest
distance from the slits to the screen divided by the fastest possible speed of the
particle. Assume that the particle hits the screen at time n′ ≥ nˆ′.
Imagine first that the twin of the particle that passes a slit is deflected
into a detector [Fig. 2.29(a)]. There is one detector for each slit, so that
detection of the twin particle determines which slit the original particle passed.
The two detectors may be placed far away, so that the twin particle reaches
them long after the original particle hits the screen. Regardless whether the
two detectors are turned on or off at the time the experiment starts, path
information may or may not be gained, since the status of the detectors can
be changed afterwards. Therefore the alternatives corresponding to property
values p1 or p2 are at knowability level 2. Regardless the time of detection
of the twin particle, the path information refers to a time before the original
particle hits the screen. Thus, to respect epistemic consistency, Nature must
choose a state corresponding to the passage through one slit or the other already
at time n′ − 1, even if no observation of the path is made at this time, or even
if no observation will ever be made. If Nature would not make such a choice,
we would have a superposition of the two alternative values of P , which would
give rise to an interference pattern on the screen. This pattern would contradict
the knowledge about the value of P that might be gained after the interference
pattern is observed.
In contrast, if it is known that path information is erased before time n′,
there is no risk of inconsistency. Such an eraser is represented in Fig. 2.29(b) as
a cloud in which the twin particle disappears before the original particle passes
through one of the slits. The alternatives corresponding to property values p1
or p2 are degraded to level 1.
However, if the eraser is successively moved away, the possibility to gain path
information finally survives after time n′, and we are back in a situation where
Nature has to choose path at time n′ − 1 to make sure that no contradiction
will occur. Nature is about to paint itself into a logical corner, so to say, and
must jump out of it to preserve consistency.
This choice corresponds to a sudden increase of potential knowledge at time
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Figure 2.29: Gedankenexperiment to illustrate Case B in Fig. 2.28. The source
emits two particles in opposite directions. One of these particles passes a slit.
Property P is the slit the particle passes. Property P ′ is the position at the
screen hit by the particle that passes a slit. a) If there are two detectors that can
detect the backward-moving twin particle, the state reduces at time n′− 1, just
before the particle hits the screen at time n′. It does not matter whether the
detectors are turned on or off. b) If path information is erased in a ‘cloud’, the
values of P are degraded to knowability level 1, and the evolution corresponds
to that in Case A in Fig. 2.28. The cloud has to be close enough, so that
information is erased before the particle hits the screen.
2.9. MINIMAL OBJECTS 119
Figure 2.30: Preparation of a state. Because of the lack of determinism, any
given state can be prepared to different expermiental setups, designed to observe
different properties P and P ′. The scissor cuts correspond to state reductions.
n′ − 1. It is not clear to me how this event, dictated by logic and consistency,
relates to ordinary increase of potential knowledge by direct observation. The
latter event is associated with the potential for the subjective perception of
something new. But what about the former type of event?
Statement 2.28 (Potential knowledge may increase in two ways). A
state reduction u1S(n) → S(n + 1) ⊂ u1S(n) may occur either as the result of
subjective perception, or as the result of the requirement of epistemic consistency
(Assumptions 1.6, 2.1 and 2.2).
Of course, there are more possible combinations of alternatives than those
shown in Figs. 2.27 and 2.28. However, these are sufficient to introduce the
graphic and symbolic notation and to illustrate state reduction by observation
or by epistemic consistency.
To strengthen the intuition for the graphic notation, Fig. 2.30 shows how a
single state can be prepared in different ways to become two different experi-
ments to determine the values of properties P and P ′, respectively. Of course,
this is possible because of the lack of determinism. This indeterminism makes it
possible to apply different sequences of ‘scissor cuts’ to the same original state.
Each of these cuts represent a state reduction.
2.9 Minimal objects
In this section characetrize such objects more exactly than was done in Section
1.7 (Definitions 1.21 and 1.22).
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Consider a setM of object species Ml such that each Ml ∈M is defined by
the same set of internal attributes {A1, . . . , Am}. Each Ml is specified by a set
Υ(l) = {Υ1l, . . . ,Υml} (2.55)
of allowed values of these attributes that is distinct from the corresponding
sets Υ(l′) of all other objects M(l′) ∈ M. That these sets are distinct means
that for each pair of object species Ml ∈M and Ml′ ∈M,
∃Ai : Υil ∩Υil′ = ∅. (2.56)
This condition means that each object species Ml ∈ M is inherently different
from all the others. To make this statement meaningful, we must require that
each set Υil is constant in time. Otherwise the value of attribute Ai in Eq.
(2.56) of minimal object Ml may be observed to be υ1 ∈ Υil at one time, and
υ2 ∈ Υil′ the next time. If no object division has taken place, such blending
of attribute values means that Ml and Ml′ must be considered to be the same
object species Ml′′ , with Υil′′ = Υil ∪Υil′ . More formally: if no object division
takes place,
∀i, l : u1Υil = Υil. (2.57)
If M furthermore fulfils Definition 1.21, it is a minimal set of objects.
To relate the vocabulary used here to well-known quantities, let us consider
the internal attributes of elementary fermions. These are, in arbitrary order:
A1 : total spin
A2 : generation
A3 : baryon number
A4 : lepton number
A5 : electric charge
A6 : colour charge.
(2.58)
Spin components, parity, positions and momentum are all relational at-
tributes, since they refer to other objects that define a spatio-temporal reference
frame. Regarding the problem how to treat rest mass, we will argue in section
3.5 that it is a derived internal attribute, that the set of masses of the minimal
objects is a function of the other internal attributes in the above list. In other
words, the rest mass is not considered to be an independent attribute (Defini-
tion 1.19). Therefore it is not necessary to include it in a specification of the
members Ml of a minimal set M.
The sets of possible values of these six attributes are:
Υ1 =
1
2
Υ2 = {1, 2, 3}
Υ3 = {− 13 , 0, 13}
Υ4 = {−1, 0, 1}
Υ5 = {−1,− 23 ,− 13 , 0, 13 , 23 , 1}
Υ6 = {0, 1, exp(i 2pi3 ), exp(i 4pi3 )}.
(2.59)
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In this list we have included the possible attributes of elementary particles
as well as anti-particles. For the colour charges, we set r ↔ 1, g ↔ exp(i 2pi3 ),
and b ↔ exp(i 2pi3 ). The three non-zero values of color charges are thus seen as
a circular attribute (Definition 2.21 and Fig. 2.18).
As an example, let us specify the sets Υ(l) of allowed attribute values (Eq.
[2.55]) that define the electron and the down-quark.
Υ(electron) = {1/2, 1, 0, 1,−1, 0}
Υ(d−quark) =
{
1/2, 1, 1/3, 0,−1/3, {1, exp(i 2pi3 ), exp(i 4pi3 )}
} (2.60)
The fact that the set Υ6,d−quark = {1, exp(i 2pi3 ), exp(i 4pi3 )} that corresponds
to color charge contains more than one value reflects the fact that we may iden-
tify a minimal object without having to assume complete potential knowledge
of all the internal attribute values. The color does not stay constant in the
sense of Eq. [2.21], and therefore a single color cannot constitute a set Υil. Put
differently, the reason why quarks with different colors are not considered to be
different elementary fermions is that it is not possible to observe the color of an
individual quark and track this colored object until it divides. This makes such
a differentiation meaningless from the epistemic point of view. In contrast, it
is possible to deduce which set of quarks are contained in a composite fermion.
The members of this deduced set of quarks stay the same until the composite
fermion divides. Each of them can be tracked by means of deduction. This
makes quarks valid quasiobjects even though they cannot be observed individ-
ually.
We may express the discussion about color charge in the following alternative
way. Let Υi be the set of possible value of attribute Ai. Then the vector
υ = (υ1, υ2, . . . , υ6), (2.61)
where υi ∈ Υi, represents a state of complete knowledge about the internal
attributes of some minimal object. The fact that there may be several such
vectors υ, υ′, . . . that are identified with the same object Ml can be expressed
as a degeneracy
υ ↔ Ml
υ′ ↔ Ml.
...
(2.62)
We may also write Ml ↔ {υ, υ′, . . .}, where each element can be described as an
‘exact internal state’ ZI of the minimal object Ml. The color charge illustrates
the fact that knowledge of the internal attributes is never complete for some
minimal objects (the quarks). In other words, the internal state of a quark is
never exact.
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Figure 2.31: That object O is identifiable at time n means that SOO(n) and
SOO(n + 1) overlap. This is true also for the two object states SO(n) and
SO(n + 1) shown here. In contrast, SΩO (n) and SΩO (n + 1) must be disjoint,
since some objects must be subjectively distinguishable in the states S(n) and
S(n + 1). Graphically, it becomes clear that the smaller part of knowledge
that is encapsulated in O, the larger chance that O is identifiable. It becomes
more probable that one of all the other objects change in the temporal update
n→ n+ 1. Compare Fig. 2.7.
2.10 Identifiability
The reader may have noted that I stress the discreteness of alternatives, and
the discreteness of sequential time, but still crucially refer to the concept of
identifiable objects, which is defined with the help of continuity (Definition
1.17). Clearly, this concept must be redefined in an epistemically sound way.
The intuition is the following: if an object in a state of knowledge PK(n)
cannot be distinguished from an object in the next state PK(n+ 1), then these
two objects must be seen as the same object. It is impossible to tell them apart,
and it is epistemically unsound to give them different names. This one and the
same object is therefore possible to track from time n to time n + 1, and we
may say that it is identifiable at time n.
Of course, there must be other objects in PK(n+1) that can be distinguished
from objects in PK(n), by definition of sequential time. Time is updated when
a subjective distinction can be made between now and then. These other objects
can collectively be seen as a clock that ticks each time sequential time is updated
(Fig. 2.31). These other objects constitute the environment or complement ΩO
to O, with state SΩO (Definition 2.6). The identifiable object ‘floats’ through
time in the sense that one cannot say for sure that its attributes have changed
between two subsequent tickings of the clock. In contrast, it may be possible to
perceive a change of the identifiable object at a later time n+m, as compared
to time n, where m > 1.
Let us formalize these ideas. Recall the Definition 2.5 of the state SO of
an object O expressed in state space S, and the Definition 2.41 of the state
SOO of the same object expressed in object state space SO. Figure 2.23 tries to
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Figure 2.32: Tracking an object through time in object state space SO and in
state space S. If two object states SOO(n) and SOO(n+ 1) overlap in SO, then
they represent the same identifiable object O. Otherwise they represent different
objects O1 and O2. When two object states are represented in the full state
space S, they overlap at subsequent times regardless whether they correspond
to a single identifiable object O, or two different objects O1 and O2. Thus the
overlap of subsequent object states can be used to define a single identifiable
object only if we represent these states in SO. Compare Fig. 2.23.
poinpoint the essential difference between these two ways to express the object
state.
Definition 2.53 (Identifiable object at time n). An object O is identifiable
at time n if and only if SOO(n) ∩ SOO(n+ 1) 6= ∅.
This condition means that there are exact object states ZO that are com-
patible with both SOO(n) and SOO(n + 1) (Fig. 2.31). In other words, there
is no potential knowledge that can tell the objects at subsequent times apart.
If these two object states do not overlap, one the other hand, we have to say
that they are the states of different objects. To reach this conclusion, we have
to represent the object states in object state space, as illustrated in Fig. 2.32.
It may be possible to track an object during extended periods of time:
Definition 2.54 (Identifiable object during a time interval). An object
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Figure 2.33: The evolution of the state SOO of an object O that is identifiable
in the time interval [n, n+ 6]. The object O′ at time n+ 7 cannot be identified
with object O at time n+ 6, and is therefore given a separate name.
that is identifiable at all times n, n + 1, . . . , n + m is identifiable in the time
interval [n, n+m].
This definition is illustrated in Fig. 2.33. Even if the object is identifiable
at every time instant in the above sequence, it may be possible to distinguish
the object at some time n+ µ from the object at time n, that is, we may have
SOO(n) ∩ SOO(n+ µ) = ∅, where 1 < µ ≤ m. Due to its identifiability at each
instant, the object nevertheless preserves its identity.
When one object changes and time is updated, there are other objects that
apparently stay the same. A leave may fall from the tree, but the stem of the
tree does not move. Not everything changes at the same time. This fact can be
related to the feeling that states of knowledge at different times belong to the
same world, even though they are different. Even if everything around us seem
to change at once, some internal objects may stay the same, such as mood and
memories.
Definition 2.55 (Identity of a world). A world specified by a sequence of
states S(n) preserves its identity during time interval [n, n + m] if and only if
there is an identifiable object at all times n, n+ 1, . . . , n+m− 1.
The object that is identifiable may change from one instant to the next.
When the leave falls, the immobility of the stem preserves the identity of the
world. But when the leave has fallen, the tree may be cut down, and the leave
resting on the ground preserves the identity of the world. In this way, the
evolution of a given, identifiable world may be compared to walking: when one
foot is lifted, the other is resting on the ground.
The notion of minimal objects (Section 2.9), the assumptions of finite depth
of knowledge and noiseless physical law (Assumptions 1.16 and 1.14), together
with the assumption of epistemic invariance (Assumptions 1.6, 2.1 and 2.2),
imply that any physical state S(n) can be specified in terms of a finite set of
identifiable minimal objects, upon which the evolution u1 acts (Definition 2.8).
Consequently, to specify u1 completely, it is sufficient to specify the action of
u1 on identifiable minimal objects. Thus it is essential to define identifiability
of minimal objects.
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Definition 2.56 (Identifiable minimal object). A minimal object OM is
identifiable if and only if it is quasi-identifiable at all times. A minimal object
is quasi-identifiable if and only if, given the evolution of potential knowledge, it
cannot be excluded that OM evolves along a continuous trajectory, in accordance
with the ‘naive’ notion of identifiability (Definition 1.17).
To actually confirm that a minimal object travels along a continuous tra-
jectory would require that the time interval t(n) between the sequential time
instants n − 1 and n at which we observe it could be made arbitrarily small
for each n. This cannot be taken for granted, and it is not necessary according
to the present notion of identifiability, based on overlapping sequential object
states. In fact, arbitrarily small t(n) are forbidden according to the discussion
in section 3.8.
Statement 2.29 (Minimal objects are identifiable). The evolution of any
object is always consistent with a model in which it is composed of identifiable
minimal objects.
Statement 2.29 follows from the assumption of noiseless physical law (As-
sumption 1.14). The identifiability of minimal objects means that we are never
forced into a physical model where objects pop out of nowhere, or suddenly
disappear.
The fact that minimal objects are identifiable gives meaning the concept
of the evolution of a minimal object. That is, we are allowed to use a model
in which predict the trajectory of a particular minimal object OM given the
present knowledge of its state.
Definition 2.57 (The evolution of a minimal object). Consider a particu-
lar minimal object OM at time n with state SOM (n). Its evolution u1(S(n))SOM (n)
is the smallest set such that we always have SOM (n+ 1) ⊆ u1(S)SOM (n).
If minimal objects were not identifiable, it would not make any sense to
single out their evolution in the evolution u1S(n) of the entire world. Note that
we have to let the evolution operator u1 depend on S(n) when we apply it to
SOM (n), since OM may interact with its environment.
How can distinct time instants appear if all minimal objects are identifiable?
If none of the minimal objects can be told apart at times n and n+ 1, how can
the states S(n) and S(n+ 1) they build collectively be told apart? Some of the
minimal objects must be deduced quasiobjects, as illustrated in Fig. 2.34. If the
state of potential knowledge PK(n) consisted of directly perceivable minimal
objects only, there would be no object that could act as a clock, that could
define the distinction between S(n) and S(n + 1). (Compare the discussion in
the caption to Fig. 2.31).
Statement 2.30 (There are always minimal objects that cannot be
individually perceived). At all sequential time instants n, there are some
minimal objects that are quasiobjects.
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The existence of minimal quasiobjects makes it possible to speak about iden-
tifiable objects that are not directly perceived at each time instant at which it
is identifiable. If we look at the moon, close our eyes, and then look at it again,
we want to be able to say that it is the same moon we are looking at the second
time.
Definition 2.58 (Quasi-identifiable object during a time interval). An
object O is quasi-identifiable during the time interval [n, n+m] if and only if it
can be described in terms of the same set of identifiable minimal objects for any
n′ ∈ [n, n+m], and these minimal objects evolve according physical law.
This definition makes it possible to introduce the evolution of a quasi-
identifiable object in the same way as we introduced the evolution of a minimal
object (Definition 2.57).
Definition 2.59 (The evolution of a quasi-identifiable object). Consider
an object O which is quasi-identifiable at time n, having state SO(n). Its evo-
lution u1(S(n))SO(n) is the smallest set such that we always have SO(n+ 1) ⊆
u1(S)SO(n).
We see that an identifiable object is always quasi-identifiable, but a quasi-
identifiable object does not need to be identifiable. We may also say that we can
be sure that an identifiable object stays the same throughout the period dur-
ing which it is identifiable, whereas we cannot exclude that a quasi-identifiable
object stays the same throughout the same period of time, given physical law.
Needless to say, it is this weaker form of identifiability that we use in everyday
life. We do not need to stare constantly at a flower in the kitchen window to
say that it is the same flower we see each morning as we drink our coffee.
2.11 States of the body and of the world
It is not altogether clear how to make the distinction between the external world
and the bodies of aware subjects. Does my toenail belong to my body or to the
outside world? What if I cut it off? What about the retina, which is essential
for visual preception, and thus for subjective knowledge?
Let us try to clear things out. Each perception has two ends. It consists
of the perceived object O, and those objects in the body that correspond to
the subjective perception according to detailed materialism (Assumption 1.4).
These objects in the body are quasiobjects; they are the objects that can be
deduced from physical law as necessary for the perception at hand (Fig. 2.35).
For example, any visual perception requires a lens Oi1, a retina Oi2, a visual
nerve Oi3 and a visual cortex Oi4. (The subscript i indicates that we are talking
about an internal object of the body.) Even if we do not normally perceive these
objects directly, we know that they must be there in our heads - otherwise we
would have seen nothing.
Let Sˇi be the state consisting of all exact states of a body of a preceiving
subject that cannot be excluded by the perception of O. Since bodily objects
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Figure 2.34: If all minimal objects in the physical state S were directly perceived
and were still identifiable, then there would be no object OC that could act as a
clock and make it possible to distinguish time n from time n+1 in the sense that
S(n)∩S(n+1) = ∅. For such a clock we must require SOOC(n)∩SOOC(n+1) =
∅. In this example the world consists of two directly perceived minimal objects,
and there is no such clock. We conclude that some minimal objects must be
deduced quasiobjects.
Figure 2.35: According to the assumption of detailed materialism, each per-
ceived object O correspond to a set of internal quasiobjects Oˆik in the body.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the perceived state SO of O and
the (reduced) state Sˇi of these quasiobjects.
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Oˆik are deduced quasiobjects, the state Sˇi of these objects is classified as a
reduced state (Fig. 2.8). We have a one-to-one correspondence
SO ↔ Sˇi. (2.63)
let Ok(n) be the totality of the objects potentially perceived by subject k at
time n. Then the corresponding reduced state of the body of k can be written
Sˇki (n).
Definition 2.60 (The body of a subject). The body of subject k at time n
is the set Bk(n) of quasiobjects that are part of all exact states Z ∈ Sˇki (n).
This definition identifies a minimal group of necessary quasiobjects: none of
them can be excluded in a body that is able to account for the present state of
individual potential knowledge PKk(n). The body becomes a dynamical object,
where the constituent objects may change from one time to the next.
Even if the perceived object Ok(n), of course, is necessary to account for the
perception, we exclude it from the body - only the corresponding quasiobjects
count (Fig. 2.35). Otherwise we would have to consider a flower that we see on
the ground to be part of our body.
It often happens, however, that some of the perceived objects indeed are part
of the body (Fig. 2.36). If we let our two hands touch, the direct sensation of
touch necessitates as quasiobjects the very same skin with nerve endings as we
also perceive directly. Some of the perceived objects Ol can be identified with
some of the necessary quasiobjects Oˆil′ . In this situation, the states SOl and
SˇOˆil′
of the objects we identify must overlap, to respect epistemic consistency.
If we look at our own eyes in the mirror, we never see that the eyelids are closed.
The definition of the body in terms of a set of objects B is just an attempt
to be semantically clear. The essential physical quantity associated with the
body is the reduced state Sˇi. If we break the body down to minimal objects
like electrons and quarks, a description of the body in terms of objects would
just read X electrons, Y quarks, and so on. Such a list provides no useful
information. It is the state Sˇi of these objects that is important, their relations,
the conditional knowledge that defines the larger structures they form.
Having defined the body, and the state of the body, it possible to state
the assumption of detailed materialism (Asssumption 1.4) more precisely. In a
materialistic world, each time a subject potentially perceives a distinct change
of the world, there is also a distinct change of her body. By definition, at each
temporal update n→ n+1 there is at least one subject that perceives a distinct
change of the world.
Assumption 2.7 (Detailed materialism 2). At each time n there is a subject
k such that Sˇki (n+ 1) ∩ Sˇki (n) = ∅.
The fact that some of the perceived objects are part of the body makes it
possible to divide this set of objects into two groups: the objects Oki that belong
to the body of subject k and those objects Oke that do not. We associate the
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Figure 2.36: Sometimes we perceive part of our own body. Some of the perceived
objects Ol can be identified with some of the quasiobjects Oˆil′ that defines the
body. If we snap our fingers, the sensation of snapping necessitates the same
fingers (quasiobject Oˆi8) as we see directly in front of our head (object O6).
Figure 2.37: The physical state corresponding to the knowledge of subject k can
be divided into two parts: the state Ske to the knowledge of the external world,
and the state Ski corresponding to the knowledge or perception of her own body.
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Figure 2.38: The physical state S belong to the common part of the physical
states Sk that correspond to individual potential knowledge. The reduced col-
lective state of the bodies SˇI of a group of subjects belong to the common part
of the individual states of these bodies.
states Ski and S
k
e to these two objects, respectively (Fig. 2.37). The physical
state corresponding to the individual potential knowledge of k fulfils
Sk ⊆ Ske ∩ Ski . (2.64)
We concluded in section 2.10 that the entire world with state S has to consist
of several objects to be able to preserve its identity as time passes. In the same
way we may conclude that the internal state Ski of subject k has to consist of
several objects if she is to be able to preserve her subjective identity as time
passes. At least one internal object has to stay the same when she perceives
that another one changes. In the same way, Ske must consist of several object if
the external world should be able to preserve its identity in the eyes of subject
k.
Note that the somewhat paradoxical situation might occur, where k experi-
ences a loss of individual identity, but the external world nevertheless preserves
its identity in her eyes. This situation occurs if all internal objects undergo a
distinct change at some time, whereas some external objects subjectively remain
the same. Note also that identity may be preserved at the collective level even
if it is lost at the individual level.
Let us turn to this collective level. Let SˇI be the reduced state of the
composite object consisting of all bodies in the world (Fig. 2.38). Epistemic
consistency (Assumptions 1.6, 2.1 and 2.2) requires
S(n) ⊆ ⋂k Sk(n)
SˇI(n) ⊆
⋂
k Sˇ
k
i (n).
(2.65)
Assume that these relation were not true, and that there were an exact state
Z ∈ S(n) such that Z ∈ S1(n), but Z /∈ S2(n) (Fig. 2.38). Then, at a later
time n′ > n subject 2 could meet subject 1 and tell her that she excluded Z as a
possible state of the world already at time n. That could lead to a contradiction
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knowable to subject 1, since the evolution of her state S1(n)→ S1(n′) depends
irreducibly on S(n) (Statement 2.8), just like the state of any object.
The potential knowledge PK(n) of the world consists of the perceptions of
all subjects k, corresponding to individual internal states Sˇki of their bodies,
giving the collective internal state SˇI . By definition, PK(n) also corresponds
to S(n). We conclude that there is a one-to-one correspondence between SˇI(n)
and S(n):
S(n)↔ SˇI(n). (2.66)
This relation embodies intertwined dualism and detailed materialism. The
correspondence is not an identity, but a functional relationship where physical
law defines the function. Given S(n), we can deduce SˇI(n) from physical law,
and given SˇI(n) there is exactly one possible state of knowledge PK(n) and a
corresponding physical state S(n).
We may define SI as the state of the composite object OI that consists of
the parts of all the bodies that are directly perceived by somebody. SE is then
the state of all the other parts ΩE of the world, those that do not belong to the
body of anyone (Fig. 2.39). We have
S(n) ⊆ SE(n) ∩ SI(n). (2.67)
Let SˇII be the reduced state of the quasiobjects OˆII in the bodies that
are necessary to account for the perception OI of the corresponding subjects.
Likewise, let SˇEI be the reduced state of the quasiobjects OˆEI in the bodies that
are necessary to account for the perception of the external world ΩE . We may
also define the reduced state SˇEE of those quasiobjects OˆEE that are possible
to deduce from the directly observed external objects in ΩE and physical law.
The relation between these sets are illustrated in Fig. 2.39.
Clearly, we must have
SˇI ⊆ SˇII ∩ SˇEI ∩ SˇEE , (2.68)
and
SˇI ⊆ S. (2.69)
These relations should be compared with Eq. (2.65), (2.66), and (2.67).
The (composite) quasiobjects OˆII , OˆEI , and OˆEE that are defined above,
can be used to make a more elaborate version of Fig. 1.10. We let PKI ↔ SI
denote the potential knowledge of the directly perceived internal objects OI ,
and we let PKE ↔ SE denote the potential knowledge of the directly perceived
external objects in OE . Clearly PK ⊇ PKI ∪ PKE . The length of the interval
covered by the various composite objects indicate how many distinct objects are
contained in the representation of the corresponding physical state. In short,
we can deduce more (quasi)objects than we can see directly.
Basically, the physical state of the internal and external world is an encoding
of our knowledge about these two worlds. This knowledge is in turn encoded in
the physical state of the internal world, so that the state of both the internal and
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Figure 2.39: Relation between various physical states derived from the distinc-
tion between subject and object, the body and the external world. All states are
derived from the collective potential knowledge PK of all individual subjects.
The subscripts I and E stands for internal and external, respectively. See text
for further explanation.
Figure 2.40: An elaborate version of Fig. 1.10. The relations between the
corresponding states of these objects are shown in Fig. 2.39. The discrete
sequences of objects along the upper and lower lines shown in Fig. 1.10 are
suppressed for clarity.
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Figure 2.41: States Sk of a person standing with a ball in her hands. (a) The
idea to throw the ball to the left or to the right comes into her mind, splitting
the state into two future options. She decides to throw it to the right. The
solid half circle becomes the new state. (b) The idea to throw the ball forward
or backward comes into her mind, and she decides to throw it forward. (c) The
composite idea to throw the ball to the right and forward comes into her mind,
and she makes it happen.
the external world is encoded in the state of the internal world. As we discussed
in section 1.7, this implies that the knowledge of both worlds is incomplete.
2.12 Options, intention and choice
We return to the concept of alternatives, introduced in section 2.4, and further
discussed in the following sections. In our terminology, an alternative is a phys-
ical state that corresponds to the present potential knowledge plus a specific
property of some object, the value of which is not known at present. The object
may or may not turn out to have this property when it is observed at some later
time. We let an option be an alternative that is subjectively preconceived.
To highlight the difference between an alternative and an option, suppose
that a cat is hiding in the bushes. If someone walks along a street and approaches
the bushes without thinking about the possibility that there may be a cat nearby,
and it suddenly walks out before her, then it is an alternative that comes true.
Her individual state changes so that it becomes a subset of the part of state
space defined by the property ”there is a cat nearby”. If she walks along thinking
that her neighbour’s cat might come to greet her in the street any second, and
it actually does, the alternative would also be an option that comes true.
Imagine next that someone is standing with a ball in her hand. Suddenly,
the two options to throw it to the left or the right materialize in her mind. This
event corresponds to a distinct change of the state Sˇki of her body, according
to detailed materialism. At this stage, suppose that there is nothing in her
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state of mind that favours one option above the other. Half of the exact states
that conforms with the present state of subject k must then correspond to an
evolution where the ball moves to the left, and the other half to a future scenario
where the ball moves to the right (Fig. 2.41).
In the same way, the options to throw the ball forward och backward may
appear in her head [Fig.2.41(b)]. In this case there is an inherent asymmetry of
the options, but for the sake of illustration we may again assign the two options
the same chance of realization.
The idea to throw the ball to the right is rather imprecise. Consequently,
there are many exact states that are consistent with this option [the solid half-
circle in Fig. 2.41(a)]. Options may be combined, of course. The idea may
appear in her mind to throw the ball to the right and forward. This option is
more precisely defined and thus correspond to a smaller area in state space -
the upper left quarter of the circle [Fig.2.41(c)].
In this case the combined option may be realized without any problem. But
since knowledge is always incomplete, there is a limit to how precisely an option
can be defined, if we require that it should be possible to decide whether it comes
true or not. Not every alternative is realizable (Definition 2.52). Suppose that
the state depicted in Fig. 2.41 corresponds to a single electron rather than a
person with a ball in her hands. Suppose further that the options to throw the
ball to the left or to the right are replaced by the options that the x-component
sx of the spin of the electron turns out to be positive or negative, and that the
ball flying forward or backward corresponds to the cases where the y-component
sy of the spin is positive or negative, respectively. Then we know experimentally
that it can never be decided whether the combined option sx > 0 and sy > 0 is
realized. It is epistemically meaningless.
The lesson is the usual one: in a graphical representation of a state S as
a set, where realizable alternatives Sj divides S into subsets, each such subset
always contains more than one exact state Z.
Let us make the discussion more formal. We have a target object Ot, which
subject k perceives, with state Skt . In the example above it is the ball. Alter-
native future states of this target object takes the form of imagined, internal
objects Oi, which are subjectively associated with Ot. The state of Oi is S
k
i .
The interpretation of Ski as an option, as possible future state of O
k
t , can be de-
scribed as a directed relational attribute, that points from the imagined object
Oi to the target object Ot.
Definition 2.61 (Image attribute I). The directed relational attribute I is
such that Ikit(n) = 1 if subject k interprets an internal object Oi to be an image of
another object Ot that differs from the present state of Ot, i.e. S
k
i (n)∩Skt (n) =
∅ when Ski and Skt are represented in object state space SO (Definition 2.40).
Otherwise Ikit(n) = 0.
Note that we do not specify whether the target object Okt is external or
internal. Often it is an external object we wish to manipulate, but it may
also be an internal object. We may want to steer our fantasies in a given,
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Figure 2.42: That subject k start to visualize an option for object Ot with
present state Skt corresponds to a temporal update n → n + 1. ΩO is the
complement to Ot and Oi, such that S
k ⊆ Skt ∩Ski ∩SkΩO when these states are
represented in the full state space S. The visualized object Oi is an internal
object in subject k with state Ski that appears at the temporal update, together
with a directed relational attribute that associates Ski with a possible future
state of the target object Ot. This relation is represented by an arrow.
preconceived direction. That is, the target object Ot may be a pure fantasy,
just like the imagined future state Oi of this fantasy.
The imagined object Si that points to Ot may be a composite object. This
is the case for the combined option where your intention is to throw the ball to
the left and forward. It is an intention with two parts Oi1 and Oi2. However,
the incompleteness of knowledge prevents the imgained object Oi from being
composed of too many objects - if the corresponding option should have any
chance to come true. In the case of spin directions of an electron Ot, already
two constituent objects Oi1 and Oi2 is one too many, as discussed above.
The formation of an option for the target object Ot in someone’s mind can
be expressed as a temporal update n→ n+ 1 in which the state Sk of subject k
undergoes a distinct change where an object Oi is created such that I
k
it(n+1) = 1
(Fig 2.42). As usual, the complement ΩO with state S
k
ΩO
is defined as the part
of the world in the state of k that is not Ot, nor Oi (Definition 1.23).
Definition 2.62 (Option). An option is a subjectively imagined alternative. It
is a future state Ski of an object, preconceived by some subject k. Necessary and
sufficient ingredients are the target object Ot with state S
k
t , an internal object Oi
representing the imagined future state Ski of Ot, and the attribute value I
k
it = 1
according to definition 2.61.
It is convenient to represent options as a partition of the state of the tar-
get object, just like we represented alternatives in the preceding sections. Let
us establish the link between this representation and the formalism described
above.
Suppose that we have a set {Skij} of distinct imagined future states of the
target object. This set of states corresponds to a set of internal objects {Oij}
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in subject k. We have
Skij ∩ Skij′ 6= ∅ (2.70)
since they correspond to different objects that can be present at the same time
in the mind of k. However, each state Skij correspond to a distinct property
value
pj ↔ Skij (2.71)
of some property P of the target object Ot, such that
Pj ∩ Pj′ = ∅. (2.72)
The property values pj of the target object may or may not become realized.
Definition 2.63 (Realizable option). The option defined by the imagined
state Skij is realizable if and only if it is equivalent to a realizable property value
pj according to Eq. [2.71].
We may now define present and future options in the same way as we defined
present and future alternatives in Definitions 2.48 and 2.50, and we can also
define complete sets of such options just like in Definitions 2.49 and 2.51. From
now on, for the sake of illustration, we focus mainly on sets of future options
{S˜j} that define a partition of the state St of the target object Ot such that
S˜j ⊆ St and S˜j ∩ S˜j′ = ∅. However, we drop the tildes to avoid cluttered
notation.
Suppose that there is just one realizable option Ski1, and that the correspond-
ing alternative S1 is a proper subset of S
k
t [Fig. 2.43(a)]. Then a complementary
alternative S2 is automatically defined as S2 = S
k
t /S1, so that S
k
t =
⋃
j Sj with
Sj ∩ Sj′ = ∅ for j 6= j′, as described in section 2.4. For instance, if you get the
idea to throw the ball to the right, the alternative that it nevertheless is thrown
to the left is implicitly defined, even if you do not consider it as an option.
It may also be the case that the option Ski1 can never be realized, but the
complementary option S2 is automatically realized at some future time. We
have St ⊆ NP1 and St ⊆ P˜2, according to Fig. 2.25 and Eq. [2.49]. This
situation may be illustrated as in Fig. 2.43(b). It may also be the case that the
option is necessarily realized at some future time n′ > n [Fig. 2.43(c)]. There
is no complementary option S2.
Note that in a deterministic world with complete knowledge, one of the cases
in Fig. 2.43(b) or 2.43(c) always apply. The physical state is an exact state Z, a
point in state space, and cannot be partitioned into two or more options. Then
it is meaningless to introduce the concepts of alternatives and options as basic
ingredients in the formulation of physical law. There is no chance and no ‘free
will’ (Definition 3.3).
In a non-deterministic world there is one possibility left. It may be the case
that neither the option S1 nor its complement S2 can ever be realized [Fig.
2.43(d)]. There are two possible reasons for this.
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Figure 2.43: The relation between the representation of options as intersecting
states (Fig. 2.42) and the representation as a partition of a present state (section
2.4). The target state Skt is separated from the states S
k
i and S
k
c for clarity. (a)
The option Ski1 can be realized. It corresponds to the subset S1 in the partition.
There is also an implicit complementary option S2. (b) the option cannot be
realized. (c) The option is realized with certainty at some future time. (d) It
will never be decided whether the option is realized. (e) Two options Ski1 and S
k
i2
are imagined, corresponding to subsets S1 and S2 in the partition, respectively.
There is also an implicit alternative S3 that completes the set of options.
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The first possibility is that physical law makes it impossible to gain enough
knowledge. The option is too specific, like sx > 0 and sy > 0 for the spin of an
electron.
The second possibility is that the initial state Skt (n) of the target object
Ot happens to be such that S
k
t (n
′) for any n′ > n will have parts on both
sides of the dashed line separating S1 from S2. One example is the double slit
experiment arranged in such a way that it is impossible to ever tell which slit
the particle passed. Another initial condition S′t(n) could make it possible for
one option to come true, as in Fig. 2.43(a). That is, the double slit experiment
could be prepared with a detector at one of the slits.
Options may materialize one by one in the mind of subject k. We get an
extended set of imagined, future states {Skij} of the target object Ot. These may
represent a set {Oij} of identifiable objects that exist ‘in the back of your head’
for some time. In the morning, you may wonder what to cook for supper. During
the day, more and more ideas may pop up in your head, options that are stored
in your memory until you finally decide on your way to the supermarket. This
situation is illustrated in Fig. 2.43(e). The circular set Skt may then represent
the state of the round dinner table Ot. If the set of options is not exhaustive,
it is always completed by the automatically generated complementary options
‘not any of the above’, as discussed above and in section 2.4.
Let us turn from the characterization of options to the choice of one option.
As usual, we are very allowing in the definitions. We are not concerned with the
question whether the chosen option comes true, or how the choice comes about.
We just want to combine the concepts and quantitities already introduced to
define a sequence of events that any detailed description of the process of choice
must follow.
For the first time, we will have to distinguish the current knowledge K(n) at
time n from the potential knowledge PK(n), where K(n) ⊆ PK(n) (Fig. 1.12).
That is, we will contrast current awareness with potential awareness, or, using
a popular phrase, we will distinguish the conscious from the subconscious. An
object O with state SO may belong to the current knowledge K
k of subject k
or not. If so, we may say that O is in the attention of k.
Definition 2.64 (Current awareness attribute Ca). The binary attribute
Ca is such that CakO(n) = 1 if O ∈ Kk(n), and CakO(n) = 0 otherwise.
Just as the binary presentness attribute Pr, we let Ca be an attribute that is
defined for all objects. They are both seen as fundamental parts of the epistemic
formalism.
A choice by subject k is a sequence of two subsequent events (Fig. 2.44):
1. As n→ n+ 1 one option Ski becomes part of current knowledge, Cki (n) =
0→ Cki (n+ 1) = 1.
2. As n+ 1→ n+ 2 the state SkO of some identifiable object O undergoes a
distinct change SkO(n+ 1)∩SkO(n+ 2) = ∅. O is always an internal object
of k, who is aware of the change: CO(n+ 1) = CO(n+ 2) = 1. It may or
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Figure 2.44: One way in which a choice may come about. The knowledge space
of one subject is shown. At time n her attention is focused on the target object
Ot and she is ready for action, as represented by the awareness of the internal
object O, the change of which defines the action. She has three already formed
options Oi1, Oi2, and Oi3 in the back of her head. The next instant (time n+1)
her intention is to choose option Oi1, and the instant after that (time n+ 2) she
has taken action, represented by a change in the state of O, which is part of her
body. The arrow represents the interpretation of Oi1 as an object that defines
an option for Ot (I
k
it = 1).
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may not be the target object Ot, but it is not Oi. The latter object stays
in the current knowledge, so that Ci(n + 2) = 1, without any knowable
changes: Si(n+ 1) ∩ Si(n+ 2) 6= ∅.
Simply put, a choice is an action with a future state of an object in mind.
The two steps may be said to represent intention and action, respectively. The
action is the aware change of the internal object O. If the target object Ot is
a piece of chocolate, O may be a sudden tension in the muscles of the arm,
followed by the vision of the arm stretching out to grab the target object. Just
as we do not care if the action is the beginning of a sequence of events that
leads to the realization of the option, we are not concerned with the question if
the awareness of the option in some sense cause the action, or it just happen.
Our treatment is purely descriptive.
The two-step process of choice is illustrated in Fig. 2.44. It is not specified
whether the option Ski that comes into attention (Ca = 1) is created in the
update n→ n+ 1 (Pr = 1), or it is fetched as a memory (Pr = 0) from latent
knowledge (Ca = 0). The same goes for the target object. Of course, if the
option is fetched from memory, there has to be a memory of the target object
also.
Let us try to express the essence of choice in condensed form.
Definition 2.65 (Choice). A choice is two-step process n → n + 1 → n + 2.
Either Caki (n) = 0, or Oi is not defined at time n. We have Ca
k
i (n + 1) =
Caki (n + 2) = 1. Further, Cat(n + 1) = Cat(n + 2) = 1. There is also an
internal object O which is not Oi such that CaO(n+ 1) = CaO(n+ 2) = 1 and
SkO(n+ 1) ∩ SkO(n+ 2) = ∅.
We may have a sequence of choices with the target Ot in mind. Then, Oi
stays in the current knowledge without any knowable changes for a sequence of
temporal updates. We may call this a ‘sustained action’, an action in several
steps to make the option Ski come true.
We may have an intention without making a choice. In the present formal-
ism, this means that the conditions in Definition 2.65 for the update n→ n+ 1
are fulfilled, but an external object defines the next update n+1→ n+2 rather
than an internal object O as in Fig. 2.44. We may have a future option in mind,
but instead of taking action with our own body, we listen to a dripping faucet
in the kitchen. Of course, we may make a choice and take action at a later time
n+m, if we revive the intention in our head.
Definition 2.66 (Intention). An intention is a temporal update n→ n+1 such
that Caki (n) = 0, or Oi is not defined at time n, but Ca
k
i (n+1) = Cat(n+1) = 1.
We have not specified whether the imagined future state Ski is something
the subject wants to achieve or to avoid. This is not needed in the above formal
description, although it is an elementary aspect of making a choice. Sometimes
the option that gets your attention is negative: if you stand in the street and
see a car approaching, you imagine the situation where it hits you, and jump
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away. In other cases the option you imagine is positive: you see a coin in the
street, imagine that it will become yours, and bend down to grab it.
No matter how fuzzy an intention may be, it can be captured by the above
formalism. A fuzzy intention simply means that the state Ski of the imagined
object Oi is large. This situation is sometimes combined with a fuzzy target
object Ot with a corresponding large state S
k
t . We may say that an intention
I = {Ski , Skt } becomes more precise if it is replaced by I ′ = {(Ski )′, (Skt )′} with
(Ski )
′ ⊂ Ski and (Skt )′ ⊂ Skt .
The name ‘intention’ given to the event described in Definition 2.66 may
seem too narrow. We may have a mental image of some target object in our
mind even if we do not want to manipulate it. We neither want to achieve nor
avoid the imagined state. We call it intention since we will only use the concept
in conjunction with a subsequent action, forming a choice.
It is possible to define other kinds of associations between objects than that
between the imagined object Oi and the target object Ot, which makes Si an
option. To do so we have to introduce other relational attributes than the image
attribute I (Definition 2.61). For example, we might use our formalism to define
a symbol. We do not pursue these matters here, since they will not be needed
in the following.
2.13 Individual subjects
We can imagine several alternatives at the same time. The composite wish to
throw a ball to the left and forward is one example. However, we cannot have
two mutually exclusive alternatives Oi1 and Oi2 in our mind simultaneously,
while taking action (Fig. 2.44). You cannot have the mental images of throwing
the ball to the right and to the left in your mind at the same time as you make
your choice, and takes action.
This is reasonable, but it is nevertheless possible to question the statement.
To circumvent the problem, we may simply define a subject in such a way that
a single individual can never have two contradicting alternatives in mind while
making a choice. If there are two such alternatives at work simultaneously, there
are, by definition, two or more subjects present.
Such a definition of a subject is appealing since it makes it possible to express
what we mean by an individual without having to introduce additional concepts
and quantitites. Up to now we have repeatedly referred to individual subjects k
without defining what they are - the relation between the individual potential
knowledge PKk and the collective potential knowledge PK that corresponds to
the physical state has never been clarified. (This matter was briefly discussed
in section 1.6.)
The prize to pay is that such a definition of an individual needs the concept
of choice as a fundamental ingredient. Since the common potential knowledge
PK is constructed from the knowledge of all individuals, and since PK is the
basis of the physical state, as defined in this text, the concept of choice becomes
fundamental in the physical world view.
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Figure 2.45: The collective current knowledge K(n), consisting of a group of
objects in the foam picture (Fig. 1.6). There are three arrows of intention, so
that at least three subjects exist at this time. Subjects 1 and 2 are currently
aware of two common objects, as indicated by the overlapping dashed ovals,
whereas subject 1 is isolated from the other two at this moment. Furthermore,
subjects 1 and 2 have independent intentions for the same target object Ot1.
Figure 2.45 shows the currently known objects at a given time n in the collec-
tive state of potential knowledge, those objects that someone is currently aware
of, those objects that have current awareness attribute CaO = 1 (Definition
2.64). The relation between the imagined alternatives Oi and the target objects
Ot that interprets the former to be an image of the latter can be regarded as
an association object Oit that carries an image attribute Iit = 1 according to
Definition 2.61.
Definition 2.67 (Association object Oit). An association object Oit is the
interpretation of an imagined object Oi as an image of another target object
Ot. If Oit is part of the potential knowledge PK(n), it carries the internal
attributes PrOit(n) = 1 and Iit(n) = 1 (Definitions 1.25 and 2.64). Also,
Oit ⊂ K(N) ⊆ PK(n).
These objects are indicated as arrows rather than sets (Fig. 2.42). The use of
arrows is justified since the association is a directed relation: the imagined object
represent the target object, but not vice versa. At this stage, no superscripts k
labeling individual subjects are used, since we have not yet defined the meaning
of an individual.
Definition 2.68 (Individual subjects). If there are M association objects
Okit in the state of current knowledge K(n) at time n, then there are at least M
individual subjects at time n.
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Figure 2.46: (a) Two arrows of intention that can be linked by a chain of
imagined objects belong to the same subject. (b) We exclude by assumption the
possibility that chains that link different arrows of intention branch. Subjects
do not merge or divide. The chains of objects in PK(n) form worms, but no
trees or loops. Subjective experiences are personal. It is hard to make sense of
the statement that two subjects share the same perception of an object. (The
branching object states are represented in object state space SO.
Loosely speaking, individuals are subsets of current awareness capable of
making independent choices. We allow the possibility that there are individuals
that do not make choices at time n, that just ‘go with the flow’. They perceive
but do not act deliberately. Such individuals are invisible in the snapshot K(n)
in Fig. 2.45, they have no associated ‘arrows of intention’. They may eventually
resume activity, while others become passive. Arrows may appear and disappear
in the sequence {K(n),K(n + 1), . . .} even if no subject is born or dies. The
number of arrows is not conserved.
This picture calls for a way to associate arrows of intention present at dif-
ferent times to the same individual subject. Such an association requires a
subjective link of identifiable objects between two times n and n′′ where an
arrow of intention is present (Fig. 2.46). This link consists of a chain of objects
with overlapping states, such that you can jump from object to object from
intention A at time n to intention B at time n′′.
However, we cannot allow any kind of object in the chain. By definition, the
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chain starts at time n with the image object O1 ≡ Oi, the source of the arrow
that defines the intention A. The next object O2 in the chain must overlap Oi.
Therefore, in a sense, O2 is also an image object associated with an intention.
However, this intention does not have to be ‘active’ at time n + 1. We do not
need to require that there is an association object Oit ⊂ K(n+ 1). Finally, the
evolved image object surfaces again, becoming the source for a new intention B
at time n′′, possibly targeting a new object Ot′′ .
If this kind of link is present, the two intentions A and B can be said to
belong to the same individual. Admittedly, we have dived into deep waters in
this discussion. We should think of it merely as a game, where we see how far
we can go with the formal concepts that we have introduced. In any case, the
picture that emerges resembles the psychological one, where an unbroken flow
of imaginations, which may sometimes belong to the subconscious, sometimes
surfaces to become sources of conscious intentions and choices that affect the
world around us.
The (possibly) new idea here is that the existence of such a continuous flow
of internal images defines the individual. If the flow is interrupted at some time
n′ between n and n′′, we do no longer say that the intentions A and B belong
to the same person.
Definition 2.69 (Link between intentions). Consider two intentions A and
B at times n and n′′, respectively, with association objects (Oit)A and (Oit)A
referring to the image objects (Oi)A and (Oi)B, respectively. Let (Oi)A ≡ O1(n)
and (Oi)B ≡ On′′−n+1(n′′). A and B are linked if and only if there is a chain of
objects {O1(n), O2(n+1), O3(n+2), . . . , On′′−n+1(n′′)} such that Sn′−n+1(n′)∩
Sn′−n+2(n′ + 1) 6= ∅ for each n ≤ n′ < n′′.
We have defined O1(n) and On′′−n+1(n′′) to be such that they belong to the
current knowledge, that is, O1(n) ∈ K(n) and On′′−n+1(n′′) ∈ K(n′′). However,
for each n < n′ < n′′ it suffices that On′−n+1(n′) ∈ PK(n′).
Definition 2.70 (Intentions and subjects). Two intentions A and B belong
to the same subject if and only if there is a link between them according to
Definition 2.69.
Note that this definition allows for a subject k to become unconsciuos for a
while, and still preserve her identity as a subject when she wakes up. According
to the discussion in Section 1.10, and in particular Fig. 1.24, her state of
potential knowledge PKk is resting in a ‘frozen’ state if the events that define
the temporal update happen to another subject k′. It is just carried along,
meaning that PKk(n + 1) = PKk(n). That is, from the perspecive of subject
k there is no temporal lacuna.
Assumption 2.8 (Separate subjects). The links between intentions never
branch. There is no chain of image objects according to Definition 2.69 such
that two or more arrows of intention at time n can be linked to a single arrow
of intention at time n′ > n. There is no arrow of intention at time n′ such that
it can be linked to two or more arrows of intention at time n′′ > n′.
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Figure 2.47: (a) The two objects Ot1 and O in the current knowledge shown
in Fig. 2.45 that subjects 1 and 2 both perceive. (b) That they both perceive
object O means that the states S1OO and S
2
OO of their personal perceptions O
1
and O2 of O overlap. Since no stronger condition that is epistemically sound can
be formulated, this necessary condition for identity is also treated as a sufficient
condition.
This means that subjects can be born and die, but they cannot multiply by
division, and they cannot merge. Note that subjects described in this way do
not mirror objects, which can indeed both divide and merge, and still keep their
identity (section 2.16 and 2.17).
The assumption that subjects are separate and cannot be linked to each other
raises the question what links them to the same world. Intuitively, different
subjects in the same world have to be able to perceive the same object. Let
us return to Fig. 2.45. The dashed ovals encircle the objects perceived by
each of the three subjects. Some objects are encircled by more than one oval.
The situation is depicted in Fig. 2.47(a), where subjects 1 and 2 in Fig. 2.45
perceive the common objects Ot1 and O. The former object is the target for
two independent intentions, whereas the latter is passively perceived by both.
The statement that two subjects 1 and 2 perceive the same object O cannot
mean that their perceptions are identical. If they were, it would not be possible
to distinguish the two subjects. Therefore, we cannot write O1 = O2, where
Ok denotes the object O as perceived by subject k. Rather, we should demand
that it cannot be excluded that the two perceived objects are the same [Fig.
2.47(b)].
Definition 2.71 (Perception of the same object by two subjects at
time n). Subjects 1 and 2 perceive the same object O at time n if and only
if S1OO(n) ∩ S2OO(n) 6= ∅, where the states SOO are subsets of the object state
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Figure 2.48: Battle of wills. Two subjects can have mutually exclusive intentions
O1it ↔ {O1i , O1t } and O2it ↔ {O2i , O2t } concerning the same target object Ot,
and take action accordingly. In this situation, in the simplest case, the total
physical state S is divided into two distinct alternatives S1 and S2 that evolve
into fulfilment of intention 1 and 2, respectively.
space SO (Definition 2.40).
Equivalently, we may say that the corresponding reduced states must over-
lap: Sˇ1O(n) ∩ Sˇ2O(n) 6= ∅. The overlap of these states means that there are
exact states Z represented by minimal quasiobjects that are consistent with
both perceptions O1 and O2. The notational exercise may seem obscure, but
this is just the usual scientific view of a necessary condition for the statement
that two people observe the same object: their perceptions of the object are
consistent in terms of elementary particles, atoms, molecules, spectrum of light,
temperature, pressure and so on. The perception of the same object by two
subjects defines a mutual relation between these subjects, as illustrated in Fig.
1.8.
Definition 2.72 (Perception of the same identifiable object by two
subjects during a time interval). Subjects 1 and 2 perceive the same object
O during the time interval [n, n + m] if and only if 1) they perceive the same
object at each time n ≤ n′ ≤ n+m according to Definition 2.71, and 2) objects
O1 and O2 are identifiable throughout this time interval by subjects 1 and 2,
respectively.
We may say that the states of objects O1 and O2 are locked onto each
other during an extended period of time. Definitions 2.71 and 2.72 should be
compared to the corresponding Definitions 2.53 and 2.54 of identifiable objects.
We defined identifiability so that two objects that cannot be told apart at two
subsequent times are considered to be the same. Analogously, we say that if
two subjects perceive objects with physical states that cannot be told apart, the
subjects perceive the same object. The necessary condition for identity is used
as the defining condition for identity.
We may apply the considerations about identity to the object that corrsponds
to the total potential knowledge PKk of subject k. This is the entire world,
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as subject k perceives it. It must be the same world as another subject k′ per-
ceives. If we assume that two subjects that are born into the same world live in
the same world until one of them dies, we conclude that the overlapping states
shown in Fig. 2.38 must overlap as long as all three subjects persist.
Assumption 2.9 (Subjects are locked into the common world in which
they live). If S1(n) ∩ S2(n) 6= ∅, then S1(n′) ∩ S2(n′) 6= ∅ for all n′ > n.
We do not explicitly have to account for the death of subject 1 or 2 in the
above assumption if we make the following definition.
Definition 2.73 (The death of a subject). Subject k dies at time n if and
only if Sk(n− 1) ⊂ Sk(n) and Sk(n) = S.
In words, death means that the individual state expands to fill the entire
state space. Individual potential knowledge becomes zero. Analogously,
Definition 2.74 (The birth of a subject). Subject k is born at time n if and
only if Sk(n− 1) = S and Sk(n) ⊂ Sk(n− 1).
The death of a subject k means that there is no future subject that can have
direct access to the memories of k; the chain of objects that link the intentions
of k to a continuous, personal history according to Definition 2.70 is broken at
time n. In the same way, the birth of k means that there is no objects that
bridge her personal experiences to any objects present before her birth.
To conclude, the crucial identifier for an individual subject is the capability
of independent intention. The ultimate manifestation of independence is the
possibility that two subjects have contradictory intentions (Fig. 2.48). The
states of some personally preceived objects always overlap, to create a tempo-
rally connected world (Definition 2.55). Also, they overlap the states of some
objects perceived by other persons, to create a single world in which we all live.
In other words, the unity of the world means that some object states overlap
both along the temporal axis n, n + 1, n + 2, . . ., and along the axis defined by
the set of subjects k, k + 1, k + 2, . . . (Fig. 2.49).
2.14 Individuality and time
This means that there is an analogy between the degrees of freedom represented
by time and individuality, respectively. The difference is that time is directed,
whereas the space of individuals is not - they are not inherently ordered. This
analogy is visible in language. The relation between the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’
resembles the relation between the adverbs ‘now’ and ‘then’, except for the di-
rectionality of the latter pair. Just like everyone is ‘I’ from her own perspective,
every moment is ‘now’ from its own perspective. The analogy can be extended,
so that reference to third person, ‘She’ or ‘he’, corresponds to a temporally neu-
tral ‘at five o’clock’ or the physicist’s ‘at time t’. The epistemic view explored
in this text is that the latter neutral perspective is not enough to account for
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Figure 2.49: To preserve the notion of one single world that several subjects
perceive during an extended period of time, the states of some object must
overlap, both along the temporal direction, and among the set of subjects that
perceive it. Metaphorically speaking, the unity of the world corresponds to a
nest of linked rings of quasiobjects, where no ring is completely loose.
physical law. In fact, it exists only as a perspective a given subject may take at
a given time.
Consider the neutral perspective taken in Fig. 2.50. Each subject is repre-
sented by three perceived objects. Subjects 1 and 2 both perceive object O3,
and subjects 2 and 3 both perceive object O5 (compare Fig. 2.47). However,
as discussed above, the identity of the objects perceived by different subjects is
indirect. In the same way, the identity of the objects perceived by subject 3 at
different times is indirect.
Each group of three objects shown in Fig. 2.50 is separated from all the
other groups in the sense that no one can jump to perceive directly a group of
objects belonging the past, or a group of objects belonging to another subject.
It is impossible to transcend ‘I’ and ‘now’. This is a consequence of the concept
of time that was introduced in section 1.10, and of the assumption of separate
subjects (Assumption 2.8).
Statement 2.31 (No transcendence). No subject can transcend her own
perceptions to see through the eyes of another subject or see directly into the
past or the future.
Instead, the other groups of objects are represented inside the group of ob-
jects that ‘I’ perceive ‘now’ (Fig. 2.51). In Fig. 2.50, we let time n+3 represent
‘now’ and subject 3 represent ‘I’. In the temporal degree of freedom, the rep-
resentation of past objects take the form of memories. These are nevertheless
perceived right now. As discussed in section 1.10, we have to associate an entire
space-time to each sequential time n+3. All the past objects in this space-time,
from times n+ 2, n+ 1, and so on, forms the representation of the past in the
present, as illustrated in Fig. 2.51(a). Since the memory may not be perfect,
this representation may not be perfect. In the same way, the representation of
perceptions of other subjects in our own perception may not be perfect [Fig.
2.51(b)].
2.14. INDIVIDUALITY AND TIME 149
Figure 2.50: The neutral perspective on the space spanned by the set of se-
quential times and individual subjects. Each group of three objects is perceived
at a given time by a given subject. No single subject can have perfect neutral
overview like this, transcending time and individuality. Instead, the knowledge
contained in the perceptions at other times, or by other subjects, is partially
represented in my own perceptions here and now, which may be identified with
the three objects O5−7 perceived by subject 3 at time n+ 3.
Figure 2.51: (a) Representation of the perceptions at times n + 1 and n + 2
in the perception at time n + 3. (b) The perceptions of subjects 1 and 2 as
represented in the perceptions of subject 3. The analogy between the cases is
only partial. Time is directed, so that time n+ 2 is represented in time n+ 3,
but not vice versa. In contrast, each subject is represented in each of the other
subjects. Compare Fig. 2.50.
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These relations, where the whole is represented in a part of the whole, re-
sembles the relation between the body and the world expressed in Fig. 1.1.
There, the world (the body and the external world) is represented in a part of
the world (the body). This led to the conclusion that knowledge is incomplete.
By the same argument, it can be shown that the representation of other people’s
perceptions in my own perception must also be incomplete or imperfect.
It is not possible to conclude, using the same argument, that past times
cannot be perfectly represented in the present. The reason is the directionality
of time. In a perfect representation, the state at a given time must contain a
representation of the states of all previous times, but not of any future states.
The contradiction is avoided. However, a perfect representation of the past
would mean that the amount of potential knowledge is a strictly increasing
function of time. If the amount of new knowledge gained at each time instant
is approximately constant, this leads to a situation where potential knowledge
is increasing linearly with time, so that an exact state Z is approached, contra-
dicting the incompleteness of knowledge. Admittedly, this is just a plausibility
argument.
Definition 2.75 (States of the present and of the past). Let SM (n) be
the physical state of the past, as represented in the present state S(n) at time n.
That is, SM (n) ↔ M [PK(n − 1)] (Fig. 1.21 and Definition 1.25). Let SN (n)
be the physical state of the present at time n, that is the state of all objects with
presentness attribute Pr = 1. We may write SN (n)↔ PKN(n).
Statement 2.32 (Incomplete representation of past times and of other
subjects). At all times n we have S(n− 1) ⊂ SM (n) and Sk(n) ⊂ S(n), given
that there is more than one subject.
Apart from these incomplete representations, there is another sense in which
the states of past times and other subjects leave their fingerprints on the present
personal state Sk(n) - they govern its evolution. In general, we may write
Sk(n+ 1) ⊆ uk1Sk(n) = f [S(n), Sk(n)], (2.73)
where uk1 is the ‘personal’ evolution operator of subject k. The crucial fact
about uk1 is that it depends not only on the personal state Sk, but also on the
collective state S.
Consider Fig. 2.52(a), showing the evolution of the total state S from time
n to time n + 3. The state S(n + 3) is constrained by the very fact that the
intermediate states S(n+1) and S(n+2) exist. The constraining effect of these
intermediate states are shown in the uppermost ‘russian doll’ of states. The
existence of the state S(n+ 1) implies that S(n+ 3) has to be contained inside
outer dashed oval, and the existence of the state S(n+ 2) implies that it has to
be contained inside the inner dashed oval. The two intermediate states corre-
spond to a sequence of two subjectively perceived changes, to two independent
observations. The content of these observations, the states they resulted in,
determines in part the evolution of my own personal state Sk according to Eq.
[2.73]. It does not matter who made the intermediate observations.
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Figure 2.52: (a) Indirect representation of past states S(n+ 1) and S(n+ 2) in
the present state S(n+ 3). The existence of these past states forces the present
state to be contained inside the dashed ovals, thus constraining its evolution. (b)
Indirect representation of the states of subjects 1 and 2 in the state of subject
3. The existence of these other subjects forces the total state S to be contained
inside the intersection of the three states, thus constraining the evolution of the
state of subject 3. Compare Fig. 2.50.
152 CHAPTER 2. EPISTEMIC FORMALISM
Consider now Fig. 2.52(b). Quite analogously, the very fact that the other
subject 1 exists constrains S(n+ 3) to be contained inside Sk(n+ 3) under the
top of the left dashed oval. The existence of subject 2 further constrains S(n+3)
so that it also has to be contained under the top of the right dashed oval. The
existence and the state of these other subjects determines in part the evolution
of the personal state S3 of subject 3 according to Eq. 2.73.
As noted above, the analogy between the degrees of freedom defined by time
and individuality is not perfect. The directionality of time gives rise to the
russian doll structure of the constraints defined by sequential observations. In
contrast, the roles of the three different subjects in Fig. 2.52 are symmetrical,
as are the constraints they define for each other when it comes to the evolution
of the personal state Sk.
As a final remark, note that S(n) does not define which objects belong to
the perception of which subjects; it does not define the number of subjects nor
their individual states Sk. In this sense, S(n) is an incomplete description of
the state of the world. It is defined in the opposite direction: given a number of
subjects with individual states Sk, the physical state S(n) corresponds to the
union of their potential knowledge.
Statement 2.33 (The physical state is incomplete). Information about
individuality is not contained in the physical state. We have S = f({Sk}), but
{Sk} 6= f(S).
2.15 The evolution of individual aware knowl-
edge
We have defined physical law essentially as an operator u1 that acts on the
physical state S (Definition 2.13). The physical state S corresponds to the state
of potential knowledge PK. In addition to PK we have also introduced the
state of aware knowledge K ⊆ PK (Fig. 2.4). Clearly, physical law does not
refer to K. What role can then be given to K in the evolution of the world? It
should have a crucial role, since we have used K to define such basic notions as
intention and choice, as well as the meaning of an individual.
That physical law does not refer to the aware state of knowledge Kk of a
subject k means that we cannot exclude that a single such state Kk(n − 1) ⊆
PKk(n − 1) ⊆ PK(n − 1) may evolve into any of two distinct states Kk(n) ∩
Kk(n)′ = ∅ such that Kk(n) ⊆ PKk(n) ⊆ PK(n) and Kk(n)′ ⊆ PKk(n) ⊆
PK(n). This is a formalisation of the subjectively perceived volatility of our
attention (Fig. 2.53). We may imagine a hunter waiting for prey. At a given
moment n, her attention may be caught by a faint flapping of wings to the left,
corresponding to Kk(n), or by the rustle of some leaves in the bushes to the
right, corresponding to Kk(n)′.
Each of these two states of aware knowledge may give rise to an intention
and a choice, according to the discussion in Section 2.12. These choices may
affect the future physical state of the world in different ways, so that we get
2.15. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL AWARE KNOWLEDGE 153
Figure 2.53: The evolution of potential knowledge PK is determined by physical
law, but the evolution of the aware knowledge Kk of subject k is more free.
There may appear two distinct states of aware knowledge Kk(n) and Kk(n)′
from a single aware state Kk(n − 1). This is a formalisation of the subjective
feeling that the target of ones own attention is volatile. The different possible
states of aware knowledge enables different sets of choices, which give rise to
different future states of potential knowledge PK(n + m), and thus different
future physical states S(n + m). The volatile aware individual knowledge may
therefore affect the evolution of the world without being fully determined by
physical law.
S(n + m) ∩ S(n + m)′ = ∅ for some m. In knowledge space, PK(n + m) and
PK(n+m)′ will be different (Fig. 2.53). If the attention of the hunter is caught
by the flapping of wings, the hunter may choose to shoot at the presumed bird.
If the attention is caught by the rustle, she may choose to look at the bushes to
see whether an animal is moving there. The state of the world will be different
in the two cases. A shot is fired in the first case but not in the second, and a
head is turned towards the bushes in the second case but not in the first.
This means that the volatility of attention can have real physical effects
even if it is not restrained by physical law. This is an expression of the ‘white
hole’ in physical law discussed in Section 1.11. There seems to be an action A
emanating from the subjetive aspect of the world that cannot be explained in
terms of the observation O of a sequence of events governed by physical law
(Fig. 1.26).
We may identify events ”caused” by an action A with events or choices
that cannot be predicted deterministically or probabilistically. The choice of
measurement in quantum mechanics is an example of such an event. Given the
choice to measure the spin of an electron along the x-axis, the probabilities for
different outcomes are known, and given the choice to measure the spin along
the y-axis, the corresponding probabilities are also known. But there are no
154 CHAPTER 2. EPISTEMIC FORMALISM
probabilities associated with the initial choice of axis. This event may be traced
back to a volatile shift of attention, followed by an intention and a choice, just
as in the example of the hunter who takes different actions depending on which
sound happens to catch her attention.
The necessity to consider events in the bodies of subjects without determin-
istic or probabilistic causes is discussed in Section 3.2. The question how such
events may go together with detailed materialism (Assumption 1.4) is discussed
in Section 5.1.
It would be satisfying if the picture painted here holds water, since that
would be an expression of epistemic closure (Assumption 1.20). The epistemic
distinction between potential knowledge and aware knowledge would correpond
to the physical distinction between events with and without cause, respectively.
2.16 Object division and conservation laws
In this section, we discuss how the concept of object division and the requirement
of identifiability lead to conservation laws.
Object division means that the state of potential knowledge about an iden-
tifiable object increases in such a way that it is observed to be composite, to
consist of two or more parts. It is not appropriate to say that these parts always
are ”smaller” than the original object. If the object is minimal, its parts belong
to the same set of minimal objects as the original object. Since object division
corresponds to a change of potential knowledge, it is always associated with an
update n→ n+ 1 of sequential time.
To be able to speak about object division, there must be a way to identify
the parts with the object they are parts of. Figure 2.33 shows the temporal
evolution of an identifiable object O that does not divide. Suppose instead that
a division into two parts takes place at time n. (An object may divide into
three or more parts in the same temporal update, but for clarity we consider
first division into two parts.) There are three possible ways to ensure that the
two parts can be identified with the original object (Fig. 2.54).
1. The physical states of the objects O2 and O3 that correspond to the parts
both overlap the state of the original object O1, but their states do not
overlap with each other, when represented in object state space SO. That
is, SOO1(n) ∩ SOO2(n + 1) 6= ∅ and SOO1(n) ∩ SOO3(n + 1) 6= ∅, but
SOO2(n+ 1) ∩ SOO3(n+ 1) = ∅.
2. There is no state overlap between any of these three objects, but their
attribute values are functionally related, providing the link. We have
to require that O1, O2 and O3 share the same set of attributes A =
{A1, . . . , Am}. Then, for each value υi1 ∈ Υi1 of any attribute Ai ∈ A of
object O1, there is a function fi such that we have the following conditional
knowledge: υi1 = fi(υi2, υi3), where υi2 and υi3 are attibute values of
objects O2 and O3, respectively.
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Figure 2.54: When an object divides, corresponding to a temporal update n→
n+1, there are two ways to identify one of its components as a part of the original
object. Either the state of the component object overlaps with the state of the
original object, or the non-overlapping attribute values are functionally related
to the corresponding values of the original object. When the component is
actually possible to distinguish from the original object, such an exact attribute
relationship is necessary to be sure they belong together. When an object
divides into two, these possibilites can be combined into three cases a), b) and
c). The object states are represented in object state space SO. Compare Fig.
2.33.
3. The state of one part O3 overlaps the state of O1 (case 1), whereas each
attribute value of the other part O2 is functionally related to the corre-
sponding attribute value of O1 (case 2). That is, υi1 = f˜i(υi2). Since O3
and O1 are indistinguishable, they must be seen as the same object O1,
emitting object O2.
Case 1 corresponds to the situation where the only new knowledge we get at
time n+ 1 is that there are now at least two objects. We cannot with certainty
distinguish them from the original object, but we can tell them apart. We may
listen to a tone, and suddenly realize that there is slight disharmony, so that
there are at least two tones, but we we cannot decide with certainty that any
of these is different from the single tone we heard to begin with.
In this situation, neither of the parts O2 and O3 can be said to be the same
as the original object O1. If we tried to identify one of them with O1, we had to
do the other component the same favour. Since they are distinct, this leads to
a contradiction. In contrast, in case 3 it causes no problems to identify object
O3 with O1, and we should therefore do so.
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Figure 2.55: (a) The state of an object O2, that is a divided part of O1, overlaps
the state of O1, as in Fig. 2.54, case 1. The sets Υi1 and Υi2 of possible values
of each of their common attributes Ai must overlap. (b) The states of O1 and
O2 do not overlap, as in Fig. 2.54, case 2 or 3. There is at least one attribute
such that Υi1 and Υi2 do not overlap. The possible values of this attribute must
each be related according to Eqs. (2.74) or (2.75).
In cases 2 and 3, the functional relationship of attribute values between two
non-overlapping object states can be seen either as a necessary requirement
to be sure the objects can be associated, or as a mathematical definition of
what mutual association means. A typical example is the relationship between
internal attribute values of a decaying particle and its decay products.
We talk here about attributes and attribute values that can be assigned to
individual objects. Thus we talk in essence about internal attributes. However,
in some circumstances relational attributes may be called ‘pseudo-internal’. If
we study a set O of objects and choose another set R of objects as a reference
frame, spatio-temporal attributes such as linear and and angular momentum
can be assigned to each object in O, so that these attributes become pseudo-
internal. To exemplify, the total angular momentum of an object is an internal
attribute, whereas the angular momentum in a given direction is a pseudo-
internal attribute. Additional objects are required to define the direction.
The two possibilities that two objects O1 and O2 can be associated either
by state overlap, or by functional relations of attribute values, can be brought
down from the object level to the attribute level (Fig. 2.55).
If the states of O1 and O2 overlap, then the sets of possible values Υil and Υil′
of each common attribute Ai ∈ A overlap. Just as SOO1(n)∩SOO2(n+ 1) 6= ∅,
we have Υi1 ∩Υi2 6= ∅ for all i. In contrast, if the states of O1 and O2 do not
overlap, then we have Υi1 ∩Υi2 = ∅ for at least one i.
In the latter case, suppose that Υi1 = {υ1, . . . , υu}, that Υi2 = {υ′1, . . . , υ′u},
and that Υi3 = {υ′′1 , . . . , υ′′u}. Then any indisputable association of the values
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of attribute Ai must be expressed as
υj = f˜i(υ
′
j) (2.74)
for any j ≤ u. In case 3 [Fig. 2.54(c)] this relation holds for the values of at
least one attribute Ai.
In case 2 [Fig. 2.54(b)], it may or may not hold for some attribute values.
Instead, we require that
υj = fi(υ
′
j , υ
′′
j ). (2.75)
for the values of at least one attribute.
Expressed as conditional knowledge, this relation should be read: ”If the
values of attribute Ai for the divided objects O2 and O3 are υ
′
j and υ
′′
j , the cor-
responding value for the original object O1 is υj = fi(υ
′
j , υ
′′
j ), for some function
fi that is known a priori”. That the function is known ‘a priori ’ is another
way to say that it should be considered part of physical law. Equation (2.74)
should be read in a corresponding way. The implications cannot automatically
be turned around. For example, if we know υj in Eq. (2.74), υ
′
j is only fixed if
f˜i happens to be invertible.
According to Statement 2.8, physical law should not refer to exact states Z.
More generally, according to epistemic minimalism (assumption 1.19), it should
not refer to any state that cannot correpond to actual, subjective potential
knowledge. The conditions (2.74) or (2.75) should therefore only be applied in
situations where it can be checked that they hold exactly. This is only possible
if 1) the values of Ai are known to be discrete, or 2) if there is some conservation
law, deduced by other means, that ensures that they are fulfilled.
Regarding condition 1), a continuous set of attribute values means that each
of the three values υj , υ
′
j and υ
′′
j have to be measured with infinite precision to
check relation (2.75). An uncountable number of bits is required to encode such
infinite precision, or, equivalently, an uncountable number of objects. According
to Statement 1.2, the number of objects is always countable. Thus infinite
precision can never be achieved, and to be able to check relations ((2.74) and
2.75) we have to assume discrete attribute values, separated in such a way that
they can be told apart by observation, at least in principle.
As an example of a situation where condition 2) applies, take linear mo-
mentum p (a pseudo-internal attribute). Conservation of momentum can be
deduced from the translational symmetry of space. Thus we know, a priori,
that p = p′ + p′′, without having to rely on the assumption that the momenta
take discrete values.
In fact, established physical understanding suggests that all conservation
laws ‘deduced by other means’ concern relational spatio-temporal attributes. It
seems that all of these laws follow from the redundancy in the mathematical de-
scription that arises when relational attributes (such as distance) are described
as pseudo-internal attributes (such as position). This matter is further discussed
in Section 3.12.
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Statement 2.34 (Conservation laws for relational and internal at-
tributes). General conservation laws can be derived for relational attributes
from redundancies in their mathematical representation. No such conservation
laws can be derived for internal attributes.
One may argue that it is not important to be sure that one object can be seen
as a part of another. But we have assumed that physical law can be expressed in
terms of identifiable minimal objects (Statement 2.13), and we have argued that
these must be allowed to divide into other minimal objects. Minimal objects
have a precise definition in terms of its attributes and attribute values (Section
2.9). Therefore, to uphold the assumed identifiability, the rules that associate
the divided minimimal objects from the original minimal object must be exact.
Thus, for minimal objects, the above discussion is essential. If Statement 2.29
is accepted, the following statement follows.
Statement 2.35 (Minimal objects have discrete attribute values). For
minimal objects, the values of all internal attributes are discrete.
Consider a set of minimal object speciesM = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mm}. Whenever
an object OMl of species Ml is divided into another, distinct, object OMl′ of
species Ml′ we have case 2 or 3 in Fig. 2.54. Thus there is an attribute, such as
A2 in Fig. 2.55(b), for which each allowed attribute value of OMl can be paired
with the corresponding allowed attribute value of OMl′ . Consider one of these
attribute value pairs, for instance (υ3, υ
′
3).
Generalize such a pair to a multiplet of corresponding attribute values (υ(1), υ(2), . . . , υ(m))
for all object species inM. We drop the index referring to value number in the
pool of allowed values of A2, but keep track of which attribute i the values
belong to [in fig. 2.55(b) we have i = 2].
We may generalize Eq. (2.75) to represent a division of one object Ml ∈M
to any number of objects in M:
υ(l) = fi
(
υ(1) υ(2) . . . υ(m)
q1 q2 . . . qm
)
. (2.76)
The integer ql′ is the number of objects of species Ml′ that is produced in
the division. Several occurences of the same attribute value υ(l′) among the
arguments of fi may be represented by the single number ql′ in this way, since
there is no inherent ordering of objects. For the same reason, fi should be
invariant under variable exchange
What form may the function fi take? Without loss of generality, we look for a
function such that a division of OMl to a set of minimal objects having species
that form a subset of all species in M corresponds to setting the attribute
values of all object species that do not occur to zero. For example, if M =
{M1,M2,M3,M4} and OM1 divides to one object OM1 belonging to species M1
and two objects OM3 and OM3′ belonging to the same species M3, we have
υ(1) = fi
(
υ(1) 0 υ(3) 0
1 0 2 0
)
. (2.77)
2.16. OBJECT DIVISION AND CONSERVATION LAWS 159
Figure 2.56: Object division in a set of minimal object species with at least
four members M1, M2, M3 and M4. υ(l) is a value of attribute Ai of Ml
that can be paired with the corresponding value υ(l′) of Ml′ (c.f. Fig. 2.55).
To maintain identifiability if the attribute values are different for the objects
invloved in a division, these values must be functionally related. Since υ(l) is
an inherent property of object species Ml, it does not depend on the way in
which a particular object OMl of this species was created. (a) OM1 divides
into one object OM1, one object OM3, and one object OM4. (b) OM1 divides
first into one object OM1 and one object OM2. At a second temporal update,
one object OM2 divides into one object OM3 and one object OM4. The end
result is the same in both processes. If the values υ of attribute Ai are not all
the same, the functional relation must therefore be υ(1) = υ(1) + υ(3) + υ(4) in
process (a). In process (b) we must have υ(1) = υ(1) + υ(2) in the first event,
and υ(2) = υ(3) + υ(4) in the second. We have a conservation law for the values
of internal attribute Ai.
The value υ(l) is an inherent property of object speciesMl; it does not depend
on the division processes that ended up producing the object OMl that belong
to this species. Consider, for instance, the two processes in Fig. 2.56. Both
have one object of species M1, one of species M3, and one of species M3 as final
products. The first process is characterized by the conditional knowledge
υ(1) = fi
(
υ(1) 0 υ(3) υ(4)
1 0 1 1
)
. (2.78)
The second process is characterized by
υ(1) = fi
(
υ(1) υ(2) 0 0
1 1 0 0
)
= fi
 υ(1) fi( 0 0 υ(3) υ(4)0 0 1 1
)
0 0
1 1 0 0
 . (2.79)
In principle, an endless number of relations like Eq. (2.78) and Eq. (2.79)
can be produced, and they can all be equated. Physical law may, however,
contain selection rules that limit the number of allowed combinations. Anyhow,
the only two options that are guaranteed to allow a solution to the set of all
possible equations of this type are the following:
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1) fi
(
υ(1) υ(2) . . . υ(m)
q1 q2 . . . qm
)
=
∑m
l′=1 ql′υ(l′)
2) υ(1) = υ(2) = . . . = υ(m)
(2.80)
For some internal attributes Ai, option 1) may apply, and for others option 2)
may apply.
Clearly, option 1) corresponds to a conservation law for the values υ of
attribute Ai. Whenever an object that possesses attribute Ai divides, the at-
tribute values of the divided parts add upp to the original value. If the potential
knowledge of the values is defocused, this additivity holds true for each possible
value - a kind of detailed balance. Attributes with values that fulfil option 2)
may be described as inherited identity markers: ‘objects of a certain type divide
into objects of the same type’.
In Fig. 2.56(b), the first process belongs to case 3 in Fig. 2.54, and the second
process belongs to class 2. If Eq. (2.80) is fulfilled by all attributes Ai in case 3,
we must either have υ(l′) = 0 and υ(l) 6= 0 (option 1), or υ(l′) = υ(l) (option 2).
Clearly, since MOl′ is distinct from MOl by assumption, we must have υ(l′) = 0
and υ(l) 6= 0 for some attribute. For minimal objects, this condition is expressed
in Eq. (2.56).
If some division processes are forbidden a priori, Eq. (2.80) does not neces-
sarily apply, as noted above. Imagine, for instance, that we have the following
selection rule: ”if a minimal object of species M1 divides, it divides into two
minimal objects, one of which belongs to species M2”. This condition excludes
Eq. (2.78). We may also have backward-referring selection rules, for instance:
”minimal objects of species M3 and M4 always appear in pairs created when
a minimal object of species M2 divides”. This condition again excludes Eq.
(2.78).
Either of these conditions make it possible to have υ(2) 6= υ(1) as well as
υ(2) 6= 0 for the process in Fig. 2.56(b), in disagreement with Eq. (2.80).
Equations (2.78) and (2.79) cannot be used together to exclude the possibility.
To be able to associate OM2 with its parent OM1 in such a case, there must be
a function υ(1) = f˜i2(υ(2)). (In the following discussion we omit the second row
of arguments of fi to make the notation less cluttered.)
A minimal object such as OM2 with attribute values that causes disagree-
ment with Eq. (2.80) when it is created may be given a special mark. We may
write O˜M2 instead of OM2. The root of such disagreement is always that for
some attribute Ai, option 2) applies for all involved objects except O˜M2 at the
same time as option 1) is not fulfilled. If Eq. (2.80) is fulfilled for all other
attributes (or M˜2 causes trouble in the same way as we just described), all the
other involved object can be left unmarked.
We may consider more complicated possibilities where we have to mark
minimal objects in several different ways, but let us concentrate on the case
with two object classes. In Fig. 2.57 the exceptional object O˜M2 is shown as a
dashed line. When O˜M2 divides, we have two possibilities: either its components
2.16. OBJECT DIVISION AND CONSERVATION LAWS 161
Figure 2.57: Equation (2.80) not necessarily applies if there are selection rules
that forbid some division processes. In this example, the same objects as in Fig.
2.56 are involved. There is apriori knowledge that minimal objects of species
M3 and M4 are always created pair-wise when a minimal object of species M˜2
divides. If objects OM1, OM3 and OM4 are observed at some time n + 2, this
conditional knowledge excludes the process in Fig. 2.56(a). At time n + 1,
object O˜M2 breaks Eq. (2.80) by having a non-zero attribute value υ(2) 6= υ(1).
This makes O˜M2 an ‘exceptional’ object. To be able to associate it with its
parent OM1 and its children OM3 and OM4, these objects must nevertheless be
related by some functions f˜i2 and f˜i. OM1 may be interpreted as an electron
emitting a chargeless boson O˜M2 (γ or Z
0), that divides into a neutrino OM3
and an anti-neutrino OM4. O˜M2 is exceptional in the sense that it is a boson,
whereas all the other objects are fermions. The attribute Ai is the total spin,
with values υ(1) = υ(3) = υ(4) = 1/2 and υ(2) = 1.
belong to the same marked class as O˜M2, or to the unmarked class. If Eq. (2.80)
is fulfilled, they should belong to the same marked class as their parent O˜M2.
Equation (2.80) makes it possible to identify the parent at time n+ 1 with the
children at time n+ 2 class-wise as well as individually.
If, on the other hand, all objects OM1, OM3 and OM4 that are present at
time n+2 fulfil Eq. (2.80) in relation to the original object OM1 at time n, they
can all be class-wise identified with OM1 as unmarked objects represented by
solid lines. Still, OM3 and OM4 have to be associated with their parent O˜M2 on
the individual level. As usual, this means conditional knowledge summarized as
υ(2) = f˜i(0, 0, υ(3), υ(4)). Since f˜i refers to the exceptional object O˜M2, it does
not have to fulfil Eq. (2.80).
It is tempting to interpret the two object classes introduced in this way as
fermions (solid lines) and elementary bosons (dashed lines). Of course, it does
not follow from our discussion that there has to be more than one object class,
or, if so, that there should be two of them. Anyhow, the process shown in Fig.
2.57 could represent an electron emitting a chargeless boson, that divides into
a neutrino and an anti-neutrino. O˜M2 is the boson.
The displayed attribute values υ may then represent total spin. We have
υ(1) = υ(3) = υ(4) = 1/2 and υ(2) = 1, so that Eq. (2.80) is not fulfilled in
the first division. Further, f˜i2(x) = x/2 and f˜i(0, 0, x, y) = x + y. The latter
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function happens to conform with option 1) in Eq. (2.80) even if this does not
follow from the above discussion as a necessity. The total spins of the final set
of objects at time n + 2 are the same as the total spin of the initial object at
time n. In other words, they fulfil option 2) in Eq. (2.80). Thus, all internal
attributes values of the objects at time n + 2 are related to the corresponding
attribute values of the object at time n via Eq. (2.80). Therefore they shall be
associated class-wise as fermions and be represented as solid lines.
We have to check that the behaviour of the other attributes conforms with
this conclusion. In the list (2.58), total spin is called A1. Let us assign zero
values of generation A2, baryon number A3, and lepton number A4 to the boson
O˜M2. In the first division, option 1) in Eq. 2.80) is fulfilled for these three
attributes. (For baryon number, option 2) is also fulfilled.) In the second
division we have f˜i(0, 0, x, y) ≡ 0 for these three attributes, which is perfectly
allowed. Regarding electric charge A5, option 1) is fulfilled in the first division,
and options 1) and 2) are fulfilled in the second division. For colour charge,
options 1) and 2) are both fulfilled in both divisions.
Let us summarize some qualities that minimal objects have. Some of them
have already been motivated, others are motivated briefly below.
Statement 2.36 (All minimal objects have the same internal attributes).
All minimal objects OMl of any species Ml in a setM share the same attributes
Ai.
This is necessary to maintain identifiability when they divide. The condition
is easily met by assigning the value zero to an attribute that some object inM
apparently lack.
Statement 2.37 (The number of allowed values of a given internal
attribute is the same for all minimal objects). The number of elements
υij(l) in the set of allowed values Υi(l) of attribute Ai is the same for each
minimal object species Ml ∈M.
This is necessary in division processes, given the detailed balance of the
functional relations between the each attribute value that is required (Fig. 2.55).
Statement 2.38 (The potential knowledge of the internal attribute val-
ues does not change in a division). The number of elements υij(l) according
to Statement 2.37 that are consistent with potential knowledge is the same before
and after division.
Potential knowledge of attribute Ai is characterized by the set Υil of values
that are not excluded by this knowledge. Υil is a subset of Υi(l). To avoid
notational confusion, Υil are the values of Ai that are allowed by potential
knowledge of an individual minimal object OMl. In contrast, Υi(l) are the
values allowed in the definition of minimal object species Ml.
To maintain the detailed balance described above, the number of elements
in Υil must be the same for all component objects that emerge in a division as it
was in the original object. This may be seen as a matter of definition. What we
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do is to distinguish the mere division from the observations that subsequently
can be made on the objects that emerge from the division. For example, we may,
as a matter of definition, collect all generations of fermions into four minimal
objects: a up-like quark, a down-like quark, an electron-like lepton, and one
neutrino. If the generations are superposed in the original object just before
a division, they are superposed in the emerging component objects, until a
measurement increases potential generation knowledge, deciding, for instance,
that it was a muon that emerged from the partice reaction rather than an
electron.
Statement 2.39 (Conservation laws for internal attributes). When a
minimal object divides, the only general way to maintain identifiability is that
one of two options hold for each attribute value: 1) the values of the emerging
objects add up to the value of the original object, or 2) each emerging object
inherits the value of the original object.
As an example of a law of type 1) we may take charge conservation, and as
an example of a law of type 2) we may take the fact that all objects in the same
class involved in a division have the same total spin 1/2.
Among the six internal attributes for elementary fermions that we listed in
section 2.9, there is one that is neither of type 1), nor type 2), namely the
generation A2. We assigned three possible values 1, 2, 3 to this attribute, but
these numbers are not conserved in flavor changing weak interactions. A quark
of generation 3 (say a top quark) may decay to a quark of generation 2 (a strange
quark) without the appearance of another decay product that carries the ‘lost’
generation unit.
Thus the generation attribute has a special status. In section 3.5 we will
very superficially discuss the idea that this attribute is analogous to the quan-
tum number n in atomic physics, which lists the possible energy eigenvalues for
the orbiting electron for given values of the quantum numbers l and m (corre-
sponding to angular momentum and magnetic moment, respectivley). In the
case of elementary fermions, the task corresponding to the calculation of en-
ergy eigenvalues is the calculation of possible rest mass eigenvalues for given
values of baryon number, lepton number and charge. Just as there are several
possible quantum numbers n (energies E) for each pair {l,m}, there may be
several possible generations (rest masses) for each triplet of quantum numbers
that specify baryon number, lepton number and charge. And just as n is not
conserved in atomic transitions, the generation quantum number does not need
to be conserved in transitions between minimal objects within the same set M
of minimal fermions.
Assumption 2.10 (Minimal objects cannot be copied). There is no divi-
sion process in which option 2) above is fulfilled for all attributes.
This assumption can be seen as a way to prevent the amount of matter to
increase without bound. It excludes case 1) in Fig. 2.54 for minimal objects.
Statement 2.40 (Classes of minimal objects). If there is some attribute
for which none of the options in Statement 2.39 are fulfilled, but identifiability
164 CHAPTER 2. EPISTEMIC FORMALISM
can still be upheld, it is possible to divide the minimal objects in two or more
classes, in such a way that within each class, one of the options is fulfilled for
each attribute.
This statement is vague. We refer to the discussion in relation to Fig. 2.57
for more details. To formulate the statement precisely would require quite a
bit of notation and technical distinctions that are not very interesting. The
reason the statement is made is that elementary fermions and bosons can be
seen as two such classes of objects, according to the example discussed above
(Fig. 2.57).)
However, we will qualify this conclusion in sections 3.4.9 and 3.10. We will
argue that elementary bosons are not really objects at all, in the sense that
they cannot be observed. Referring to Fig. 2.57, this means that the first
division does not correspond to a temporal update n → n + 1. All that is
observed are the incoming object OM1 at time n and the outgoing object triplet
(OM1, OM3, OM4) at time n+ 2. Another event, not pertaining to the division
process, may then define the update n→ n+ 1. If there is no such event, time
n + 2 should be renamed n + 1. The intermediate step is merely a deduced
association between OM1 and the object pair (OM3, OM4), as symbolized an
abstract entity O˜M2. This ‘degradation’ of elementary bosons indeed justify the
notion that they correspond to an entirely different class of minimal ‘objects’
than the minimal fermions.
Statement 2.41 (Minimal objects do not transform without division).
If a minimal object O is identified to belong to species Ml at time n, it cannot be
found to belong to another species Ml′ at a later time, unless Ml′ is the species
of an object that emerged in a division that O underwent at some intermediate
time.
This is a direct consequence of the temporal invariance expressed in Eq.
(2.57), as part of the definition of a minimal object.
Up to now we have considered identifiability of internal attributes in division
processes. This ensures that object species are preserved or functionally related.
To make sure that individual objects remain properly identifiable in division
processes, we need to focus on relational (or pseudo-internal) attributes also.
The conservation of linear and angular momentum provide perfect means to
associate the original object with its divided components. For position there is
no such conservation law. Let r4 = (r, t) be the pseudo-internal spatio-temporal
attribute of an object that is constructed from a set of distances to a group of
reference objects. The necessary condition for identifiability is then that the set
of values Υr41 allowed by potential knowledge of r4 of the original object O1
overlaps all the corresponding sets Υr42,Υr43, . . . of the objects O2, O3, . . . that
emerge from the division. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 2.58.
One may argue that minimal objects do not divide, but rather transform
into other minimal objects. But this process can also be described as a division.
The dividing worm of object states projected onto space-time (Fig. 2.58) stays
connected during the transformation or division. Imagine that we sketch the
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Figure 2.58: (a) In a division, the states of the parts O2 and O3 at time n +
1 do not always overlap with the state of the original object O1 at time n
[2.54(b)]. Instead, the internal attributes of the three objects are linked by the
function f . (b) However, if we project the object state space SO onto space-time,
the projections of these three states must overlap, to maintain spatio-temporal
identifiability. For minimal objects, such an overlap is never present if wo do not
make such a projection. That would correspond to copying, which is prohibited
by Assumption 2.10. Compare Fig. 2.33.
166 CHAPTER 2. EPISTEMIC FORMALISM
Figure 2.59: The region of space-time consistent with the potential knowledge
of a moving object forms a tube. When the object divides, the tube splits into
two (compare Fig. 2.58). We may imagine that attribute value substance flows
freely in the tube. When a minimal (or any other) object O1 divides, some
substance chooses one direction, and the rest the other direction, leading to the
additive rule in Eq. (2.80).
envelope of this worm as a smooth, dividing tube, as in Fig. 2.59. According
to Statement 2.39, we have υ(1) = υ(2) + υ(3) for the values of some internal
attribute, at least if all three objects belong to the same class. if not, the relation
holds anyway for linear and angular momentum. Such conserved attributes may
be seen as ‘attribute substance’ that flows inside the tube. When the tube splits,
some amount of this substance chooses one road, and the rest chooses the other
road. (The use of the smooth envelope of the sequence of spatio-temporal object
states is justified in section 3.1, where the evolution parameter is introduced.)
This picture conforms with Kant’s conclusion that ‘das Ding an sich’ is
inaccessible in principle. According to epistemic minimalism, physics should
therefore not refer to such a thing. A minimal object species is not defined as
something with given identity per se, but rather a prescribed set of attribute
values that are confined to a specific region of space-time. These values are just
a numerical encoding of the subjective observations of this region that can be
made in principle. What is assumed to exit ‘an sich’ is the physical law that
limits what attribute values can be observed, determines how often and how
the specific region in space-time divides into several such regions, and how the
attribute values recombine when this happens.
2.17 Object merging
Objects sometimes must merge, to avoid that potential knowledge grows without
bound. This is excluded, at least in spirit, by Statement 1.3.
Object merging is the reverse of object division. Let us focus on the internal
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attributes of minimal objects that belong to the set of species M. Let a set
{OMl} of minimal objects whose species all belong to the set M merge into a
single minimal object OMl′ with species Ml′ ∈ M. Going through all possible
cases in the preceding section in reverse, we see that for any such set {OMl},
each set Υil′ of allowed attribute values of attribute Ai of the final object OMl′
is uniquely determined by the corresponding sets {Υil} of {OMl}.
Statement 2.42 (The result is unique when minimal objects merge).
For any initial set of minimal objects that merge into one, the species of the
final minimal object is uniquely determined by the initial set of minimal objects.
Physical law may not allow all sets {OMl} of minimal objects to merge into
one. The distinct sets of attribute values used to define each initial object OMl,
together with the deduced conservation laws for internal attributes, may exclude
some combinations. If we allow merging into one object in several time steps,
physical law may be such that more sets {OMl} are allowed than if we require
that they all merge into one object at once.
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Chapter 3
MATHEMATICAL
REPRESENTATION
3.1 The evolution parameter
The statement that any physical law can be encapsulated by an evolution op-
erator u1 that tells us what can be said about the temporal update PK(n) →
PK(n + 1) does not capture the apparent continuity of evolution. Subsequent
states of knowledge PK(n) and PK(n + 1) tend to be more similar than an
arbitrary pair of states PK(n) and PK(n′). In terms of physical state repre-
sentations, the numerical values of the attributes that define S¯(n) and S¯(n+ 1)
are close. This is what makes the concept of time meaningful, and makes it
natural to use the temporal attribute t in the formulation of physical law. The
relational attribute t can be seen as a measure of the degree of dissimilarity
of two states S(n) and S(n′). Further, the apparent smoothness of evolution
makes it tempting to disregard sequential time n altogether; if the degree of
dissimilarity is roughly proportional to n for small enough n, then we may use
an approximate parametrization n = n(t).
The m-step evolution operator um was introduced in Definition 2.10 as
umS(n) = (u1)
mS(n). (3.1)
That is, umS(n) is the set of allowed exact states Z at time n + m given the
state S(n) at time n. In other words, umS(n) is the smallest set C
′ such that
we can be sure at time n that S(n+m) belongs to C ′. Clearly,
S(n+m) ⊆ u1S(n+m− 1) ⊆
⊆ u2S(n+m− 2) ⊆
...
⊆ umS(n).
(3.2)
We may define
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Figure 3.1: The action of the stepwise evolution operator u1, and its relation to
the world tube defined by UM . Since the states S(n) and S(n+ 1) are distinct
by definition, S(n) and u1S(n) does not overlap.
UMS(n) =
M⋃
m=1
umS(n). (3.3)
In words, given the state S(n) at time n, UMS(n) is the smallest set C
′′ such
that any exact state Z outside C ′′ can be excluded as a description of the
physical state within the time interval [n, n+M ]. As we let M grow, the ‘world
tube’ defined by UMS(n) gets longer and longer in state space S. The relation
between these operators and sets is illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
Consider now the evolution of the state SO of object O rather than the
total state S (Definition 2.5). Let ΩO be the complement to O (Definition
2.6), representing ‘all the other objects’, so that S ⊆ SO ∩ SΩO . Because of
the assumed identifiability of all objects, O and ΩO can be separated at any
time after the partition is defined, regardless the fact that there may be object
divisions and mergings in O or in ΩO. Thus it is possible to apply u1 to SO as
well as to SΩO and write
SO(n+ 1) ⊆ u1SO(n)
SΩO (n+ 1) ⊆ u1SΩO (n), (3.4)
and
S(n+ 1) ⊆ u1S(n) ⊆ (u1SO(n) ∩ u1SΩO (n)). (3.5)
(Compare Fig. 2.31.) Remember that epistemic invariance makes u1 indepen-
dent of the state we apply it to - it gives the minimal future state C of S, as
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well as of SO and SΩO . However, there are two differences to keep in mind when
we apply u1 to S and SO, respectively.
• We have to write u1(S)SO, since the evolution of object O depends in its
environment. In contrast, u1 has no argument when it is applied to the
total state S.
• We always have S(n) ∩ u1S(n) = ∅, whereas we may have SO(n) ∩
u1SO(n) 6= ∅. The latter situtation occurs when a distinct change of
O does not define the temporal update n→ n+ 1.
In that latter case there is no complete set of present alternatives {Sj}
(Definition 2.49) such that SO(n + 1) = u1Sj for some j. No reduction of the
object state SO occurs at time n+ 1. We may write
SO(n) ∩ u1SO(n) 6= ∅⇒ SO(n+ 1) = u1SO(n). (3.6)
A sequence of such states is shown in Fig. 3.2(a). In the same way as for the
total state S, we can define a world tube UMSO that defines the ‘trace’ of SO
in state space during the time interval [n, n+M ].
The apparent fact that evolution is continuous can be expressed as the as-
sumption that it is possible to parameterize the evolution of an object O with
an evolution parameter σ ∈ R in such a way that
u(σ1)SO(n) ↔ u1SO(n)
u(σ2)SO(n) ↔ u2SO(n)
u(σ3)SO(n) ↔ u3SO(n)
...
(3.7)
where σ1 < σ2 < σ3, and u(σ)SO depends continuously on σ [Fig. 3.2(b)].
The S-dependence of um is suppressed for clarity. It is natural to choose the
parameterization so that u(0) is the unit operator:
u(0)SO(n) = SO(n). (3.8)
Note that it is not very meaningful to apply the parameterized evolution
operator u(σ) to the total state and write u(σ)S, since all that can be said
about S(n + 1) is a function of S(n). Thus the stepwise evolution u1 suffices.
There is no freedom to vary the instant at which the entire world is observed,
corresponding to a distinct change of S. By definition there is no observer
outside the world with a clock that can choose to study the changes of the
world at certain times.
In contrast, according to the discussion in section 2.8, there may or may not
be lower and upper time limits nˆ and nˇ such that a distinct change of object O
occurs with certainty between times n+ nˆ and n+ nˇ:
SO(n+m) ∩ SO(n) = ∅ ⇒ m ≥ nˆ
SO(n+m) ∩ SO(n) 6= ∅ ⇒ m ≤ nˇ. (3.9)
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Figure 3.2: (a) If object O is not directly observed for a while after time n, its
subsequent states SO(n+ 1), SO(n+ 2), and so on, are determined by physical
law alone: SO(n+ 1) = u1SO(n), SO(n+ 2) = u1SO(n+ 1) = u2SO(n), and so
on. (b) The apparent fact that physical evolution is gradual can be expressed as
the possibility to find a representation u(σ) of the stepwise evolution operator
um that depends continuously on an evolution parameter σ. Given the state
SO(n) of object O at time n, the world tube U(∞)SO(n) expresses all future
states of O allowed by physical law and the present total state S(n).
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The existence of these time limits is a function of the total state S(n), and so
are their values - there is nothing else they can be a function of. However, when
we would like to study the evolution of some system O, we most often separate
O from its complement ΩO in such a way that this functional dependence resides
in ΩO. In theoretical analyses, we often want to evolve a system for an arbitrary
amount of time, and then ask the question: what can we say about the state of
the system if we observe it at that time? This is, of course, what predictions of
the outcome of experiments is all about. In our formalism, ‘time’ in the above
sense corresponds to the parameter σ. We seek
SO(σ) = u(σ)SO(n), (3.10)
and ask what present alternatives Sj are possible as the outcome of an obser-
vation at a time n + m + 1, given that SO(n + m) = SO(σ). In analogy with
Eq. (3.3), we may define the ‘dressed world tube’
U(σ)SO(n) (3.11)
as the union of all states u(σ′)SO(n) for 0 ≤ σ′ ≤ σ [Fig. 3.2(b)].
We can use the evolution parameter σ to define what we mean by the state-
ment that an object that we observe at two different times is the same, even if
it has undergone a distinct change in the meantime. This will be an alternative
formulation of the condition of quasi-identifiability, as introduced in Defintion
2.58.
Definition 3.1 (Quasi-identifiable object at times n and n+m). Assume
that SO(n) ∩ SO(n+m) = ∅. The object O is quasi-identifiable at times n and
n+m if and only if there is a σ > 0 such that SO(n+m) ⊆ u(σ)SO(n).
In other words, the object O observed at two different times is considered
to be the same if and only if this interpretation is consistent with physical law.
The evolution parameter σ is no attribute; it is not an observable quantity.
Consider the world tube U(σ)SO in state space projected on space-time (Fig.
3.3). Let PU(σ)SO represent this projection.
Suppose that after time n, the object O is not observed to undergo a distinct
change until time n+m. That is, the observed distinct change of O defines the
temporal update n+m− 1→ n+m. If this observation corresponds to a state
reduction (Definition 2.12), we have
∀σ > 0 : PSO(n+m) 6= PSO(σ)
∃σ > 0 : PSO(n+m) ⊂ PSO(σ). (3.12)
Since PSO(σ) evolves continuously with σ, it follows from these two statements
and the definition of PU(σ)SO that there are (at least) two evolution parameter
values σ 6= σ′ such that PSO(n + m) ⊂ PSO(σ) and PSO(n + m) ⊂ PSO(σ′).
Therefore it is not possible to deduce the value of σ from the observation of
object O at time n + m (Fig. 3.3). In other words, σ is not an observable
measure of the exact amount of time passed between sequential time instants n
and n+m.
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Figure 3.3: Projection of the world tube on space-time (compare Fig. 3.2).
The projection operator P acting on the states is suppressed for clarity. It is
not possible to deduce the value of σ uniquely, given the two states S(n) and
S(n + m). The evolution parameter σ is not an exact measure of the amount
of time that has passed between two observations of object O, or, speaking
relativistically, between two events.
We have not assumed a priori, however, that a state reduction always takes
place when an object is observed to undergo a distinct change. If m is large
enough, we expect that umSO ∩ SO = ∅ (compare Fig. 2.33), so that we may
have SO(n + m) ∩ SO(n) = ∅, but still SO(n + m) = umSO(n). Does this
mean that we can deduce the values of σ? If the object state SO were exactly
knowable, that would indeed be the case. Given a known SO(n) and a known
SO(n+m) = umSO(n), the value σ = σm is determined according its definition
in Eq. [3.7]. But we have argued in section 2.3 that the boundary of a state
cannot be known exactly unless the state is an exact state Z. This is never
the case since knowledge is incomplete (Statement 1.3). Therefore σ cannot be
exactly known, either. This remains true also if the state of the object has not
knowably changed between the two observations, and for the same reason.
Statement 3.1 (The exact value of the evolution parameter is unknow-
able). Suppose that a given object O is observed at times n and n+m. Suppose
further that we fix a parametrization such that σ(n) = σn, and such that σ(n−µ)
is assigned a definite value σm−µ for each previous time n− µ at which O was
observed. Even so, the knowledge of the states SO(n + m) and SO(n) is never
sufficient to deduce the value σn+m exactly.
Since σ is not an observable attribute, it is not constrained by the incom-
pleteness of knowledge of attributes: we can simply assign a definite value to
it. The evolution parameter is a way to express physical law, it parameterizes
the work of the bird that winds up the world; it acts behind the backdrops.
Nevertheless, it is closely related to the passage of time. Naively, we would like
to have
d 〈t〉
dσ
= constant, (3.13)
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Figure 3.4: (a) The knowledge of the position in space-time of object O at time n
is represented as a set PSO of allowed pairs of coordinates (xk, tk). The evolved
states are characterized by corresponding sets of allowed coordinates (xk′ , tk′).
The change of position related to σ is thus represented by the set of Lorentz
distances lkk′ . The projection P of the states to space-time is suppressed for
clarity. Compare Fig. 3.5.
where we take the appropriate average over the fuzziness of our knowledge of
the relational temporal attribute t. (That the derivative is constant means that
it does not depend on σ.) However, we have to respect Lorentz invariance. A
natural choice of parameterization then fulfils
d 〈l〉
dσ
= constant, (3.14)
where l =
√
c2t2 − x2 (Fig. 3.4). The average should be taken over all allowed
pairs of points (k, k′). The terms in the sum should not be weighted, since no
measure is defined on the exact states Z ∈ SO. Naturally, we exclude all time-
like pairs (k, k′), for which s becomes imaginary. In Section 3.4.8 we will derive
a simple differential evolution equation bases on these ideas in the particular
situation in which we have a well-defined experimental context where a wave
function can be defined.
Let us relate the theoretical family of states SO(σ) to the actual states of
object O in the situation where O is observed at time n and then again at time
n+m. As n→ n+1, the state of O at time n becomes a memory; its presentness
attribute Pr changes from 1 to 0. Let SO(n;n
′) denote the memory at time
n′ ≥ n of the state of O at time n, with SO(n;n) = SO(n). Since memory
of the past cannot improve with time, or, more formally, because of epistemic
consistency (Assumptions 1.6, 2.1 and 2.2):
SO(n) = SO(n;n) ⊆ SO(n;n+ 1) ⊆ SO(n;n+ 2) . . . . (3.15)
Before time n + m we get no new information about object O. We have
SO(n + 1) = u1SO(n), SO(n + 2) = u2SO(n), and so on. Finally, at time m,
new potential knowledge is gained: SO(n + m) ⊂ u1SO(n + m− 1). Thus, the
potential knowledge at time n+m of the recent evolution of objectO corresponds
to:
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Figure 3.5: (a) At time n the spatio-temporal knowledge of object O is repre-
sented by a set of points PSO(n) in a coordinate system. The dashed world tube
represents all future states allowed by physical law. (b) The next observation
of object O takes place at time n + m. Its state turns out to be SO(n + m).
The potential knowledge at time n + m of the state of O at the past time n is
represented as SO(n;n+m). This state will have greater volume in space-time
than SO(n) if memory is imperfect. The projection P of the states to space-time
is suppressed for clarity. Compare Fig. 3.4.
SO(n) ⊆ SO(n, n+m)
SO(n+m) ⊂ umSO(n). (3.16)
Figure 3.5 illustrates the relation between these ‘actual’ states and the family
of evolved ‘theoretical‘ states SO(σ) shown in Fig. 3.4. Again, we project the
states onto space-time. The coordinate system has to be regarded as an object
(or rather a set of objects) that stays the same during the time interval [n, n+m].
That is, it does not undergo any distinct changes during this time. Thus it makes
it possible to define x and t as pseudo-internal attributes of object O valid both
at time n and at time n + m, and also to define the Lorentz distance l that
object O has travelled during this time.
We see that the actual potential knowledge of l at time n+m, corresponding
to the set of distances between the set of allowed pairs of points (k, k′), is not
the same as the ‘theoretical’ knowledge, since the states marked with solid lines
are different from the states marked with dashed lines. The potential knowledge
of l tends to become more defocused because of imperfect memory.
It becomes clear in Fig. 3.5 that there is one space-time defined for each
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Figure 3.6: Schematic illustration of the relation between the three temporal
entities n, t and σ.
sequential time n. In general, each such space-time consists of objects (or events)
belonging to the present as well as objects belonging to the past. In Fig. 3.5(b),
the state SO(n+m) corresponds to a present object, and the state SO(n;n+m)
corresponds to an object of the past.
Note that the states of two past objects may overlap along the temporal
axis, meaning that memory of which event occurred first has been lost. More
formally, consider two states SO and SO′ projected onto space-time. Let O be
a past object with presentness attribute Pr = 0 and characterized by a set of
possible positions k. If O′ is a present object with Pr′ = 1 and possible positions
k′, then we have the following conditional knowledge, dictated by relativity:
Pr′ = 1 : ctkk′ ≥ |xkk′ | , (3.17)
where tkk′ = tk′ − tk and xkk′ = xk′ − xk. If, instead, O′ is a past object just
like O, we should write
P ′ = 0 : c |tkk′ | ≥ |xkk′ | , (3.18)
expressing the fact that we cannot be sure a priori about the sign of tkk′ .
Finally, if P = P ′ = 1 the condition simply reads tkk′ = 0.
It is important to note that the Lorentz distance l is an attribute that relates
two objects belonging to the same space-time, defined for a given sequential time
instant. In contrast, the evolution parameter σ makes it possible to jump from
one space-time to the next; it makes it possible to foresee, to some degree, the
content of future space-times.
We have made the concept of time more involved: instead of a single variable
t, we argue that we need a discrete, sequential time n, a relational attribute t
(the knowledge of which may be incomplete), and also an evolution parameter σ
in order to express physical law conveniently. The relation between these three
entities is illustrated schematically in Fig. 3.6.
Why do we allow the presence of a mysterious parameter σ that can never be
measured, at the same time as we try to adopt a strictly epistemic perspective
on physics? As we discussed at the beginning of this text, we must assume
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that physical law is absolute, that it is independent of our perception of it. It
transcends epistemology. The evolution parameter is simply a convenient way
to express such a physical law, given the apparent continuity of evolution it
gives rise to.
Finally, let me modify a statement I made at the beginning of this section.
It is not t that measures the degree of dissimilarity between two states S(n) and
S(n′), but rather σ. (We have also seen that we should focus on the state SO
of a group of objects rather than the total state S.) What t actually does is to
measure the degree of dissimilarity between the memories of two states SO(n)
and SO(n
′) at a later time n′′. These memories are two parts of the single state
S(n′′).
3.2 Probability
To make the assignment of a probability to an alternative Sj epistemically
meaningful, the following conditions should be fulfilled.
1. Probabilities should only be assigned to options Sj that are predefined in
the mind of some subject k, as described in section 2.12. Otherwise it will
never be decided by anyone whether the alternative come true or not, and
the concept becomes meaningless.
2. Probabilities should only be assigned to realizable options (Definition
2.63). It is meaningless to speak of a probability associated with an exact
state Z, or another state that is too specific to represent actual potential
knowledge. The electron with a given spin in both the x- and y-directions
is one example.
3. Probabilities should only be assigned to future alternatives or options
S˜j since probabilities presuppose a predefined test situation. Some time
passes between the formation of the options S˜j at some time n and the
realization of one of these alternatives at a later time n+m. At least one
intermediate time instant n + 1 has to be allowed to deduce the proba-
bilities from the options (Eqs. [2.7] and [2.9]), before the alternative is
realized, so that m ≥ 2.
4. Probabilites should only be assigned to a complete set of such future al-
ternatives (Definition 2.51) at knowability level 3 (Table 2.1). We must
be sure that one alternative in the complete set is indeed realized within
a time limit nˇ known a priori. There has to be a predefined moment of
decision. If it may happen that no actual event that corresponds to the
realization of a property value pj occurs, the complete set has to contain
an additional alternative ‘nothing happens before the upper time limit
n+M ’. For this alternative we have nˆ = nˇ = n+M
5. Probabilities must be knowable a priori, before the trial is carried out.
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The last requirement can only be fulfilled if the set of options is repeatable,
or if it is possible to deduce the probabilities beforehand using symmetries of
the observed system O to which the probabilities apply. If the set of options is
repeatable, then the probabilities can be calculated before a given trial by the
observation of the relative frequency of the realization of the different options in
a large collection of identical previous trials. Such repeatability requires that O
is sufficiently isolated from the environment, to avoid that the necessary changes
in the subsequent states of the environment ΩO make different repetitions in-
quivalent.
It is immediately clear that the five conditions are not fulfilled in all state
reductions S(n) → S(n + 1) ⊂ u1S(n). Therefore probability is not a funda-
mental concept in the present approach to physics; it cannot always be used
to quantify the chance to observe those things that are not dictated by a de-
terministic law. While the evolution of any state can be expressed in terms of
minimal objects (Statement 2.13), probability should therefore not always enter
in this expression. It may be lost somewhere along this reductionist path since
it is a measure on an subjectively perceived option S˜j , which is a macroscopic
state by definition. Consider the alternative Sj : The spin in the x-direction of
an electron is +1/2. If this statement should have any chance to come true in
a knowable sense, the proper future alternative S˜j must involve a detector and
an observer. Therefore, from the present perspective, the probability we assign
to the spin direction of an electron is a measure not on the state of the electron,
but on the state of the electron together with the states of the detector and the
observers (Fig. 3.7).
The only measure that can be defined for any set Σ is state space volume
(Definition 2.43). For any subset Σj ⊆ Σ we may use the state space volume to
define the relative volume of Σj .
Definition 3.2 (Relative volume ). For any partition Σ =
⋃
Σj such that
Σj ∩ Σj′ = ∅ whenever j 6= j′, we let v[Σj ,Σ] ≡ V [Σj ]/V [Σ].
Whenever the probability associated with Σj exists, we will see that it is
given by this relative state space volume. No other determinants are needed.
The only entities there are (in the present approach to physics) on which the
probability qj to see the propery value pj may depend are the future alternative
S˜j that corresponds to pj , the other alternatives {Sj′} in the complete set, the
system state SO, and the total state S. We may write
qj = f [S˜j , {Sj′}, SO, S]. (3.19)
The total state S enters the picture if the system O is not isolated from
the environment. As discussed above, such isolation is necessary if qj cannot
be deduced from the symmetries of SO. Even if qj can be deduced beforehand
in this way, these symmetries must include all aspects of the environment that
may affect the outcome. That is, we should enlarge O to include all parts of the
environment that are relevant to the trial. This means that we can drop the
dependence of qj on S.
180 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
Figure 3.7: Probability as a macroscopic quantity. a) The projection of state
space onto the spin in the x-direction of a single electron. The projected state
Se contains one or both of the (projected) exact states Z1 : sx = −1/2 and
Z2 : sx = −1/2. We have V [Se] = 1 if the spin direction is known, V [Se] = 2
otherwise. No probability can be assigned to each alternative in the latter case;
the relative volumes v1 = v2 = 1/2 provide no such information (Definition 3.2).
b) The state SO of an experimental setup aimed at measuring the spin of the
electron in the x-direction. The futue alternatives S˜1 and S˜2 with probabilities
q1 = v1 and q2 = v2 correspond to the perception of a detector showing one of
two possible results (Statement 3.2). Once this happens, the corresponding spin
of the electron quasiobject can be deduced from the conditional knowledge that
relates detector state with spin state. This conditional knowledge is encoded in
the state SO.
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In this way we also exclude hypothetical ’mental influences’ on the outcome.
Such influences have to be attributed to states of the bodies of observers that
does not belong to the system O under study and cannot affect it by means of
ordinary physical law. The exclusion of mental influences also makes it possible
to drop the dependence of qj on the other future alternatives {S˜j′} in the
complete set. You cannot influence the probability that something will happen
by imagining other alternatives.
Assumption 3.1 (No mental influence on probability). For any system O
in the state SO, whenever the probability qj can be assigned to a future alternative
S˜j ⊂ SO we have qj = f [S˜j , SO] for some function f .
Sets of realizable alternatives {Sj} (Definition 2.52) correspond to mutually
exclusive events. Given Assumption 3.1, the axioms of probability can therefore
be expressed as
f [S˜j , SO] ≥ 0
f [SO, SO] = 1
f [S˜j ∪ S˜j′ , SO] = f [S˜j , SO] + f [S˜j′ , SO].
(3.20)
These relations are fulfilled for all complete sets of future alternatives (Def-
inition 2.51) for which probabilities can be assigned if and only if we identify
probability qj with relative volume vj ≡ v[S˜j , SO], meaning that
qj = f [S˜j , SO] = V [S˜j ]/V [SO]. (3.21)
This follows from a direct comparison of Eq.[3.20] with the definitions of
volume and relative volume (Definitions 2.43 and 3.2).
Statement 3.2 (Probability is relative volume). If a probability qj can be
assigned to all future alternatives S˜j in a complete set {S˜j}, then qj = vj ≡
v[S˜j , SO].
This means that the probability of an alternative does not depend on the
shape of the boundary ∂Sj , but only on the ‘size’ of the region in state space that
S˜j encloses. However, state space volumes and relative volumes are primary in
the description of physical law whereas probabilities are secondary.
We might argue that even if a probability cannot be known it still exists in
principle. The potential knowledge about any object determine its state SO in
principle, so that V [SO] is defined, and the imagination of an option determine
S˜j in principle, so that V [S˜j ] is defined. Therefore v[S˜j , SO] is always defined.
Further, u1SO is always defined, so that we can speak about the evolution
u1v[S˜j , SO] of the relative volume. However, physical states are unknowable
in their details according to Section 2.3, so that v[S˜j , SO] is not knowable in
general. Therefore we should not use these numbers in general representations
S¯ of S¯O of physical states and physical law u¯1 according to the assumption of
epistemic minimalism. We may say that if v[S˜j , SO] is knowable (and the other
requirements in the list 5 are fulfilled), then the probability of the alternative
S˜j exists, otherwise not.
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Statement 3.3 (The relative volume corresponds to a probability in
the frequentist sense). Consider a system or object O that to arbitrary preci-
sion can be prepared in a given state SO an arbitrarily large number N of times,
and can be arbitrarily well isolated from the environment so that u1(S)SO =
u1(SO)SO. Suppose that we can associate to SO a complete set of future al-
ternatives {S˜j} at knowability level 3 (Table 2.1) that corresponds to the set of
values {pj} of some property P . Let ON be a system in which P is repeatedly
observed N number of times according to the above, with initial state SON . Let
n−(N) be the largest integer n ≥ 0 such that n−(N)/N ≤ v[S˜j , SO]− , and let
n+(N) be the smallest integer n ≥ 0 such that v[S˜j , SO] +  ≤ n+(N)/N . Let
S˜j,N, be the future alternative defined for the state SON that corresponds to the
fulfilment of the condition that the number of times R that pj is observed obeys
n−(N) ≤ R ≤ n+(N). Then limN→∞ v[S˜j,N,, SON ] = 1 for any  > 0 such
that 0 ≤ v[S˜j , SO]±  ≤ 1.
In plain language, the relative frequency Fj with which an alternative is
fulfilled approaches the relative volume v[S˜j , SO] with probability one as the
number of trials increases without bound. Put differently, in this limit the future
alternative for which property value pj is observed with relative frequency vj
becomes identical with SON , meaning that there is no room in the initial state
SON for other alternatives for which the relative frequency turns out to be
different than vj . This statement can be seen as a variant of Borel’s law of large
numbers [57], expressed in the vocabulary used in this text. Figure 3.8 provides
a rudimentary illustration.
Statement 1.9 expresses the temporal invariance of the evolution u1. This
is the deterministic aspect of physical law. Statement 3.3 can be seen as a cor-
responding expression of the temporal invariance of the probabilistic aspect of
physical law, in those cases such an aspect exists. The probabilistic temporal
invariance follows from the deterministic counterpart. The relative frequency
Fj is potentially a function of the time n at which the data collection from
system O begins, the environment ΩO, the number N of repetitions, and the
detailed sequence of outcomes p1, p2, . . . , pN . Temporal invariance means that
the outcome pj of the j:th observation depends neither on n, nor on the pre-
ceding sequence of outcomes p1, . . . , pj−1 (Fig. 3.8). We have assumed that
the evolution of O, as an idealisation, is independent of the environment. This
means that each outcome pj in the sequence must be seen as an independent
event, in a temporal as well as a spatial sense. Statement 3.3 is a consequence
of that fact.
Sometimes a large number of repetitions can be performed at the same time.
This is the case if we are dealing with a system O that can be divided in a
large number N of subsystems Ol that evolve independently, and where each
subsystem is identically prepared. That is, SOl = SOl′ for all pairs (l, l
′). In
that case we may write SO = (SOl, N) meaning that the state of the system O
is the same as the state of any of its parts Ol, apart from the fact that there is
also a number N indicating how many parts it has. The diffraction of light is
one example of this situation. Statement 3.3 implies that the same diffraction
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Figure 3.8: A system ON , with initial state SON , in which the same property
P is repeatedly observed N times with the same set of alternative values {pj}.
In this example we let P (k) represent the k:th observation of P . A complete set
{S˜1, S˜2} of future alternatives is defined by the binary outcome ‘p1’ and ‘not
p1’ for N = 2. For the system ON we my define a meta-alternative S˜1,N,m as
‘p1 is observed m times in N trials’ (corresponding to the shaded region for
m = 1). Letting v1 ≡ v[S˜1, SO], we see that v[S˜1,2,1, SON ] = 2v1(1 − v1). The
relative volumes behave just like probabilities, in the axiomatic sense. Temporal
invariance of probability means that the volumes of the four compartments are
invariant under the interchange P (1) ↔ P (2). Compare Fig. 2.27.
pattern appears each time an experiment is performed, and that it can be used
to decide the probability that a photon hits a given position on the detector
screen.
z
Statement 3.4 (No universal probabilities). It is not possible to define
probabilites for future alternatives S˜j for the total state S, only for states SO ⊃ S
of objects O.
To define a probability, there has to be a subject who observes an object and
formulate alternatives about its future, who defines options. By the definition
of a universe, there cannot be any outside subject that formulate alternatives
about it. While this provides an intuitive explanation, I think the statement
is most easily motivated in knowledge space, where each object is represented
by a ‘bubble’ (Fig. 1.6). In the normal situation, the system O about which
someone formulates alternatives consists of a set of bubble objects. There is
also a set of objects OA belonging to the body of the observing subject that
correspond to the alternatives that she formulate. These must be separate from
all objects of the observed system. If we want to include them, we have a new
system O′, about which another set of alternative-defining objects OA′ must be
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formulated, objects that are separate from O′. If O′ is the entire universe, this
procedure is not possible.
Statement 3.5 (No frequentist probabilities for bodies of subjects). No
probabilities can be assigned by repetition for future alternatives S˜j that concern
the state SO = Sˇ
k
i of the system defined by the body Bk of a subject k that have
memory and finite life time.
The reason is that the condition of repeatability cannot be fulfilled. If a
subject k remembers the outcome of the previous repetitions made to verify
an assigned probability, she is not in her original state SO just before the next
repetition. If she remembers all previous attempts to see which alternative
comes true, she is put into a new state at each new repetition. Repeatability can
only be upheld in this case if the subject has no memory of previous repetitions,
or in the far-fetched case where the life time of k is infinite and her memory
only streteched a finite time ∆n backwards. Then the required limit N → ∞
can be taken if the time span between each repetition is greater than ∆n.
Apart from the ability to prepare the system in the original state over and
over again, another necessary condition for repeatability is that the system can
be arbitrarily well isolated from the environment, so that it evolves in the same
way according to u1 after each preparation. No part of the body of a given
subject fulfils this condition. Therefore we cannot even assign probabilities to
alternatives that concern body parts whose state are not immediatley associated
with memories. These will nevertheless be indirectly affected when memories
are formed.
Statement 3.6 (No frequentist probabilities for the union of all bod-
ies). No probabilities can be assigned by repetition for future alternatives S˜j
that concern the state SO = SˇI of the system defined by the union of the bodies
Bk of all subjects k. The alternative S˜j should not be possible to reduce to an
alternative concerning the states of a proper subgroup of subjects only.
In this collective case, we can drop the memory condition, since if no subject
has any memory, even if the system or object that consists of all bodies can, in
principle, be repeatedly put in the same original state, there is no one that can
remember the outcome of all trials and verify that an assigned probability that
alterntive S˜j comes true is correct.
We have left the possibility open that a probability can be assigned a pri-
ori by deduction rather than ‘experimentally’ by repetition. By a simple self-
reference argument it will be shown below, however, that there are some alter-
natives and states for which this is not possible.
Statement 3.7 (There are states of some objects for which no proba-
bilities exist). There are future alternatives S˜j that concern the state SO = Sˇ
k
i
of an object O that contains the body of a subject that have memory and finite
life time, for which no probabilites exist.
To verify this statement, consider an experiment where a subject is asked
to press one of two buttons a given number t of seconds after the ringing of
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a bell. The pressing of button 1 corresponds to the future alternative S˜1 and
the pressing of button 2 corresponds to the future alternative S˜2. The state
SO of the entire experimental setup - including the body of the subject - just
after the ringing is such that both alternatives S˜1 and S˜2 are realizable, so that
SO = S˜1 ∪ S˜2 with V [S˜1] > 1 and V [S˜2] > 1.
Before moving on, let us problematize this setup. First, in a deterministic
world it cannot be realized. Then we have V [SO] = 1 so that SO cannot
be divided into two realizable alternatives S˜1 and S˜2, each having a non-zero
volume. However, in an indeterministic world such as ours where potential
knowledge is incomplete, such alternatives can be considered in principle. But
can they occur in practice? Let us argue by contradiction that they can.
Assume therefore that there cannot be two realizable alternatives S˜1 and S˜2
even if the world is indeterministic. Then either SO ⊂ P1 or SO ⊂ P2, where Pj
is the region in state space in which button j will be pressed (Eq. [2.49]). We
may make the experimental setup symmetrical so that there is nothing special
about button 1 or button 2. This means that if we may have SO ⊂ P1, then we
may also have SO ⊂ P2. Simply put, is is possible to press both buttons. Choose
two such states S′O ⊂ P1 and S′′O ⊂ P2 (Fig. 3.9). In an indeterministic world
we always have SO ⊂ S so that V [SO] > V [S] > 1. Therefore V [S′O] > 1 and
V [S′′O] > 1. Imagine that we move SO gradually from S
′
O to S
′′
O. We may define
a family of states SO(α) parameterized by α ∈ [0, 1] such that SO(0) = S′O and
SO(1) = S
′′
O. There is no circumstance a priori that excludes any state SO(α)
in such an interpolation. Since V [SO(α)] > 1 for all α, there will be at least one
realizable state SO ∈ {SO(α)} such that V [SO ∩ P1] > 1 and V [SO ∩ P2] > 1.
These two intersections ought to correspond to two realizable alternatives S˜1
and S˜2. If so, we have contradicted our assumption, and the outcome of the
choice between the buttons may very well be unknowable.
Having escaped the problematization of S˜1 and S˜2, let us move on. The task
is to construct an example involving these alternatives that confirms Statement
3.7. Suppose that there is some procedure by which the probabilities q1 =
v[S˜1, SO] and q2 = v[S˜2, SO] can be determined after the ringing of the bell, and
that the result is ready to be announced within t seconds, before the subject
presses one of the buttons. Suppose also that this procedure is part of the
experimental setup, as well as a mechanism with which the result is announced
to the subject. Further, the setup is assumed to be such that the subject is
instructed to press button 1 if q1 < q2, and to press button 2 if q1 ≥ q2.
Clearly, regardless the procedure used to deduce the probablities, the result
will be wrong. This means that we have an example of a state SO with two
future alternatives involving the state of a subject for which no probabilities
can be deduced before one of the alternatives is realized. Therefore Statement
3.7 holds.
This gedankenexperiment can be related to those experiments [38, 55] in
which analysis of brain activity is used to predict a decision before the subject
is aware of it herself. Benjamin Libet let subjects decide at a time of their
own choosing to move a hand. He analysed so called readiness potentials to
conclude that the decision was made 500 ms before the subject reported that
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Figure 3.9: A system O that contains a subject that is asked to press one of
two buttons. If there are states SO for which it is knowable in principle which
button will be pressed, then, by interpolation, there should be a realizable state
that is divided by the line in property space that separates the two alternatives.
In other words, there are realizable states for which the outcome of such a choice
is unknowable in principle.
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she consciously decided to take action. Soon et al. went a step further and
deduced in advance not only that a decision had been made but also which.
The subjects were asked to press one of two available buttons. By the use
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) the researchers were able to
predict, with significant accuracy, whether a subject was going to press the left
or the right button, several seconds before the subject herself reported that she
made up her mind.
It is hard to define free will. A negative definition, based on what it is not,
is the following.
Definition 3.3 (Free will). The possibility to take one of several actions the
choice of which is neither dictated by necessity nor governed by probabilities.
The reported experiments demonstrate that some choices that are subjec-
tively perceived as free are indeed goverened by probabilities that can be deduced
beforehand, so that there is no free will in the above sense.
These experiments do not rule out free will for all types of choices, however.
Sometimes alternatives unknown beforehand materialize within a second before
a conscious decision is made. A hunter may suddenly spot something that
moves in the bushes, and must decide immediately whether to shoot or not.
In such situations, probabilistic predictions of the outcome several seconds in
advance are, of course, impossible, suggesting that the kind of brain activity
Soon et al. analyzed to predict the outcome cannot be used for all kinds of
conscious choices. In a controlled experiment, a pair of random objects may
appear simultaneously on a computer screen, and the subject may be asked to
click on one of them as fast as she can.
Libet himself introduced the idea of ‘free won’t’, the possibility to veto,
until the last moment, a choice that has been building up consciuously or un-
consciously in the brain for an extended period of time. The self-referential
gedankenexperiment presented above may be described in this way: the subject
negates any attempt to predict her behaviour by doing the opposite to what is
predicted. Soon et al. could have implemented this setup by telling the subject
the prediction of which button she was going to press during those seconds that
were available after the prediction, but before she actually did press one of the
buttons.
The conclusion expressed in Statement 3.7 that there are realizable alterna-
tives, involving states of subjects, with no associated probabilities, means that
in some cases will is indeed free according to Definition 3.3. This conforms with
the primary role given to intention in section 2.12. In Definition 2.66, intention
is described as the appearance of an option in the active mind of a subject,
an internal object that is an image of a possible future state of another object.
If will is not free, intention should be regarded a secondary, deduced concept.
It should not be given a crucial role in a fyndamental formalism that aims to
describe physics.
It can be argued that the appearance of a set of options cannot be the result
of a probabilistic or deterministic process. Just as in the motivation why there
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cannot be any universal probabilities (Statement 3.4), we end up in infinite
regress if we try.
To calculate the probability for the appearance of a set of options A = {Sj}
in the mind of some subject k in state SO, this set of alternatives must already
have appeared, in the following sense. A can be seen as a meta-option that
is chosen by k rather than any other set of alternatives A′. To deduce the
probability for this event, the relative state space volume V [SA]/V [SO] must be
calculated by some subject k′, possibly with the help of some apparatus. In any
case, A = {Sj} must already have appeared in k′. To deduce the probability
for the appearance of A = {Sj} in k′ we must then invoke a third subject k′′,
and so on. In conclusion, either the set of options A has always been present in
the collective state of potential knowledge PK, or it appeared in some subject
k at some time as an act of free will.
Statement 3.8 (Appearance of intention is the result of free will). There
is no probability associated with the subjective appearance of one complete set of
options rather than another.
From a symmetry point of view, the primary status of intention goes together
well with the assumption of intertwined dualism (Fig. 1.26). It is the channel
through which the subjective aspect of reality affects the objective aspect, just
as physical law is the channel through which the objective aspect affects the
subjective aspect. None of them can be reduced to the other, they are both
primary.
It should be noted that the self-reference argument used to motivate State-
ment 3.7 does not rely on the presence of a subject. She could be replaced by an
apparatus that is programmed to act against the prediction. For example, in a
double slit experiment, the task may be to deduce the probability of the passage
of an electron through each slit given the presence of a probability calculating
device that is coupled to a generator that creates an electric field that steers
the electron towards the slit with the lowest calculated probability.
In this case, however, true probabilities do nevertheless exist. For a given
probability calculating device, the setup can be isolated and the experiment
repeated an arbitrary number of times so that probabilities can be estimated
in the frequentist sense. That the probabilities deduced a priori are all wrong
does not matter.
At the beginning of this section we stated boldly that it is immediately
clear that there are some state reductions S(n)→ S(n+ 1) ⊂ u1S(n) to which
no probability can be associated, taking the four requirements into account.
After that we argued that this is, in fact, always the case when we consider the
total state S(n) (Statement 3.4). It is therefore sufficient to contemplate the
reduction of object states SO(n)→ SO(n+ 1) ⊂ u1SO(n). In so doing, we gave
examples of such state reductions without probabilities, namely those where the
observed obect O contains bodies of subjects (Statement 3.7).
There are other examples. Suppose that we see a branch falling off a tree
while we pass it in a park. We may imagine a probability that tells us the odds
for the event that it will fall in the time span T during which we are able to see
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it as we walk by. However, in that case there are no predefined options, it is not
possible to recreate the initial state of the tree perfectly an arbitrary number of
times in order to determine the frequentist probability, and there is no apparent
symmetry that makes it possible to deduce it. Nevertheless, if we inspect the
fallen branch afterwards, we might notice that its base is rotten. This could
make it possible to estimate the probability a posteriori. Two questions arise.
How should treat ‘fuzzy’ probabilities which cannot be determined exactly, and
how should we treat options and probabilites that are defined and determined
after the event has taken place?
In a sense, all probabilities are fuzzy, since the condition of perfect repeatabil-
ity is an idealization. However, we will treat all probabilities that are introduced
in our formalism as if they were perfectly known. One may ask if the formalism
that we are going to discuss should be generalized to allow fuzzy probabilities,
just like we argued in Section 2.3 that the physical state S itself is fuzzy. We
will not address this question here.
Regarding probabilities determined a posteriori, the crucial matter is whether
they are potentially knowable beforehand or not. If such potential knowl-
edge about symmetric alternatives is present before the event, making it pos-
sible to deduce probabilities, then these probabilities are proper elements of
a representation of a reduced state SˇO(n), otherwise not. It does not mat-
ter whether these probabilities are actually known to someone before the event
SO(n) → SO(n + 1) ⊂ u1SO(n). This is just the basic assumption in our ap-
proach to physics that it is the potential knowledge PK(n) that corresponds
to the physical state rather than the aware knowledge K(n). Regarding the
question if knowledge deduced afterwards, say at time n+m, belongs to PK(n)
or to PK(n+m), we refer to the discussion in Section 1.3.
z
Let us approach the more concrete matter of probability calculation. Consider
a complete set of future alternatives {S˜j} (Definition 2.51) with relative volumes
{vj} ≡ {v[S˜j , SO]}. Since actual probabilities are only defined for object states
SO (Statement 3.4), we focus on this case. For any such state and any such set
of alternatives we may write
S¯O ≡
[
S˜1 S˜2 . . . S˜m
v1 v2 . . . vm
]
↪→ SO. (3.22)
The interpretation of this schema should be obvious. The schema is a represen-
tation S¯O of SO. There may, of course be several complete sets of alternatives,
corresponding to different properties P and P ′. We may then also write
S¯′O ≡
[
S˜′1 S˜
′
2 . . . S˜
′
m
v′1 v
′
2 . . . v
′
m
]
↪→ SO. (3.23)
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Figure 3.10: The relative volumes of future alternatives are invariant under evo-
lution u1 (Statement 3.9). a) If only one property P is defined, the proportions
of the state volume V [SO] that belong to P˜1 and P˜2 stay the same. b) If two
properties P and P ′ are defined, the relative volume of each quadrant stays the
same. The position of the state is ‘nailed’ by the two coordinate axes in this
two-dimensional projection of state space.
It follows from Statement 2.24 that for any state S ⊆ P˜j we have u1S ⊆ P˜j .
The definition of state space volume and relative volume (Definitions 2.43 and
3.2) then imply that the relative volume of any future alternative S˜j is invariant
under the action of u1 (Fig. 3.10).
Statement 3.9 (Relative volumes of future alternatives are invariant
under evolution u1). Let vj ≡ v[S˜j , SO] and u1vj ≡ v[u1S˜j , u1SO]. Then we
have u1vj = vj.
Suppose that we are dealing with two sets of complete future alternatives
{S˜1, S˜2} and {S˜′1, S˜′2}, which correspond to two properties P and P ′. Define the
quadrants Σ11 ∪ Σ12 ∪ Σ21 ∪ Σ22 = SO like in Fig. 3.11. The relative volumes
v[Σij ] are then invariant under evolution u1 [Fig. 3.10(b)].
As long as no state reduction occurs, the total state S such that the state
SO of the studied system is affected, the following holds true.
Statement 3.10 (Relative volumes of future alternatives are constant
in time). As long as the state S is not reduced in a way that affects SO, the
relative volumes vj stay the same.
The total state S may be reduced in two ways that affect SO. In the first
case, the state reduction of S simply means that SO is also reduced, that is, an
alternative S˜j for the system SO is realized. In the second case, the reduction of
S means that the conditional knowledge that may relate O with its environment
changes. Recall that the object state SO is defined in such a way that this
conditional knowledge is neglected; the object O is treated as if it was isolated
(Definition 2.5).
For future alternatives we have, from Statement 3.9:
u¯1S¯O ≡
[
u1S˜1 u1S˜2 . . . u1S˜m
v1 v2 . . . vm
]
↪→ u1SO. (3.24)
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The same statement would not necessarily hold true if we considered present
alternatives. For such alternatives we would have to write
u¯1S¯O ≡
[
u1S1 u1S2 . . . u1Sm
u1v1 u1v2 . . . u1vm
]
↪→ u1SO. (3.25)
The set of property values {pj} to which the alternatives {S˜j} (or {Sj})
correspond can be used to define a partial representation of the state SO:
S¯Op ≡
[
p1 p2 . . . pm
v1 v2 . . . vm
]
⇀ SO. (3.26)
The representation is partial since the shape of boundary ∂Sj of each alternative
S˜j is not represented, only its relative volume. The set of realizable property
values {pj} may be said to define a coordinate system, and we may interpret
the relative volumes as coordinates of a vector S¯Op that represents the state SO
(partially). This algebraic picture is developed further in Section 3.4.
Statement 3.11 (Stationary state). The state SO of an object O equipped
with a complete set {S˜j} of future alternatives is stationary with respect to prop-
erty P during the time interval [n, n+ nˆ] if and only if S¯Op(n) ⇀ umSO(n) for
each m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ nˆ.
We may say that the state SO, as represented by a set of future alternatives
{S˜j}, is stationary with respect to the corresponding coordinate system {pj} as
long as none of these alternative is realized, and the object O is not affected by
the environment, as discussed in relation to Statement 3.10.
The above list of five conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to assign
probabilities to alterntives leaves us with a few basic cases for which we need
rules to calculate probabilities (Fig. 3.11). The simplest case is when we have a
single property P for which we can assign probabilities to its values. The more
complex cases arise when we have two properties P and P ′ whose values pj and
p′j are realized in succession. Let P be the property whose value pj is realized
first. Then we need to consider two possibilities: either both values are realized
with certainty at some future time (knowability level 3), or pj can never be
known (knowability level 1).
For the sake of clarity we will consider the case where P and P ′ have only
two values each, corresponding to complete sets of future alternatives {S˜1, S˜2}
and {S˜′1, S˜′2}, respectively. The following discussion can be repeated straightfor-
wardly when there are more than two alternatives for each property value. The
results that we arrive at will be analogous. In a similar fashion, the cases when
there are more than two properties P, P ′, P ′′ whose values are determined in
succession can be straightforwardly reduced to the case when there is a series
of two properties whose values are determined in succession.
The subsets of SO shown in Fig. 3.11 that are called Σij rather than Sij do
not correspond to realizable alternatives for which evolution u1 can be defined.
They are just parts of the state that are created by a theoretical division. Con-
sider the state in Fig. 3.11(c). We know by construction that the actual value
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Figure 3.11: The basic cases in which probabilities can be defined. The state
SO is schematically represented as in section 2.8. The solid lines divide future
alternatives corresponding to a property P for which the value pj will be decided
with certainty. (a) A single such property P is defined. (b) Two such properties
P and P ′ are defined, where the value of P is decided first, then the value of P ′.
(c) It is known that the value of P cannot be decided (knowability level 1). The
symbols Σij are labels on the quadrants of SO that not correspond to realizable
alternatives S˜ij . Each of the cases can be implemented by an adjustable Mach-
Zehnder interferometer. Property P corresponds to the passage of the left or
right mirror, and P ′ corresponds to the final absorption to the left or right. The
prescence of a detector to decide the value of the property is marked by the
letter D.
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of property P will never be known, so that the state SO of the system can never
be found entirely on the upper half plane.
Figure 3.11 also shows a Mach-Zehnder interferometer that can be adjusted
to correspond to each of the basic cases described above. There is a monocro-
matic light source whose intensity can be reduced so much that individual pho-
tons are sent out one by one. A beam splitter transmits some fraction of the
light, and reflects the rest. A phase difference with a fixed magnitude between
the transmitted and reflected beam arises. The two beams are reflected at two
mirrors. Depending on which case we are considering, there may be a pair of
detectors D1 and D2 at these mirrors, which registers the reflection of the pho-
ton without disturbning its direction of motion. The two beams are recombined
at a second beam splitter. The two outgoing beams are absorbed at detectors
D′1 and D
′
2, which may or may not be switched on, depending on the case.
In the simplest case with a single measurement by detector D1 or D2 [Fig.
3.11(a)], the probabilities can simply be expressed as
qj = q(pj). (3.27)
We may also write
qj = v[S˜j ], (3.28)
since the relative volumes stay constant until the measurement or state reduc-
tion takes place (Statement 3.10), even if we may not know exactly when this
happens. (We assume that the surroundings do not affect the experimental
setup O during this time.)
In the case where we make measurements in succession (Fig. 3.11b), we get
analogous probabilities qj = q(pj) for the outcome of the first measurement,
and then
q′j = q(p
′
j |p1)q(p1) + q(p′j |p2)q(p2) (3.29)
for the outcome of the second measurement, where q(p′j |pi) is the conditional
probability that property P ′ will have value p′j given that P turned out to have
value pi. Suppose that this was decided at time n and that the value of P
′ will
be decided at time n′ > n. Let us write SO(m) = S˜′1(m)∪S˜′2(m) for n ≤ m < n′,
where S˜′1(m) and S˜
′
2(m) are the two future alternatives for property P
′. Then
we may express
q(p′j |pi) = v[S˜′j(m)] (3.30)
at any time m between the two state reductions. Remember again that the
relative volumes stay constant if nothing affects the experimental setup between
the two measurements.
In the case where it is assumed to be impossible in principle to determine
whether the particle passed mirror 1 or 2, the probabilities qj = q(pj) are not
defined, nor are the conditional probabilities q(p′j |pi). Just like in the first case
(Eq. 3.27), we must simply write
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Figure 3.12: The state SO just after the value of property P is decided to have
value p1 in case b in Fig. 3.11. (a) If P and P
′ are simultaneously knowable, the
state may be contained in a single quadrant just after the value of P ′ has been
decided. (b) This may never happen if the properties are not simultaneously
knowable.
q′j = q(p
′
j). (3.31)
Statement 3.12 (On conditional probabilities). The probability q(p′j |pi)
can be defined if and only if P is a realizable property at knowability level 3,
with a value pi that will be potentially known before the value p
′
j of property P
′
becomes potentially known.
It is also of interest to consider what can happen after one of the alternatives
in Fig. 3.11 has been realized. When we have two properties P and P ′ with
corresponding alternatives that are realized in succession (panel b), we should
distinguish between the cases where P and P ′ are simultaneously knowable or
not. The fact that there are property pairs whose values cannot be simultane-
ously known follows from Statement 2.23.
For the specific implementation of these cases provided by the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer, P and P ′ are indeed simultaneously knowable. We may know
that the photon first passed the left mirror, and then arrived at the right de-
tector. To discuss the general case, we therefore forget about this particular
setup.
Consider Fig. 3.12. The observation of the value of property P defines a
temporal update n − 1 → n. Thus the state SO(n) is contained in either the
upper or lower half-plane that correspond to the regions P1 and P2. If P and
P ′ are simultaneously knowable, it is possible that the state stays in the (say)
upper half plane until the time n+nˆ when observation of the value of P ′ becomes
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Figure 3.13: The state SO before it is decided whether the value of property P
will ever be known or not. At the moment of decision, we end up in cases b or
c in Fig. 3.11. (a) This decision corresponds to a state reduction. The reduced
state may not be left-right symmetric even if the original state is symmetric.
This means that the probabilities to see values p′1 or p
′
2 may be unequal. (b) If
we somehow know the value of P beforehand, we start out with states S1 or S2.
Then there is no symmetry breaking. Two subsets of a state SO need not stay
subsets forever. This is an example of the irreducibility of physical law.
possible (according to the definition of the knowability levels). Then SO(n+m)
is contained in one of the quadrants for some m ≥ nˆ.
Obviously, this scenario is forbidden when P and P ′ are not simultaneously
knowable. Then the state must evolve from time n to time n+m to cover part
of the lower half-plane. When the value of property P ′ is observed, the state
have parts that belong to P1 as well as P2, so that the outcome of a repeated
observation of P is no longer certain.
We conclude that the state SO can never be contained in a single quadrant
Pi ∩ Pj when P and P ′ are not simultaneously knowable. Thus evolution u1
cannot be defined for such a hypothetical state (Statement 2.12). The classical
example is the spin of an electron. Its component along two spatial directions
cannot be known at the same time. There is no evolution equation for a spin
vector where all components are specified.
This irreducibility of physical law (Assumption 2.8) is also helpful to under-
stand the fact that a left-right symmetric experimental arrangement, like the
interferometer in Fig. 3.11 with transmission ratio 1/2 at each beam splitter,
can produce unequal probabilities for the arrival of photons in the left and right
detectors (D′1 and D
′
2). We know that this is the case due to interference effects
that may arise because of the phase delay of the reflected beam at the beam
splitters.
Strictly speaking, the experimental arrangement is not left-right symmetric,
since the beam that emanates from the light source moves to the right (Fig.
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3.11). It is symmetric only in the sense that if we imagine an exact state Z
that corresponds to a photon taking a well-defined route through our ‘pinball
machine’, then each possible route is equally probable. Thus, if we want to
illustrate the initial state SO of the setup as in the right panel of Fig. 3.7, then
the volumes of all quadrants Σij should have equal volumes (leftmost panel in
Fig. 3.13). At least, this must be true when it is possible in principle to decide
whether the photon arrives at mirror 1 or 2 (the values of property P ), and at
detector D′1 or D
′
2 (the values of property P
′). In other words, the volumes of all
quadrants Σij must be the same if both properties P and P
′ have knowability
level 2 or 3.
Assume that this is initially the case. Then, at some moment, it becomes
certain that it will forever be unknowable whether the photon passed mirror 1
or 2. The detectors at these mirrors are switched off. The knowability level of
property P changes from 2 to 1. Such an event necessarily corresponds to a
state reduction (Definition 2.12), since knowability level 2 means that it is not
part of potential knowledge whether the value of property P will ever be known.
The physical state corresponding to this state of knowledge cannot evolve via
u1 alone to a state where it is part of potential knowledge whether property
P will be known or not (levels 3 or 1). That would be a contradiction, since
anything that can be deduced about the future via physical law is part of the
extended present potential knowledge (Eq. 2.11), which is equivalent to the
present potential knowledge (Definition 1.8).
This state reduction can be expressed as u1SO(n)→ SO(n+ 1) ⊂ u1SO(n).
Since we have assumed no physical law that dictates that the ‘center of mass’
of the reduced state is the same as that of the state it is reduced from, the
equality of the volume of the quadrants may very well be lost at this moment.
In conclusion, such a symmetry breaking may occur at the same time as it is
established that property P will be forever unknowable. This is indicated in
Fig. 3.13(a). The unequal volumes V [SO(n + 1) ∩ P1] and V [SO(n + 1) ∩ P2]
that follows in such a situation means that the probabilites to see the values p′1
and p′2 will be different.
Imagine another situation, in which hidden detectors are found along the
beams between the first beam splitter and the two mirrors. They make it
possible to decide the value of property P before the photon hits one of the
mirrors. It is still not known whether the detectors at the mirrors will be
switched on or off at the time of the photon’s passing, just like in the initial
state of the previously studied case.
Just after the passing of the hidden detectors, the state SO is a subset of
either P˜1 or P˜2, as shown in Fig. 3.13(b). Here, both possible states SO1 and
SO2 after the passing are shown. The first snapshot in bottom row is shown
under the state u1SO(n) in the top row, just to indicate that the splitting of the
state by the hidden detectors takes place some time after the experiment starts.
Since the presence of the hidden detectors amounts to more information about
the setup - increased potential knowledge - the union of the splitted states is a
proper subset of the corresponding state with the hidden detectors blanked out
from perception. We may write SO1 ∪ SO2 ⊂ u1SO. The latter state is marked
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as the dashed circle in the first panel of the bottom row.
In this case, the event where the detectors at the mirrors are switched off
can have no effect on the relative volumes of the left and right halves of the
splitted states S1 and S2, since we already know which of the switched off de-
tectors will be passed. No symmetry can be lost at this moment. The result
may be that SO1(n + 1) ∪ SO2(n + 1) 6⊆ SO(n + 1); the splitted states have
partially jumped out of the ‘mother state’ SO. This is no violation of epistemic
invariance (Assumptions 1.17 and 2.4) since this principle only applies for or-
dinary evolution u1, and may be broken when state reductions are involved.
This is an example of the irreducibility of physical law - the sequence of states
SO(n), SO(n + 1), SO(n + 2), . . . cannot be modelled by rules that determine
sequences of exact states Zj(n), Zj(n+ 1), Zj(n+ 2), . . ., where Zj(n) ∈ SO(n).
3.3 The postulate of a priori equal probabilities
Statistical mechanics relies on the assumption that all microscopic states com-
patible with a set of macroscopic constraints should be assigned equal probabil-
ities. The perspective adopted here is that it is only macroscopically observable
alternatives that should be assigned probabilities. These probabilites are the
relative volumes of the alternatives, according to Statement 3.2. The postu-
late of a priori equal probabilities is then nothing more than a repetition of this
statement, where we identify ‘macroscopic constraints’ with the state SO, which
corresponds to our subjective potential knowledge of the system of interest, and
the ‘microscopic states’ with the exact states Z that make up SO.
The possibility that ‘microscopic states’ have different ‘probabilities’ is ex-
cluded in the present description, since there is no measure defined a priori on
the elements Z of SO. The physical state is the set of exact states that are
not excluded by potential knowledge, nothing more. Of course, measures that
are functionals of SO as a whole can be defined, depending, for example, on its
volume or the shape of its boundary. But that is a different matter.
We need to know the possible attribute values of exact states to be able
to compute the relative volume of alternatives Sj . We return to this question
below. At this stage we just note the simple fact that we may often group small
sets of exact states together and use these groups as the ‘microscopic states’ in
statistical mechanical applications. For example, if we have a gas of particles
that do not interact, and if there is no external magnetic fields, then we may
disregard the spin, and group the possible spin states (sx, sy, sz) together into
one unit when we sum over all possible states in the partition function. Each
such spin-unit Σs will have the same volume V [Σs] for any given array of values
of the other attributes, such as position and momentum. They can therefore be
given the same unit statistical weight. Such ‘microscopic units’ may correspond
to states that are observable in principle, in contrast to the exact states Z.
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3.4 The postulates of quantum mechanics
We seek an algebraic representation of the object state SO that uses schemas
such as [3.22] as a starting point. The aim is to find algebraic rules operat-
ing on such a representation that extract everything that can be said about
probabilities.
Formally, we may rearrange the schema [3.22] as follows:
S¯O = v1S¯1 + v2S¯2 + . . . vmS¯m. (3.32)
To make such a representation meaningful, we must check that the algebraic
rules for addition and multiplication hold. We put bars over the future alter-
natives S˜j to emphasize that they are now part of an (algebraic) representation
rather than sets. On the other hand, we skip the tildes when we throw in the
bars, to make the notation less cluttered.
To each alternative S˜j is associated a value pj of property P . Suppose that
these alternatives have knowability level 3 (Table 2.1). That is, we know for
sure that at some future time we will get to know which value pj applies. Con-
sider now another property P ′, which is simultaneously knowable (Fig. 3.12),
for which another set of future states {S′j} having knowability level 3 is de-
fined. Suppose that these alternatives are related according to Fig. 3.14(b). We
may then define a combined property P ′′ with possible values (p1, p′1), (p2, p
′
1),
(p2, p
′
2) and (p3, p
′
2), and with corresponding complete set of future alternatives
{S˜1, S˜21, S˜22, S˜3}. We may also write
S¯2 =
[
S˜21 S˜22
v21 v22
]
, (3.33)
with v21 ≡ v[S˜21, S˜2] and v22 ≡ v[S˜22, S˜2], just like in Eq. [3.22]. Using the
notation of Eq. [3.32] this expression transforms to
S¯2 = v21S¯21 + v22S¯22 (3.34)
From the definition of each involved relative volume it follows that
S¯O =
[
S1 S2 S3
v1 v2 v3
]
=
[
S1 S21 S22 S3
v1 v2v21 v2v22 v3
]
, (3.35)
where the equality sign means ‘represent the same state as’. We may therefore
use Eqs. [3.34] and [3.35] to write
S¯O = v1S¯1 + v2S¯2 + v3S¯3
= v1S¯1 + v2(v21S¯21 + v22S¯22) + v3S¯3
= v1S¯1 + v2v21S¯21 + v2v22S¯22 + v3S¯3.
(3.36)
This is reassuring, since these expressions conform with the distributive law.
Eq. [3.24] transforms to
u¯1S¯O = v1u¯1S¯1 + v2u¯1S¯2 + . . . vmu¯1S¯m, (3.37)
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Figure 3.14: The introduction of two simultaneously knowable properties P
and P ′ at knowability level 3 can be used to motivate why the distributive law
(Eq. [3.36]) holds for the relative volumes vj . This is an indication that the
set-theoretic description of physical states can be translated into an algebraic
description. The volume measure V is the bridge to the algebraic world.
meaning that we, tentatively, should interpret the evolution operator as a linear
operator in this (proto-algebraic) representation.
3.4.1 Contextual states
To proceed further, we need to take a step back and introduce a couple of new
concepts. When we imagine a set of options, and when we subsequently identify
which option Sj comes true, we are most often interested in a particular aspect
of the realized alternative, an aspect that can be coded as a value pj of property
P . Other information that is part of the potential knowledge that corresponds
to Sj is considered irrelevant.
For example, in a scientific experiment the state SO that we use to define
alternatives Sj is the state of the object O that consists of the experimental
apparatus together with the specimen OS to be examined. If the specimen is a
single electron, the property of interest may be its spin direction or its position
when it hits a detector. As we perceive the outcome of the experiment, it is
irrelevant if we, at the same moment, perceive a new scratch on some metal
part of the detector.
Let us schematically discuss the role of the specimen in the observational
setup (Fig. 3.15). Such a setup necessarily consists of at least two subjectively
distinct objects: the object O whose state (or evolution) we observe, and the
body OB of an observer. In a controlled, scientific setting, O is divided into
at least two parts: the specimen OS and the apparatus OA, with which we
study the specimen, decide one of its properties. This is the crucial distinction
introduced in this section.
Our aim is to formulate physical law in terms of the behavior of specimens.
What kind of specimens can be scientifically investigated? First, the specimen
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Figure 3.15: Objects that have to be or may be parts of an observational setup.
a) The observed object O and the body of an observer OB are necessary parts.
b) The observed object may sometimes be divided into a specimen OS and an
apparatus OA with which we decide a property of the specimen. We may then
say that the observation is the outcome of an experiment. c) When the specimen
is a deduced quasiobject, the apparatus can be divided into a machine OM and
a detector OD, where the subjective change in the state of the detector defines
the outcome of the experiment.
must be ‘real’ rather than imagined. We cannot expect physical law to hold for
fantasies. But what does ‘reality’ mean in this context?
Recall that we assumed the basic ability of a subject to make proper inter-
pretations of perceptions in terms of internal or external, present or past, and
so on (Fig. 1.2). In fact, we defined knowledge as perceptions with proper in-
terpretation (Definition 1.5). Further, we associated physical states with states
of knowledge. Therefore we may regard the interpretation of a perceived object
as a set of internal physical attributes that describe the state of this object. We
have already introduced one such attribute, namely the presentness attribute
Pr, with possible values zero and one. Let us introduce a similar binary reality
attribute Re (Table 3.1) and let it rely on the following definition of reality.
Definition 3.4 (Real objects). Suppose that the object O is identifiable dur-
ing the time interval [n, n+m] (Definition 2.54). The sequence of states {SO} =
{SO(n), SO(n+1), . . . , SO(n+m)} will be consistent with at least one sequence of
states {SˇOM} = {SˇOM (n), SˇOM (n+ 1), . . . , SˇOM (n+m)} describing the evolu-
tion according to physical law of a set of identifiable minimal objects (Definition
2.56). Consider a relational attribute Ar that relates O with its complement ΩO
(Definition 1.23). Then O is real if and only if 1) there is a sequence {SˇOM}
for which the expected value of any such Ar for the set of minimal objects {OM}
is the same at each time n, n + 1, . . . , n + m as the expected value of Ar for O
itself, and 2) for all n, the physical state S(n) is consistent with the description
of SO in terms of the sequence {SˇOM}.
Basically, the definition says that it should be possible to model a real object
with minimal objects that move along with the object in question, and that this
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Attribute Values Definition
Reality Re = 0, 1 3.4
Presentness Pr = 0, 1 1.25
Direct perception Dp = 0, 1 2.1
Table 3.1: Binary internal attributes that apply to all object O and concerns its
basic interpretation. A quasiobject is an object O with Dp(O) = 0. A directly
perceived specimen must be real: Re(OS) = 1 if Dp(OS) = 1.
model should be valid at all times, even after the object itself has disintegrated.
Consider a cloud, for example. It is possible to model this object as a set
of water droplets, which in turn consists of elementary particles arranged in
atoms and molecules. These water droplets move across the sky together with
the cloud itself. This model is valid even after the cloud dissolves; it does not
contradict any later observations. The water in the droplets simply evaporates.
In contrast, if we watch a film of a cloud on a television screen, there are no
water molecules that move across the screen together with the image of the
cloud. If we watched the cloud dissolve on the screen and attempted such a
model, we would not be able to account for the evaporated water by measuring
the humidity in the living room where the TV set is located.
In the above example, velocity is the relevant relative attribute Ar. Let us
discuss an example in which position is the relevant relative attribute. Suppose
that you feel pain in your leg. This interpretation of the perception may be
proper (Fig. 1.2) in the sense that it can actually be modeled by a set of
minimal objects in the leg engaged in a process that causes the pain, so that
no future perception can contradict this model. Then the ‘pain in the leg’ is a
real object. If, on the other hand, your leg has been amputated, such a model
would be contradicted once you recall your condition and look at your body.
The ‘pain in the leg’ would not be a real object.
However, the ‘pain’ is still a real object - it is just the location ‘in the leg’
that is a wrong interpretation. In the same way, the ‘cloud displayed on the
TV-screen’ is a real object - it can be modeled by minimal objects arranged as
a TV set, with the screen emitting light according to the recipe provided by
the input signal. It is just the interpretation ‘the cloud is moving across the
sky’ that is wrong. That every object has a proper interpretation that makes it
‘real’ can be seen as an expression of detailed materialism (Definition 1.4). The
distinction between ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ objects can be seen as a simple reflection
of the basic assumption that it is possible in principle to distinguish proper
interpretations from improper ones.
This means that we treat the ability to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘un-
real’ objects as fundamental, just like the ability to distinguish the present from
the past, and perceived objects from deduced ones. Therefore, from our epis-
temic perspective, the attributes listed in Table 3.1 should enter the physical
description at a fundamental level, just like the directed nature of time.
We may argue that a memory of a cloud that passes across the sky is not
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real in the same way as we argued that an image of a cloud on a TV screen
is not real. The memory of the cloud cannot be modelled in terms of minimal
objects that travels here and now across your field of vision. Instead, it must
be modelled in terms of internal minimal objects in the brain that are quite
stationary in relation to yourself.
Statement 3.13 (Remembered objects are not real). Objects O with
Pr[O] = 0 and Dp[O] = 1 are not real in the sense of Definition 3.4. How-
ever, all remembered objects become real if we let the proper interpretation ‘this
is a past object’ be part of the object.
The reverse of this statement is not true. We may have present objects that
are not real. Two examples are the cloud on the TV screen and the phantom
pain.
Statement 3.14 (There are both real and unreal present objects). We
may have both Re[O] = 1 and Re[O] = 0 for objects O with Pr[O] = 1 However,
all present objects become real if we let the proper interpretation of its context
be part of the object.
We argued above that the specimen must be ‘real’. Does this mean that
it must be a present object, that we must have Pr[OS] = 1? To answer this
question we discuss first the possible role of quasiobjects in the experimental
setup (Fig.3.15).
The division of O into a specimen OS and an apparatus OA opens up the
possibility that OS is a quasiobject. That is, we allow both Dp[OS] = 1 and
Dp[OS] = 0. However, OA cannot be a quasiobject, since something has to be
actually observed. If OS is a quasiobject the setup is such that there is condi-
tional knowledge that relates the states of OS and OA, so that new knowledge
about the state of OS is gained by deduction (using physical law) when new
knowledge of OA is gained by observation. Such a ‘quasiobservation’ of OS
means that the extended potential knowledge grows, and the reduced physical
state shrinks (Figs. 2.2 and 2.8).
It does not make sense to talk about ’unreal’ quasiobjects. Their role is
to account for the evolution of real, directly perceived objects in a reductionis-
tic, scientific way. In fact, minimal quasiobjects are used to define the reality
of directly perceived objects according to Statement 2.30 and Definition 3.4.
Formally, Dp[O] = 0⇒ Re[O] = 1.
These considerations open up the possibitily that we can use an apparatus
OA to deduce the past state of a specimen that is a quasiobject and still keep the
requirement that specimens should be real. In that case we have Re[OS] = 1,
Dp[OS] = 0, and Pr[OS] = 0. For instance, we may use a telescope to observe
a distant galaxy. The perceived luminous blob is a present, directly perceived
object, but the galaxy as deduced to be located in a distant part of space in the
distant past must be considered a past quasiobject.
Definition 3.5 (The specimen OS and its state SOS). Assume that O is
a composite object, and let SOS be the state of an object OS that is part of O,
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and whose possible property values are used to define a complete set of future
alternatives for O. If OS is real (Defintion 3.4), then OS is a specimen with
specimen state SOS.
From this definition, we immediately conclude that
SOS ⊃ SO. (3.38)
When the specimen OS is a quasiobject, it is possible to divide the apparatus
OA into one detector OD and one machine OM (Fig. 3.15). The term ‘machine’
may not be very illuminating, and we define it negatively as those parts of the
apparatus OA that is not a detector.
Definition 3.6 (The detector OD). Suppose that an experiment starts at time
n, that the observation that defines its outcome occurs at time n+m, and that OS
is not directly perceived during the course of the experiment. Then OD are those
objects that are part of the apparatus OA, and are such that SOA(n)∩SOA(n′) 6=
∅ whenever n ≤ n′ < n+m and SOA(n+m− 1) ∩ SOA(n+m) = ∅.
The distinct change of the detector state SOD thus defines the outcome of
the experiment, and also defines the temporal update n+m− 1→ n+m. The
state of the machine SOM , on the other hand, may undergo distinct changes
during the course of the experiment, but may not change subjectively at time
n+m.
Definition 3.7 (Property value state SPj of a specimen). Consider a
set of properties {POS} that specify the nature of the specimen OS, with fixed,
limited value ranges {ΥPOS} that are considered known a priori. Consider also
another property P that can be defined for OS, but whose value may vary. Let
SPj be the state of OS that corresponds to the knowledge that the value of P is
pj, in addition to knowledge about {ΥPOS}.
We assume in Definition 3.6 that the observation of P occurs at time n+m.
This means that any future alternative S˜j becomes a present alternative Sj at
time n + m − 1 (Definitions 2.48 and 2.50). The fact that SPj corresponds to
knowledge about nothing more than that the value of P is pj means that
Sj ⊂ SPj (3.39)
for all such present alternatives Sj just before the observation of P is made (Fig.
3.16). The union
⋃
j SPj is a state that corresponds to knowledge about the
fixed ranges {ΥPOS} of the values of {POS}, that is, to knowledge of the nature
of the specimen. It consists of all exact states Z that are not excluded by the
existence of a specimen of the given nature.
Definition 3.8 (An observational context C). The context C is the potential
knowledge contained in the state SO, together with a sequence of complete sets of
future alternatives {S˜j}, {S˜′j}, . . . , {S˜(F )j } that correspond to values of properties
P, P ′, . . . , P (F ), that are observed in sequence. These properties are defined for
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Figure 3.16: The property value states SPj and the contextual state SC(n) of
the specimen OS we investigate. If we forget all knowledge about the composite
object O except the nature of a specimen OS that is part of it, and also know
the present value pj of a property P that applies to OS, we get the state SPj . If
this knowledge is gained at time n, then SC(n) = SPj . If the is no momentary
knowledge of the value of P (and no knowledge of any other property P ′), then
SC =
⋃
j SPj . If forget the very nature of OS we get a state that is the entire
property space P. We assume here that P is an independent attribute that has
two allowed values (for instance the two possible spin directions of an electron).
Then we have V [SP1] = V [SP2], wheras we may have V [S1] 6= V [S2] for the
corresponding (present) alternatives that apply to the entire object O.
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a specimen OS that is a part of O, but do not belong to {POS}. Further, from
a given time n, the knowability level associated with the values of each property
should be 1 or 3, and the knowability level associated with P (F ) should be 3.
We may say that the context C is initiated at time n. This is the time of
no return, after that the properties will be observed in sequence, whether we
like it or not. There may, however, be intermediate unobservable properties in
the sequence, like P in Fig. 3.11(c). The important thing is that there are no
propertes in the sequence that may or may not be observed; the observational
context should correspond to a well-defined experiment.
Definition 3.9 (Contextual state SC of a specimen). Consider a context C
in which P, P ′, . . . , P (F ) are observed in sequence at times n+m,n+m′, . . . , n+
m(F ). Then SC(n
′) is defined for n ≤ n′ ≤ n + m(F ) and corresponds to the
potential knowledge of these properties at time n′, in addition to knowledge about
the values of {POS}.
At time n, before the first property P is observed, we have
SC(n) =
⋃
j
SPj =
⋃
j
SP ′j = . . . =
⋃
j
SP (F )j . (3.40)
When the value of P is observed to be pj at time n + m, the contextual state
reduces to
SC(n+m) = SPj . (3.41)
If P and P ′ are simultaneously knowable (Fig. 3.12), the contextual state
reduces further to
SC(n+m
′) = SPj ∩ SP ′j′ (3.42)
when the value of P ′ is observed to be p′j′ at time n+m
′ > n+m. In contrast,
if P and P ′ are not simultaneously knowable, then we may loose all knowledge
of the value of P at time n+m′, so that
SC(n+m
′) = SP ′j′ . (3.43)
We may, for example, know and remember that the specimen is an electron,
and let P be the spin in the z-direction and P ′ be the spin in another direction
that will be measured subsequently. These state reductions are illustrated in
Fig. 3.17. In general, we see that
SC ⊇ SOS ⊃ SO. (3.44)
Assume that the specimen OS indeed is an electron, for which we have
just measured the spin in the direction defined by the unit vector e¯z. Let the
complete set of alternatives {S′1, S′2} be defined by the possible values −1/2 and
+1/2 in a subsequent measurement of the spin in a direction e¯n that is deflected
15◦ from e¯z. If object O is taken to be the combined apparatus that perform
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Figure 3.17: Sequences of state reductions of the contextual state SC when
properties P and P ′ are observed at times n + m and n + m′, respectively.
The final state SC(n + m
′) depends on whether P and P ′ are simultaneously
knowable or not. Compare Figs. 3.12 and 3.16.
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both spin measurements, the knowledge of the outcome of the first measurement
is encoded in the state of the apparatus before the second measurement takes
place. This encoded knowledge makes it possible to predict which outcome of
the second measurement is more likely. No such knowledge is encoded in the
electron itself, however. This is the distinction expressed in Fig. 3.7. In this
case SC = SOS .
In contrast, if the specimen OS is macroscopic, it is possible to encode its
history in the specimen itself, to mark it in a way that makes it possible to
predict its future property values. Then SC ⊃ SOS .
However, we want to avoid the terms ‘microscopic’ and ‘macroscopic’ since
they are vague. The relevant distinction is that between an object and a qua-
siobject. The property values of a quasiobject (like an electron) can never be
directly perceived, and therefore their history cannot be encoded in the object
itself, but only in the state of its environment from which we deduce the very
existence and the attributes of the quasiobject. This encoding may take place
in the experimental setup, in the object O, or in the memory of a subject, in
the body OB of a experimenter (Fig. 3.15).
Statement 3.15 (No information can be encoded in a permanent qua-
siobject). If the specimen OS in an observational context C is a quasiobject
that is never directly perceived in the time period [n, n+m(F )] during which the
set of observations in C is performed (Definition 3.9), then SOS = SC .
We add the condition of permanence since the quality that an object is a
quasiobject is not absolute; a given identifiable object may be a quasiobject at
some times and be directly perceived at other times (Statement 2.1).
Even if the specimen OS is a directly perceived object, the values of the
property P of interest may not be directly perceivable. We may speak about
‘quasiproperties’. As an example we may take the blood sugar level of a human
being. The physician cannot decide it by just looking at the patient, but must
extract a blood sample an analyze it in an apparatus. The case of blood pressure
is slightly different. To some extent it is possible to deduce it by looking at
the skin color or the veins on the forehead, neck or hands. In other words,
there is conditional knowledge that relates perceivable attributes to the ‘hidden’
property.
Definition 3.10 (Quasiproperty). A property of an object whose values are
not directly perceivable is a quasiproperty if and only if these values are not
related by conditional knowledge to the values of any other directly perceivable
property of the same object.
Statement 3.16 (No information can be encoded in a specimen if only
quasiproperties are observed). If all properties P, P ′, . . . , P (F ) of a specimen
OS that is observed in a context C are quasiproperties, then SOS = SC regardless
whether OS is a quasiobject or not.
After this conceptual digression, we return to the task to develop an algebraic
representation of physical states. The state that we will try to represent is the
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contextual state SC . Assume that P is an independent attribute (Definition
1.19), and that the complete set of future alternatives {S˜j} corresponds to the
set of all values of P that are allowed by physical law. Then there is exactly
one exact state Z for which the value of P is pj for each exact state for which
the value is pi. This is true for each i and j. It follows that V [SPi] = V [SPj ]
for all i, j. If the number of possible property or attribute values is finite and
equals m we may write v[SPj , SC ] = 1/m.
Definition 3.11 (Fundamental property). A property that corresponds to
an individual independent attribute according to Definition 1.19.
Definition 3.12 (Fundamental set of future alternatives). A complete
set {S˜j} of future alternatives defined by the values pj of some property P , such
that there is one alternative S˜j for each property value allowed by physical law.
Definition 3.13 (Fundamental context). An observational context C in
which all involved properties are fundamental, and all sets of future alterna-
tives are fundamental.
It may not be possible to create an observatinal context C such that the
set of future alternatives becomes fundamental. This occurs for example, if the
allowed property values of P form a continuous set. The set of possible outcomes
of an actual observation must form a discrete set because each outcome must
be subjectively distinguishable from all the alternatives that were not realized.
Figure 3.16 illustrates the situation where we have a fundamental set of
(discrete) future alternatives for a fundamental property. For such contextual
states it is meaningless to represent SPj as a schema like that in Eq. [3.22];
all the relative volumes are equal and carry no information. We get, with
vPj ≡ v[SPj , SC ],
S¯C ≡
[
SP1 SP2 . . . SPm
vP1 vP2 . . . vPm
]
=
[
SP1 SP2 . . . SPm
m−1 m−1 . . . m−1
]
↪→ SC .
(3.45)
If we consider a property that is not fundamental, or a set of future alterna-
tives that is not fundamental, the relative volumes vPj need not be the same.
These numbers are nevertheless of no primary interest, since it is the relative
volumes v[Sj , SO] that can be identified with a probability for a perceivable
outcome of an observation. The crucial point is that probability is a measure
that refers to the entire observational context C, not just the specimen OS.
Assume that a mouse is known to be somewhere in a house, and let property
P be its location. Let the value of P be p1 when the mouse is in the bathroom,
and let it be p2 when it is somewhere else in the house. We have V [SP1] <<
V [SP2], since the bathroom is just a small part of the house. In general this
means that it is more likely to find property value p2 than p1.
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The mouse may be very shy however, so that is is very hard to get a glimpse
of it unless you trap it. Assume that you place one mouse trap in the bathroom
and one trap in the cloakroom. Then the probabilities of the outcomes p1 and
p2 are nevertheless roughly the same. In this case the state SO is the state
that corresponds to the knowledge of the house, the mouse and the traps. S1 is
the future alternative that corresponds to finding the mouse in the trap in the
bathroom, and S2 is the alternative in which it is caught in the cloakroom. The
mouse is the specimen, with state SOS . Clearly, the relevant relative volumes
are v[S1, SO] ≈ v[S2, SO] ≈ 1/2, since these are the ones that relates to the
actual observation.
3.4.2 Born’s rule
Instead of Eq. [3.45] we attempt the following, more meaningful representation
S¯C =
[
SP1 SP2 . . . SPm
a1 a2 . . . am
]
, (3.46)
where the numbers aj are related in some as yet undetermined way to the
relative volumes vj of the future alternatives S˜j , and thus to the probability to
find property value pj in an actual observation within the context C. In other
words, the numbers aj are contextual, referring not primarily to the contextual
‘naked’ state SC of the specimen OS that we investigate, but to the state of the
entire experimental setup O, of which the specimen is just a small part. The
state of this setup may carry information about the past and present state of
the specimen that is not carried by the specimen itself, as discussed above. And
this information may be crucial to determine the probability to find property
value pj .
The purpose of the state representation S¯C is to strip the state SO of every-
thing irrelevant. S¯C represents, via the states SPj , just the possible property
values that are about to be observed, and also aims to make it possible to cal-
culate the probability to see these property values via the contextual numbers
aj . Therefore, S¯C is just a partial representation of SO:
S¯C ⇀ SO. (3.47)
This means that different contexts C and C ′ with different initial states SO and
SO′ may have the same representation of its contextual state: S¯C ⇀ SO and
S¯C ⇀ SO′ , or S¯C = S¯C′ . In contrast, S¯C is a complete representation of SC , that
is S¯C ↪→ SC . In fact, the representation is over-determined. As discussed above,
it represents knowledge about the state of macroscopic experimental apparatus
OA apart from knowledge about the specimen OS. This means that the same
state SC may have different representations S¯C ↪→ SC and S¯′C ↪→ SC , depending
on its experimental environment. For example, in the two cases where we aim
to observe the value of properties P and P ′, respectively, we may write
S¯C =
[
SP1 SP2
a1 a2
]
, S¯C′ =
[
SP ′1 SP ′2
a′1 a
′
2
]
, (3.48)
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Figure 3.18: The contextual states SC and SC′ in two observational contexts
aimed to measure the values of properties P and P ′, respectively, together with
the corresponding property values states SPj and SP ′j . We have SC = SC′ , but
the corresponding states S¯C and S¯C′ defined within context may differ.
as illustrated in Fig. 3.18. Even if SC = SC′ since these sets cover the same
subset of state space, in general we have S¯C 6= S¯C′ , since the sets of numbers
{aj} and {aj′} may be different.
Let us leave the conceptual and notational subtleties aside. To fulfil the task
of S¯C to make it possible to calculate probabilities, a given set of numbers {aj}
must correspond to a single set of relative volumes {vj}, and thus to a given set
of probabilities {qj}. That is, we require
{vj} = f({aj}). (3.49)
Of course, SC can still be seen as a legitimate state of an object (the specimen),
and can therefore be represented by the schema [3.22] using relative volumes vj
rather than by the schema [3.46] using numbers aj . This situation occurs when
all knowledge of the context dissipates, so that SO grows to fill the entire state
SC (Fig. 3.16). To make these two representations consistent we require
vj = f(aj). (3.50)
There is no need to require a priori that the function f is invertible, given
the purpose of the representation [3.46] that we seek, which is to keep track of
property values and probabilities.
To do so, we want to be free to do algebraic manipulations in the corre-
sponding representation
S¯C = a1S¯P1 + a2S¯P2 + . . . amS¯Pm. (3.51)
We concluded above that the distributive law [3.36] holds in the analogous
representation [3.32] of future alternatives and relative volumes. We seek a
function f(aj) that makes it possible to uphold the same distributive law for
the numbers aj in the representation [3.51], as well as a distributive law for the
property value states:
3.4. THE POSTULATES OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 211
ax(ay + az)S¯Pj = (axay + axaz)S¯Pj ,
(ax + ay)S¯Pj = axS¯Pj + ayS¯Pj .
(3.52)
The bars put above the states SPj are introduced just to close the notation,
so that we get objects of the same type at both sides of the equality in equations
like Eq. [3.51], and thus are free to perform the desired algebraic manipulations.
We also want to define a contextual evolution operator uC whose represen-
tation is linear, just like the ordinary evolution operator u¯1 becomes linear in
the analogous representation [3.32] according to Eq. [3.37]:
u¯C S¯C = a1u¯C S¯P1 + a2u¯C S¯P2 + . . . amu¯C S¯Pm. (3.53)
The evolution of S¯C depends on the entire experimental setup O and its
evolution. We may define a contextual evolution operator such that u¯C S¯C(n)
is a proper representation of the contextual state just before the observation of
property P at time n + m. That is, the temporal update n + m − 1 → n + m
corresponds to a state reduction
uCSC(n)→ SC(n+m) ⊂ uCSC(n), (3.54)
where uC = uC [SO(n), SOB ]. Similarly, u¯C S¯C(n+m) is a proper representation
of the contextual state just before the observation of property P ′ at time n+m′,
so that the temporal update n+m′−1→ n+m′ corresponds to a state reduction
uCSC(n+m)→ SC(n+m′) ⊂ uCSC(n+m). (3.55)
Equations [3.50], [3.52], and [3.53] express three desiderata that the formal
representation [3.51] should fulfill. To make such a representation useful, it
should also be generally applicable. It should be possible to use same function
f(aj) regardless the details of the context. It should not matter how many prop-
erties we observe in succession, or their knowability level. These four conditions
taken together make it possible to motivate a specific form of the function f(aj),
as we will now see.
Consider Fig. 3.19. As usual, the observational context is assumed to be
initiated at time n, and properties P and P ′ attain their values at times n+m
and n + m′, respectively (Definitions 3.8 and 3.9). We use the vague phrase
‘attain their values’ rather than ‘are observed’, since we allow for the case where
P has knowability level 1 (Table 2.1).
Consider first the case where property P has knowability level 3 [Fig. 3.19(a)].
A state reduction takes place at time n+m, at which value p1 or p2 is revealed:
S¯C(n+m) = S¯Pj (3.56)
for j = 1 or j = 2. If the probabilities q1 and q2 of these alternatives are defined,
we have qj = vj = f(aj). At time n+m
′ a second state reduction takes place,
at which the value of P ′ is revealed. The state that reduces is
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Figure 3.19: The evolution in the setup depicted in Fig. 3.11 in terms of the
contextual state SC and the property value states SPj . Panel a) shows the case
in which properties P and P ′ both have knowability level 3, and the values p1
and p′1 are realized in succession. Panel b) shows the case in which property
P has knowability level 1. Again, property P ′ has knowability level 3, and the
value p′1 is realized.
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u¯C S¯C(n+m) =
[
SPP ′j1 SPP ′j2
aj1 aj2
]
(3.57)
for j = 1 or j = 2, where
SPP ′jk ≡ SPj ∩ SP ′k. (3.58)
If the probabilities q′1 and q
′
2 in this second set of alternatives are also defined,
we get
q′k = f(a1)f(a1k) + f(a2)f(a2k) (3.59)
according to the classical axioms of probability.
Consider now the case where property P has knowability level 1 [Fig. 3.19(b)].
At time n + m we know (contextually) that P has attained value p1 or p2 but
it is forever outside potential knowledge which of these values apply. No state
reduction occurs, but epistemic completeness (assumption 1.13) requires that
we somehow account for the knowledge that ‘one of the two alternatives has
occurred’ in the representation of the contextual state. Most natural is to do it
by writing
S¯C(n+m) = S¯C(n) =
[
SC1 SC2
a1 a2
]
, (3.60)
where SC1 and SC2 are two hypothetical contextual states that would have
applied if the corresponding alternative had occurred. At time n + m′ a state
reduction does finally take place. The state that reduces is
u¯C S¯C(n+m) =
[
uCSC1 uCSC2
a1 a2
]
, (3.61)
according to the linearity of uC in the formal algebraic representation (Eq.
[3.53]. We should write
u¯C S¯Cj =
[
SP ′1 SP ′2
aj1 aj2
]
. (3.62)
These expressions are different from Eq. [3.57], since in the present case we
have no knowledge about the value of P after the final state reduction within
context.
Let us express these relations in the formal algebraical representation, and
manipulate them by making use of the algebraic rules [3.50], [3.52], and [3.53]
that this representation is supposed to fulfill. Consider first the case where both
properties P and P ′ have knowability level 3. In the sequence of events shown
in Fig. 3.19(a):
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S¯C(n) = a1S¯P1 + a2S¯P2
u¯C S¯C(n) = a1S¯P1 + a2S¯P2
S¯C(n+m) = S¯Pj
u¯C S¯C(n+m) = aj1S¯PP ′j1 + aj2S¯PP ′j2
S¯C(n+m
′) = S¯PP ′jk.
(3.63)
Consider next the case where property P haw knowability level 1 [Fig.
3.19(b)]. Just like in the previous case we get
S¯C(n) = a1S¯P1 + a2S¯P2
u¯C S¯C(n) = a1S¯P1 + a2S¯P2.
(3.64)
However,
S¯C(n+m) = a1S¯C1(n+m) + a2S¯C2(n+m), (3.65)
and
u¯C S¯C(n+m) = a1u¯C S¯C1(n+m) + a2u¯C S¯C2(n+m)
= a1(a11S¯P ′1 + a12S¯P ′2) + a2(a21S¯P ′1 + a22S¯P ′2)
= (a1a11 + a2a21)S¯P ′1 + (a1a12 + a2a22)S¯P ′2,
(3.66)
where we have used Eq. [3.52] in the final equality. Finally,
S¯C(n+m
′) = S¯P ′k. (3.67)
Equation [3.66] means that the probability that the evolved contextual state
uCSC(n+m) will reduce to SP ′1 is f(a1a11 +a2a21), and the probability that it
will reduce to SP ′2 is f(a1a12 + a2a22), provided that these probabilities exist.
In short,
q′k = f(a1a1k + a2a2k). (3.68)
We argued in Section 1.20 that we should not treat the case where the value
of property P is unknowable as if we can actually know it. According to the
principle of explicit epistemic minimalism (Assumption 1.19) we get the wrong
answers if we do. In the present sitution this means that the probability [3.68]
must be different than in the case [3.59] where the value of P becomes known,
and can sometimes be associated with a probability qj . That is,
f(a1a1k + a2a2k) 6= f(a1)f(a1k) + f(a2)f(a2k). (3.69)
We may put the reason why different equations must hold in the two cases
another way, as a consequence of epistemic completeness (Assumption 1.13).
The fundamental epistemic distinction between knowability levels 1 and 3 must
correspond to a distinction in physical law. Such a distinction can be expressed
only if different equations hold for the probabilities of the values of P ′. To fulfill
this condition we must require that
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f(a) 6= a. (3.70)
Given this fact, let us discuss which other functions f are possible in Eq.
[3.50]. All relative volumes of a complete set of future alternatives add to one.
We get the conditions
1 = f(a1) + f(a2)
1 = f(a11) + f(a12)
1 = f(a21) + f(a22)
1 = f(a1a11 + a2a21) + f(a1a12 + a2a22)
(3.71)
Since f(a) corresponds to a relative volume, we must also require
0 ≤ f(a) ≤ 1 (3.72)
for all a in the domain of f . To determine f from these conditions we make use
of the assumption that the parts of the observational context O that correspond
to properties P and P ′ can be arranged independently from each other.
One way to express this fact is to say that the parameters describing the
experimental setup that determine the mode of observation of property P ′ are
independent from the corresponding parameters that determine the mode of
observation of property P . If both P and P ′ have knowability level 3 (Table
2.1), then this vague statement can be translated to a statement about relative
volumes.
Statement 3.17 (Relative volume independence). Consider the set {C}
of all observational contexts C with a given sequence . . . , P, P ′, . . . of observed
properties where P and P ′ have knowability level 3, and with given sets of pos-
sible values . . . , {pj}, {p′k}, . . .. There are enough elements C in in {C} so that
the relative volumes {vjk} that describe the measurement of property P ′ can be
chosen independently from the relative volumes {vj} that describe a preceding
measurement of P .
This statement is quite trivial and follows from the fact that the only con-
dition that the relative volumes has to fulfil a priori is that they add to one:
1 =
∑
j vj and 1 =
∑
k vjk. These relations do not mix relative volumes belong-
ing to {vj} with those belonging to {vjk}. Therefore relative volumes associated
with a property P are independent from those associated with another property
P ′.
If the values of property P are unknowable, then we must generalize the
above statement to account for the fact that the relative volumes {vjk} may not
be knowable either, since they do not correspond to a probability q(p′k|pj) that
is possible to determine by repeating the experiment a large number of times.
Nevertheless, {vjk} can still be formally defined in those cases, as
vjk = f(ajk) =
V [u1SO(n+m
′ − 1) ∩ P˜j ∩ P˜ ′k]
V [u1SO(n+m′ − 1) ∩ P˜j ]
. (3.73)
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However, in a strict epistemic approach we should not refer to potentially un-
knowable quantities in a physical statement about the independence of the prop-
erties P and P ′, just as we do not refer directly to the exact states Z when we
make statements about the evolution u1 of the physical state S. A more general
version of Statement 3.17 is then the following, which must now be seen as an
assumption, since it cannot be motivated in the same straightforward way.
Assumption 3.2 (Property independence). Consider the set {C} of all
possible observational contexts C with a given sequence . . . , P, P ′, . . . of observed
properties where P ′ has knowability level 3, and with given sets of possible values
. . . , {pj}, {p′k}, . . .. Let {αj} be a set of knowable property values that describe
the part of the observational setup that is related to the observation of P , and
let {α′k} be a corresponding set relating to P ′. Suppose that these parameter sets
are minimal in the sense that they determine the probability q′k to get the value
p′k for each k, so that we may write {q′k} = f({αj}, {α′k}), but if we take away
one parameter αj or α
′
k this is no longer true. Then there are enough elements
C in {C} so that {αj} can be chosen independently from {α′k}.
If property P has knowability level 3, we can choose {αj} = {vj} and
{αk} = {vjk}, and we regain Statement 3.17. These sets are minimal since
q′k =
∑
j vjvjk for each k, but we cannot take away any element from these sets
and still determine all probabilities q′k.
We may ask how many elements are contained in the two minimal sets of
independent parameters {αj} and {α′k} that pertain to properties P and P ′,
respectively. Suppose that there are M and N possible values of these properties
in the context C. There is then M − 1 independent values of vj and M(N − 1)
independent values of vjk, taking into account the relations 1 =
∑
j vj and
1 =
∑
k vjk. These numbers give the requested number of elements in {αj}
and {α′k} if both P and P ′ have knowability level 3, since then we can choose
{αj} = {vj} and {αk} = {vjk}. We may argue that the amount of freedom to
choose the experimental setup should never be less than in this case.
Assumption 3.3 (Experimental freedom). Consider the set {C} of all pos-
sible observational contexts C with a given sequence . . . , P, P ′, . . . of observed
properties where P ′ has knowability level 3, and with given sets of possible val-
ues . . . , {pj}, {p′k}, . . .. Suppose that {pj} and {p′k} contain M and N values,
respectively. Then the sets of independent parameters {αj} and {α′k}, as defined
in Assumption 3.2, contain at least M − 1 and M(N − 1) values, respectively.
If we add the numbers M−1 and M(N−1) we conclude that there is always
at least MN − 1 free parameters to describe the observations of P and P ′.
We look for a function f(a) such that the numbers aj and ajk can always be
used to parametrize the necessary level of experimental freedom, just as vj and
vjk can in the cases where both P and P
′ have knowability level 3. Otherwise
the algebraic representation S¯C of the contextual state becomes useless, since it
cannot be used to calculate probabilities for the possible outcomes in all kinds
of experiments. The whole point of the search for f(a) is that we should find a
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function that makes the form of the representation [3.51] generally applicable,
regardless the number of observed properties, their knowability level, and their
sets of possible values. This means that we should be able to write
{αj} = F ({aj})
{α′k} = F ′({ajk}).
(3.74)
It then follows from property independence that f(a) is also such that the
elements in {aj} and {ajk} can be chosen independently.
If both P and P ′ have knowability level 3 [Fig. 3.19(a)] we could identify
{αj} = {vj} and {α′k} = {vjk} with the independent parameter sets introduced
in Assumption 3.2. We cannot in general do the corresponding identifications
{αj} = {aj} and {α′k} = {ajk}. The parameters αj and αk are defined in
Assumption 3.2 as values of properties that define the design of the observational
context C, which must be assumed to be known a priori. This means that they
should not only be knowable, but already known at the start of the experiment
at time n. In contrast, the relative volumes vj and vjk, as well as the numbers
aj and ajk may be unknowable in principle when it is unknowable which value
of P is attained, when this property has knowability level 1. In that case the
functions F and F ′ in Eq. [3.74] are unknowable, even though it is known that
they exist.
The assumptions 3.2 and 3.3 make it possible to pinpoint a single acceptable
function f(a), given the other requirements discussed above.
We note first, however, that if properties P and P ′ both have knowabil-
ity 3 within context, then any function f(a) will do. In that case property
independence and experimental freedom is automatically fulfilled. The fourth
condition in Eq. 3.71 is replaced by 1 = q′1 + q
′
2 = f(a1)f(a11) + f(a2)f(a21) +
f(a1)f(a12) + f(a2)f(a22) according to the classical axioms of probability (see
Eq. [3.59]). This condition follows from the first three conditions in Eq. [3.71],
and is therefore not independent. This circumstance accounts for the fact that
no restriction on f(a) can be derived.
In what follows, we therefore focus on the case where P has knowablity
level 1 and P ′ has knowability level 3. We will see that the existence of the
fourth condition in Eq. [3.71] is crucial, together with the requirement that
the representation allows experimental freedom. Let us first make a general
observation.
Statement 3.18 (We must allow complex a). No function f : R→ R such
that f(a) 6= a fulfils conditions [3.71], and can also be used to parametrize the
necessary level of experimental freedom (Assumption 3.3).
If all ax are restricted to be real and f(a) 6= a, we have four conditions in
Eq. [3.71] that relate six real numbers a1, a2, a11, a12, a21 and a22. In that case
two independent real parameters are sufficient determine the probabilities q′k,
whereas experimental freedom (Assumption 3.3) requires that at least MN−1 =
3 are necessary, since M = N = 2.
This consideration applies to the simple observational context with only two
possible values for P as well as for P ′. Figure 3.20 shows how one can visualize
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more complex situations with M possible values of P and N possible values of
P ′. Since we seek a function f and numbers a that apply generally, the fact that
a restriction to real numers is impossible in the simplest context means that we
must allow complex numbers.
One could try to identify the quantities ax with members of another collec-
tion (ring) of mathematical objects than the complex numbers (requiring that
addition and multiplication is defined and yield another member of the same
collection). We might, for example, consider vectors of three real numbers, or
matrices. The discussion below will show, however, that nothing is gained in
terms of property independence (Assumption 3.2) if we use more complicated
mathematical objects than complex numbers, objects defined by more than two
real numbers.
Thus, we assume that f : C → R. We may then write v = f(a) = g(x, y),
where a = x + iy and g : R2 → R. We then ask which functions g(x, y)
fulfil the requirements expressed in Eqs. [3.70], [3.71], and [3.72], as well as
property independence and experimental freedom (Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3).
We argue without proof that the only function that does the job is g(x, y) =
x2 +y2, that is, f(a) = |a|2. This can be seen by inserting the Taylor expansion
g(x, y) =
∑∞
m,n=0 dmnx
myn into Eq. [3.71] and check in what cases property
independence and experimental freedom can be upheld. The general expressions
become messy, but the lesson is that more terms and higher exponents make it
impossible to comply with these assumptions if we insist on fulfilling the other
requirements. We take a shortcut through this mess by arguing that f(a) should
fulfil one additional condition, which makes the argument why f(a) = |a|2 is
the only possible choice much easier.
If we write the evolution of the contextual state representation S¯C sequen-
tially in the case where both P and P ′ have knowability level 3 (Fig. 3.19(a))
we get Eq. [3.63]. The probability qjk to see the property values pj and p
′
k
becomes qjk = f(aj)f(ajk). However, we may also regard (P, P
′) as one single
property with values (pj , p
′
k). This value is decided at time n + m
′. We may
therefore write
u¯C S¯C(n+m) = a1a11S¯PP ′11+a1a12S¯PP ′12+a2a21S¯PP ′21+a2a22S¯PP ′22. (3.75)
In this way we see that qjk = f(ajajk). Thus the function f(a) must also fulfil
f(axay) = f(ax)f(ay). (3.76)
There are only two operations on a pair of complex numbers that have this
property, namely complex conjugation and exponentiation. That is, we must
have f(a) = (a∗)man. Since f(a) is real we hve to require m = n, so that
f(a) = |a|2n, (3.77)
where n is a positive integer.
Let us check first that the choice f(a) = |a|2 is acceptable, as claimed. We
start by considering the simple case where property P has knowability level 1,
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and P ′ has knowability level 3, and there are two possible values for each of
these properties (Figs. 3.19(a) and 3.20(a)). Inserting the ansatz in Eq. [3.71]
we get
1 = |a1|2 + |a2|2
1 = |a11|2 + |a12|2
1 = |a21|2 + |a22|2
0 = a1a
∗
2(a11a
∗
21 + a12a
∗
22)+
a∗1a2(a
∗
11a21 + a
∗
12a22).
(3.78)
Suppose that a given choice {aj} and {ajk} satisfies the last equation. Property
independence (Assumption 3.2) then means that we should be allowed to vary
{ajk} freely for the given choice of {aj}, or vice versa, and the equality would
still hold. To make this possible we must require that the following relation is
always fulfilled.
0 = a11a
∗
21 + a12a
∗
22. (3.79)
This relation corresponds to two equations that relate the eight real parame-
ters in the set {xjk, yjk}. The second and third lines in Eq. [3.78] give two more
conditions, so that we have four free parameters that are related to the setup to
measure the value of P ′. The necessary minimum number of free parameters is
two according to Assumption 3.3. All in all, we get five equations relating ten
real parameters {xj , yj} and {xjk, yjk}. This means that five free parameters
are left to specify the probabilities, whereas the minimum possible number is
three in order to respect experimental freedom. We conclude that the choice
f(a) = |a|2 for complex a is acceptable in experimental contexts involving two
properties P and P ′ with two possible values each.
Let us next try f(a) = |a|4. If we require property independence, we get
the following conditions that relate the numbers ajk, describing the setup to
measure property P ′:
0 = a11a21a
∗
21a
∗
21 + a12a22a
∗
22a
∗
22
0 = a11a11a
∗
21a
∗
21 + a12a12a
∗
22a
∗
22
0 = a11a
∗
11a21a
∗
21 + a12a
∗
12a22a
∗
22
0 = a11a11a
∗
11a
∗
21 + a12a12a
∗
12a
∗
22
(3.80)
These relations should be compared to the corresponding Eq. [3.79] that holds
for f(a) = |a|2. They correspond to eight conditions that relate the eight real
parameters in the set {xij , yij}. The second and third lines in Eq. [3.78] give
two more conditions, so that we have ten independent conditions, preventing
any solution at all with property independence. Thus the choice f(a) = |a|4 for
complex a is not acceptable.
It is easy too see that the higher exponent n is used in Eq. [3.77], the
more independent conditions like those in Eq. [3.80] appear when we demand
property independence. This fact spoils all chances to get any solution at all
for n > 1. Having concluded in this way that f(a) = |a|2 is therefore the only
acceptable choice in the simple situation with two properties P and P ′ with two
220 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
property values each, we must also check that it is acceptable in more complex
situations with more than two properties that can take more than two values.
Figure 3.20 shows some of the simplest of these more complex cases. Se-
quential time n flows upwards in these diagrams, so that the order in which the
values of properties P , P ′ and P ′′ occur is assumed to be known a priori. Each
circle represents an ‘event’ defined by the occurrence of property value px. The
contextual numbers ax encapsulate the relative volume of the event at the end
point of the associated arrow given the event at the starting point. If this latter
event is knowable (if the corresponding property has knowability level 3), this
relative volume may correspond to a probability for the event at the end point
of the arrow given the event at the starting point.
The context depicted in Fig. 3.20(b) gives rise to the following relation
for the numbers ajk when P has knowability level 1, and we require property
independence (compare Eq. [3.79]):
0 = a11a
∗
21 + a12a
∗
22 + a13a
∗
23. (3.81)
This relation corresponds to two conditions that relate twelve real parameters.
The equations that correspond to the requirement 1 =
∑
j vjk give three more
conditions, so that we have left seven independent real parameters describing the
setup to measure property P ′. This is more than enough to fulfil experimental
freedom.
If we have more than two properties with possible property values each that
are observed in succession, we get a new set of relation of the type in Eqs.
[3.79] and [3.81] for each such property at knowability level 1 when we demand
property independence. For the context in Fig. 3.20(c) we get
0 = a11a
∗
21 + a12a
∗
22
0 = a′11(a
′
21)
∗ + a′12(a
′
22)
∗. (3.82)
It is easily understood that experimental freedom is respected in cases such as
that as well. If we have more than two possible values of P , we also get more
than one relation of the same type when property independence is required. For
the context in Fig. 3.20(d) we get
0 = a11a
∗
21 + a12a
∗
22
0 = a11a
∗
31 + a12a
∗
32
0 = a21a
∗
31 + a22a
∗
32.
(3.83)
Here we have six conditions relating twelve real parameters. The requirement
1 =
∑
j vjk gives three conditions more. Thus we are left with three real pa-
rameters which equals the minimum number M(N − 1) needed to respect ex-
perimental freedom (Assumption 3.3). Here we are approaching a problem. If
we increase the number of possible values M of P from three to four, and still
have N = 2 possible values of P ′, we get six relations of the type in Eq. [3.83].
This means twelve conditions relating sixteen real parameters. The requirement
1 =
∑
j vjk gives four conditiions more, so that we have at most a unique so-
lution {ajk} when we demand property independence. Experimental freedom
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Figure 3.20: Observational contexts depicted as ‘networks of alternatives’. The
nodes at each row correspond to the values of a given property that are possible
in the given context. The numbers ax are seen as relations between the possible
values of sequentially realized properties. Time flows upwards, as indicated by
the directed edges. The context in panel a) is the one shown in 3.11. In more
complex contexts, the visual representation introduced here is easier to interpret.
We do not distinguish graphically between different knowability levels in this
figure, but this can, of course, be accomplished by marking the nodes or the
edges in different ways.
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is obviously not respected. This problem arises when M > N , and gets worse
when M −N gets bigger.
Does this mean that there are contexts in which the choice f(a) = |a|2 is
not acceptable, so that we fail in the search for a function f(a) that makes the
representation [3.51] generally applicable? No, we are saved by a trick, by a bit
of sophistry, by the elusive relation between the numbers ajk and the tangible
physical properties that describe the experiment. We may simply regard the
set of contexts in which M > N as contexts in which M = N where the set of
probabilities {q′N+1, q′N+2, . . . , q′M} to see the last M −N values of property P ′
are set to zero. In such contexts we regain the necessary experimental freedom
(Assumption 3.3) that should be reflected in the representation. This is so
since we add M(M −N) numbers ajk, corresponding to 2M(M −N) new real
parameters, while we only add M −N conditions that relate all real parameters
that occur in the representation, corresponding to q′N+1 = q
′
N+2 = . . . = q
′
M =
0.
We may argue that we should also set all corresponding relative volumes
vj(N+1), vj(N+2), . . . , vjM and numbers aj(N+1), aj(N+2), . . . , ajM to zero, in or-
der to really erase the ghostly presence of the imagined extra M −N values of
property P ′. If we do this, the point of the trick is lost, since then we introduce
as many new real parameters as we introdude conditions relating them. The
degree of experimental freedom in the representation does not increase.
However, the procedure to add hypothetical values to P is needed only when
the knowability level of P is 1, when the value this property attains is forever
unknowable. In that case ajk and vjk are also unknowable in principle. (To
determine vjk would mean to repeat the experiment many times until the con-
ditional probability q(p′k|pj) is determined. But this would require that we know
in which repetitions the value pj of P was attained.) Therefore we should not
refer to ajk or vjk explicitly when we demand that the context is not physically
arranged so that imagined new values of P ′ are observable. That would go
against explicit epistemic minimalism (Assumption 1.19). We should only refer
to the knowable final probabilities q(p′k) = q
′
k.
If, on the other hand, P has knowability level 3, just as P ′, then it is equiva-
lent to demand that q′k = 0 and to demand that q(p
′
k|pj) = vjk = f(ajk) = 0 for
all j. We may introduce imagined values of P and erase them again by setting
the relevant probablities or relative volumes to zero, but there is absolutely no
point to it - nothing changes in the representation.
Statement 3.19 (Born’s rule). Consider the formal algebraic representation
[3.51] of the contextual state SC , where the relative volume vj of the correspond-
ing future alternative S˜j is given by vj = f(aj). A generally applicable choice of
function f(a) is such that it makes this representation fulfil the distributive laws
[3.52] in all observational contexts C (Definition 3.8), as well as the linearity of
evolution [3.53]. Such a choice should also make sure that the representation re-
spects explicit epistemic minimalism (Assumption 1.19) in all contexts, and also
expresses property independence (Assumption 3.2) as well as the necessary de-
gree of experimental freedom (Assumption 3.3). The choice f(a) = |a|2, where
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f : C → R, is generally applicable in this sense, and it is the only generally
applicable choice.
3.4.3 Contexts and Hilbert spaces
The form of relations [3.79], [3.81], [3.82], and [3.83] resembles that of inner
products in a vector space. We may treat them as actual Hermitian inner
products in a complex vector space if we formally define the orthonormality
relation
δij = 〈S¯Pi, S¯Pj〉, (3.84)
where δij is the Kronecker delta. Then the condition [3.79] translates to
0 = a11a
∗
21 + a12a
∗
22
= 〈a11S¯P ′1 + a12S¯P ′2, a21S¯P ′1 + a22S¯P ′2〉
= 〈u¯C S¯C1, u¯C S¯C2〉
(3.85)
Consider the general case where a property P at knowability level 1, with
an arbitrary number of possible values, is observed before another property P ′,
which also has an arbitrary number of possible values. Then the conditions
corresponding corresponding to Eq. [3.79] can be collapsed to the relation
∀ij : δij = 〈u¯C S¯Ci, u¯C S¯Cj〉. (3.86)
The conditions of the form [3.79] arose because we required that the rep-
resentation [3.51] should be able to express property independence. Therefore
the orthonormality relation [3.86] can be seen as a consequence of this require-
ment. In words, the hypothetical contextual state representations S¯Cj that
would have applied if we knew the value of P are orthogonal to each other, and
stay orthogonal as they evolve according to u¯C .
Let us focus again on the basic context in Fig. 3.20(a). We see that we have
now developed three ways to describe the same situation, as shown in Fig. 3.21.
We have the familiar state space description, the description as a network of
alternatives, and now we also have a description in terms of a complex vector
space, which we may call HC . It is sufficient to choose a two-dimensional vector
space, in which case the orthonormality relations [3.84] and [3.86] implies that
the contextual states SC and property value states SPj become elements or
normalized vectors S¯C and S¯Pj in this space [Fig. 3.21(c)].
Since the numbers ax are contextual, so is the entire vector space HC . More
precisely, it is defined only within an observational context C, as introduced in
Defintion 3.8.
In a general context where there are more than two possible values of some
property, or there are more than two properties that will be realized in succes-
sion, the smallest possible dimension DH of HC will be larger than two, and the
property value states SPj do not necessarily correspond to elements of HC , but
should be interpreted more generally as orthogonal subspaces. Suppose that we
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Figure 3.21: Three representations of an observational context in three spaces.
Compare Figs. 3.11 and 3.20.
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are dealing with two properties P and P ′ with M and N possible values, respec-
tively. If P has knowability level 1 and P ′ has level 3, we need the dimension
DH = max{M,N} to describe the context. If both P and P ′ has knowability
level 3 and are simultaneously knowable, we need the dimension DH = M ×N .
Let us analyze and generalize these statements. We start with the case where
there are one or more property at knowability level 1, before the final observation
of P (F ) is made. Since Eq. [3.84] should hold for all pairs of property value
states SPi and SPj associated with any property P that is part of the context, we
need to have DH ≥ Mmax ≡ max{M,M ′, . . . ,M (F )}, where M is the number
of possible values of property P . This is necessary since we want to embed
all sets of orthogonal subspaces {S¯Pj}, {S¯′Pj}, . . . , {S¯(F )Pj } in the same vector
space HC that is supposed to describe the entire context, not just a particular
property. Let P be a property that is part of the context and has Mmax possible
values. Without loss of generality, we can choose the dimension of the associated
subspaces S¯Pj as small as possible, that is, let them be normalized vectors. In
other words we may choose DH = Mmax.
We may define the property space S¯P as follows.
S¯P = ⊕jS¯Pj (3.87)
According to the above discussion the dimension of such a property spaces is
equal to or less than the dimension of the vector spaceHC itself in the case where
there are one or more property at knowability level 1. That is, DSP ≤ DH . The
situation is different when all properties have knowability level 3. Then we must
require DS¯P = DS¯P ′ = DS¯(F )P
= DH for all properties P, P
′, . . . , P (F ) that are
observed within context, as we will discuss below.
Generally speaking, if we try to identify the property value state SPj with
a subspace of a complex vector space, the dimension of S¯Pj must be at least as
large as the number of distinct outcomes there are from the context in which the
value of P is known to be pj . Referring to the principle of epistemic minimalism,
the dimension should not be greater than the number of such distinct outcomes
either. That would introduce a redundancy of description, since such formal
degrees of freedom would have no epistemic counterpart.
The reasonable description is then to identify each possible state of final
potential knowledge with a vector in HC that is perpendicular to all other
such vectors, which correspond to the other possible states of final potential
knowledge. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 3.22(a), where we have two
properties P and P ′ at knowability level 3 with M = 2 and M ′ = 3, giving
six distinct outcomes from the context as a whole, represented by the sets Sij .
We then let these sets correspond to perpendicular vectors, that is, 〈S¯ij , S¯kl〉 =
δ(ij),(kl).
The dimension of S¯P1 and S¯P2 is three, since there are three possible final
states for each value of P , and the dimension of S¯P ′1, S¯P ′2 and S¯P ′3 is two,
since there are two possible final states for each value of P ′. We may write
S¯Pi = ⊕DH/Mj=1 S¯ij and S¯P ′j = ⊕DH/M
′
i=1 S¯ij . This is illustrated in Fig. 3.22(b).
Equation [3.87] holds also in the present case where all involved properties have
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Figure 3.22: In a context with two simultaneously knowable properties P and
P ′ at knowability level 3, we must choose a vector space with dimension DH =
M×M ′. In this example we get DH = 2×3 = 6. The property value spaces S¯Pi
and S¯P ′j become subspaces rather than vectors. In this case we get D[S¯Pi] = 3
and D[S¯P ′j ] = 2 (panel b). The observation of the value of P corresponds to a
projection of the contextual state representation S¯C down to S¯Pi (panel c). The
subsequent observation of the value of P ′ corresponds to a further projection
down to a vector S¯ij , which corresponds to one of the six compartments in state
space shown in panel a).
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knowability level 3, so that both property spaces S¯P and S¯P ′ span the entire
vector space HC , implying DH = DS¯P = DS¯P ′ .
In this vector space picture, the observation of the value pj of property P
corresponds to a projection of the contextual state vector onto the subspace
S¯Pi, and the subsequent observation of value p
′
j of property P
′ corresponds to
a further projection down onto the line defined by the vector S¯ij . This process
is illustrated in Fig. 3.22(c).
The above description is straightforwardly generalized to contexts with an
arbitrary number of properties at knowability level 3, each having an arbitrary
number of possible values. We get DH = M × M ′ × . . . × M (F ), and each
subseqent observation of property values correspond to successive projections
onto smaller and smaller subspaces of HC , until the state is described by one
of the normalized vectors that correspond to one of the distinct final states
Sii′...i(F ) . Each property space S¯P spans the entire context space HC , implying
DH = DS¯P = DS¯P ′ = . . . DS¯P (F )
. Further, each property value space S¯Pj
is perpendicular to all other property value spaces associated with the same
property, meaning that 〈v¯i, v¯j〉 = 0 whenever v¯i ∈ S¯Pi, v¯j ∈ S¯Pj , and i 6= j.
A guiding principle for choosing the dimension DH of the vector space HC
has been that two states that are subjectively distinguishable, and both may
occur at a given future time, should be represented by two perpendicular vectors
in HC whenever the context C describes the possible states at this future time.
To avoid formal redundancy with epistemic basis, DH is chosen as the smallest
dimension for which this principle is fulfilled.
z
These considerations may also be applied to contexts in which we have two
properties P and P ′ that both have knowability level 3, but are not simultane-
ously knowable. Say that there are two possible values of each property, like in
Fig. 3.20(a). Since they both have knowability level 3, one may argue that we
should choose DH = M ×M ′ = 4. However, since there is no final outcome in
which the state is one of the four possible property value combinations, it suf-
ficient to let DH = max{M,M ′} = 2. This is the maximum number of degrees
of freedom in terms of alternatives at any given time n.
Let us see if we can fit contexts with a sequence of such observations into the
vector space formalism. However, before we do, let us consider the combined
property space PP ′ of two such properties. Having set this abstract stage, it
will be easier to see how to handle actual observations.
For the sake of illustration, we will focus mainly on the case M = M ′ = 2,
that is, we consider one property P with a set of possible values {p1, p2}, and one
property P ′ with a set of possible values {p′1, p′2}. Unfortunately, the reasoning
does not generalize straightaway to situations in which M = M ′ > 2. In due
course we will return to these cases. In the meantime, the reader should take
note that some statements only apply when M = M ′ = 2.
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Figure 3.23: Relation between the state space and vector space representation
of two properties P and P ′ that are not simultaneously knowable. P and P ′ are
assumed to have two possible values each. (a) The region of state space enclosed
by the dashed curve is the set in which both P and P ′ are defined. When the
tilted line associated with P ′ is rotated to the left, so that P and P ′ become
‘more different’, the corresponding basis in the vector space is also rotated, but
only half the angle. We assume that the properties P and P ′ are fundamental
(Definition 3.11) so that the state space volumes at each side of the horizontal
line are equal, as well as the volumes at each side of the tilted line. (b) This
fact implies that v
(P )
ij = v
(P )
ji and v
(P )
ii = v
(P )
jj , making it possible to represent
the property value spaces associated with P and P ′ as two orthonormal bases
in a vector space.
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Statement 3.20 (Equipartition of property space). Let v[Pj ] = V [Pj ]/V [P].
If P is fundamental according to Definition 3.11, then v[Pi] = v[Pj ] for any pair
(pi, pj) of property values allowed by physical law.
The reason why the relative volumes are equal is simply that for each exact
state Z for which the value of P turns out to be pi there exists exactly one exact
state Z ′ for which the value is pj , but all other attributes that defines the exact
state are the same. This follows from the assumed independence of the attribute
that defines the fundamental property P . Actually, Statement 3.20 is just a
reformulation of a part of the definition of state space volume (Definition 2.43)
in the vocabulary used here. Namely, a fundamental property is nothing but an
independent attributeA, which means that we can write Pi = S(A, υi) according
to Definition 2.42. If we refer directly to the definition of V [S] we do not have to
bother about whether the possible values of P are discrete or continuous. (The
notation used here with subscripts implicitly assumes a discrete underlying set
of property values, but this is not essential.)
Consider Fig. 3.23(a). Let us define the space PP ′ ⊆ S as the set of exact
states Z for which there is at least one object for which both P and P ′ are
defined. Let v
(P )
ij = v[Σij ], where Σij is the region in PP ′ inside which the
value of P is pi and the value of P
′ is p′j . Explicitly,
v
(P )
ij ≡
V [Pi ∩ P ′j ∩ PP ′]
V [PP ′] . (3.88)
Note that if P and P ′ is not simultaneously knowable, this region does not
correspond to any alternative; there is no object O that can have a state SO
such that SO ⊆ Σij .
In any case, we see in Fig. 3.23(a) that the equipartition of property value
spaces (Statement 3.20) implies that
v
(P )
ij = v
(P )
ji ∀(i, j)
v
(P )
ii = v
(P )
jj ∀(i, j)
(3.89)
in the case M = M ′ = 2. This follows algebraically from the equipartition
criteria v
(P )
11 + v
(P )
12 = v
(P )
21 + v
(P )
22 = v
(P )
11 + v
(P )
12 = v
(P )
12 + v
(P )
22 = 1/2. (The
corresponding criteria do not necessarily imply Eq. [3.89] when M = M ′ > 2.)
Equation [3.89] makes it possible to represent the two sets of property value
spaces {P1,P2} and {P ′1,P ′2} as two orthonormal bases in one vector space, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.23(b). These bases are specified by the following conditions.
〈P¯i, P¯j〉 = δij
〈P¯ ′i, P¯ ′j〉 = δij
〈P¯i, P¯ ′j〉 =
√
2v
(P )
ij exp(iθij)
(3.90)
The relation between the inner product and the relative volume in the bottom
row is chosen to conform with Born’s rule in the following general sense.
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Statement 3.21 (Generalized Born’s rule). If the vectors v¯ and w¯ are
associated with two regions Σv ⊂ S and Σw ⊂ S such that
V [Σv] = V [Σw], (3.91)
then
|〈v¯, w¯〉|2 = V [Σv ∩ Σw]
V [Σv]
. (3.92)
The requirement [3.91] is necessary to make sense of the representation of
Σv and Σw as vectors or subspaces in a vector space.
By conforming to this rule in vector representations of all kinds of contexts,
we can use the same formalism throughout. Recall that, according to Statement
3.19, Born’s rule is forced upon us in contexts where two properties P and P ′
are observed, and where the alternatives of P have knowability 1, as illustrated
in Fig. 3.21. In other kinds of contexts we may just choose to conform to it for
simplicity.
Clearly, the conditions [3.90] just specify the relation between the bases com-
pletely up to a set of arbitrary, independent phases {θij}. In other words, if
the property value spaces ({Pi}, {P ′j}) of two properties P and P ′ are repre-
sented by the two bases ({P¯i}, {P¯ ′j}) in a vector space, then this representation
is preserved under the transformation
({P¯i}, {P¯ ′j})→ ({exp(iθi)P¯i}, {exp(iθj)P¯ ′j}), (3.93)
a symmetry that just reflects the redundancy of the representation. The need to
consider complex vector spaces follows from the fact that we must allow complex
contextual numbers aj (Statement 3.18).
We may look at the boundary between P ′1 and P ′2 in Fig. 3.23 as a line that is
fixed at the centre of PP ′ and may be rotated to alter the relative volumes v(P )ij .
If the line is vertical we have v
(P )
11 = v
(P )
12 = v
(P )
21 = v
(P )
22 . The corresponding
basis (P¯ ′1, P¯ ′2) is tilted 45◦ in relation to the basis (P¯1, P¯2). If the boundary line
is horizontal the two properties P and P ′ are not independent and can be seen
as two manifestations of the same property. We have v
(P )
11 = v
(P )
22 = 1/2 and
v
(P )
12 = v
(P )
21 = 0. The corresponding bases in vector space coincide. In general,
if we rotate the boundary line in state space between P ′1 and P ′2 the angle φ,
the corresponding basis in vector space is rotated the angle φ/2.
Let us now descend from the abstract realm to actual contexts in which P
and P ′ are observed. From the definition of the contextual state SC and the
property value states SPi we see that we can formulate another equipartition
principle as follows, analogous to that in Statement 3.20.
Statement 3.22 (Equipartition of the contextual state). Consider the
contextual state uCSC(n) before the observation of the first property P is made
at time n+m. Let v[SPi] = V [SPi]/V [uCSC(n)]. If C is fundamental according
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to Definition 3.13, then v[SPi] = v[SPj ] for any pair (pi, pj) of property values
allowed by physical law.
Figure 3.16 illustrates the close relation between SC before any observation
is made and P, and also between SPj and Pj .
Consider a fundamental context in which the P and P ′ are observed, and
the alternatives correspond to the two sets (p1, p2) and (p
′
1, p
′
2) of values allowed
by physical law. Then we can clearly represent (SP1, SP2) and (SP ′1, SP ′2) as
two bases (S¯P1, S¯P2) and (S¯P ′1, S¯P ′2) in a vector space HC in the same way as
we did for the property value spaces in Fig. 3.23.
However, we have to be more careful when we interpret the representation of
the context than that of the property value spaces, since now we are represent-
ing a sequence of events rather than an abstract relation between properties.
Clearly, in a given context there is a predefined order in which two properties
are observed. This introduces a hierarchy among the corresponding bases used
in the vector space representation; we have the basis associated with the first
observation and that associated with the second observation. To obtain a more
symmetric picture we need to consider contexts in which P ′ is observed after P
in conjunction with those contexts in which P ′ is observed first, and then P .
Definition 3.14 (Reverse context C˘). Let C be a context in which two prop-
erties P and P ′ are observed in succession. Let the sets of future alternatives
associated with the two observations correspond to sets of possible property val-
ues {pi} and {p′j}, respectively, where the number of members in each set is
the same (M = M ′). A context C˘ is the reverse of C if and only if the same
properties P and P ′ are observed, but in reverse order, and the sets of possible
property values are the same as in C.
A context C and its reverse C˘ are shown in Fig. 3.24. The properties P
and P ′ and their relation in state space are assumed to be the same as those in
Fig. 3.23. We obviously have SO ⊂ PP ′. The left part of panel a) shows the
state SO just before the observation of P , an event which is assumed to define
n+m−1→ n+m. The state SO reduces when P is observed. In Fig. 3.24(a) it
reduces to a subset of the property value space P2 as the value of P is found to
be p2. There will always pass some time after this event before P
′ is observed.
This second event defines n + m′ − 1 → n + m′. Between these two events,
the object state SO have had time to move, governed by the evolution u1, as
indicated by the dashed and solid half-circles in the right part of panel a). If
we wish, we may describe this motion with the continuous evolution parameter
σ, as discussed in section 3.1. We let
u ≡ um′−m, (3.94)
and define
vij ≡ V [Pi∩P
′
j∩umSO(n)]
V [umSO(n)]
uvij|k ≡ V [Pi∩P
′
j∩uSO(n+m)]
V [uSO(n+m)]
,
(3.95)
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Figure 3.24: a) A context C in which P is observed first, then P ′. b) A reverse
context C˘ in which P ′ is observed first, then P . The observation of the first
property takes place at time n+m, at which time the states SO and SO˘ reduce
(left panels). After the first observation in C, the state may evolve so that the
relative volume vij may change to uvij just before the second observation. In
this example, value p2 of P is observed. The observation of P
′ takes place a
time n+m′. The probability to see p′j given the observed value p2 is q(p
′
j |p2) =
uv1j +uv2j . If P and P
′ had been simultaneously knowable, we would have had
uv11 = uv12 = 0. Compare Fig. 3.12.
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Figure 3.25: A context C in which two properties P and P ′ with two alternative
values is observed, together with a reverse context C˘ in which the order of
observation is reversed. The contextual numbers ax and the reverse numbers
a˘x are not necessarily related in any particular way.
and correspondingly for the reverse context C˘. In the second row, the evolved
volumes uvij|k depends on which value pk was found for property P . Recall
that the regions with volumes vij , uvij|k, v˘ij or uv˘ij|k do not correspond to any
realizable alternatives if P and P ′ are not simultaneously knowable. The object
state can never be contained inside any single such region, and the evolution of
such a region is not defined. Referring back to Fig. 3.20 we have
|ai|2 = vi1 + vi2
|akj |2 = uv1j|k + uv2j|k. (3.96)
For the reverse context the corresponding relations hold.
|a˘i|2 = v˘i1 + v˘i2
|a˘kj |2 = uv˘1j|k + uv˘2j|k. (3.97)
The relation between C and C˘ in terms of these contextual numbers is
illustrated in Fig. 3.25.
To be able to express contexts and reverse contexts in the same vector space
representation, corresponding to that in Fig. 3.23, it should be possible to choose
bases (S¯P1, S¯P2) and (S¯P ′1, S¯P ′2) so that these have the same mutual relation
as (P¯1, P¯2) and (P¯ ′1, P¯ ′2). This relation should not depend on the details of the
context, just the inherent relation between the property values, as illustrated in
Fig. 3.23. Put differently, given a pair of bases (S¯P1, S¯P2) and (S¯P ′1, S¯P ′2), it
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should be possible to represent variations in the contextual details by a trans-
formation of the contextual state vector S¯C rather than a transformation of the
relation beteen (S¯P1, S¯P2) and (S¯P ′1, S¯P ′2).
Definition 3.15 (Neutral context). Consider a context C in which two not
simultaneously knowable properties P and P ′ are observed, and suppose that
we observe value pi of P . Then C is neutral if and only if it is possible to
assign labels so that uv1j|k + uv2j|k + . . . + uvMj|k = Mv
(P )
kj for all (k, j), or,
equivalently, |akj |2 = |〈P¯k, P¯ ′j〉|2.
Expressed in words, the relative volumes in the state SO that determines the
contextual relation between S¯Pk and S¯P ′j should be the same as the relative
volumes in the entire property space PP ′ that determine the relation between
P¯k and P¯ ′j . Figuratively speaking, a neutral context is transparent; it does not
color the inherent relation between the properties we observe. An example of a
neutral context is shown in Fig. 3.26.
We can always formulate the formal algebraic representation
u¯C S¯C(n) = a1S¯P1 + a2S¯P2
S¯C(n+m) = S¯Pj
u¯C S¯C(n+m) = ak1S¯P ′1 + ak2S¯P ′2,
(3.98)
where we have assumed in the second and third row that the value pk of property
P was observed at time n + m. We may alternatively say that the context is
neutral if and only if
|akj |2 = v(P )kj (3.99)
for each pair of indices (k, j), where v
(P )
kj is defined in Eq. [3.88].
Let us define q(p′j |pk) as the conditional probability to find value p′j given
that we have found value pk. Analogously, let q(pk|p′j) be be conditional prob-
ability to find pk given p
′
j in a reverse context.
Statement 3.23 (A principle of detailed balance). Consider a neutral
context C in which two properties P and P ′ are observed in succession, and a
neutral reverse context C˘. Then we have q(p′j |pk) = q(pk|p′j) for all (k, j).
This statement follows directly from the fact that the same basis pairs
(P¯1, P¯2) and (P¯ ′1, P¯ ′2) can be used to describe both C and C˘ if they are both
neutral.
With the notion of neutral contexts at hand, let us clarify the issue when
and how contexts dealing with not simultaneously knowable properties can be
represented in a vector space. Whenever this is possible, we identify this vec-
tor space with that which is defined for the involved properties themselves, as
indicated above.
Statement 3.24 (Existence of the property vector space HPP ′). Con-
sider two fundamental properties P and P ′ with the same number of possible
3.4. THE POSTULATES OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 235
Figure 3.26: Illustration of a neutral context. a) The relation between the
volumes V
(P )
A and V
(P )
B in property space determines the angle between P¯1 and
P¯ ′1, as well as between P¯2 and P¯ ′2 (Fig. 3.23). b) A neutral context in which
value p2 of P has been observed, and in which we are about to observe P
′.
The relation between VA and VB is the same as that between V
(P )
A and V
(P )
B .
More precisely, VA/VB = V
(P )
A /V
(P )
B . We get q(p
′
1|p2) = VA/(VA + VB) and
q(p′2|p2) = VB/(VA + VB), where q(p′j |p2) is the probability to observe value p′j
given value p2. Analogous relations would hold if p1 would have been observed.
We can therefore use the property bases (P¯1, P¯2) and (P¯ ′1, P¯ ′2) to represent the
context in a vector space.
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values (M = M ′), which fulfil v(P )ij = v
(P )
ji for all (i, j). Such a pair (P, P
′)
can be represented in a M -dimensional vector space HPP ′ spanned by two or-
thonormal bases (P¯1, P¯2) and (P¯ ′1, P¯ ′2) that are related accordning to Eq. [3.90].
The requirement that P and P ′ are fundamental (Definition 3.11) is needed
to fulfil the necessary condition [3.91] for a vector space representation. In the
present case this condition requires the equipartition of the combined property
space PP ′, and such an equipartition is only guaranteed for fundamental prop-
erties (Statement 3.20). This does not mean that it is impossible to construct
vector space representations for other kinds of properties. We just have to
make sure ‘by hand’ that the property space is equipartitioned (and also that
the conditions v
(P )
ij = v
(P )
ji and M = M
′ are fulfilled).
Statement 3.25 (Representation of neutral contexts in a vector space
HC). Consider a pair of properties P and P ′ such that the vector space HPP ′
exists. Suppose that the same two properties are observed in a neutral context C,
that they are not simultaneously knowable, and that the sets of future alternatives
correspond to the sets of values {pi} and {p′j} that are allowed by physical law.
Then C can be represented in a vector space HC which we may formally identify
with HPP ′ so that S¯Pi = P¯i and S¯P ′j = P¯ ′j for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤M .
Note that if P and P ′ were simultaneously knowable, it would not be possible
to identify HC with HPP ′ , since then we have to use a contextual vector space
HC with dimension M ×M ′ = M2, whereas the dimension of HPP ′ is M (Fig.
3.22).
We should keep in mind that for a given context C, the two bases {S¯P1, S¯P2}
and {S¯P ′1, S¯P ′2} are not on equal footing, since the contextual state vector S¯C
is first projected onto S¯P1 or S¯P2 when P is observed, then onto S¯P ′1 or S¯P ′2
when P ′ is observed - but not the other way around. The order in which the
projections occur is reversed in a reverse neutral context C˘, of course. However,
in order to treat the bases as equivalent in the sense that we change bases in
the manner we are used to in quantum mechanics, we need to consider a reverse
context C˘ that is ‘the same’ as C, apart from the reversion (Fig. 3.27).
Definition 3.16 (The reciprocal context C˜). Consider a neutral context C
that has a vector space representation HC . A reciprocal context C˜ is a reverse
context C˘ to C for which a˘j = a1a1j + a2a2j for all j, and A˘ = A
−1, where
A˘ ≡
(
a˘11 a˘12
a˘21 a˘22
)
, A ≡
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
(3.100)
in the case M = M ′ = 2.
Such a choice of reciprocal context C˜ is chosen since it gives rise to an
evolution of S¯C˜(n) as if we set S¯C˜(n) = S¯C(n) in Eq. [3.98], and make an
algebraic change of basis from {S¯P1, S¯P2} to {S¯P ′1, S¯P ′2}, using the fact that
contextually we have S¯Pj = aj1S¯P ′1 + aj2S¯P ′2 according to Eq. [3.98].
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Figure 3.27: Vector space representation of a context C with a reciprocal C˜
where two not simultaneously knowable properties P and P ′ are observed. a)
In C, property P is observed first, and {S¯P1, S¯P2} is therefore the primary basis.
In C˜ property P ′ is observed first, and {S¯P ′1, S¯P ′2} beomes the primary basis.
b) If we consider C and C˜ together, we may identify S¯C = S¯C˜ and consider the
two bases to be interchangeable in the common vector space.
Clearly, C is a reciprocal context to C˜ whenever C˜ is a reciprocal context to
C.
Definition 3.17 (A pair of reciprocal contexts (C, C˜)). The members of
such a context pair are reciprocals to each other.
The concept of pairs of reciprocal context makes it possible to motivate
from the present vantage point the cavalier manner in which we change bases
in quantum mechanical Hilbert spaces. We see that we may put the two bases
on completely equal footing if we consider the context pair (C, C˜) together, and
if we make a formal identification u1S¯C(n + m − 1) = u1S¯C˜(n + m − 1) [Fig.
3.27(b)]. We include the temporal arguments to emphasize that the two state
vectors are treated as equal before any observation is made in either context.
Statement 3.26 (Physical interpretation of a change of basis). When
we change the basis in a quantum mechanical Hilbert space to express the same
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state, what we are actually doing is to switch focus from a context C to a re-
ciprocal context C˜, and the vector space in which we change the bases is the
combined vector space HCC˜ in which we consider the reciprocal context pair
(C, C˜) together.
The most natural illustration of these considerations is the subsequent mea-
surements of the spin of an electron along two axes that are tilted the angle φ
in relation to each other. Property P is then the spin direction along the first
axis, and P ′ is the spin direction along the second axis.
There are, of course, angular momentum properties with more than two
possible values. Let us therefore address the more general situation where we
have two not simultaneously knowable properties for which M = M ′ > 2. Then
the equipartition conditions∑
j v
(P )
ij =
∑
j v
(P )
kj ∀(i, k)∑
i v
(P )
ij =
∑
i v
(P )
il ∀(j, l)
(3.101)
for a fundamental property pair (P, P ′) do not automatically imply v(P )ij = v
(P )
ji ,
which is a necessary condition for a vector space representation of C. Which
property pairs (P, P ′) that have more than two possible values each do actually
fulfil the necessary additional condition vij = vji? Consider again the angular
momentum J , observed along an arbitrary z-axis. Let us call this property Jz.
The angular momentum component along another axis may be called Jz′ . The
relation between these properties are defined by the angle φzz′ between the two
axes. When we speak of the relation between two properties, we speak of the
way the property values spaces Pi and P ′j relate to each other in the combined
property space PP ′ (Fig. 3.23). We are therefore not allowed to refer to any
particular context containing objects that can be used to define an external
coordinate system in which we can assign coordinates to the z- and z′-axes.
The only relation between Jz and Jz′ is thus given by the angle φzz′ . An angle
has no direction:
φzz′ = φz′z. (3.102)
This relation should be understood in the following sense. The permutation
of the indices z and z′ has no epistemic meaning if we consider the proper-
ties stripped from any context. Therefore, in a symbolic representation where
the permutation nevertheless makes a graphical difference, like the one in Eq.
[3.102], we must compensate for this redundancy in the representation by in-
voking a symmetry relation in this representation. This reasoning resembles
the discussion in section 1.9, concerning the ability to distinguish left from right
(Fig. 1.19). We conclude immediately that for the property pair (Jz, Jz′) we
must have vij = vji because of such a redundancy of representation.
Definition 3.18 (Mutually defined property pairs). A pair of properties
(P, P ′) is mutually defined if and only if the difference between them is com-
pletely specified by one or several relational quantities that lack direction, such
as angles or spatial distances.
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It follows that mutually defined property pairs must have the same num-
ber of possible values, since a difference in number has a direction. A pair of
integers can be ordered according to size. We also see that two properties re-
lated according to a temporal difference are not mutually defined, since time is
directed.
Statement 3.27 (Mutual properties have symmetrical relative vol-
umes). For any mutually defined fundamental property pair we have v
(P )
ij = v
(P )
ji
for all index pairs (i, j).
If we let P be the position and P ′ be the momentum of the same object,
there is no inherent relation between them at all, directed or not, that allows
the observation of a given position xi to make it more probable to observe some
momentum pj rather than pl. This may be so in a particular experimental
setup, but not in the entire property space PP ′. This becomes even more clear
if we consider the fact that the numerical value of xi is just a matter of choice of
a coordinate system, which requires external objects to define. In the abstract
property space without any specific context, the numerical value assigned to xi
is completely arbitrary. The same line of reasoning applies to pj , since velocity is
also defined in relation to an external coordinate system. We must set vij = vkl
because we cannot define any quantity that relates xi and pj on which any
difference could depend.
Definition 3.19 (Independent property pairs). A property pair (P, P ′) is
independent if and only if there is no set of relational attributes that can be used
to specify the difference between them.
Statement 3.28 (Independent fundamental properties have equal rela-
tive volumes). For any independent and fundamental pair of properties (P, P ′)
we have v
(P )
ij = v
(P )
kl for all index pairs (i, j) and (k, l).
In particular, it follows that independent, fundamental properties have sym-
metrical relative volumes v
(P )
ij = v
(P )
ji , so that a vector space representation
exists. Referring to Eqs. [3.90] and [3.93], for independent property pairs we
must choose a pair of bases ({P¯i}, {P¯ ′j}) in a common vector space such that
|〈P¯i, P¯ ′j〉| = |〈P¯k, P¯ ′l〉|, ∀(i, j, k, l). (3.103)
The reason why we include the technical condition in Statements 3.27 and
3.28 that the properties should be fundamental is that otherwise we could define
one property value to consist of two possible property values of the correspond-
ing fundamental property. Then the symmetry between a property value pair
(pi, p
′
j) could be broken, and we could motivate an assignment v
(P )
ij 6= v(P )kl .
Statement 3.29 (Representable fundamental property pairs). Consider
a pair (P, P ′) of not simultaneously knowable, fundamental properties, for which
M = M ′. If (P, P ′) are mutually defined (Definition 3.18), or independent
(Definition 3.19), they can be represented as two orthonormal bases in a vector
space HPP ′ with dimension M .
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This statement is illustrated in Fig. 3.28.
As an example of an independent property pair, we discussed the position
and momentum of the same object. If we consider the pair of properties defined
by the momenta of two different objects, the distance between them specifies the
difference between the properties. They are therefore not independent according
to Definition 3.19. Does this mean that a vector space representation does not
exist? No, since the two properties in this case are simultaneously knowable,
they can be represented in a common orthonormal basis of higher dimension
(M ×M ′). This is discussed in relation to Fig. 3.22 for specific contexts C. We
can, of course, make the same kind of representation for the abstract properties
themselves.
Let us finally discuss the case where we have a continuous set of property
values allowed by physical law. In the case of x or px, for example, we cannot
exclude a priori any real value of these quantities. Since the number M of
alternatives in an actual context C where we observe such properties is always
finite, C is never fundamental (Definition 3.13). We therefore cannot make the
identification S¯Pi = P¯i straightaway. Instead, we must try to represent a non-
fundamental version PM of such a property P , where we group together the
possible values of the fundamental P into M bins that match the resolution of
the observation.
Is it possible to perform such a discretization and still fulfill the necessary
equipartition v(P(M)i ) = v(P(M)k ) for all (i, k)? (If so, the equally necessary
symmetry v
(P )
ij = v
(P )
ji follows for a pair [P
M , (PM )′] of such properties if they
are mutual or independent.) Yes, any chopping up in finite pieces of the axis
in state space defined by P will do the job. The reason is that the definition
of the volume V [S] (Definition 2.43) does not care about particular coordinate
systems applied to the attribute axes in state space. (Recall that we identify a
fundamental property with an independent attribute.) The coordinate system
is not fundamental to state space, as discussed in section 2.5.
In that section, we introduced the attribute value space S(A, υ) (Definition
2.42) and the attribute interval space (Definition 2.44). The latter concerns an
entire interval of values ∆υ rather than just one value. We used it to conclude
that the volumes of any pair of such intervals of values of a given attribute are
equal (Statement 2.22). If we consider two independent attributes A and B, we
can make the analogous statement for the ‘areas’ ∆υA∆υB .
Statement 3.30 (Equipartition of attribute value areas). Let A and B be
two independent attributes. Also, let (∆υA,∆υ
′
A) be a pair of sets according to
Definition 2.44 that belong to A, and let (∆υB ,∆υ
′
B) be a pair of corresponding
sets that belong to B. Further, let S(A,∆υA;B,∆υB) be the set of exact states
Z for which there is at least one object for which A and B are defined, and for
which the value of A belongs to ∆υA and the value of B belongs to ∆υB. Then
V [S(A,∆υA;B,∆υB)] = V [S(A,∆υ
′
A;B,∆υ
′
B)].
Let us define the values of a discretized property PM such that pMi = {p :
p ∈ ∆pi}, where the interval ∆pi contains a continuous infinity of property
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Figure 3.28: Representation of pairs of not simultaneously knowable properties
P and P ′. a) Representation of a pair of mutually defined such properties,
exemplified by the angular momentum J of a given object (grey) along two axes
e¯z and e¯z′ . In the state space representation (middle panel), we have vij = vji
because of the symmetry in the mutual definition of the property pair. In the
Hilbert space representation (bottom panel), the two bases that are associated
with P and P ′ are tilted in relation to one another in a way that depends on the
relational attribute φ that defines the property pair. b) Representation of a pair
of independent such properties, exemplified by the position x an momentum px
of a given object. In the state space representation all relative volumes vij are
the same. This holds true even though the possible values form a continuous
set. In the Hilbert space representation, the two associated bases are tilted 45◦
in relation to one another, given that there are only two possible values of each
property. Compare Fig. 3.23.
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Figure 3.29: A partition of the values of the independent, continuous properties
x and px into bins with widths ∆xi and ∆pxj , where each such interval corre-
sponds to a given value xi and pxj of the discretized properties x
M and pMx .
Here M is the number of bins used to partition the domain of each continuous
property. a) The bins shown in a traditional phase space (x, px) with a coor-
dinate system with which we can calculate the area of the elements ∆x∆px.
b) The bins shown in state space, where the only measure with which we can
compare bin sizes is V [S]. The one-to-one correspondence between points in
two bins in the vertical direction, as well as in the horizontal direction, implies
that the volume of all bins is the same.
values p of P . If we discretize a second property P ′ in the same way, we see
that we fulfill the necessary equipartition and symmetry v
(PM )
ij = v
(PM )
ji for a
vector space representation.
Statement 3.31 (Representable non-fundamental property pairs). Con-
sider a pair (PM , (PM )′) of not simultaneously knowable, non-fundamental
properties, for which M = M ′. Suppose that they are defined by the group-
ing together of continuous property values of the fundamental properties P and
P ′, respectively. If both P and P ′ are mutually defined (Definition 3.18), or in-
dependent (Definition 3.19), they can be represented as two orthonormal bases
in a vector space HPM (PM )′ with dimension M .
To exemplify the procedure, imagine that we have a double slit, towards
which we shoot a specimen. There is a detector at each slit. There are three
alternative outcomes in this context. The specimen may be detected at detector
1 or 2, or it may not be detected at all. We may then discretize the positions
on the plane that is defined by the double slit screen into three compartments:
those points that define slit 1 may be called ∆x1, those that define slit 2 may
be called ∆x2, and the set of all other points are placed in the trashbin ∆x3.
Then we may make a three-dimensional vector space representation. We may
also combine the position measurement with a measurement of the momentum,
which we should then discretize into three bins to enable a common algebraic
representation.
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In fact, the coordinate system independence of the possibility to make vector
space representations of discretized continuous properties is crucial. Since the
choice of coordinate system is arbitrary, basic physical distinctions, such as
that between contexts that can be algebraically represented or not, should not
depend on such arbitrary choices. Furthermore, when we take relativity into
account, different observers may assign different coordinate values to parts of
the same context. We have chosen to build the algebraic representation upon
the measure V [S] on state space. We conclude that the coordinate independence
of this measure is essential.
It may seem counter-intuitive that the choice of bin widths is irrelevant when
we construct the vector space representation. Consider, for example, a context
in which we observe position and momentum in succession, and in which there
are just two alternative values for each property. This means that the bins may
be ‘very big’. Even more, we can make one of the position bins, say x2, very
wide compared to the other [Fig. 3.29(a)]. Say that we indeed find value x2
of the discretized position property. Even so, the outcome of the momentum
measurement is completely undetermined, since the position and momentum
bases are tilted 45◦ in relation to one another regardless the details of the
discretization. One might think that the finding of x2 correspond to such a wide
interval ∆x2 that Heisenberg would have allowed us to determine momentum
well enough to be sure whether we would find px1 or px2, corresponding to the
intervals ∆px1 and ∆px2, which may also be wide.
Recall, however, that the vector space representation is only possible for
neutral contexts (Definition 3.15 and Fig. 3.26), which are constructed to pre-
serve the indeterminacy inherent in the abstract relation between x or px. It
may be harder to obtain such neutrality if we use a context with large bins.
Recall also that the state that we represent in vector space is the memoryless
contextual state SC of the specimen OS (Definition 3.9). Whenever OS is not
a permanent quasiobject (like an electron), we may have more knowledge about
its state than is encoded in SC (Statement 3.15). In other words, we may have
SOS ⊂ SC . That is, the vector space description does not always represent all
knowledge about a specimen. In particular, if the specimen is directly perceived
object like a ball, we obviously can keep track of position xi and momentum
pxj simultaneously if we choose large enough bins ∆xi and ∆pxj .
z
We have been speaking of the complex vector space HC , and we have also
introduced the combined vector space HCC˜ in Statement 3.26. Let us be a little
more precise about what we mean by these spaces.
Definition 3.20 (The complex vector space HC). Consider the set SC of
all observational contexts C allowed by physical law for which the specimen OS
is the same, meaning that the specimens in all contexts are described by the same
set of properties POS with the same set the fixed value ranges ΥPOS (Definition
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3.8). Suppose also that the same sequence of properties P, P ′, . . . , P (F ) with
the same sequence of knowability levels, and the same sets of realizable values
{pj}, {p′j}, . . . , {p(F )j } are observed within each context C ∈ SC. To each such
set SC we associate one vector space HC = {S¯C(n)}, where {S¯C(n)} is the
set of all initial contextual states representations that corresponds to contexts in
SC.
In plain language, we may say that each context that makes it possible to
observe a given sequence of properties of a given specimen corresponds to a
unique point in HC . At the next level, to each type of specimen and to each
sequence of observed properties of this specimen corresponds a unique vector
space HC . The dimension DH of HC depends on the sequence of knowability
levels of the observed properties, as well as on the fact whether these properties
are simultaneously knowable or not. These matters are discussed above.
Definition 3.20 formally specifies the elements of HC , these being vectors of
unit length with complex coordinates. It does not define any operations that
we may perform on these vectors, and it does not tell us when HC can be used
in practice. These matters are summarized in Statement 3.33 below.
Operations on the elements of HC have physical meaning only in certain cir-
cumstances. Well-defined projections occur at given instants during the course
of the context. A change of basis is only justified if we consider a pair of re-
ciprocal contexts C and C˜, where the basis change corresponds to a change
of perspective from one of these contexts to the other (Statement 3.26). This
viewpoint is necessary to make epistemic sense of the statement that one and
the same vector is expressed in two different bases (Fig. 3.27). All these qual-
ifications express the same moral: HC is not a universally defined state space
in which we can follow the evolution of the state vector from a place for spec-
tators, and look at it from different angles. Rather, we construct it ourselves
when we build experimental setups, and it is defined during the course of the
experiment only. When we build another experimental setup, we define another
vector space HC′ , independent from the first.
We have defined the inner product 〈S¯Pi, S¯Pj〉 between basis vectors (Eq.
[3.84]), and we know that we have to deal with complex coordinates (Statement
3.18). To be able to call HC a complex Hilbert space we must also argue that it
is complete. If it is not complete, then there must be coordinates aj which can
take a dense set of values in HC , where this dense set contains holes in which a
Cauchy sequence can end up.
We may write aj =
√
vj exp(iφj), where vj = V [S˜j ]/V [SO]. In our argument
why aj has to be complex, we could not exclude any phase φ. It must be allowed
to take any value in [0, 2pi). This means that there cannot be any holes in the set
of allowed phases. We must look for them in the set of possible relative volumes
vj instead. In the set SC of contexts that contribute elements to HC according
to Definition 3.20, there are experimental setups O of all possible sizes, shapes
and compositions. This means that SO can have a very large number of sizes,
shapes and positions in state space, and consequently that the future alternative
S˜j = SO ∩ P˜j can have any conceivable size and shape (Fig. 3.16). This means
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in turn that virtually any value of vj is possible, so that they may very well form
a dense set. Can there be holes in this set? The existence of such a hole would
mean that we can exclude a given pair of volumes (V [S˜j ], V [SO]) that applies
to context C, but not another pair (V [S˜′j ], V [S
′
O]), which is arbitrarily close,
that applies to a very similar context C ′. Such a distinction would correspond
to arbitrarily exact knowledge about the boundaries ∂S˜j and ∂SO. That kind
of knowledge cannot be attained according to the discussion in section 2.3.
Therefore there cannot be any holes between the values of aj even if they form
a dense set, and therefore HC is complete.
Statement 3.32 (The complex vector space HC is a Hilbert space). We
have introduced an inner product in the construction of HC and we have argued
heuristically that it is complete.
z
Let us summarize our discussion about the complex Hilbert space represen-
tation of a sequence of observations within a given context. We have considered
three kinds of contexts in which two properties with a given set of alternative
values are known from the outset:
1. those where only the second property is observed, whereas the attained
value of the first is outside potential knowledge,
2. those where both properties are observed in succession, and they are si-
multaneously knowable,
3. those where both properties are observed in succession, but they are not
simultaneously knowable.
These three kinds of situations play different roles in the translation from a
set-theoretic state space description to the algebraic representation. Contexts of
the first kind forces us to choose a complex Hilbert space representation among
all possible algebraic representations, whereas contexts of the second and third
kind can also be represented in this way. Observational contexts C in which
more than two properties are observed can be described as a combination of
contexts of the above three kinds. There may, for example, be more than one
unobserved property in contexts of the first kind (having knowability level 1)
before any actual observation takes place. We have not mentioned the simplest
kind of context of them all: those in which just one property is observed, and
nothing more happpens. Such contexts can trivially be represented in complex
vector spaces. We conclude that almost all context of interest can be represented
in a complex Hilbert space. We refer to the preceding discussion for exceptions
and limitations. The condition of neutrality (Definition 3.15) in contexts of the
third kind is maybe the most severe limitation.
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Statement 3.33 (Hilbert space context representation). Suppose that
an observational context C is such that the relative volumes of SO associated
with the alternatives are known, so that the corresponding probabilities are de-
fined. Then almost all contexts C of practical interest can be represented in a
complex Hilbert space HC according to Definition 3.20. When an observation
corresponding to a state reduction occurs at time n+m, the evolved state vector
that reduces can be written u¯C S¯C(n) =
∑
j ajS¯Pj, where {S¯Pj} is a set of or-
thogonal subspaces of HC . The reduced state vector S¯C(n+m) is a projection of
u¯C S¯C(n) to one of the subspaces S¯Pj. The probability associated this projection
is |aj |2 = |〈u¯C S¯C(n), S¯Pj〉|2.
Note that the Hilbert space representation is only partial; the exact shape
and position of the sets SO, SOS and S˜j in state space are not represented,
just the associated relative volumes vj . This fact is interesting just as a matter
of principle, since the relevant quantities in an observational situation are the
probabilities we identify with vj . These probabilites are not always defined, as
discussed in section 3.2.
Note also that the Hilbert space representation is only meaningful as a way
to calculate the outcome of an experiment if the specimen OS is a permanent
quasiobject (Definition 3.15), where ‘permanent’ in this setting means that is
never directly perceived during the course of the observational context C.
Statement 3.34 (Unique algebraic context representation). Assume that
the function f(a) defined in Eq. [3.50] is infinitely differentiable, and that we
require that the distributive law expressed in Eq. [3.52] should hold. Then the
Hilbert space description expressed in Statement 3.33 is the only possible alge-
braic representation that applies to almost all kinds of contexts C.
3.4.4 Properties and operators
Having translated the alternatives and their probabilites or relative volumes to
Hilbert space language, we may ask how the properties and the property values
that the alternatives correspond to can be represented in the same language.
We have discussed the subject to some extent in relation to the observation
of properties that are not simultaneously knowable. Here we continue that
discussion.
A property transcends the object for which it is defined, as well as the
context in which it can be observed or measured. Therefore we should consider
the entire property space P, which contains the states of all such objects and
contexts. Also, we should consider the set {pj} of all possible values of the
property allowed by physical law, not just the set of possible values that are
possible to see in a particular object.
To each value pj is associated a set Pj ⊆ P such that Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ for
i 6= j and P = ⋃j Pj . As discussed in Section 2.6, it may not be possible
to order property values subjectively, in contrast to attribute values. We may
nevertheless label the property value spaces and the associated values with an
index j according to the above. We just have to remember that the labelling is
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sometimes arbitrary. If there is no inherent ordering among the property values,
we can nevertheless assign numerical values to them, for instance according to
pj = j.
We can formally construct a Hilbert space HP such that each property value
space Pj corresponds to a vector P¯j such that 〈P¯i, P¯j〉 = δij [Fig. 3.30(a)]. This
Hilbert space is analogous to HC except for the fact that the coordinates aj are
not determined by any context in the case of HP . In the Hilbert space language,
each property P is uniquely specified by the complete basis {P¯j} with associated
real numbers {pj}. Conversely, each such pair of sets ({P¯j}, {pj}) in HP defines
at least one property P .
P ↔
 HP{P¯j}, a complete basis forHP{pj}, pj ∈ R for all j (3.104)
A linear operator is uniquely defined by its eigenvectors and eigenvalues if the
basis of eigenvectors is complete. Therefore we can associate P with exactly one
linear operator P¯ with domain HP , with a complete basis of eigenvectors P¯j ,
and with real eigenvalues pj . Any such operator P¯ is necessarily self-adjoint:
〈P¯ v¯, w¯〉 = 〈v¯, P¯ w¯〉 whenever v¯, w¯ ∈ HP .
For any observational context C in which property P is observed, we have
SC ⊆ P. It would therefore be natural to define HP so that HC ⊆ HP . To
relate the two Hilbert spaces, we define the action of P¯ on a vector S¯C ∈ HC
so that
SC ⊆ Pj ⇒ P¯ S¯C ≡ pjS¯C . (3.105)
If the property value state fulfils SPk ⊆ Pj , then we may identify S¯Pk = P¯j
since both quantities are defined as an eigenspace of the same operator with the
same eigenvalue. If we define HP according to HP = ⊕jP¯j , then we indeed get
HC ⊆ HP , as desired. In this picture we must regard P¯j as an eigenspace rather
than an eigenvector, since S¯Pk in some contexts must be seen as subspaces ofHC
with dimension two or higher. This may happen when the context C contains
several properties at knowability level 3, as illustrated in Fig. 3.22.
Assume that we have a fundamental set of future alternatives (Definition
3.12). Then we have SPj ⊆ Pj for all j, so that we may write S¯Pj = P¯j
for each j [Fig. 3.30(b), top panel]. The set {P¯j} becomes a complete set of
orthogonal subspaces in HC in the sense that HC = ⊕jP¯j , and 〈v¯i, v¯j〉 = 0
whenever v¯i ∈ P¯i and v¯j ∈ P¯j , where i 6= j. We have HC = HP . The outcome
of an observation within such a context is a property value that corresponds to
exactly one eigenvalue pj of P¯ .
Assume now that we still have SPj ⊆ P¯j for all j, but that the complete
set of alternatives is not fundamental. This simply means that there is one or
more property values allowed by physical law that cannot be observed in the
given context. The situation is illustrated in the middle panel of Fig. 3.30(b),
where p3 cannot be realized. The angular momentum along a given axis is a
typical example. Physical law allows a discrete sequence of values in the range
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Figure 3.30: a) The property space P as a Hilbert space HP spanned by the
eigenvectors Pj of property operator P¯ . b) Relation between the property space
P and the contextual state SC and the corresponding relation between the
Hilbert spaces HP and HC . Three cases are shown. Top panel: all possible
property values can be realized within context. Middle panel: Some property
values cannot be observed. Bottom panel: some alternatives (S˜2 in this ex-
ample) correspond to several property values - the observation is not always
precise.
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from −∞ to ∞, but the total angular momentum of the objects in the context
truncates this sequence so that the absolute value of the angular momentum
along the chosen axis never becomes greater than the total angular momentum.
In this situation, we can still identify S¯Pj = P¯j for each set SPj that occur in
the complete set of alternatives, but the dimension of HC is less than that of
HP . Such a statement is meaningful only if the dimension is finite. In general
we may write HC ⊂ HP , where HC is spanned by a set of subspaces that is a
proper subset of the complete set of eigenspaces {P¯j}. Again, the outcome of
an observation within this kind of context is a property value that corresponds
to exactly one eigenvalue pj of P¯ , just like in the case of a fundamental set of
alternatives.
Assume finally that the resolution of the observation of a property value is
imperfect [Fig. 3.30(b), bottom panel]. In other words, the property value that
defines the future alternative S˜j corresponds to more than one of the property
values allowed by physical law. Technically, there is a k such that for each
j we have SPk 6⊆ Pj . Then we have to make a formal distinction between
the imperfectly resolved ‘contextual property’ PC and the ‘proper property’
P . This situation always occurs for properties that are continuous, such as
distance. This case was discussed in section 3.4.3 in relation to Fig. 3.29.
(We may identify the contextual property with the discretized property PM .)
Of course, we may also have imperfect resolution among the alternatives that
correspond to discrete-valued properties. If we allow ourselves to use the same
index notation in both the continuous and the discrete case, we may say the
following: sometimes we have to identify S¯Pk with an entire set of eigenspaces:
S¯Pk = ⊕i1j=j0P¯j . Correspondingly, the outcome of the observation is a set of
eigenvalues pCk = {pj0, pj0+1, . . . , pj1}, representing the property values that
cannot be excluded by the acquired knowledge.
In the above discussion about the representation of properties as linear self-
adjoint operators, we did not need to assume that the property we consider is
fundamental, that it is a single independent attribute (Definition 3.11). If we
add this assumption to the case shown in the top panel of Fig. 3.30(b), then
we are dealing with a fundamental context. It is then possible to formulate
the following clear-cut statement about the relationship between observations,
eigenspaces and eigenvalues.
Statement 3.35 (Properties as self-adjoint operators in HC in funda-
mental contexts C). To each property P that is observed in a fundamental
context C, there corresponds exactly one self-adjoint linear operator P¯ with a
complete set of eigenvectors {P¯j} that span HP . The set of property values pos-
sible to observe in C is the set of eigenvalues {pj}. We may identify HC = HP
and S¯j = P¯j. We have P¯ S¯Pj = pjS¯Pj. If value pj is observed at time n + m,
then SC(n+m) ⊆ Pj and S¯C(n+m) = S¯Pj.
Few physical contexts are truly fundamental. In realistic cases the above
statement should therefore be weakened appropriately, according to the dis-
cussion in conntection with Fig. 3.30. We do not provide formal statements
about the relationship between the property operator and the outcome of the
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observation in each possible case. We do however provide the weakest possi-
ble statement, that applies even if we have a poorly resolved obeservation of a
non-fundamental property.
Statement 3.36 (Properties as self-adjoint operators in HC in any con-
text C). To each property P that is observed in a context C, there corresponds
exactly one self-adjoint linear operator P¯ with a complete set of eigenspaces {P¯j}
that span HP . Each property value pk possible to observe in C corresponds to
a proper subset pk = {pj0, pj0+1, . . . , pj1} of the set of eigenvalues {pj}. We
may write HC ⊆ HP and S¯Pk = ⊕j1j=i0P¯j. We have P¯C S¯Pk = pkS¯Pk, where
P¯C is defined below. If value pk is observed at time n + m, then SC(n + m) ⊆
Pj0 ∪ Pj0+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pj1 and S¯C(n+m) = ⊕j1j=j0P¯j.
Definition 3.21 (The contextual property PC). Consider Statement 3.36.
If HC ⊂ HP , then the property observed in context C is not fundamental. PC is
the property associated with P with M possible values that is actually observed in
C. The corresponding self-adjoint linear operator is P¯C , with a complete set of
eigenspaces {S¯Pk} that span HC , and a corresponding set of eigenvalues {pk}.
Let us check that the operators P¯ fulfil the familiar commutation rules.
Consider a context in which two properties P and P ′ are observed in succession.
If they are simultaneously knowable we have SC(n + m
′) = SPi ∩ SP ′j at the
time n + m′ when we have just observed the value of P ′. We have SPi ⊆ Pi
and SP ′j ⊆ P ′j . According to Eq. [3.105] this means that P¯SC(n + m′) =
piSC(n + m
′) and P¯ ′SC(n + m′) = p′jSC(n + m
′), so that P¯ P¯ ′S¯C(n + m′) =
P¯ ′P¯ S¯C(n + m′) = pip′jS¯C(n + m
′). This holds true for any final contextual
state. These final states are the same as those called Sij in Fig. 3.22, and the
corresponding subspaces S¯ij can be identified with a complete basis for HC .
Thus, for any vector v¯ ∈ HC we get
P¯ P¯ ′v¯ = P¯ ′P¯ v¯. (3.106)
The situation is different if P and P ′ are not simultaneously knowable. Then
SC(n+m
′) = SP ′j . We have P¯ P¯ ′S¯C(n+m′) = p′jP¯ S¯C(n+m
′), but P¯ S¯C(n+
m′) 6= piS¯C(n + m′) for all i, as expressed in Fig. 3.12. Therefore we cannot
arrive at the conclusion that P¯ P¯ ′S¯C(n+m′) = P¯ ′P¯ S¯C(n+m′) in the same way
as before.
We could nevertheless try to use the same kind of basis {S¯ij} for HC as in
the case when P are simultaneously knowable. Then we could try to apply P¯ to
S¯C(n+m
′) written as a linear combination of these basis vectors. We would get
the same commutation relation [3.106] as for simultaneously knowable proper-
ties. Why is this approach forbidden? The reason is that the corresponding sets
Σij in state space do not correspond to realizable alternatives (Definition 2.52
and Statement 2.27). Referring again to Fig. 3.12, we understand that SC can
never be squeezed into any of the individual compartments Sij in Fig. 3.22(a).
The property operators simply cannot be applied to vectors that correspond to
such hypothetical states. Therefore it does not help to write S¯C(n + m
′) as a
linear combination of vectors Σ¯ij , since we cannot apply P¯ to the outcome.
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Statement 3.37 (Property operators act only on state vectors that
can occur within context). The expression P¯ v¯ is defined only for vectors v¯
in Hilbert spaces HC defined so that all v¯ ∈ HC correspond to states SC that
can be realized within the context C.
This is analogous to the fact that the evolution u1 is defined for physical
states and realizable alternatives only (Statement 2.27), not for exact states Z
or other physical states that can never be observed.
These considerations block the road for any attempt to derive the result that
P¯ and P¯ ′ commute when P and P ′ are not simultaneously knowable. As we
discussed above, in this case we should choose a Hilbert space HC with dimen-
sion max{M,M ′}, rather than M×M ′. This reduction of dimensionality means
that HC will be spanned by two ‘competing’ orthogonal bases, one associated
with P and one with P ′, as explained in connection with Fig. 3.23, rather than
a combined basis that spans a larger space. Since the two competing bases are
not orthogonal to each other, we immediately see that the corresponding two
operators cannot commute.
Statement 3.38 (Commutation rules for property operators P¯ ). Assume
that we have a context C in which two properties P and P ′ are observed in
succession. Then the pair of operators P¯ and P¯ ′ defined according to Statement
3.35 or 3.36 fulfil the following commutation rules: [P¯ , P¯ ′] ≡ 0¯ if P and P ′ are
simultaneously knowable, and [P¯ , P¯ ′] 6≡ 0¯ if they are not.
Here 0¯ is the zero operator that maps any vector to the origin.
The direction of the reasoning behind Statements 3.35 and 3.36 can be re-
versed - just like a property corresponds to a self-adjoint operator, a self-adjoint
operator corresponds to a property.
Statement 3.39 (Self-adjoint operators in HC as properties). Consider
a context C in which P is the last property to be observed. To each linear, self-
adjoint operator P¯ ′ that acts upon any vector v¯ ∈ HC and has a complete set of
DH orthonormal eigenvectors P¯ ′j that span HC , there corresponds at least one
property P ′ with DH possible values in the following sense: there exists another
context C ′ that is the same as C except that another property P ′ is observed
after P , and this property corresponds to the operator P¯ ′, in the sense expressed
in Statement 3.35 or 3.36. P ′ and P are not simultaneously knowable whenever
P¯ ′ 6= P¯ .
To see why this statement is reasonable, consider Fig. 3.31. In the top panel
we show the state space and the vector space representation inHC of the original
context C. Choose an arbitrary self-adjoint operator P¯ ′ that acts in HC . It will
have a set of orthogonal eigenvectors {v¯j} that spans HC (middle panel, right).
To define the operator uniquely, we also have to fix a set of eigenvalues {j}.
We may write
P¯ ′ ↔
{ {v¯j}
{j} (3.107)
252 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
Figure 3.31: In a context C, described by the state SO, in which property
P is observed with possible values {pi}, we may define a Hilbert space HC
with basis {S¯Pi}. We may define another arbitrary basis {v¯j} in HC . Such a
basis can always be associated with another property P ′, where we can identify
{v¯j} = S¯P ′j in another context C ′ in which P ′ is observed after P . This context
C ′ is described by the state SO′ , and must be such that a reciprocal C˜ ′ exists.
Compare Figs. 3.23 and 3.27.
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To interpret the basis {v¯j} as the vector space representation of the property
value spaces P ′j of another property P ′, we have to make a partition of the
presumed property space
PP ′ = P ∩ (⋃P ′j)
P ′j ∩ P ′l = ∅, ∀(j, l)
(3.108)
that conforms with such an interpretation. To start with, we construct the
spaces Pj so that the property space is equipartitioned with respect to P ′ (State-
ment 3.20), since this is a necessary condition for the vector space representation
(Statement 3.90). Then we let the relative volume v
(P )
ij of the intersections be-
tween Pi and Pj be given by the condition in the third row of Eq. [3.90]. That
is, the spaces P ′j may be chosen so that
v[P ′j ] = v[P ′l ], ∀(j, l)
v
(P )
ij = |〈P¯i, v¯j〉|2/2.
(3.109)
We see that sets of the desired kind always exist, but they may not be
uniquely determined by the operator P¯ ′ and its eigenvectors {v¯j}. First, we
ignore the phase factor in the third row of Eq. [3.90], so that several sets {v¯j}
of eigenvectors to P¯ ′ may be assigned the same set of property value spaces
{P ′j}. Second, the set of relative volumes {v(P )ij } does not uniquely determine
{P ′j}. The boundaries ∂P ′j may wiggle around some mean position without
changing the relative volumes.
As a last step, we have to assign values p′j to the new property P
′. Since the
property value spaces P ′j are distinct by construction, they correspond to states
of the world that are subjectively distinct. As such, they can be encoded by a
set of values {p′j}. We may set p′j = j without loss of generality, since this is
just a matter of choosing a coordinate system.
3.4.5 Composite specimens
Until now we have treated the specimen OS as a single object. Here we discuss
the cases when it is known to be composite, and when we investigate how many
objects it actually contains. The presentation will be less detailed than in the
previous sections; we just want to indicate that the concepts and the formalism
developed so far can handle these cases in a natural way.
When the possibility that the specimen is composite is allowed for, the possi-
ble outcome of an observation is affected in three ways. First, the possible values
of a property of an individual object within the specimen may be affected by
the presence of other objects. Second, we may choose to investigate how many
objects the specimen is made of; we can introduce a ‘number property’ PN .
Third, we may choose to observe collective properties, that is, properties Pc
whose values pc are a function of property values pl, pl′ , . . . of several different
objects Ol, Ol′ , . . .:
pc = f(pl, pl′ , . . .). (3.110)
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A familiar example is the total energy Ec of a composite system, where Ec =
El + El′ + . . ..
Let Pc be the collective property, and Pl the property that refers to the state
of the indivdual object Ol. We may then distinguish two kinds of contexts where
collective properties are observed. In the first kind, one or more properties Pc
are observed in succession, together with one or more properties Pl. In the
second, only collective properties Pc are observed.
In the first kind of context, the relation [3.110] may define conditional knowl-
edge - the observation of the sequence of values {pl, pl′ , . . .} may limit the set
of possible values pc of Pc, or vice versa. This situation occurs in experiments
of EPR type. Suppose that we measure the total angular momentum L of a
specimen that is known to consist of two objects O1 and O2. After that we
measure the angular momentum Lz1 in the z-direction of O1. If we find that
L = 0 and Lz1 = 1/2, then we can exclude all possible values of Lz2 except
Lz2 = −1/2.
In the second kind of context we do not actually make use of the fact that
the specimen is composite. It determines the possible values of the collective
property, but the algebraic formalism will be the same as in the case when the
specimen is a single object. Two collective properties Pc and P
′
c may or may not
be simultaneoulsy knowable, depending on the functions f and f ′ that define
them according to Eq. [3.110]. The same holds for two individual properties
Pl and P
′
l , defined for the same object Ol. We may say that the formalism is
blind to the possibility that a specimen is composite, as long as its parts are
not explicitly investigated.
Contexts in which we do not observe any collective properties Pc at all,
just a succession of individual properties Pl of one or several specimen parts,
do not introduce much new from a conceptual point of view, either. There is
little difference between the observation of a sequence of properties P, P ′, . . .
that refer to a single object, and the observation of Pl, Pl′ , . . . that refer to
different objects Ol, Ol′ , . . .. The only thing to keep in mind is that properties
that refer to different objects are always simultaneously knowable. This is true
for independent objects, at least. We assume that we are always dealing with
such objects, since two dependent objects cannot be considered truly distinct.
Definition 3.22 (Independent objects and simultaneous knowability).
Two independent objects O1 and O2 are such that any pair of independent at-
tributes (A1, A
′
2) are simultaneously knowable, where A1 is an internal attribute
of O1 and A
′
2 is an internal attribute of O2.
This condition sharpens the previous definitions of independent objects and
independent attributes (Definitions 1.18 and 1.19). Not only shall any value
of the independent attribute A′2 be possible given the value of A1, the value of
A′2 shall also be possible to determine at the same time as that of A1, so that
the independence of A′2 becomes manifest. This condition guarantees that the
arguments in Eq. [3.110] can be known at the same time, which is necessary
in order to make the collective property value pc knowable, which in turn is
necessary to make the collective property Pc well defined. Note also that this is
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a statement of principle, a statement about what is allowed by physical law. A
given observational context C may be such that it is not possible to verify the
independence of the attributes of two independent objects within this particular
context.
To conclude, the fact that we allow the specimen to be composite intro-
duces two new possibilites, from a conceptual point of view. First, conditional
knowledge may arise from the interplay between the observation of collective
and individual properties. Second, we may investigate how many objects the
specimen is made of. In other words, we may introduce a ‘number property’ PN
with values pN = 1, 2, . . ..
After this general orientation, let us look at the appropriate formalism. As-
sume that OS is known to consist of two objects O1 and O2 with states SO1 and
SO2, respectively. If there is no conditional knowledge relating the two objects,
then SOS = SO1∩SO2. The existence of conditional knowledge means that some
exact states Z ∈ SO1∩SO2 can be excluded, so that SOS ⊂ SO1∩SO2. Let us try
to define the algebraic representation of the contextual state SC ⊇ SOS of the
composite specimen appropriately, with the possibility of conditional knowledge
in mind.
Any conditional knowledge that relates the attributes of objects O1 and O2
must arise either from some previous observation of a collective property, or from
the ability to exclude a set of possible attribute values of O1 or O2 from the
very fact that they belong to the same specimen, according to the observation
above that the set of allowed individual property values may change due to the
interaction between the objects within the specimen. However, the latter case
can be seen as an example of the former, where the knowledge that the objects
are parts of a specimen with a given nature can be regarded as the result of ‘an
observation of a collective property’.
Assume first that there is no conditional knowledge that relates the at-
tributes of objects O1 and O2. Then the same holds true for any property P
that is a function of the attributes of one of the objects only. Say that we are
about to observe such a property P of object O1. No observation is made of
the other object O2; we assume that it is just a passive passenger within the
specimen. Focusing on the relevant object, we may write, as before,
S¯C1(n) =
∑
j
ajS¯Pj1. (3.111)
To indicate the knowledge of the existence of O2 we may simply attach its state
to this expression, and represent the contextual state of the enitre specimen as
follows:
S¯C(n) = S¯C2(n)S¯C1(n)
= S¯C2(n)
∑
j ajS¯Pj1.
(3.112)
Note that we have not yet assigned any algebraic meaning to this side-by-side
notation. As usual, we suppose that the observation of P takes place at time
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AND OR
Knowledge space ∪ ∩
State space ∩ ∪
Algebraic space × +
Table 3.2: Symbols expressing corresponding relations between two objects in
knowledge space, in state space and in algebraic (Hilbert) space.
n+m. The state ofO2 does not change in the temporal update n+m−1→ n+m,
since, by assumption, no observation is made of O2. We should therefore write
S¯C(n+m) = S¯C2(n)S¯Pj1
= S¯C2(n+m)S¯C1(n+m),
(3.113)
for one of the j:s, to keep the notation consistent with Eq. [3.112]. The purpose
of such an expansion is to express the possible outcomes of a complete set of
future alternatives S˜j . Since the possible contextual states after observation are
given by the top row of Eq. [3.113], we may replace Eq. [3.112] with
S¯C(n) =
∑
j
ajS¯C2(n)S¯Pj1. (3.114)
We have identified the distributive law
S¯Cα(a2S¯Cβ + a3S¯Cγ) = a2S¯CαS¯Cβ + a3S¯CαS¯Cγ . (3.115)
The indexation is generalized to make the algebraic rule stand out clearly, but
this is allowed since the relation nevertheless don’t make any operational sense
except in contextual expressions such as Eqs. [3.112] and [3.114], where the
proper indexation is given by the circumstances. The ordering between the
states in the side-by-side notation carries no meaning, since it is just introduced
to indicate the existence of two objects. Neither does the ordering between the
complex coefficient aj and a state S¯C , since aj just indicates the contextual rel-
ative volume associated with the combined states of the two objects. Therefore
the following commutative laws also hold:
S¯CαS¯Cβ = S¯CβS¯Cα
S¯Caj = ajS¯C .
(3.116)
We can therefore identify the side-by-side notation with ordinary multiplication:
S¯CαS¯Cβ ↔ S¯Cα × S¯Cβ . (3.117)
This fact completes the dictionary displayed in Table 3.2, showing how relations
between object states are expressed in knowledge space, in state space and in
the (partial) algebraic representation that we have developed most recently.
Assume next that we still consider a context C in which we observe one
property P of objectO1, and no property ofO2, but that there is now conditional
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knowledge that relates the value of P with the values of some property P ′ of
object O2. As discussed in section 2.2 this means that there is a value pj of P
such that there is at least one value p′j′ of P
′ that can be excluded in the final
state of potential knowledge given that pj is observed. To express this fact we
must expand the contextual state SC2 in the expression of SC , even if no actual
observation of object O2 is made within the context.
S¯C2(n) =
∑
j′
S¯P ′j′2. (3.118)
Note that since no future alternatives are defined for the state SO2 of object
O2, there are no relative volumes associated with these alternatives, and con-
sequently we cannot define any contextual numbers aj′ . Equation [3.118] is
therefore an algebraic expression that cannot be seen as an element in a Hilbert
space. We express
S¯C(n) =
∑
jj′
aj∂jj′ S¯Pj′2S¯Pj1, (3.119)
where ∂jj′ = 0 if the property value pair (pj , p
′
j′) is excluded by conditional
knowledge and ∂jj′ = 1 otherwise. When observation of property P takes place
at time n+m and value pj is found, we have
SC(n+m) =
(∑
j′ ∂jj′ S¯Pj′2
)
S¯Pj1
= SC2(n+m)SC1(n+m)
(3.120)
Note however that we must write
S¯C(n) 6= S¯C2(n)S¯C1(n) (3.121)
since SC2(n) as given by Eq. [3.118] multiplied by SC1(n) =
∑
j ajS¯Pj does not
yield Eq. [3.119]. The representation of the combined contextual state of two
parts of the specimen does not factorize if there is conditional knowledge that
relates these parts. This ‘frustration’ of the state is released when an actual
observation is made; then the conditional knowledge disappears. To express it
more simply: if we have the conditional knowledge A⇒ B, and observe whether
A holds true, we no longer have any conditional knowledge. We have instead
the knowledge A AND B or NOT A.
We may imagine that the values of P are related by conditional knowledge
to more than one property of object O2. Such cases can be reduced to the case
discussed above if we consider such a set of properties {Pα, Pβ , . . .} as a single
property P ′ with vectorial values p′ = (pα, pβ , . . .).
We argued above that a context in which we observe a collective property of
a composite specimen is formally equivalent to a context in which we observe
an individual property of a specimen that consists of a single object. Let us
make that statement a bit more precise. Consider the example illustrated in
Fig. 3.32. We assume that the individual objects do not interact, and we
define a collective energy Ec = E1 +E2. The energy values consistent with our
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Figure 3.32: A specimen that consists of two objects O1 and O2 may be treated
as a single object Oc if we do not make any observation of its parts, and they
play no other individual role within the context. In this example, the objects
are assumed to be non-interacting, and the energy Ec = E1 + E2 of the entire
specimen is measured. The individual energies can take the values 1 or 2.
a) The specimen is viewed as composite, where the two parts have individual
states SO1 and SO2. b) The specimen is viewed as a single object, with state
Sc = SO1 ∩ SO2. The energy of the entire specimen can take the values 2, 3 or
4.
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knowledge of objects O1 and O2 are E1 ∈ {1, 2} and E2 ∈ {1, 2}. Since we have
not prepared a context to observe the individual energies, we cannot introduce
any coefficients aj when we expand the individual contextual states, just like in
the motivation of Eq. [3.118]. We get instead
S¯C1(n) = S¯P11 + S¯P21
S¯C2(n) = S¯P12 + S¯P22,
(3.122)
and
S¯C(n) = a1S¯P11S¯P12 + a2(S¯P11S¯P22 + S¯P21S¯P12)+
+a3S¯P21S¯P22,
(3.123)
which reduces to
S¯C(n+m) = S¯P11S¯P12 OR
S¯C(n+m) = S¯P11S¯P22 + S¯P21S¯P12 OR
S¯C(n+m) = S¯P21S¯P22
(3.124)
when the collective energy is measured at time n+m.
Let us define the collective object Oc with state Sc = SO1 ∩SO2, and future
alternatives
S˜c1 = Σ11 ∩ Σ12
S˜c2 = (Σ11 ∩ Σ22) ∪ (Σ21 ∩ Σ12)
S˜c3 = Σ21 ∩ Σ22,
(3.125)
corresponding to the collective property values Ec = 2, Ec = 3, or Ec = 4,
respectively, with Σij = SOj ∩ P˜ij according to Fig. 3.32. (As usual, we denote
subsets of states that do not correspond to realizable alternatives with the Greek
letter Σ rather than the Latin letter S.) Then we may equally well describe the
context collectively:
S¯cC(n) = a1S¯cP1 + a2S¯cP2 + a3S¯cP3 (3.126)
with collective property value states
S¯cP1 = S¯P11S¯P12
S¯cP2 = S¯P11S¯P22 + S¯P21S¯P12
S¯cP3 = S¯P21S¯P22.
(3.127)
When the collective energy Ec is measured, the state of the collective object
reduces to
S¯cC(n+m) = S¯cPj (3.128)
for j = 1, 2 or 3 with probability |aj |2.
We have discussed at length something that is quite simple to understand.
The we have done so since the conclusion important as a matter of principle.
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The epistemic perspective dictates that if the assumption that an object Oc
consists of two objects O1 and O2 plays no role in the actual investigation or
manipulation of Oc, then it should play no role in the formalism, and should
not affect the outcome of calculations in any way. In this respect, the formalism
described here differs from conventional quantum mechanics. There, coefficients
aj1 and aj′2 would have been assigned to the property value states S¯Pj1 and
S¯Pj′2 in Eq. [3.122]. Here, we only consider realizable alternatives as elements
in a Hilbert space, or alternatives that are known to play a role within the
context even if it is outside potential knowledge which alternative is actually
realized (knowability level 3). The passage of one of the two slits in the double
slit experiment is the classical example.
Let us turn our attention to contexts in which the composition of the speci-
men certainly matters, namely those in which we count the number of objects.
Sticking to the example shown in Fig. 3.32, suppose that we have measured the
total energy to be Ec = 3. We are no longer sure that the specimen consists
of two objects, but we still know that all objects Ol that we may find within
it have possible individual energies El ∈ {1, 2}. Thus we are dealing with at
most three objects; let us call them O1, O2 and O3. Obeying the formalism
introduced above, we write
S¯C(n) = a1S¯P11S¯P12S¯P13+
+a2(S¯P11S¯P22 + S¯P11S¯P23+
+S¯P21S¯P12 + S¯P21S¯P13+
+S¯P12S¯P23 + S¯P22S¯P13).
(3.129)
We will see two objects with probability |a1|2 and three objects with prob-
ability |a2|2. By assumption, we investigate only the number of objects in the
specimen, not their identity. Therefore we get
S¯C(n+m) = S¯P11S¯P22 + S¯P11S¯P23 + S¯P21S¯P12+
+S¯P21S¯P13 + S¯P12S¯P23 + S¯P22S¯P13
(3.130)
if we observe two objects at time n + m. We may dicriminate between the
six combinations of two objects in a subsequent observation of their internal
attributes, and thereby reduce the state further. However, it is impossible to
make such a discrimination if the objects O1, O2 and O3 are identical. Two
objects are identical whenever the knowledge about the internal attributes is
the same for both. This may be the case for minimal objects, for example.
To make it meaningful to talk about different objects in such a situation, it
is necessary to assume that the values of some relational attributes can be
distinguished, such as their position. To acknowledge that we are dealing with
identical objects, we write Ol = O1 = O2 = O3, but to indicate that disjunct
sets of possible values are associated with their relational attibutes, we represent
their contextual states as S¯Cl, S¯
′
Cl, and, if three objects appear, S¯
′′
Cl. Equation
[3.129] transforms to
S¯C(n) = a1S¯P1lS¯
′
P1lS¯
′′
P1l + a2S¯P1lS¯
′
P2l. (3.131)
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To arrive at this expression, remember that the symbol ‘+’ in this representation
does not mean that we should add things up, but that it corresponds to ‘OR’,
according to Table 3.2. If the objects are identical, there are no longer six
distinct alternative arrangements of two objects with energies 1 and 2, but just
one. The three terms contract to one.
In cases where it is impossible to distinguish both the internal and relational
attributes of two objects from each other, it does not make epistemic sense to
talk about two objects at all. This matter will be discussed further in section
3.10. If we nevertheless want to represent such a situation with the present
formalism, we should drop the apostrophes, write S¯Cl = S¯C1 = S¯C2 = S¯C3 and
S¯C(n) = a1S¯P1lS¯P1lS¯P1l + a2S¯P1lS¯P2l. (3.132)
It is redundant to write the same state three times in the first term above. All
states in expressions like these are identical, except possibly for the value of a
well defined property (energy in our example). We may therefore use instead a
variable N indicating how many ‘objects’ there are in the property value state
that is placed after it:
S¯C(n) = a1N11S¯P1l + a2N21S¯P1lN22S¯P2l, (3.133)
with N11 = 3 and N21 = N22 = 1.
Let us finally say a few words about the operator representation of collective
properties specified as in Eq. [3.110]. When we observe an individual property
of an object Ol in a specimen that contains other objects Ol′ as well, we need to
specify which object the corresponding property operator acts upon. Let P¯ be
an operator that represents the property P , and let P¯l be the operator defined
in HC that refers to property P of object Ol.
We may then define there operators so that
P¯lS¯Cl′ = S¯Cl′ (3.134)
whenever l 6= l′. That is, the property operator for a given object in the speci-
men does not affect the contextual state of another object within the specimen.
It follows that any two property operators that act on different independent
objects commute: P¯lP¯l′ S¯C = P¯l′ P¯lS¯C for any contextual state representation
S¯C , or
[P¯l, P¯l′ ] = 0 (3.135)
whenever l 6= l′. Therefore, if the function f in Eq. [3.110] is infinitely differen-
tiable, we can use its Taylor expansion to define
P¯c = f(P¯l, P¯l′ , . . .). (3.136)
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3.4.6 Knowability of physical law
Until now we have considered predefined contexts, fixed experimental setups
for which the relevant relative volumes vj and corresponding amplitudes aj are
constants. But to understand physical law means to be able to specify how the
outcome of an observation depends on the parameters that specify the context.
In other words, we need to let these parameters vary.
There are two ways to vary such parameters. We may vary the values of
those attributes that specify the initial state SO(n) of the experimental setup
that defines the context (Fig. 3.15). We may also vary the time at which we
observe the outcome. However, these two kinds of variations are linked. The
initial preparation of the specimen OS, and the final observation of OS that
define the ‘outcome’ define two distinct object states, or two events. Clearly,
the relational time t passed between these two events is, loosely speaking, a
function of the attributes that define the observational setup O.
Here, we do not consider variations in the initial state SOB(n) of the observer
(Fig. 3.15). Such a change might in itself influence the time t passed until the
outcome is observed. However, we want to focus on physical law that governs
the evolution of the observed specimen OS rather than the evolution of the
observer. Further, we do not consider variations in the initial state SΩO (n) of
the environment ΩO to the experimental setup O (Definition 1.23). We assume
that the interaction between ΩO and O can be made arbitrarily small, so that
the physical law that governs the specimen OS itself can be investigated to
arbitrary precision. Implicit in such a statement is also the assumption that the
influence on OS from the environment decreases smoothly with the strength of
the interaction.
In terms of the evolution parameter σ, the fact that the state of the detector
does not change appreciably before the observation of property P at time n+m
(Definition 3.6) can be expressed as
SOD(σ0) ∩ SOD(σ) 6= ∅, (3.137)
where SOD(σ0) = SOD(n), and we assume that σ ≥ σ0. (We have to assume
that the state SOD is specified in terms of relativistically invariant attributes.
If not, the attributes of the apparatus would change if it were not in the rest
frame of the observer.) In contrast, nothing prevents the state of the specimen
to vary during the course of the experiment, so that
SOS(σ0) ∩ SOS(σ) = ∅. (3.138)
Since the state of the specimen OS is allowed to move arbitrarily far away
from SOS(n) under the action of u(σ) during the course of the experiment, so
is the entire experimental setup O, consisting of apparatus and specimen. That
is, we may have
SO(σ0) ∩ SO(σ) = ∅. (3.139)
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Figure 3.33: An experimental setup whose initial state SO(n) depends on the
attributes x and y, which specify the state SOA(n) of the apparatus OA. We let
the value of the (unknowable) evolution parameter just before the specimen OS
arrives at the detector screen OD be σk when the distance between the particle
gun and the detector is yk.
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This is possible regardless the behavior of the machine OM , which may or may
not undergo a sequence of distinct, directly perceived changes between times n
and n+m.
Figure 3.33 is intended to illustrate the abstract discussion above. This
setup O, designed to execute a double-slit experiment, consists of particle gun,
an ejected particle, a screen with slits, and a detector screen OD. The ejected
particle is the specimen OS. The machine OM is the particle gun and the
screen with slits.
The distance between the particle gun and the detector screen is variable,
as well as the distance between the slits. These two attributes belong to the
apparatus OA, and their values y and x does not change significantly during
the course of the experiment. The apparatus is fixed. That is, SOD(σ0) ∩
SOD(σ) 6= ∅ and SOM (σ0) ∩ SOM (σ) 6= ∅ during the entire experiment. The
specimen moves through the slits towards the detector. Thus its state cannot
be considered constant between the two events that mark the beginning and the
end of the experiment. We must have SOS(σ0)∩SOS(σ) = ∅ for some σ during
the course of the experiment.
The final observation of the specimen at the detector screen at time n+m
corresponds to a state reduction, since the state of the specimen covers a vast
area in the (x, y)-plane just before detection, whereas its spatial location is
much more accurately known afterwards, provided the spatial resolution of the
detector is reasonable. This fact implies that
SOS(n+m) ⊂ u1SOS(n+m− 1)
SOD(n+m) ⊂ u1SOD(n+m− 1)
SO(n+m) ⊂ u1SO(n+m− 1).
(3.140)
In contrast, the machine does not necessarily have to undergo a perceived
change. We may have
SOM (n+m) = u1SOM (n+m− 1). (3.141)
As we seek to express the outcome of an observation as a function of the
parameters that specify the initial state, it is wise to keep the complete set {S˜j}
of future alternatives that define the possible outcomes constant as we vary
these parameters. We have previously defined these in terms of a set of values
{pj} of a property P , so that S˜j ≡ SO ∩ P˜j (Definitions 2.50 and 2.51). Here,
we make the analogous definition, referring to the specimen OS rather than the
entire setup O. That is, S˜j ≡ SOS ∩ P˜j .
Under the condition that we keep {S˜j} constant, we look for the state
SOS(n + m − 1) just before the observation is made at time n + m, so that
SOS(n + m) = Sj for some j. We let the initial state of the specimen be
SOS(n). To make the notation simple, we introduce
S0 = SOS(n)
S1 = SOS(n+m− 1)
S2 = SOS(n+m).
(3.142)
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Trying to use the conceptual framework presented above in a straightforward
manner, understanding physical law could mean to know the function f in the
expression
S1 = f(S0, {υi}) (3.143)
where {υi} is a set of attribute values that specify at time n the apparatus OA
that is part of the observational context C. In the setup shown in Fig. 3.33 we
may set υ1 ≡ x and υ2 ≡ y.
There are problems with this expression, however. We cannot assume that
knowledge is complete, neither about the specimen OS, nor about the appa-
ratus OA. The irreducibility of physical law (Statement 2.8) then makes Eq.
[3.143] invalid. The exact values {υi} should be replaced by intervals of values
{υmini , υmaxi } that are not excluded by potential knowledge. We may try to write
S1 = f(S0, {υmini , υmaxi }). (3.144)
However, this expression is valid only for states SO(n) specified by a number
of independent intervals {υmini , υmaxi }, meaning that the state takes the form of
a rectangle in a state space where the values of each attribute are repesented
along an axis perpendicular to all the others. This may not be the case if there
is conditional knowledge that relate values of different attributes υi and υi′ .
Furthermore, we cannot take for granted that the boundary values υmini and
υmaxi are exactly knowable, according to the discussion in Section 2.3.
This means that it is not possible in general to formulate physical law in
terms of a well-defined response δS1 in the evolved state S1 to a change of an
attribute value, or of a value interval:
δS1 6= f ′(dυi)
δS1 6= f ′′(dυmini )
δS1 6= f ′′′(dυmaxi ).
(3.145)
This conclusion can be applied to relational time t, just like to any other
attribute. It is therefore not possible to express physical law in a precise manner
as
S1 6= f(S0, t). (3.146)
It is most often possible in practice, however. It goes without saying that
this approach has been an outstanding success for centuries. In a similar way
it is, of course, possible to express the response to changes in other attributes
to a high degree of precision. For instance, we can calculate the response in
the interference pattern when the distance x between the slits is changed. The
inherent uncertainty in the value of x, and conditional knowledge that relates
different parts of the apparatus, most often play very little role.
Fair enough, but we are interested in those precise statements about physical
law that we can make in principle, statements based on what can be actually
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known about the physical state. Since we have excluded all attributes as numer-
ical arguments in a functional expression of physical law, we are left with the
evolution parameter σ (section 3.1). With SOA(σ0) = SOA(n), and choosing a
parametrization such that σ0 = 0 we may write
S1 = f(S0, SOA(0), σf ), (3.147)
where σf is the ‘final’ value of the evolution parameter at time n+m− 1, just
before the observation of the relevant property P . We assume, as an idealization,
that the specimen and apparatus is isolated from the environment. Expression
[3.147] should be compared with the previous attempts [3.143] and [3.144].
The prize to pay for the functional precision is that σf is not an observable
quantity. With a proper parametrization we can, however, relate it closely to
the relational time t passed between sequential time instants n and n + m, or
the Lorentz distance l2 in space-time travesed by the specimen. We may, for
example, choose the parametrization so that σf = 〈t〉, or σf = 〈l2〉, where 〈. . .〉
denotes the expected value, defined in some convenient way.
The ideas are illustrated in Fig. 3.34. We ‘simulate’ the actual movement
of the detector screen by a change of σf , roughly interpreted as the value of
the evolution parameter when the detection takes place at time n + m. Two
contexts C and C ′ are indicated, one in which the detector is placed before the
passage of the slits, and one in which it is placed after the passage. In the first
case (dashed detector), we have S1 = SOS(σf ), and in the second case (solid
detector), we have S1 = SOS(σ
′
f ), where σ
′
f > σf . Contexts C and C
′ may be
seen as members of a family of contexts C(σf ). If we restict the possible initial
settings SOA(0) of the apparatus to this one-parameter family, we may remove
this argument in Eq. [3.147] and write
S1 = f(S0, σf ), (3.148)
The property P that is observed is the position along the x-axis at the
detector screen. As noted above, we keep the alternatives defined by the possible
values {pj} constant as we vary the context within the family C(σf ). We have
{pj} = {x1, x2, . . . , x6, p7}, where property value p7 is introduced to make the
set of future alternatives complete. It corresponds to the event that the specimen
never hits the detector in one of the six compartments of the detector. This
event occurs if the specimen passes beside the detector, or if it never passes one
of the slits since it hits the walls that define them.
The strategy to keep the alternatives fixed means that the relative volumes
vj ≡ v[S˜j ] may depend on σf . In the setup shown in Fig. 3.34 we have, for
example, v[S˜1] ≡ v[S˜1(σf )] = 0, whereas v[S˜′1] ≡ v[S1(σ′f )] 6= 0. The same is
true for the corresponding contextual numbers aj , so that we may write
vj = fj(S
0, {S˜j}, σf )
aj = gj(S
0, {S˜j}, σf ). (3.149)
These statements may seem confusing, since we have concluded that relative
volumes of future alternatives are invariant under the application of the evolu-
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Figure 3.34: Two members of a family C(σf ) of observational contexts, where a
change in the vertical position y of the detector screen is simulated by a change
in the value of σ at which the observation takes place. The property P that
is observed is the position x along the detector screen. The possible values are
pj = xj . This set of values is the same in all contexts that belong to C(σf ).
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tion operator u1 (Statement 2.24), which means that they are independent of σ.
However, we need to distinguish the ‘final’ value σf of the evolution parameter
just before we observe the specimen OS from the evolution parameter σ itself,
which interpolates between the initiation of the context at time n, and the ob-
servation at time n+m, according to the discussion in Section 3.1. For a given
context in the family C(σf ), the relative volumes are independent of σ, which
may vary in the range [0, σf ].
Equation [3.149] summarizes what can be said in precise functional form
about physical law. To be able to actually find the functions fj and gj , we
must be able to ‘execute’ the same context over and over again, so that the
relative volumes can be determined. In that case they can be interpreted as
probabilities, as discussed in section 3.2. This presupposes the ability to isolate
the experimental setup O from the environment to arbitrarily high degree. Fur-
ther, this must be possible for all σf in some interval of interest, corresponding
to a one-parameter family of contexts C(σf ). However, since σf is not an ob-
servable that can be determined to arbitrarily high precision, it is not possible,
even in principle, to repeat the experiment for fixed σf . Therefore the actual
form of physical law, as expressed in Eq. [3.149], is not possible to determine
from experiment to arbitrarily high precision. We may say that physical law in
this form is formally well-defined, but unknowable in its details, just like the
physical state (section 2.3).
Statement 3.40 (Physical law). Those aspects of physical law that in princi-
ple can be expressed in functional form with numerical arguments are captured
by the functions fj and gj in Eq. [3.149].
Statement 3.41 (Physical law is not exactly knowable). It is not possible
to determine the functions fj and gj in Eq. [3.149] to arbitrary precision with
the help of repeated observations. This holds true for any specimen in any initial
state S0, and for any family of contexts C(σf ).
Figuratively speaking, the ‘detector comb’ in Fig. 3.34 is our tool to dissect
the state SOS and learn about it. By varying its position and orientation we
can learn what it possible to know about the physical law that governs its
behaviour. In essence, the unknowability of physical law stems from the facts
that we cannot know the state SOS exactly, and we cannot know the exact
position and orientation of the detector comb. This does not prevent us from
hypothesizing exact forms of fj and gj via theoretic reasoning, of course. The
point is that such hypotheses cannot be checked experimentally to arbitrary
precision.
Let us nevertheless discuss an idealized situation. We assume that fj and
gj are indeed exactly known, even if this contradicts Statement 3.41. Say that
property P is observed in a context C. We assume that C is fundamental
(Definition 3.13), so that each property value pj that corresponds to the future
alternative S˜j corresponds to a single numerical value, not a set of values allowed
by physical law. The expected value of the property P just before we observe
it at time n+m will be 〈p〉 = ∑j vjpj/∑j vj . (If physical law cannot exclude
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any real value of P , the sum should be replaced by an integral.) We may then
write down the implicit relations
vj = fj(S
0, 〈p〉)
aj = gj(S
0, 〈p〉). (3.150)
Note that we omit the complete set of future alternatives {S˜j} as an argument in
these functions. Since C is assumed to be fundamental, {S˜j} is predetermined
to correspond to the entire set of values {pj} allowed by physical law.
If the property that we observe within context is the relational time t passed
since the initiation of the context at sequential time n, then we have
vj = fj(S
0, 〈t〉)
aj = gj(S
0, 〈t〉). (3.151)
We have regained the familiar form of physical law, reinterpreting the conven-
tional temporal parameter t as the expected value 〈t〉 of the relational attribute
t. Note, however, that these relations hold only in fundamental contexts C
in which t is actually measured. In that case we may speak about families of
contexts C(〈t〉).
We will discuss in section 3.4.8 the so called natural parametrization d〈t〉/dσ =
1 in fundamental contexts in which four-position r4 = (x, y, z, ict) is observed.
Since t is one of the observed properties we may express physical law either in
the form [3.149] or in the form [3.151]. Simply put, since we may set σ = 〈t〉,
we may identify the families of contexts C(σ) and C(〈t〉).
We may choose to observe the energy E of the specimen rather than t. Then
we may use Eq. [3.150] to define a family of fundamental contexts C(〈E〉). This
family has no trivial relation to C(〈t〉). The contexts in the two families are
fundamentally different, since different properties are observed. We will discuss
such contexts in section 3.7.
Statement 3.42 (Idealized physical law). Suppose that property P is ob-
served in the fundamental context C, and that the functions fj and gj in Eq.
[3.149] are exactly known. Then we may define a family of contexts C(〈p〉)
where the ‘evolution’ is given by Eq. [3.150].
We put the world ‘evolution’ within citation marks since Eq. [3.150] de-
scribes continuous temporal evolution only if t is observed. If another property
is observed, such as energy E, we have to make a more involved description of
what the equations say. Generally, they specify the probabilities to see different
values of P at time n + m as a function of the expected value of P , given the
initial state of the specimen at time n.
3.4.7 The wave function
Suppose that all members in a family of contexts C(σf ) are possible to express
in a Hilbert space representation according to Statement 3.33. Then the state
of the specimen just before observation of property P can be represented as
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S¯C(σf ) =
∑
j
aj(σf )S¯Pj (3.152)
The fact that we do not change the set of future alternatives {S˜j} as we let
the context vary within the family C(σf ) is reflected in the fact that the set
of property value states {S¯Pj} does not depend on σf in the above equation.
In order to simplify the notation, we will drop the subscript f on the ‘final’
evolution parameter σf . That is, we write
S¯C(σ) =
∑
j
aj(σ)S¯Pj . (3.153)
We refer to the discussion in the preceding section to avoid confusion on the
meaning of the symbol σ in the following sections.
Definition 3.23 (The wave function aP (pj , σ)). Suppose that we use varia-
tions in the evolution parameter σ as a proxy for variations of a property that
determines the physical setup of an observational context C. Then aP (pj , σ) ≡
aj(σ), where aj(σ) is given by Eq. [3.153]. The wave function specifies the con-
textual state SC just before the observation of the contextual property PC , which
may have fewer possible values than a corresponding fundamental property P .
The domain of aP (pj , σ) is ({p1, p2, . . . , pM}, [0, σmax]) for some arbitrary σmax
that depends on the parametrization, and the details of the family of contexts
C(σ).
Note that we have to add the index P to the wave function since it is only
defined together with the property P that we are about to observe. The function
a(x, y) has no physical meaning in itself.
By definition of relative volume, we have, for all σ and for any complete set
of future alternatives {S˜j} corresponding to the values {pj} of property P :
1 =
∑
j |aj(σ)|2
=
∑
j
∑
j′ a
∗
j (σ)aj′(σ)〈S¯Pj , S¯Pj′〉
= 〈S¯C(σ), S¯C(σ)〉
=
∥∥S¯C(σ)∥∥2
(3.154)
We may transform these simple relations into a couple of more fancy state-
ments and definitions.
Statement 3.43 (The wave function aP (pj , σ) is always normalized).
We have
∑
j |aP (pj , σ)|2 = 1 for all σ in the domain of aP .
Statement 3.44 (The contextual state vector S¯C(σ) has unit norm).
We have
∥∥S¯C(σ)∥∥ = 1 for all σ in the domain of the context family C(σ).
Definition 3.24 (The contextual evolution operator uC(σ)). The operator
u¯C(σ) is defined by the relation S¯C(σ) ≡ u¯C(σ)S¯C(0).
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Figure 3.35: a) A family of contexts C(σ) in which one property P is observed.
b) A family of contexts C(σ, σ′) in which two properties P and P ′ are observed
in succession.
Here S¯C(0) is a limiting context such that the variation of the experimental
setup that corresponds to a change of σ cannot be pushed further. To give an
example, we may consider the double slit experiment, and let variations in the
position y of the detector screen correspond to changes in σ (Fig. 3.34). Then
we may let S¯C(0) be the context in which the screen is pushed all the way up
to the particle gun.
Statement 3.45 (The contextual evolution operator u¯C(σ) is unitary).
For any family of contexts C(σ) we have
∥∥S¯C(0)∥∥ = 1 and ∥∥u¯C(σ)S¯C(0)∥∥ = 1
for all σ in the domain of C(σ).
The wave function aP (pi, σ) is no longer defined after the observation of P .
We may, however, observe a second property P ′ in the same context C. Then
we may define a second wave function aP ′(p
′
j , σ
′) that represents the contextual
state just before P ′ is observed. The evolution parameter σ′ is completely
independent from σ. It describes variations in the experimental setup that
affect the relational time tPP ′ that passes between the observations of P and
P ′. We may thus define a family C(σ, σ′) of contexts in which two properties P
and P ′ are observed (Fig. 3.35). The notation can obviously be generalized to
contexts with three or more properties.
There is one situation in which we can use a single evolution parameter σ
to describe contexts in which two properties are observed. Then we have to
consider a pair of reciprocal contexts C and C˜ (Definition 3.17). For a given σ,
we just switch the order in which P and P ′ are observed, and assume that this
can be done so that the contextual numbers are preserved according to Definition
3.16. The fact that we use the same σ in both C and C˜ means that we consider
the same variations in the experimental setup regardless which property P or
P ′ is observed first. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 3.36. If we consider the
members of the context pair together, without any predefined ordering, we can
define the joint family of contexts CC˜(σ) [compare Fig. 3.27(b)].
Definition 3.25 (The joint contextual state vector S¯CC˜(σ)). Consider
a pair (C, C˜) of reciprocal contexts described by the joint family CC˜(σ). Then
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Figure 3.36: a) A family of contexts C(σ) in which two properties P and P ′ are
observed. b) A family of reciprocal contexts C˜(σ) where the same σ is used.
We may define the joint family of contexts CC˜(σ).
S¯CC˜(σ) is defined in the joint Hilbert space HCC˜ , so that we may write S¯CC˜(σ) =∑
i aP (pi, σ)S¯Pi =
∑
j a˜P ′(p
′
j , σ)S¯P ′j, where S¯C(σ) =
∑
i aP (pi, σ)S¯Pi and
S¯C˜(σ) =
∑
j a˜P ′(p
′
j , σ)S¯P ′j.
Simply put, we define the joint contextual state vector so that we are allowed
to make a change of basis like in Fig. 3.23(b) and still talk about ‘the same’
state vector. It also allows us to apply the two different property operators P¯
and P¯ ′ to the same state vector.
P¯ S¯CC˜ =
∑
i aP (pi, σ)piS¯Pi
P¯ ′S¯CC˜ =
∑
j a˜P ′(p
′
j , σ)p
′
jS¯P ′j
(3.155)
In contrast, to the state vector S¯C we can only apply the operator P¯ , and
to the state vector S¯C˜ we can only apply the operator P¯
′.
P¯ S¯C =
∑
i aP (pi, σ)piS¯Pi
P¯ ′S¯C˜ =
∑
j a˜P ′(p
′
j , σ)p
′
jS¯P ′j
(3.156)
The expressions P¯ ′S¯C and P¯ S¯C˜ are not defined.
Strictly speaking, we consider here the contextual property operators P¯C
that correspond to the contextual property PC , or the discretized property P
M
(Definition 3.21). As discussed above, the property PC has just as many values
M as there are alternatives S˜i, which means that the property values of the
fundamental property P are sometimes grouped together into M bins. However,
we drop the index C to simplify notation.
The fact that we can express the same joint state vector S¯CC˜ in either basis
{S¯Pi} or {S¯P ′j} according to Definition 3.25 means that we can re-express Eq.
[3.155] as
P¯ S¯CC˜ =
∑
i(P¯PaP )S¯Pi =
∑
j(P¯P ′ a˜P ′)S¯P ′j
P¯ ′S¯CC˜ =
∑
i(P¯
′
PaP )S¯Pi =
∑
j(P¯
′
P ′ a˜P ′)S¯P ′j
(3.157)
for a quadruplet of operators (P¯P , P¯P ′ , P¯ ′P , P¯ ′P ′), where we have suppressed the
arguments of the wave functions for clarity.
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Definition 3.26 (The wave function property operators). In a joint con-
text CC˜, the quadruplet of operators (P¯P , P¯P ′ , P¯ ′P , P¯ ′P ′) are defined by Eq.
[3.157]. We may say that P¯P is the operator corresponding to property P that
acts on the wave function when it is expressed in terms of P , and that P¯P ′ is the
operator corresponding to P that acts on the wave function when it is expressed
in terms of P . The interpretation of P¯ ′P and P¯ ′P ′ is analogous.
If we adopt array representations [a1(σ), a2(σ), . . . , aM (σ)]
T and [a˜1(σ), a˜2(σ), . . . , a˜M (σ)]
T
of the wave functions aP (pi, σ) and a˜P (p
′
j , σ), respectively, we can express the
wave function property operators as matrices. In particular, the operators P¯P
and P¯ ′P ′ become diagonal.
P¯P =

p1 0 . . . 0
0 p2 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . pM
 P¯ ′P ′ =

p′1 0 . . . 0
0 p′2 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . p′M
 (3.158)
From Statement 3.35 or 3.36 we get the familiar expressions for the expec-
tation value 〈p〉 of P just before it is about to be observed.
〈p〉 = 〈S¯C , P¯ S¯C〉 = 〈S¯CC˜ , P¯ S¯CC˜〉
〈p′〉 = 〈S¯C˜ , P¯ ′S¯C˜〉 = 〈S¯CC˜ , P¯ ′S¯CC˜〉
(3.159)
If we express the wave function in terms of P , we get from Eq. [3.157]
〈p〉 = ∑i a∗P (pi)[P¯PaP ](pi) = ∑i |aP (pi)|2pi
〈p′〉 = ∑i a∗P (pi)[P¯ ′PaP ](pi) (3.160)
Corresponding equations hold if we express the wave function in terms of P ′.
From the last equality we may identify the relation P¯PaP (p) = piaP (p), which
holds whenever the expression on the left hand side appears as a term in a sum.
In such a situation we may therefore simply write
P¯P = pi. (3.161)
This relation will hold for any property P , and can be used instead of the matrix
representation [3.158].
Definition 3.27 (Eigenfunctions and eigenvalues to wave function op-
erators). Let S¯P ′j be an eigenvector to the operator P¯
′ defined in some contex-
tual Hilbert space HC , so that P¯ ′S¯P ′j = p′jS¯P ′j. Suppose that the property P is
observed in C, and that it has D[HC ] possible values {pi} with associated eigen-
vectors {S¯Pi}, so that we can write S¯P ′j =
∑
i aPj(pi)S¯Pi. Then we call aPj(p)
an eigenfunction to the wave function operator P¯ ′P , with associated eigenvalue
p′j.
The terms ‘eigenfunction’ and ‘eigenvalue’ are motivated by the relation
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P¯ ′PaPj(p) = p
′
jaPj(p) (3.162)
that follows from Eq. [3.157].
Definition 3.28 (Orthonormal eigenfunctions). Two eigenfunctions aPj(p)
and aPl(p) to the same wave function operator P¯
′
P are orthonormal if and only
if
∑
i a
∗
Pj(pi)aPl(pi) = 0.
We see that if the operator P¯ ′ acting inHC has two orthonormal eigenvectors
S¯P ′j and S¯P ′l, so that 〈S¯P ′j , S¯P ′l〉 = 0, then the corresponding eigenfunctions
aPj(p) and aPl(p) to P¯
′
P are orthonormal according to Definition 3.28.
Definition 3.29 (A complete set of orthonormal eigenfunctions). Sup-
pose that the wave function operator P¯ ′P corresponds to an operator P¯
′ that acts
in the contextual Hilbert space HC , in which property P is observed with D[HC ]
possible values {pi}. If there are D[HC ] eigenfunctions aPj(p) to P¯ ′P such that∑
i a
∗
Pj(pi)aPl(pi) = δjl for all 1 ≤ (j, l) ≤ D[HC ], then P¯ ′P has a complete set
of orthonormal eigenfunctions.
Say that we express the wave function in terms of some property P . Then
Eq. [3.157] provides a one-to-one correspondence between a linear operator P¯ ′P
with real eigenvalues that acts on this wave function and a linear, self-adjoint
operator P¯ ′. Statement 3.39 asserts that to such an operator P¯ ′ corresponds at
least one property P ′. We conclude the following.
Statement 3.46 (Some wave function operators correspond to prop-
erties). Let P¯ ′P be a wave function operator that acts on any wave function
aP (p) that can be defined in the contextual Hilbert space HC . In this context
C, the property P is observed with D[HC ] possible values {pi}. If P¯ ′P has a
complete set of orthonormal eigenfunctions, and real eigenvalues {p′j}, then P¯ ′P
corresponds to at least one property P ′ with D[HC ] possible values {p′j}, in the
sense described in Statement 3.39. The property C ′ referred to in that statement
is one of the members in a pair of reciprocal contexts in which P and P ′ are
observed.
Suppose that we have a wave function expressed in terms of a property P
that we are about to observe. When we identify an operator P¯ ′P acting on this
wave function as a property P ′, we should imagine that P ′, together with P ,
are observed in a reciprocal pair of contexts (C, C˜). If we change basis and
write down the wave function in terms of the new operator P ′, then we should
imagine that we switch perspective from C to C˜, that we switch the property
that we are about to observe from P to P ′ (Fig. 3.27).
The joint state vector allows us to define the commutator [P¯ , P¯ ′] as follows.
[P¯ , P¯ ′]S¯CC˜ ≡ (P¯ P¯ ′ − P¯ ′P¯ )S¯CC˜ (3.163)
We used this commutator already in section 3.4.4 to formulate Statement
3.38. The difference is that in connection with that statement we applied it to
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the contextual state vector just after both P and P ′ have been observed. Here
we apply it to the (joint) contextual state vector just before the first of these two
properties is observed. Of course both approaches lead to the same conclusion:
[P¯ , P¯ ′] = 0¯ if and only if P and P ′ are simultaneously knowable.
We may use Eq. [3.157] to define wave function operator products P¯ ′P P¯P
according to
P¯ ′P¯ S¯CC˜ =
∑
i(P¯
′
P P¯PaP )S¯Pi =
∑
j(P¯
′
P ′ P¯P ′ a˜P ′)S¯P ′j
P¯ P¯ ′S¯CC˜ =
∑
i(P¯P P¯
′
PaP )S¯Pi =
∑
j(P¯P ′ P¯
′
P ′ a˜P ′)S¯P ′j
(3.164)
We see that [P¯P , P¯
′
P ] = [P¯P ′ , P¯
′
P ′ ] = 0 if and only if [P¯ , P¯
′] = 0, and conclude
the following.
Statement 3.47 (Simultaneous knowability of a property defined by
a wave function operator). Consider the property P , observed in a context
C, together with a property P ′ specified by the operator P¯ ′P , as described in
statement 3.46. These two properties are simultaneously knowable if and only
if [P¯P , P¯
′
P ] = 0. Then we also have [P¯P ′ , P¯
′
P ′ ] = 0.
The above two statements will be essential when we analyze the evolution
equation in section 3.4.8.
Suppose that P and P ′ are simultaneously knowable. We restrict ourselves
to contexts in which M = M ′, so that the dimension of the relevant Hilbert
spaces is D[HC ] = D[HC˜ ] = D[HCC˜ ] = M2. The representations S¯Pi and S¯P ′j
of the property value states will not be vectors but supspaces with dimension
D[S¯Pi] = D[S¯P ′j ] = M , as discussed in connection with Fig. 3.22. In context
C, the state vector S¯C will first be projected down to one of the supspaces S¯Pi
when P is observed, and then further down to one of the vectors S¯ij when P
′ is
observed. In the reciprocal context C˜, the state vector is first projected down
to one of the subspaces S¯P ′j when P
′ is observed, then, again, down to one of
the vectors S¯ij when P is observed. We have
S¯Pi = ⊕Mj=1S¯ij
S¯P ′j = ⊕Mi=1S¯ij
(3.165)
Clearly, {S¯ij} is a simultaneous set of eigenvectors to P¯ and P¯ ′. We may
therefore write
S¯C(σ) =
∑
i aP (pi, σ)S¯Pi,
S¯C˜(σ) =
∑
j a˜P ′(p
′
j , σ)S¯P ′j ,
S¯CC˜(σ) =
∑
ij aPP ′(pi, p
′
j , σ)S¯ij .
(3.166)
In the last row we have implicitly used the fact that we must have a˜PP ′(pi, p
′
j , σ) =
aPP ′(pi, p
′
j , σ) since C and C˜ are reciprocals of each other (Definition 3.17).
The last row defines a two-dimensional wave function aPP ′(pi, pj , σ).
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Definition 3.30 (The combined wave function aPP ′(pi, p
′
j , σ)). Consider
a pair (C, C˜) of reciprocal contexts described by the joint family CC˜(σ) where the
two simultaneously knowable properties P and P ′ are observed. Then aPP ′(pi, p′j , σ)
is defined according to the third row in Eq. [3.166]. It specifies the joint contex-
tual state SCC˜ just before the first property is observed in C or in C˜.
It will become necessary to consider a combined wave function when we try
to motivate the Dirac equation in section 3.4.8. We will have to introduce a
spin property s that we consider together with the spatio-temporal four-position
property r4 in order to find an evolution equation of the wave function. The spin
and the four-position are simultaneously knowable, and thus we may say that
the evolution equation applies to the combined wave function ar4s(r4i, sj , σ).
Speaking about evolution, we thus have to consider a reciprocal pair of contexts
in which two properties are observed, at least implicitly.
If we have more than two simultaneously knowable properties, we may define
a multi-dimensional wave function that characterizes the initial state of the joint
context, defined in this case as consisting of all permutations of the order in
which the properties are observed.
z
Consider a relational property P like the spatial position x, and idealize the
context so that the number of teeth of the ‘detector comb’ goes to infinity (Fig.
3.34), that is M →∞. Then the set of possible values xj becomes dense along
the property value axis of the corresponding funamental property x. Suppose
that we cannot exclude that the possible values of x are continuous (Definition
2.23).
For such a property P , define ∆pj so that the values of P not excluded by
the observation of value pj in a realistic context is contained in the interval
[p0j , p0j + ∆pj). This expression reflects the fact that if we let the property
values p that are allowed by physical law form a continuous set, we are, in
practice, always dealing with non-fundamental contexts of the kind illustrated
in Figs. 3.29 and 3.30(c). In other words, the contextual property PC is a coarse-
grained version of the fundamental property P that we may identify with the
discretized property PM discussed in connection with Statement 3.31 and Fig.
3.29. For this kind of contextual property we can define the familiar continuous
wave function Ψ according to
ΨP (p0j , σ)∆pj ≡ aP (pj , σ), (3.167)
for
pj ↔ [p0j , p0j + ∆pj). (3.168)
Definition 3.31 (The continuous wave function ΨP (p, σ)). Suppose that
|[aP (pj+1, σ) − aP (pj , σ)]/[pj+1 − pj ]| << 1 for all σ and for all j, where 1 ≤
j ≤ M − 1. Then there is a continuous wave function ΨP (p, σ), which fulfils
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Eq. [3.167], and which, to a good approximation, can be used to represent the
contextual state SC just before the observation of the contextual property PC .
The domain of ΨP (p, σ) is ([p1, pM ], [0, σmax]) for some arbitrary σmax that
depends on the parametrization, and the details of the family of contexts C(σ).
The state SOS of the specimen may be such that the relative volume v[S˜j ]
of some alternatives S˜j is zero for some σ, as illustrated in Fig. 3.34. We may
set ΨP (p, σ) = 0 for values of p that belong to the corresponding observed value
pj . In other words, the support of ΨP (p, σ) may be smaller than its domain.
Definition 3.32 (The support DP (σ) of the continuous wave function).
DP (σ) is the union of all intervals [p0j , p0j + ∆pj) such that aP (pj , σ) 6= 0.
Definition 3.31 implies that we can choose ΨP (p, σ) so that it is always
differentiable with respect to p inside its support DP (σ). However, it may be
discontinuous at the boundary ∂DP (σ) (Fig. 3.37). Let a1 = aP (p1) be the
contextual numer that corresponds to the smallest possible value p1 of property
P , and let aM correspond to the largest possible value pM . Then we have no
reason to require that |a1| and |aM | are close to zero.
Statement 3.48 (Continuous wave functions are piecewise differen-
tiable). The continuous wave function ΨP (p, σ) can be chosen to be at least
piecewise differentiable with respect to p, and to be differentiable in the interior
of DP (σ).
We may use the continuous wave function to formulate a continuous state
representation
S¯C(σ) =
∫
p∈DP (σ)
ΨP (p, σ)dpS¯P (p), (3.169)
or
S¯C(σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ΨP (p, σ)dpS¯P (p). (3.170)
Remember that summation in Hilbert space corresponds to ‘OR’ in knowledge
space, as expressed in Table 3.2. The meaning of the integration in the above
equation is therefore just that all values of P outside the support DP (σ) can
be exluded as an outcome of the observation of PC , based on the potential
knowledge before the observation. The support DP can be seen as the projection
of the state SOS down to the subspace in state space defined by property P .
Consequently, it does not make sense to actually calculate the integral - there
is nothing to add up. It should be seen as a purely formal representation of the
contextual state just before an observation.
The vector S¯P (p) in Eqs. [3.169] and [3.170] is defined according to the
relation
S¯Pj ≡ ∆p−1/2j
∫ p0j+∆pj
p0j
S¯P (p)dp. (3.171)
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This relation expresses the fact that given the property value state SPj , where
the property value pj corresponds to the interval given in Eq. [3.168], we cannot
exclude any of the ‘continuous property value states’ SP (p). Further, it is im-
possible in principle to define a context in which the exact continuous property
value p is determined. This means that we cannot define any meaningful relative
volumes v or contextual numbers a to a corresponding set SP (p) in state space.
In other words, there is no measure defined for an individual p ∈ [p0j , p0j+∆pj).
Therefore we do not introduce any function f(p) in the integrand. The factor
∆p
−1/2
j can be seen as a normalization constant, as we will see within short.
Definition 3.33 (The continuous property value space P(p)). For a fun-
damental property P with a continuous infinity of values p, the property value
spaces P(p) partition the property space P in a continuous infinity of infinitely
thin, distinct slices; P = ⋃p P(p), and P(p) ∩ P(p′) = ∅ whenever p 6= p′.
Statement 3.49 (Representation of continuous property value spaces).
The set {P(p)} of continuous property value spaces can be represented as an
orthonormal basis {P¯(p)} in a Hilbert space HP . Let the corresponding con-
textual property PC be such that the continuous wave function ΨP can be de-
fined. Then the contextual property value states SPj can be expressed as in Eq.
[3.171], where we may identify S¯P (p) = P¯(p). We have P¯C S¯Pj = pjS¯Pj and
P¯ S¯P (p) = pS¯P (p).
Equation [3.171] implies
δjj′ = 〈S¯Pj , S¯Pj′〉
= (∆pj∆pj′)
−1/2 ∫ p0j+∆pj
p0j
∫ p0j′+∆p′j
p0j′
〈S¯P (p), S¯P (p′)〉dpdp′, (3.172)
which is fulfilled if and only if we identify
δ(p− p′) = 〈S¯P (p), S¯P (p′)〉. (3.173)
Note that the introduction of the Dirac delta function is needed only in the in-
tegral representation of the contextual state S¯C , and that this integral represen-
tation is, at best, a convenient approximation to the summation representation
[3.153], which reflects the actual physical context, with its distinct alternatives.
Thus the delta function plays no fundamental role and cause no conceptual
trouble; it is just a convenient symbol in the manipulation of the integrals that
may appear.
Since the relative volumes of all alternatives by definition add to one in any
state, we have, in the same way as for the summation representation [3.153]:
1 = 〈S¯C(σ), S¯C(σ)〉
=
∫ ∫
ΨP (p, σ)
∗dpΨP (p′, σ)dp′〈S¯P (p), S¯P (p′)〉
=
∫ ∫
ΨP (p, σ)
∗dpΨP (p′, σ)dp′δ(p− p′)
=
∫ |ΨP (p, σ)|2dp,
(3.174)
for any σ. The expression on the right hand side is obviously an integral in the
conventional sense, in contrast to that in Eq. [3.169].
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Statement 3.50 (The continuous wave function ΨP (p, σ) is always nor-
malized). We have
∫ |ΨP (p, σ)|2dp = 1 for all σ in the domain of ΨP .
If we are dealing with a family of contexts C(σ, σ′) according to Fig. 3.35, we
may define a second continuous wave function ΨP ′(p
′
j , σ), which approximately
specifies the contextual state just before observation of the second property P ′C ,
and fulfils the relation
ΨP ′(p
′
0j , σ
′)∆p′j ≡ aP ′(p′j , σ′). (3.175)
At least, this is possible if the continuous approximation is good for the
second property P ′C also. Note that ΨP (p, σ) is no longer defined at this stage
in the context.
Let us now express some relations in the continuous representation in the
case we have a reciprocal context C˜ and a joint family of contexts CC˜(σ). We
refer to the above discussion about the general wave function aP for the relevant
definitions and the complete picture. We have
S¯CC˜ =
∫
ΨP (p, σ)dpS¯P (p) =
∫
Ψ˜P ′(p
′, σ)dp′S¯P ′(p′)
S¯C =
∫
ΨP (p, σ)dpS¯P (p)
S¯C˜ =
∫
Ψ˜P ′(p
′, σ)dp′S¯P ′(p′)
(3.176)
just before the observation of the first property in the context. The nota-
tion should be self-explanatory, and is analogous to the general case. In the
same manner as in the general case we may define a quadruplet of operators
(P¯ΨP , P¯
Ψ
P ′ , P¯
′Ψ
P , P¯
′Ψ
P ′) by the following relations.
P¯ S¯CC˜ =
∫
(P¯ΨP ΨP )dpS¯P (p) =
∫
(P¯ΨP ′Ψ˜P ′)dp
′S¯P ′(p′)
P¯ ′S¯CC˜ =
∫
(P¯ ′ΨPΨP )dpS¯P (p) =
∫
(P¯ ′ΨP ′Ψ˜P ′)dp
′S¯P ′(p′)
(3.177)
where we have dropped the arguments of the wave functions for notational
clarity.
Definition 3.34 (The continuous wave function property operators). In
a joint context CC˜ where an integral representation of the contextual state SCC˜
is possible, the quadruplet of operators (P¯ΨP , P¯
Ψ
P ′ , P¯
′Ψ
P , P¯
′Ψ
P ′) are defined by Eq.
[3.177]. We may say that P¯ΨP is the operator corresponding to P that acts on
the continuous wave function when it is expressed in terms of P , and that P¯ΨP ′ is
the operator corresponding to P that acts on the continuous wave function when
it is expressed in terms of P ′. The interpretation of P¯ ′ΨP and P¯ ′
Ψ
P ′ is analogous.
From Eq. [3.160] we see that the expected values of P and P ′ just before
they are observed are
〈p〉 = ∫ Ψ∗P P¯ΨP ΨP dp = ∫ |ΨP |2pdp
〈p′〉 = ∫ Ψ∗P P¯ ′ΨPΨP dp (3.178)
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where we have dropped all arguments for clarity, and we have used that
P¯P = p (3.179)
for any property P that allows a continuous representation.
We may define
P¯ S¯P (p) ≡ pS¯P (p). (3.180)
If we use this definition and apply P¯ to both sides of Eq. [3.171] we get P¯ S¯Pj =
∆p
−1/2
j
∫ p0j+∆pj
p0j
pS¯P (p)dp. This relation can be interpreted as to say that to
the eigenvector S¯Pj corresponds property values p in the range [p0j , p0j + ∆pj),
and continuous property value states S¯P (p) for p in the same range. This is
the picture we want to give, showing that Definition 3.180 is the proper way to
describe the action of P¯ on the continuous eigenstate.
Definition 3.35 (Eigenfunctions and eigenvalues to continuous wave
function operators). Suppose that we can write S¯P ′(p
′) =
∫∞
−∞ ψP (p
′, p)dpS¯P (p).
Then P¯ ′ΨPψP (p
′, p) = p′ψP (p′, p) according to Eq. [3.180] and Definition 3.34.
We call ψP (p
′, p) an eigenfunction to the continuous wave function operator
P¯ ′ΨP with associated eigenvalue p
′.
From Eq. [3.173] we see that∫ ∞
−∞
ψP (p
′′, p)∗ψP (p′, p)dp = δ(p′′ − p′). (3.181)
We may interpret this relation as to say that the eigenfunctions ψP (p
′, p) for
different fixed values of p′ are orthonormal to each other.
We see that if the operator P¯ ′ acting inHC has two orthonormal eigenvectors
S¯P ′j and S¯P ′l, so that 〈S¯P ′j , S¯P ′l〉 = 0, then the corresponding eigenfunctions
aPj(p) and aPl(p) to P¯
′
P are orthonormal according to Definition 3.28.
Definition 3.36 (A complete set of orthonormal eigenfunctions in the
continuous representation). Suppose that we can write ΨP (p) =
∫∞
−∞ ψP (p
′, p)dp′
for any piecewise differentiable wave function ΨP (p) that can be used in a con-
tinuous representation of any context C in which property P is observed. Then
we say that the set of eigenfunctions ψP (p
′, p) for different fixed values of p′ is
complete.
Using the above concepts we can formulate the continuous version of State-
ment 3.46.
Statement 3.51 (Some continuous wave function operators correspond
to properties). Let P¯ ′ΨP be a continuous wave function operator that acts on
any wave function ΨP (p) that can be used in a continuous representation of
any context C in which property P is observed. If P¯ ′ΨP has a complete set of
orthonormal eigenfunctions, and real eigenvalues {p′}, then P¯ ′ΨP corresponds to
3.4. THE POSTULATES OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 281
at least one fundamental property P ′ with a continuous infinity of possible values
{p′}.
Note that we do not refer to any specific kind of context C ′ in which the iden-
tified property P ′ is to be observed, like in Statement 3.46. Here we have been
manipulating continuous wave functions and continuous wave function opera-
tors alone. The treatement has therefore been abstract, since these continuous
objects only appear in approximative representations of actual contexts. This is
the reason why we identify P ′ as a fundamental property. Its infinity of possible
values means that we always observe a corresponding contextual property P ′C
for which these values are grouped into M bins, each of which correspond to
one observed value p′j (Fig. 3.29).
If P and P ′ are simultaneously knowable, and both properties allow a con-
tinuous representation, we may use Eq. [3.166] and write
S¯CC˜(σ) =
∫ ∫
ΨPP ′(p, p
′, σ)dpdp′S¯PP ′(p, p′) (3.182)
for a two-dimensional continuous wave function ΨPP ′(p, p
′, σ). The ‘two-dimensional
continuous property value state’ S¯PP ′(p, p
′) is defined in analogy with Eq.
[3.171], and relates to other quantities in a way that is analogous to Statement
3.49.
Definition 3.37 (The combined continuous wave function ΨPP ′(p, p
′, σ)).
Consider a pair (C, C˜) of reciprocal contexts described by the joint family CC˜(σ)
where two simultaneously knowable properties P and P ′ are observed, which both
allow a continuous representation. Then ΨPP ′(p, p
′, σ) is defined according to
Eq. [3.182]. It specifies the joint contextual state SCC˜ just before the first
property is observed in C or in C˜.
z
The wave functions aP or ΨP that we have discussed above differ from the
traditional ones in three respects.
1. They are only defined in certain experimental contexts.
2. Any given wave function is often just temporarily defined during the course
of such an experiment.
3. The support DP (σ) is typically finite.
Let us discuss this list of interpretational issues from back to front. A tradi-
tional wave function Ψx(x, t), in the form of a localized wave packet with thin
tails and infinite support that travels along a spatial x-axis as time t passes,
is most often unphysical from our point of view (Fig. 3.37). This is so even if
it can be normalized. It corresponds to an object whose position is completely
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Figure 3.37: Wave functions as defined here typically have a finite support
D(σ). In contrast, in the traditional picture the position of a particle is well
described by a spatial wave function with a well defined hump, and with thin,
but infinitely long tails. The spatial support Dx(σ) can be seen as a projection
of the state SOS along the x-axis. An infinite support would correspond to no
knowledge at all about the position.
unknown. It could be anywhere in the universe. However, if the wave function
describes a property of a specific object - an identifiable specimen that we have
identified in the past - then its position cannot become completely unknown in
finite time. There will always be large chunks of state space that we can ex-
clude. We can most often exlude faraway positions even if the specimen is not
individually identified in the past. This is beacuse the specimens entering an
observational context tend to have a known, localized source, like the particle
gun in Fig. 3.34.
In other words, the essential measure of uncertainty in our description is the
width ∆DP of the support rather than the standard deviation ∆p =
√
Var [|ΨP (p)|2]
of the probability distribution defined by the wave function. One may think that
this causes trouble when we observe two not simultaneously knowable proper-
ties in succession, like position x and momentum px. For suppose that we have
measured x to a fairly good precision, so that ∆Dx is small. Then we measure
px so that ∆Dpx becomes small. To describe the state of the specimen after this
event with a continuous wave function Ψx(x) would require an infinite support
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Figure 3.38: A family of contexts C(σ) in which P is observed at time n + m,
and then P ′ at time n + m′. The properties are simultaneously knowable. At
time n+m−1 we have |ΨPP ′(p0i, p′)|2∆p′ = q(p′|pi) in context C where P is to
be observed first, and where p′ = q(p′|pi) is the idealized conditional probability
to find p in the range [p, p+∆p) given p′j . Similarly, |ΨPP ′(p, p′0j)|2∆p ≈ q(p|p′j)
in the reciprocal context C˜ where P ′ is to be observed first. The wave function
as a function of p is no longer defined at time n+m or later, neither is σ. The
wave function as a function of p′ is no longer defined at time n+m′ or later. We
see that the domain DPP ′ is a more fundamental object than the wave function.
It is always defined since it is just a projection in state space of SOS . That the
domain DPP ′ is not rectangular to begin with means that there is conditional a
priori knowledge that excludes some value combinations (p, p′). Compare Fig.
3.39.
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∆Dx. This is so since the discontinuities in the derivatives of Ψpx(px) that arise
due to the finite ∆Dpx can only be described by infinitely many eigenfunctions
of position. This would mean that we have lost all the gained knowledge about
position, that the specimen can suddenly be infinitely far away. This is clearly
absurd, since the time difference ∆t between the two meaurements is finite, and
the specimen cannot travel faster than the speed of light. The mistake in this
reasoning is that we mix our own perspective (finite supports) with the tra-
ditional perspective (universally defined wave functions, which we can express
in any basis we want to). More precisely, the infinitely many eigenfunctions
of positions present in the wave function does not necessarily correspond to a
set of possible outcomes of a second measurement of position, since this wave
function is no longer defined at such a measurement. The point is illustrated in
Fig. 3.39, and is further discussed in section 3.5 in relation to Fig. 3.46. Here
we touch upon the second item in the above list of interpretational issues.
After the observation of a property P is made, the wave function as a function
of p and σ is no longer defined. It provides the probabilities of the options in a
complete set of future alternatives {S˜i} (Definition 2.51), where the probability
q(pi) is the relative volume v[S˜i, SO(n)]. After one alternative is realized, there
are no longer any subjectively predefined alternatives, no relative volumes, and
therefore no wave function. We can, of course, define new options for P . But
that will give rise to a new, different, wave function, which should be expressed
in terms of a different evolution parameter σ′ (Fig. 3.35 and Eq. [3.175]). These
matters are illustrated in Figs. 3.38 and 3.39.
Even if there are predefined options S˜i for the value of a property P , it may
nevertheless be impossible to define the wave function. This situation arises
when the relative volumes v[S˜i, SO(n)] are not known at the time n when the
context is initiated, so that no contextual numbers ai can be associated with
them, and therefore no corresponding wavefunction a(pi). These matters were
discussed in section 3.2.
Statement 3.52 (Collapse of the wave function). Suppose that we have
a combined wave function of two or more property values p, p′, . . . according to
Statement 3.30 or 3.37. Once property P is observed, the wave function does
no longer depend on property value p.
Statement 3.53 (Loss of the wave function). Suppose that we have a wave
function of a single property value p. Once property P is observed, the wave
function is no longer defined.
3.4.8 The evolution of a free specimen
Equations [3.154] and [3.174] express the unitarity of the evolution of the con-
textual state S¯C , as summarized in Statement 3.45. To determine the form of
the evolution equation, we add two more requirements.
1. The form of the evolution equation should be relativistically invariant.
From our perspective, this is a consequence of the assumptions of epistemic
minimalism and (individual) epistemic invariance.
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Figure 3.39: A family of contexts C(σ, σ′) in which property P is observed at
time n+m, and P ′ at time n+m′. The two properties are not simultaneously
knowable. The wave function ΨP (p, σ) is defined just before the observation
of p, but not afterwards. The second wave function ΨP ′(p
′, σ′) is defined just
before the observation of p′, but not afterwards. If we interpret P and P ′ as
position and momentum, there is an uncertainty relation A[DPP ′ ] ≈ ∆p∆p′ & ~,
where A[. . .] denotes an area. This uncertainty refers to the physical state of
the specimen rather than the wave function. Compare Figs. 3.38 and 3.46.
286 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
Figure 3.40: Two parametrizations 〈r4〉(σ), one straight and one winding, which
are both contained in the tilted plane that defines all parametrizations that cor-
respond to a free specimen with no net interactions that bend its expected
trajectory 〈x〉(σ)/〈t〉(σ). The marked states SOS are really projections of these
states onto space-time, but we suppress the projection operator for clarity. Re-
call from Fig. 3.4 that SOS(n;n + m) denotes the state that corresponds to
the memory of SOS(n) at time n + m. Put differently, the state SOS(n + m)
corresponds to an object OS with presentness attribute Pr = 1 at time n+m,
whereas SOS(n;n + m) corresponds to an object with attribute value Pr = 0.
It is the memory of the state of the same object at a previous time n. The evo-
lution equation relates the states of objects with presentness attribute Pr = 1
at different sequential times n and n+m.
2. There should be a parametrization r4 = r4(σ) so that we can write
d〈r4〉/dσ = v0 + βf(σ), where r4 = (x, ict) for x = (x, y, z), v0 is a
constant vector, and β is a scalar such that β = 0 if and only if the
specimen OS does not interact with any other object.
The second condition is illustrated in Fig. 3.40. For a free specimen, any
parametrization 〈r4〉(σ) must be contained in the tilted plane between the space-
times associated with times n and n + m, respectively, so that 〈x〉(σ)/〈t〉(σ)
does not depend on σ. Then there is a parametrization that follows the straight,
diagonal line between 〈r4〉(0) and 〈r4〉(σ). (Recall from the discussion in Section
2.3 that in this setting σ denotes the value of the evolution parameter just before
the observation at time n+m. This means that when we vary σ in Fig. 3.40, we
vary the position of the spatio-temporal plane at time n+m along the trajectory
〈r4〉(σ).)
The possibility to use the concept of a straight trajectory as a starting point
when we try to find a mathematical form for physical law is opened up by the
discussion in Section 2.5. There we list some basic relations between attribute
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values, relations which are taken to be primary from an epistemic point of view,
impossible to reduce to something else. One of these relations is straightness
(Definitions 2.33 and 2.34). A trajectory that seems straight to one subject may
not seem straight to another. This means that a specimen that seems free as
judged by the first subject may seem to be interacting as judged by the second.
We return to these matterns in Sections 3.4.9 and 3.13.
Consider a property P and a physical state S(n) such that we cannot exclude
a priori any exact value p in some continuous interval. Relational attributes are
properties of this kind. In such a situation, we can define a family of contexts
C(σ) such that the integral representation [3.169] becomes an arbitrarily good
approximation of the contextual state S¯C .
Let us focus on the evolution of the wave function ΨP (p, σ) defined in this
situation according to Eq. [3.167]. We have defined the family of contexts C(σ)
in such a way that ΨP (p, σ
′) is uniquely given by ΨP (p, σ) for any σ′ > σ. We
may therefore write
d
dσ
ΨP (p, σ) = A¯PΨP (p, σ), (3.183)
for some linear operator A¯. That A¯ has to be linear follows from the linearity
of the evolution operator u1 (Statement 2.14) and the definition of ΨP (Eq.
[3.169]). The operator A¯ cannot depend explicitly on σ, since σ is not an
attribute that describes the state of any object, and the evolution depends on
nothing else but the physical state. Therefore we may also write ΨP (p, σ) =
exp(A¯Pσ)ΨP (p, 0). We may identify the contextual evolution operator u¯C(σ) =
exp(A¯Pσ) in Statement 3.45. Therefore exp(A¯Pσ) is unitary, so that we must
have
A¯P = iB¯P , (3.184)
where B¯P has real eigenvalues. We may interpret B¯P as a continuous wave
function operator according to Eq. [3.34], which correspond to a self-adjoint
operator B¯′. We will see below that B¯P is such that it has a complete set
of eigenfunctions according to Definition 3.36. B¯P therefore corresponds to a
property B according to Statement 3.51. We may write
ΨP (p, σ) = u¯C(σ)ΨP (p, 0) = exp(iB¯Pσ)ΨP (p, 0). (3.185)
The above considerations apply for any property P . Let us find the form
of B¯P when P is the spatio-temporal distance r4, and the specimen OS moves
freely without interacting with its environment before the observation of r4 takes
place. To do so, we make use of requirement 2). Equations [3.159] and [3.178]
allow us to write
〈r4〉 = 〈S¯C , r4S¯C〉 =
∫
Ψ∗r4(r4)r4Ψr4dr4. (3.186)
These relations imply
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d
dσ 〈r4〉 = ddσ
∫
Ψ∗r4(r4)r4Ψr4dr4
= i
∫
Ψ∗r4(r4B¯r4 − B¯r4r4)Ψr4dr4
(3.187)
where we have used Eq. [3.183], and the fact that B¯r4 = −iA¯r4 corresponds to
a self-adjoint operator B¯ according to Eq. [3.34]. We have suppressed the argu-
ments in Ψr4(r4, σ) for clarity. We have also replaced the operator (r4)r4 , which
corresponds to the property r4 = (r, ict) when the wave function is expressed in
terms of the very same r4 = (r, ict), with its value r4, according to Eq. [3.179].
(Strictly speaking, the four-position r4 is not a property as expressed above,
since the fourth component is not real, but this is just a matter of notation.)
Any wave function Ψr4(r4, σ) can be expressed as a Fourier integral
Ψr4(r4, σ) = (2pi)
−5/2
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ˜)e
i(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ)dr˜4dσ˜. (3.188)
We may call the kernel Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ˜) the ‘reciprocal wave function’. Analogously,
we may call r˜4 the ‘reciprocal four-position’, and σ˜ the ‘reciprocal evolution
parameter’.
Inserting the expansion [3.188] into Eq. [3.187], we get
d
dσ 〈r4〉 = (2pi)−5
∫∞
−∞ Ψ˜
∗
r4(r˜
′
4, σ˜
′)Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ˜)×{∫
r4∈Dr4 e
−i(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ)(r4B¯r4 − B¯r4r4)ei(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ)dr4
}
dr˜4dσ˜dr˜
′
4dσ˜
′
(3.189)
Since we are considering a free specimen OS, the right hand side is a
(real) constant, so that the integral over r4 within the curly brackets cannot
depend on r4 or σ. The fact that it cannot depend on σ implies (r4B¯r4 −
B¯r4r4)e
i(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ) = f(r˜4, σ˜, r4)ei(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ), where the function f does not de-
pend on σ.
These considerations should hold for any wave function, in particular for an
individual Fourier mode Ψr4 = e
i(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ) for r4 ∈ Dr4 . In such a context |Ψr4 |2
is a positive constant for r4 ∈ Dr4 , and |Ψr4 |2 = 0 for r4 6∈ Dr4 , where Dr4 is
the support (Definition 3.32). Since the specimen is assumed to be free, and
since the spatio-temporal position r4 is basically a relational attribute whose
value is defined in relation to an arbitrary reference frame of other objects, the
constant d〈r4〉/dσ must be invariant under stiff translations of the region Dr4 in
which we know that the specimen is located. (By a ‘stiff’ translation we mean
that the shape of the region does not change.) Therefore the function f that
describe the effect of the action of r4B¯r4 − B¯r4r4 cannot depend on r4 either:
(r4B¯r4 − B¯r4r4)ei(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ) = f(r˜4, σ˜)ei(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ). (3.190)
Furthermore, the imaginary unit i that appears in front of the integrals at
the right hand side of Eq. [3.189] means that f(r˜4, σ˜) must be imaginary. These
constraints imply
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B¯r4 =
∑
k bk
∂2
∂r2k
= bx
∂2
∂x2 + by
∂2
∂y2 + bz
∂2
∂z2 − bt 1c2 ∂
2
∂t2 ,
(3.191)
for some array (bx, by, bz, bt) of real, scalar constants. Since the evolution equa-
tion [3.183] must be relativistically invariant, we must have b = bx = by = bz =
bt, so that
B¯r4 = −b. (3.192)
Equations [3.187] and [3.192] imply that we may write
d
dσ 〈r4〉 = −ib
∫∞
−∞Ψ
∗
r4 (r4−r4) Ψr4dr4
= 2ib
∫∞
−∞Ψ
∗
r4
(
∂
∂r1
, ∂∂r2 ,
∂
∂r3
, ∂∂r4
)
Ψr4dr4.
(3.193)
If we insert the Fourier integral [3.188] in the above expression, we get
d
dσ
〈r4〉 = −2b〈r˜4〉, (3.194)
where we have defined
〈r˜4〉 ≡
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ˜)
∗r˜4Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ˜)dr˜4dσ˜ (3.195)
The fact that time is directed means that d〈t〉/dσ has the same sign in all
reference frames. It is natural to choose a parametrization so that the evolution
parameter and relational time flow in the same direction:
d〈t〉/dσ > 0. (3.196)
Equation [3.194] implies that we may write
d
dσ
〈t〉 = 2ib
c
〈r˜4〉, (3.197)
since r4 = ict. Equation [3.196] should hold for all allowed values of r˜4. Equation
[3.197] therefore implies that r˜4 is imaginary, and that
ibr˜4 > 0. (3.198)
If we insert A¯r = −ib in Eq. [3.183], and express Ψr4 in terms of its Fourier
integral [3.188], we get σ˜ = −b∑k r˜2k, or
− r˜24 =
σ˜
b
+ r˜21 + r˜
2
2 + r˜
2
3. (3.199)
This relation must hold for all possible values of r˜, in particular when the
reciprocal spatial positions are all zero; r˜1 = r˜2 = r˜3 = 0. Since r˜4 is imaginary,
we must have
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σ˜
b
> 0 (3.200)
for all σ˜. The sign of the parameter b is arbitrary. In the following, let us use
the convention
b < 0,
ir˜4 < 0,
σ˜ < 0.
(3.201)
We argued above that the wave function operator B¯P corresponds to a prop-
erty B for any P , and therefore this is true in particular for B¯r4 . The set of
possible values of this property B should be found among the set of eigenvalues
σ˜ to −i ddσ , and the corresponding property value states are described in terms
of eigenfunctions as Ψ
(σ˜)
r4 = ψ(r4)e
iσ˜σ, where the function ψ(r4) is arbitrary. In
short,
Ψ
(σ˜)
r4 = ψr4(r4)e
iσ˜σ
−i ddσΨ(σ˜)r4 = B¯r4Ψ(σ˜)r4 = σ˜Ψ(σ˜)r4 .
(3.202)
In the same way (according to Statement 3.51), there are properties C and D
that correspond to the wave function operators
C¯r4 ≡ b
(
∂2
∂x2 +
∂2
∂y2 +
∂2
∂z2
)
D¯r4 ≡ −b 1c2 ∂
2
∂t2 .
(3.203)
In the same way as for B, the set of possible values of C becomes the set of
eigenvalues {x˜2 + y˜2 + z˜2}. Likewise, the set of possible values of D should be
found among the set of eigenvalues t˜2. We clearly have
B¯r4 = C¯r4 + D¯r4 . (3.204)
This operator relation is closely related to the relativistic relation E2 = (m0c)
2
+
(cp)2, as we will discuss below.
We see in Eq. [3.202] that for each eigenfunction Ψ
(σ˜)
r4 to the operator B¯r4
with eigenvalue σ˜, there is another eigenfunction Ψ
(−σ˜)
r4 with eigenvalue −σ˜.
However, Eq. [3.200] tells us that all property values σ˜ must have the same
sign (since b is a fixed constant). This means that there are eigenvalues to B¯r4
that do not correspond to possible property values σ˜. Therefore B¯r4 = −id/dσ
is not the unique operator associated with property σ˜ according to Statement
3.51, since the match between the set of eigenvalues and the set of possible
property values should be perfect.
Since σ˜ is a property with no positive values, we may define another property
M with values µ such that
σ˜ = −µ2. (3.205)
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Let us look for the appropriate operator M¯r (in the sense of Statement 3.51)
that corresponds to M .
In general, referring to Eq. [3.202] we may write
B¯r4ψr4(r4) = σ˜ψr4(r4), (3.206)
since B¯r4 does not act on σ. To ensure that all possible values of the property
B has the same sign, we may require
B¯r4 = −W¯ †r4W¯r4 , (3.207)
so that
B¯r4ψr4(r4) = −W¯ †r4W¯r4ψr4(r4) = −W¯ †r4µψr4(r4) = −µ∗µψr4(r4), (3.208)
and we get σ˜ = −|µ|2, in agreement with the sign convention [3.201]. The wave
function operator M¯r we look for should therefore be of the form [3.207], and
should correspond to a self-adjoint operator M¯ , so that µ becomes real. That
is,
B¯r4 = −M¯r4M¯r4 , (3.209)
Thus, in addition to the evolution equation [3.212], we should add the con-
straint
M¯r4ψr4(r4, σ˜) = µψr4(r4, σ˜) (3.210)
for each function ψr4(r4, σ˜)e
iσ˜σ in the general solution
Ψr4(r4, σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ψr4(r4, σ˜)e
iσ˜σdσ˜ (3.211)
to the evolution equation
d
dσ
Ψr4(r4, σ) = iB¯r4Ψr4(r4, σ). (3.212)
(We know that the constraint [3.210] means that we have to work with spinors,
but we stick to our single wave function notation here, and return to these
matters below.)
The property M is defined for any specimen OS, and is relativistically in-
variant according to the evolution equation [3.212]. It may therefore be seen as
an internal attribute. These qualities resemble those of the rest mass, or rest
energy.
Definition 3.38 (Rest mass m0). The property values of the rest mass are
given by
m0 ≡ ~
c
√−bµ. (3.213)
The corresponding continuous wave function operator for a free specimen is
(m0)r4 =
~
c
√−bM¯r4 (3.214)
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when Ψ is expressed in terms of the property r4.
The difference from the conventional notion of rest mass is that nothing in
the above reasoning prevents m0 from being negative.
Definition 3.39 (Squared rest mass m20). The property values of the squared
rest mass are given by
m20 ≡ −
~2
bc2
µ2 =
~2
bc2
σ˜. (3.215)
A corresponding continuous wave function operator for a free specimen is
(m20)r4 =
~2
c2
 (3.216)
when Ψ is expressed in terms of the property r4, or, equivalently,
m20 =
i~2
bc2
d
dσ
. (3.217)
However, these operators do not correspond perfectly to m20 in the sense of State-
ment 3.51, since they have more eigenvalues than there are property values.
We have effectively identified the reciprocal evolution parameter σ˜ with the
squared rest mass, up to suitable constant of proportionality. In an analogous
way, we can identify the reciprocal spatial position (x˜, y˜, z˜) with momentum,
and the reciprocal temporal position r˜4 with energy.
Definition 3.40 (Momentum p). The property values of the momentum of a
free specimen are given by
p = ~ (x˜, y˜, z˜) . (3.218)
The corresponding continuous wave function operator is
pr4 = −i~
(
∂
∂x
,
∂
∂y
,
∂
∂z
)
= −i~∇ (3.219)
when Ψ is expressed in terms of the property r4.
Definition 3.41 (Energy E). The property values of the energy of a free
specimen are given by
E = −ic~r˜4. (3.220)
A corresponding continuous wave function operator is
Er4 = −c~
∂
∂r4
= i~
∂
∂t
(3.221)
when Ψ is expressed in terms of the property r4.
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As a check that we have defined mass, momentum and energy appropriately,
we straightforwardly deduce from Eq. [3.199] that
E2 = m20c
4 + c2|p|2. (3.222)
We see in this equation that the fact that energy is non-negative does not exclude
negative rest masses, since energy is related to the rest mass squared. Using the
four-momentum p4 = (p, iE/c) this familiar relation reads
m20c
2 = −|p4|2. (3.223)
This equation is fullfilled if we relate the four-momentum to the reciprocal
spatio-temporal position r˜4 in the following way.
Definition 3.42 (Four-momentum p4). The property values of the four-
momentum of a free specimen are given by
p4 = ~r˜4. (3.224)
A corresponding operator is
(p4)r4 = −i~
(
∂
∂r1
,
∂
∂r2
,
∂
∂r3
,
∂
∂r4
)
(3.225)
when the wave function Ψ is expressed in terms of the property r4.
The parameter b has no physical significance. Its numerical value depends
on the way we parametrize the evolution with the help of the evolution param-
eter σ, which is not an observable property. We may contrast b with ~. The
latter parameter is a constant of proportionality that relates energy E with the
angular frequency icr˜4 with which the wave function oscillates as a function of
t. Analogoulsy, b−1 is a constant of proportionality that relates the squared rest
mass m20 with the angular frequency σ˜ with which the wave function oscillates
as a function of the evolution parameter σ. Planck’s constant ~ is a physical
constant, since it relates the two observable attributes energy and time. On the
other hand, b is not a physical constant, since it relates the observable rest mass
with the unobservable parameter σ.
We can fix the value of b if we choose the natural parametrization
d〈t〉/dσ = 1. (3.226)
This choice means that we can treat σ as we treat time t in classical mechanics,
when we do not take into account that knowledge of relational time t may
be incomplete. Note, however, that the relation [3.226] is not relativistically
invariant.
Definition 3.43 (The natural parametrization). The parametrization of
the family of contexts C(σ) is natural if and only if d〈t〉/dσ = 1 for all σ ∈
[0, σmax).
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In the natural parametrization we get
b = − c
2~
2〈E〉 . (3.227)
In this parametrization we can use Eq. [3.194] and the definition of momentum
(Definition 3.40) to derive the counterpart of Ehrenfest’s theorem:
d
dσ
〈r〉 = 〈p〉〈m〉 , (3.228)
where r = (x, y, z) and m is the relativistic mass defined according to E = mc2.
Since Ehrenfest’s theorem relates observable attributes or properties, it should
not depend on a particular parametrization. The corresponding parametrization-
independent formula is
d〈r〉
dσ
/
d〈t〉
dσ
=
〈p〉
〈m〉 . (3.229)
With the above definitions, we can write the evolution equation [3.183] or
[3.212] in more familiar terms.
Statement 3.54 (The evolution equation). We have
i~ ddσΨr4(r4, σ) =
−1
2〈E〉 (E
2
0)r4Ψr4(r4, σ)
= −12〈E〉
(
E¯r4E¯r4 − c2p¯r4 · p¯r4
)
Ψr4(r4, σ)
(3.230)
in the natural parametrization, where (E20)r4 ≡ c4(m20)r4 , or
i~
d
dσ
Ψr4(r4, σ) =
c2
2〈E〉 [(p4)r4 · (p4)r4 ] Ψr4(r4, σ). (3.231)
For a free specimen these relations correspond to
d
dσ
Ψr4(r4, σ) =
ic2~
2〈E〉Ψr4(r4, σ). (3.232)
A plane wave solution to the evolution of a free specimen is
Ψr4(r4, σ) ∝ exp[
i
~
(p · r− Et− E
2
0
2〈E〉σ)], (3.233)
in the natural parametrization [3.226], or
Ψr4(r4, σ) ∝ exp[
i
~
(p4 · r4 − E
2
0
2〈E〉σ)]. (3.234)
We write r = (x, y, z) as before, and introduce the rest energy E0 = m0c
2.
Even if 〈E〉 = E in a single plane wave, like the one above, we have to insert
the average energy in the last denominator of each plane wave if we superpose
several such waves with different energies, for instance in a Fourier integral.
z
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The above formalism presupposes that the continuous wave function repre-
sentation of the contextual state SC in Eq. [3.169] is a valid approximation for
the spatio-temporal position r4 that we supposedly observe in the context. As
we have discussed above, this means in practice that the values of r4 we cannot
exclude before the observation are dense in comparison to distance between the
teeth of the ‘detector comb’ that we introduced in Fig. 3.34. The formalism
also presupposes that the evolution of the contextual state can be represented
by the evolution of a single continuous wave function Ψr4 . However, we rec-
ognize the Dirac equation in Eq. [3.210], and we know that the solutions to
the Dirac equation are four-component spinors. Furthermore, we may want to
consider the evolution when the wave function is not expressed in terms of r4,
but some property whose values are inherently discrete, for which the integral
representation never applies.
Let us therefore express the evolution equation in a more general form. Equa-
tions [3.183] and [3.185] hold equally well if we replace the continuous wave
function with the general wave function:
d
dσaP (pi, σ) = iB¯PaP (pi, σ)
= − i2~〈E〉 (E20)PaP (pi, σ),
(3.235)
where the last line holds in the natural parmetrization, or
aP (pi, σ) = exp(iB¯Pσ)aP (pi, 0)
= exp
(
− i2~〈E〉 (E20)P
)
aP (pi, 0).
(3.236)
As before, we let M denote the number of alternatives for property P within
context, so that 1 ≤ i ≤M . The solution to the general evolution equation can
be written
aP (pi, σ) =
∫
αP (pi, E
2
0) exp
( −iE20
2~〈E〉σ
)
dE20 , (3.237)
where the stationary wave function αP (pi, E
2
0) can be seen as the eigenfunction
to the continuous wave function operator (E20)P with associated eigenvalue E
2
0 ,
according to Definition 3.27:
(E20)PαP (pi, E
2
0) = E
2
0αP (pi, E
2
0). (3.238)
Let us use this more general notation to express and interpret the Dirac
equation. The need to take the square root M¯r of the operator B¯r and use this
operator M¯r to express a constraint [3.210] on the wave function, means that we
cannot express the evolution of the state in terms of property r4 alone. We must
express the wave function a in terms of a combined property P ′′, which is the
spatio-temporal position r4 together with the degrees of freedom represented by
the components of the spinor. This means that when we express the evolution of
the contextual state SC , we must implicitly consider a context C in which both
the spatio-temporal position and the spinor property are observed in succession.
The spinor degrees of freedom do not refer to r4, and they are present even for a
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free specimen for which there are no other objects with which the specimen may
interact. They should therefore be classified as internal rather than relational
attributes. Let us denote the relational attribute r4 by P , and the internal
spinor attributes by P ′. The members of this property pair P ′′ = (P, P ′) will
be simultanesously knowable, and we may therefore express the wave function
aP ′′ as a combined wave function
aPP ′(p, p
′, σ) = ar4s((r4)i, sj , σ) (3.239)
as discussed in relation to Definition 3.30. Here the property s denotes the four
components of the spinor, so that 1 ≤ j ≤ 4. In contrast, we have 1 ≤ i ≤ M ,
where the number M of possible spatio-temporal positions within context is ar-
bitrary. For large M it becomes natural to choose the continuous representation
of r4, so that the combined wave function can be written
ar4s((r4)i, sj , σ)↔

Ψr41(r4, σ)
Ψr42(r4, σ)
Ψr43(r4, σ)
Ψr44(r4, σ)
 (3.240)
as usual.
To formulate the Dirac equation properly, we should make it clear in the
notation that we are dealing with the wave function expressed in terms of the
combined property P ′′ = r4s. Also, we should make it clear that the crucial
operators act on this combined property, not just r4. Thus we make the following
changes of notation: M¯r4 → M¯r4s and (E0)r4 → (E0)r4s.
Statement 3.55 (The Dirac equation as an additional constraint on
the wave function). Each wave function αr4s((r4)i, sj , E
2
0) exp
(
− iE202~〈E〉σ
)
in
the general solution
ar4s((r4)i, sj , σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
αr4s((r4)i, sj , E
2
0)e
− iE
2
0
2~〈E〉σdE20 (3.241)
to the evolution equation
i~ ddσar4s((r4)i, sj , σ) =
−1
2〈E〉 (E
2
0)r4ar4s((r4)i, sj , σ)
= ~M¯r4sM¯r4sar4s((r4)i, sj , σ)
= c
2
2〈E〉 [(p4)r4 · (p4)r4 ] ar4s((r4)i, sj , σ)
(3.242)
must be an eigenfunction to the continuous rest energy operator (E0)r4s:
(E0)r4sα˜r4s((r4)i, sj , E
2
0) = E0αr4s((r4)i, sj , E
2
0), (3.243)
where we define
(E0)r4s ≡
√
2~〈E〉M¯r4s (3.244)
in the natural parametrization.
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Thanks to Dirac we know that we can more explicitly write
(E0)r4s = c(p4)r4 · D¯s, (3.245)
where D¯s = (D¯1, D¯2, D¯3, D¯4) is a vector of 4×4 matrices, closely related to the
gamma matrices according to D1 = iγ
1, D2 = iγ
2, D3 = iγ
3, and D4 = γ
0.
We see that the Dirac equation can be interpreted as a stationary state
equation, analogous the equation H¯ψ = Eψ in Schro¨dinger wave mechanics.
We just replace the Hamiltonian H¯ with the rest energy operator E0, and the
energy eigenvalue E with the rest energy eigenvalue E0. The only difference
is that the solution ψ to the Dirac equation is a function of the relativistic
spatio-temporal position r4 = (x, y, z, ict) instead of just the spatial position
r3 = (x, y, z), as in the case of the stationary Schro¨dinger equation.
3.4.9 The evolution of an interacting specimen
In the preceding section, we interpreted a ‘free specimen’ to be a specimen that
is expected to travel along a straight line. Conversely, a specimen that interacts
with its environment should be expected to change direction in relation to the
objects that surrounds it. Such a change of direction can come about in two
ways. Either we observe that the specimen emits a second object and follows a
new path afterwards [Fig. 2.54(c)], or it follows curved path without knowably
emitting another object. The latter case means that the chain of overlapping
sets in Fig. 2.33 is bending.
When we speak about an interacting specimen, we assume that is is iden-
tifiable throughout the process, that it can be said to remain the same, and
that it preserves its perceived unity. This is so in the division process shown in
Fig. 2.54(c), but not in the object divisions shown in panels a) and b) in the
same figure. In these cases we may speak of specimen transformation instead
of specimen interaction.
We may speak about a specimen that is expected to follow a curved path
even if we do not continually observe it as its trajectory is bending. This is
possible whenever the specimen is quasi-identifiable, so that it possesses an
individual evolution (Definition 2.59). This is presupposed in any observational
context where we define its wave function.
Definition 3.44 (A free specimen). An identifiable specimen OS for which
we can define a spatio-temporal wave function ar4s(r4, s, σ) is free if and only
if d2〈r4〉/dσ2 = 0 in the entire interval [0, σmax] in which the wave function is
defined.
Definition 3.45 (An interacting specimen). An identifiable specimen OS
for which we can define a spatio-temporal wave function ar4s(r4, s, σ) is inter-
acting if and only if d2〈r4〉/dσ2 6= 0 for some σ ∈ [0, σmax].
Definition 3.46 (A knowably interacting specimen). A specimen OS
which is identifiable during the time period [n, n + m] is knowably interacting
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during the same period if and only if it is concluded at an observation at time
n+m that it has divided at some time n ≤ n′ ≤ n+m in such a way that the
identity of OS could be upheld in the division process, like in Fig. 2.54(c).
In other words, there should be exactly one object that emerges from the
division that can be identified with the original object. As an example of such
a process, we may take an electron that knowably interacts electromagnetically
with its environment by emitting an photon.
Definition 3.47 (A knowably transforming specimen). A specimen OS
which is identifiable during the time period [n, n+m] is knowably transforming
during the same period if and only if it is concluded at an observation at time
n+m that it has divided at some time n ≤ n′ ≤ n+m in such a way that several
or none of the identifiable objects emerging from the division can be identified
with OS, like in Fig. 2.54(a) or 2.54(b).
These four definitions are illustrated in Fig. 3.41. To say that an object is
knowably interacting or knowably transforming, we must actually observe it. It
must be a specimen in a controlled experiment, in an observational context. We
must measure a set of relational or internal attributes P to determine whether
it has changed internal nature or it has turned into two or several objects. A
state reduction must take place. This means that we are not dealing with a
context described by the simple spatio-temporal wave function ar4s discussed
above, but with aP , where the choice of P determines which kinds of knowable
interactions or transformations we are able to see. We may, however consider
a specimen in the same intial state SOS(n), but in another context, in which
we just follow its spatio-temporal evolution. In that case we can describe its
evolution with the ordinary evolution equation
d
dσ
ar4s(r4, s, σ) = iB¯r4sar4,s(r4, s, σ). (3.246)
Even if we do not explicitly observe it, we cannot exclude that the specimen
described by the above wave function transforms, divides, that the divided ob-
jects merge again, or that it knowably interacts with the environment. Therefore
all such possibilities must be consistent with the description of the evolution in
terms of Eq. [3.246]. This means that the trajectories of objects arising from
OS must all be contained in the enevolpe defined by the domain Dr4s(σ) of the
wave function (Fig. 3.42).
Another way to see this is to refer to epistemic invariance (Definition 1.17).
The evolution of an object should be independent of the amount of knowledge
we have about the object. More properly, the evolution of an object about
which we have more knowledge should always be consistent with the evolution
of the same object if we had less knowledge [Fig. 1.13(b)]. This can be seen as
an application of a generalized equivalence principle (Fig. 1.14).
In section 2.16 we argued that the concept of identifiability (section 2.10) can
be used to understand the discrete values of the internal attributes of minimal
objects, and also the conservation laws of these values in processes where such
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Figure 3.41: Different types of evolution, shown in the projection of state space
onto the spatio-temporal subspace. a) A free specimen OS whose evolution
is described by a wave function (Definition 3.44). b) An interacting specimen
OS whose evolution is described by a wave function (Definition 3.45). c) A
knowably interacting specimen OS emitting another object O′ (Definition 3.46).
d) A knowably transforming specimen OS, dividing into two other objects O′
and O′′ (Definition 3.47).
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Figure 3.42: a) A vast variety of object divisions and other processes may
take place within a specimen OS that is free according to the spatio-temporal
evolution equation [3.246]. But within the domain [0, σmax] of the evolution
parameter, we do not, by definition, observe the specimen to check what is
going on inside the envelope of the wave function (Definition 3.48). b) In the
same way, we cannot exclude that an interacting specimen is emitting other
objects while preserving its identity. If such division processes were actually
observed, the interacting specimen would be knowably interacting.
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objects divide or merge. Simply put, the sum of the values of a given attribute
of all objects in the initial state should be the same as the corresponding sum in
the final state. We may visualize this rule as in Fig. 2.59, where an ‘attribute
value substance’ flows freely in the tubes that correspond to the objects that
are present. This substance consists of parcels that correspond to a unit value
of the attribute in question, and these parcels may choose whatever branch they
like when an object divides.
This picture conforms with the idea that the evolution of the specimen OS
in a situation where we are ignorant of processes taking place in its interior
is consistent with the evolution if we do have such knowledge. In fact, the
conservation laws and the picture of a discrete attribute substance is necessary
to make the idea work. This is so because consistent evolution at the two levels
of knowledge relies on the fact that regardless how many objects are present
within the specimen at a given time, the total value of the attribute contained
in the envelope of ar4s(r4, s, σ) is always the same.
Definition 3.48 (Envelope of the wave function). Suppose that the wave
function ar4s(r4, s, σ) is defined for σ = [0, σmax]. Then the envelope UD of
ar4s(r4, s, σ) is UD =
⋃
σ∈[0,σmax]Dr4(σ), where Dr4(σ) is the support of the
wave function at the value σ of the evolution parameter.
The fact that no parcels of unit internal attribute value are allowed to leak
across the boundary of the envelope does not exclude the possibility that objects
may pass this border [Fig. 3.42(b)]. However, such leaking objects must be the
result of object divisions that corresponds to a knowably interacting object that
preserves its identity throghout the series of divisions. Figuratively speaking,
all parcels like those in Fig. 2.59 choose to follow the object that stays within
the wave function envelope.
Leaking objects are therefore ‘empty’, in a sense. Not necessarily in terms
of relational attribute values such as momentum, but in terms of values of the
internal attributes of the original specimen with state SOS(n), such as electric
charge of baryon number. Actually, this is an oversimplification; the matter
will be discussed further in section 3.10. In that section we argue that such
leaking objects are not potentially perceivable ‘real’ objects, but are examples
of ‘pseudoobjects’. We will try to identify massless elementary bosons with such
pseudoobjects.
In Fig. 3.42(b) we may, for example, interpret the identifiable specimen to
be an electron, and the leaking pseudoobjects to be photons. At the level of
less detailed knowledge, we may say that we have a single interacting electron
that follows a curved trajectory given by some evolution equation for the wave
function. At the level of more detailed knowledge, we may say that we have a
knowably interacting electron, which interacts with the environment by emitting
photons. At the latter level, we make a quantum field theory-like description
of the evolution. At the former level, we make a quantum mechanical descrip-
tion of the same evolution, where interactions that bend trajectories must be
described by classical fields. Following the ideas of Bohr, we may say that the
two descriptions are complementary, suitable for different kinds of experminetal
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arrangements. The description in terms of classical fields is proper in contexts C
where we observe spatio-temporal positions, whereas the description in terms of
quantum fields is proper in contexts C ′ where we observe the number of objects
and their internal attributes.
The main point is that these two descriptions should be mutually consistent.
The aim of the present and the preceding section is to analyse evolution equa-
tions for spatio-temporal wave functions. This means that we focus here on the
smooth quantum-mechanical evolution parametrized by σ. Then, by definition,
no observations of what goes on inside the specimen are made during the time
span ∆t that corresponds to the domain [0, σmax] of the evolution parameter.
z
We argued in section 1.9 that there is no such thing as absolute acceler-
ation. It is not possible to decide whether a given object is accelerating by
measuring spatio-temporal attributes alone. Implicit epistemological minimal-
ism (Assumption 1.24) then implies that the form om physical law should not
depend crucially on the existence of acceleration. In other words, if a specimen
follows an accelerated or bended trajectory due to interaction with other ob-
jects, there should be an equivalent description in which the specimen follows
a straight line, but in which the interaction looks different. In a given mathe-
matical representation S¯C of the contextual state, this equivalent description is
reached via a change of variables that include the spatio-temporal coordinates.
In the transformed representation S¯′C we may, by definition, say that the net
interaction is zero. The specimen appears to be free.
Conversely, if we would have a free specimen in the strong sense that we
knew for sure that it did not interact at all with its environment, then a similar
transformation of the variables that describe S¯C would make the trajectory look
accelerated or curved. This would mean, again by definition, that there is some
interaction after all. We conclude that a specimen can never be truly free in the
sense that it follows a straight line in all descriptions of its evolution allowed by
physical law. We return to these matters in section 3.13.
The same insights can be reached using the concept of epistemic invariance
(Assumption 1.17) rather than epistemic minimalism. Let us draw a hypotheti-
cal circle around the specimen, just like we did around Einstein’s elevator in Fig.
1.14. Even if we know about nothing else than the specimen inside the circle,
having no idea whether there are any outside objects that are interacting with
the specimen, its evolution must be consistent with the evolution of the speci-
men when we do know which outside objects there are, and how they interact
with it. In the lack of such knowledge, there is no reason to assign an acceler-
ated or curved trajectory to the specimen. Thus, again, we see that curved and
straight trajectories are equally good in the description of the evolution of any
specimen.
These considerations are local, meaning that it is not possible to measure
three consecutive spatio-temporal positions (r1, ict1), (r2, ict2), and (r3, ict3)
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such that t3 − t1 is a small number, and decide in an absolute sense that the
trajectory r1 → r2 → r3 is straight or curved. That t3 − t1 should be ‘small’
just means that it should be small compared to the perceived curvature of the
trajectory, so that we can exclude that it closes upon itself during the time
period [t1, t3].
From a global perspective, the specimen can follow either a closed trajec-
tory or not. These cases are not topologically equivalent, and it is only open
trajectories that can be legitimately transformed into straight lines. Let us try
to make these statements more precise.
Definition 3.49 (A bound state of a specimen). A specimen OS is in a
bound state if and only if 1) the domain of σ can be extended to Dσ = [0,∞]
in a natural parametrization, 2) OS can be knowably divided into at least two
objects OS1 and OS2, which are identifiable for all σ ∈ Dσ, 3) there is a finite
upper bound Rmax of the spatial distance r12 between OS1 and OS2.
The existence of a bound Rmax should be known at the time n at which
the observational context is initiated (corresponding to σ = 0). The distance
r12 is defined as follows. Consider a context in which the spatio-temporal wave
function ar4s(σ) is defined. Let r1 ∈ Dr1(σ), where Dr1(σ) is the projection of
the domain of ar4s(σ) to the spatial position of OS1, and let r2 ∈ Dr2(σ). Then
r12 = |r2−r1|. Condition 3) means that for each σ ∈ Dσ we have r12 < Rmax for
each possible pair of points (r1, r2). To be physically meaningful, we note that
the fulfilment of condition 3) should be invariant under a general coordinate
transformation. That is, if we let r′ = f(r) where f is a diffeomorphism, then
there is a finite R′max such that r
′
12 < R
′
max whenever r12 < Rmax.
Definition 3.50 (An unbound specimen). A specimen OS that cannot
knowably be identified with a component specimen OS1 or OS2 in a bound state
acccording to Definition 3.49.
This definition is illustrated in Fig. 3.43. In the following, we will analyze
the evolution equation of an unbound, intercating specimen. We return to
specimens in bound states in section 3.7.
We can consider the description of the free specimen in the preceding section
to be a description of an interacting, unbound specimen for which the choice of
variables is such that it appears to follow a straight trajcetory r4 in space-time.
To make the form of the general evolution equation 3.246 invariant to a change
of variables that transforms a straight trajectory into a bended trajectory and
vice versa, we may write
B¯r4s = −b+ B¯(int)r4s . (3.247)
We may want to express the interaction term B¯
(int)
r4s in terms of an interaction
strength β according to the definition given in the beginning of section 3.4.8:
d〈r〉/dσ = v0 + βf(σ), (3.248)
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Figure 3.43: Illustration of the concept of a bound specimen (Definition 3.49).
The wave function domains Dr1 or Dr2 correspond to the specimen states SOS1
and SOS2 according to Fig. 3.37. An alternative choice of coordinates is to let
the origin reside in one of the domains for all σ ∈ [0,∞]. The most natural
choice is then to place the origin within the smallest domain (in this case Dr1).
In atomic physics, this amounts to a coordinate system in which the origin is
placed within the nucleus (OS1) rather than anywhere in the cloud of electrons
(OS2).
where v0 is a constant vector. Then we may write
B¯r4s = −b+ βB¯(1)r4s (3.249)
for small β in a first order expansion.
The form [3.247] of B¯r4s follows from the discussion in the preceding section,
where we argued that we must have B¯r4s = −b for β = 0.
The operator B¯r4s in Eq. [3.246] that specifies the evolution cannot depend
or act on σ explicity, since the evolution of a physical state depends on this state
only, that is, on the knowledge about its attributes. The evolution parameter σ
is no attribute, and is introduced just as a mathematical device to interpolate
continuously between the evolution operators u1, u2, u3, and so on, according
to Eq. 3.7. Therefore B¯r4s always has eigenfunctions
a(σ˜)r4s(r4, s, σ) = α
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s)e
iσ˜σ (3.250)
such that
B¯r4sα
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s)e
iσ˜σ = eiσ˜σB¯r4sα
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s) (3.251)
and
B¯r4sα
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s) = σ˜α
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s) (3.252)
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according to Eq. [3.246]. Note that a
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s, σ) in Eq. [3.250] is an eigenfunc-
tion to B¯r4s for any choice of function α
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s) that makes the wave function
normalized according to Statement 3.43. (In typical situations we also require
that it has finite support Dr4 , according to the discussion in relation to Fig.
3.37.)
The general solution to Eq. [3.246] can be written
ar4s(r4, s, σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
α(σ˜)r4s(r4, s)e
iσ˜σdσ˜. (3.253)
In the preceding section we identified B¯r4s with a wave function operator that
corresponds to a property, namely rest mass squared m20. Can this identification
be maintained in the general situation in which interactions are inherent? If so,
we should always have
m20 ∈
{
~2
bc2
σ˜
}
, (3.254)
where σ˜ is an eigenvalue to B¯r4s, in accordance with Definition 3.39.
It will be possible in general to identify a squared rest mass m20 with the
eigenvalue σ˜ according to Eq. 3.254 if this eigenvalue is invariant under all
allowed changes of variables that turn an expected straight trajectory into an
accelerated, bending trajectory. If the set of eigenvalues {σ˜} would not be invari-
ant under those transformations, we would have to abandon this identification,
since rest mass is intended to be a physical property. As such, it cannot depend
on a change of variables that leaves the physics invariant. The freedom in the
choice of variables is simply a redundancy in the mathematical representation
of the physical state. Which are the allowed variable transformations for which
we should check eigenvalue invariance? First, we require invariance under any
diffeomorphism
r4 → r′4 = f(r4). (3.255)
Second, we require eigenvalue invariance under any gauge transformation of a
wave function a ≡ a(σ˜)r4s that is an eigenfunction associated to this eigenvalue (we
drop the sub- and superscripts on the wave function for notational simplicity):
a(r4, s, σ)→ a′(r4, s, σ) = a(r4, s, σ)eig(r4). (3.256)
(We will discuss the gauge principle from the epistemic perspective in section
3.13). Taking these two requirements together, we should check for invariance
of {σ˜} under any transformation
a(r4, s, σ)→ a′(r′4, s, σ) = a(r′4, s, σ)eig(r
′
4). (3.257)
In short, the requirement is that the following implication holds true.
306 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
B¯r4sa(r4, s, σ) = σ˜a(r4, s, σ)
⇓
B¯r′4sa
′(r′4, s, σ) = σ˜a
′(r′4, s, σ).
(3.258)
But this is clearly so since Eq. [3.250] means that we can write
a(r4, s, σ) = α(r4, s)e
iσ˜σ (3.259)
where α(r4, s) is an arbitrary function that normalizes the eigenfunction a(r4, s, σ).
That is, any transformation α(r4, s) → α′(r′4, s) leaves the eigenvalue σ˜ invari-
ant. The check for invariance of σ˜ is therefore successful, since we have
a′(r′4, s, σ) = α
′(r′4, s)e
iσ˜σ (3.260)
for any transformation [3.257].
This means that any unbound specimen, interacting or not, possesses a
property with a value m20 that is found in the set specified in Eq. [3.254].
This set was shown in section 3.4.8 to contain only non-negative numbers in the
case of a non-interacting specimen (given the sign convention in Eq. [3.201] for
the unphysical parameter b). Just as for non-interacting specimens this implies
that we can write
B¯r4s = −M¯r4sM¯r4s, (3.261)
in the general case also. This in turn means that the Dirac equation (Statement
3.55) must hold for unbound, interacting specimens as well as for non-interacting
specimens. The only change that we can do in the Dirac equation to make it
generally applicable is to generalize the definition of four-momentum. In so
doing, we can always express it in the following form.
Definition 3.51 (General four-momentum p4). A wave function operator
that corresponds to p4 can be written
(p4)r4 = −i~
(
∂
∂r1
,
∂
∂r2
,
∂
∂r3
,
∂
∂r4
)
+ (p4)
(int)
r4 (3.262)
The possible values of p4 is the set of eigenvalues to this operator.
We may use Eq. [3.247] and Definition 3.51 to express
B¯(int)r4s =
b
~2
(
{(p4)(0)r4 , (p4)(int)r4 }+ (p4)(int)r4 (p4)(int)r4
)
, (3.263)
where (p4)
(0)
r4 = −i~(∂/∂r1, . . . , ∂/∂r4), and we have introduced the anticom-
mutator {(p4)(0)r4 , (p4)(int)r4 } = (p4)(0)r4 (p4)(int)r4 + (p4)(int)r4 (p4)(0)r4 .
Definition 3.52 (General momentum and energy). Momentum p is the
vector of the first three components of p4, and energy E is proportional to the
fourth component, so that p4 = (p, iE/c).
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Since the Dirac equation holds in the general case, so does the evolution
equation (Statement 3.54). If we use Definition 3.52 this in turn means that
the Einstein energy-mass-momentum relation [3.222] also holds generally for an
interacting, but unbound specimen.
The transformations [3.255] and [3.256] may be interpreted as gauge trans-
formations associated with the gravitational and electro-magnetic fields, respec-
tively (Section 3.13). These transformations are specified by functions of r4, and
arbitrary large distances |r| may be affected, distorting faraway trajectories and
probabilities of alternatives. This fact conforms with the usual notion that the
gravitational and electro-magnetic fields have infinite range. If the specimen is
knowably interacting, we should use the quantum description of these fields in
terms of emitted gravitons and photons, respectively (Fig. 3.42). On the other
hand, if they are ‘just’ interacting, the classical descriptions in terms of general
relativity and Maxwell’s equations are appropriate.
What about the weak and strong forces? They are associated with an inves-
tigation of the internal attributes of the specimen, not the relational attribute
r4 that is used to describe its trajectory. They determine what we will see if the
specimen divides, or if we determine the value of an internal attribute precisely,
given a fuzziness of our initial knowledge. This means that these forces may be
associated with a knowably transforming specimen, rather than a (knowably)
interacting specimen (Fig. 3.41). We will discuss this interpretation briefly in
the following section. Note that there can be no smooth classical description of
the processes that lead to a knowable object transformation. Objects cannot
be ‘just’ transforming in the same way as they can be ‘just’ interacting (Defi-
nitions 3.45 to 3.47). Therefore there is no alternative description of the weak
and strong forces in terms of classical fields, like Einstein’s or Maxwell’s.
We argued above that the descriptions where a specimen is interacting and
knowably interacting must be equivalent. The difference in the amount of knowl-
edge about the system under study should not affect its evolution, according to
the principle of epistemic invariance. A somewhat stronger statement is that a
specimen that is knowably interacting must be considered free at those times it
does not knowably interact. That is, between the emissions of ‘transfer quanta’
according to Fig. 3.42(b), the object is always expected to follow a straight
line. Put differently, all interactions (bending or accelerated trajectories in the
given reference frame) must have an equivalent description in terms of knowable
emissions of transfer quanta.
Interactions between two objects must encode information that makes it pos-
sible to identify which object interact with which; interactions between objects
must be identifiable to some extent just like the objects themselves must be
identifiable. If we are dealing with interacting minimal objects having discrete
internal attributes, this implies that the information encoded in the interaction
must be discrete. We identify the emitted ‘objects’ in Fig. 3.42(b) with such
‘transfer quanta’. If no such quanta are emitted, no interaction between the
object and its environment takes place - it is free.
This conclusion makes it necessary to regard the emission of such quanta to
depend on the choice of coordinates. This fact, togheter with other observations,
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Figure 3.44: The evolution of a knowably interacting specimen OS as described
according to Statement 3.56. The evolution in between and after the observed
emissions of transfer quanta Q and Q′ can be described in a family of con-
texts C(σ, σ′, σ′′) in terms of three consecutive wave functions ar4s(r4, s, σ),
a′r4s(r4, s, σ
′), and a′′r4s(r4, s, σ
′′) [Fig. 3.35(a)]. Each of these describes a free
specimen. The arrows in the middle of the three envelopes (Definition 3.48)
represent the evolution of the expected spatio-temporal position 〈r4〉. It will
follow a straight lines as the evolution parameters increase. The double-headed
arrows that connect the specimen OS with the transfer quanta Q and Q′ sym-
bolize the functional relationship between the attributes of the pairs of entities
that makes it possible to say that the quanta are associated with the specimen
[Fig. 2.54(c)].
make it clear that these quanta cannot be considered ‘real’ objects; they can be
neither directly perceived objects, nor deduced quasiobjects (Section 3.10).
Statement 3.56 (Objects are free between knowable interactions). Sup-
pose that we, in a given coordinate system, choose to describe the evolution of
an object in terms of knowable interactions and transformations only. Then the
object must be considered free during any time interval [n, n + m] in which no
such interaction or transformation knowably occurs.
This means that during such a time interval [n, n + m] we can model the
evolution of the object by treating it as a specimen in a family of contexts
C(σ), and describe its evolution between consecutive measurements of its state
in terms of a free wave function ar4s(r4, s, σ), as specified in section 3.4.8. In
particular, the expected trajectory should be straight: d〈r4〉/dσ = v0 for a
constant vector v0 (Fig. 3.44).
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We have used the concepts of straight and curved trajectories as a point of
departure in the foregoing discussion. We have allowed for the fact that there are
equivalent descriptions in which a straight trajectories becomes bent, and vice
versa, but we have nevertheless presupposed the subjective ability to distinguish
straight from bent trajectories, in accordance with Definitions 2.33 and 2.34.
From a strict epistemic perspective we should ask what aspect of physical law
makes this subjective distinction possible. Only then do we achieve epistemic
completeness (Assumption 1.13).
We concluded in section 1.9 that we cannot use spatio-temporal attibutes
alone to distinguish accelerated motion from motion with constant velocity. The
relational nature of these attributes mean that if an object appears to accelerate,
it may equally well be the objects of reference that accelerate. In the same way,
we cannot decide in an absolute sense whether an elongated object like a stick
is straight or bent. To answer the question we have to refer to a coordinate
system, a grid of objects of reference. To decide whether the objects in this grid
are equally spaced, we need another object, a measuring stick. But to decide
whether this measuring stick keeps it length and shape as we check the spacings
in the grid in consecutive order, we need still another coordinate system.
To escape this infinite regress, we have resorted to the feeling of acceleration
as the judge. However, since we can never decide in an absolute sense whether an
object accelerates by means of the relational spatio-temporal attributes at hand,
we also concluded in section 1.9 that there has to be another interpretation of
this feeling, namely gravity.
But gravity in itself cannot account for this feeling. There has to be a force
that opposes gravity. Otherwise we would always be falling freely. We would fall
through the earth. The observer in Einstein’s elevator would fall through the
floor of the elevator without ever feeling the pressure against it. The question
whether this feeling is due to gravity or acceleration would never arise. Since
we would never be able to feel gravity, the concept would lose its epistemic
meaning. The necessary opposing force is provided by electromagnetism.
Statement 3.57 (The ability to feel acceleration implies gravity and
electromagnetism). The existence of the feeling of acceleration and the re-
quirement of epistemic closure (Assumption 1.20) make gravity and electromag-
netism necessary.
The equivalence principle implies that electromagnetism must oppose any
acceleration in exactly the same way as it opposes acceleration due to gravity.
When we go around in a roundabout, the fluid in the semicircular canals in
the ears is set in motion, which makes us feel dizzy. But in order for the nerve
cells to detect this motion, the fluid has to be contained by the walls in these
canals, exerting pressure on the hair cells from which the nerves emanate. Both
the containment of the fluid, the pressure on the hair cells that set them in
motion and the transmission of nerve signals is due to electromagnetism. That
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is, electromagnetism is necessary to account for the feeling of acceleration in
this case also.
A world without the feeling of acceleration, without electromagnetism, would
be truly bizarre in terms of spatio-temporal perceptions, almost impossible to
imagine. There would simply be no subjective distinction between inertial and
accelerated frames. We would not be able to speak about forces or interactions.
In order to define acceleration even in a relative sense, we need knowably
uniform yardsticks, and clocks that tick at knowably equal intervals. Without
such devices we cannot tell whether two trains accelerate away from each other
or move with steady relative speed. But we cannot define such yardsticks and
clocks with the help of the perception of spatio-temporal attributes alone, as
discussed above. We end up in infinite regress. Another kind of perception is
needed to get out of it.
Another way to put it is to say that it is only possible to define proper
yardsticks and clocks if the equality of the distance between the tick marks is
invariant under all coordinate transformations of a certain type (linear), but
is lost in another type of transformation (non-linear). Without the dubjective
distinction between inertial and accelerated frames we could never in practice
distinguish linear from non-linear transformations. Non-linear transformations
that distort the yardsticks could be performed without anyone being able to
tell that such a change of coordinates had actually taken place. The concept of
acceleration would lose its meaning altogether.
Statement 3.58 (Without electromagnetism, no metric space-time).
Electromagnetism is necessary in order to measure distances, and thus to dis-
tinguish straight and curved trajectories subjectively.
Note, however, that we would still be able to speak about a space-time
with ordered elements. By definition, all attribute values are possible to order
sequentially, and we assume that spatial and temporal relations are attributes.
We have discussed sequential time at length. We assume the ability to decide
that event B occurs after event A but before event C. Likewise, we can always
decide whether a point B on a rope is placed between points A and C or not.
These matters were discussed in Section 2.5.
3.5 Consequences of the evolution equation
Statement 3.56 implies that the treatment of a free specimen in section 3.4.8 is
useful even if the aim is to describe interacting or transforming objects. More
precisely, we can hope to be able to use the free wave function ar4s(r, s, σ) to
calculate probabilities to see different kinds of interactions or transformations.
We seek these probabilities as functions of the relational time t passed since the
last time n at which we observed the state of the object. As discussed above,
we do this by introducing a family of contexts C(σ), using σ as a proxy for
the passage of relational time t. Since we argue in this way that the evolution
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equation for the free specimen is generally useful, we devote the present section
to discuss some of its consequences.
The squared rest mass is given by m20 =
~2
bc2 σ˜, according to Definition 3.39.
This means that the possible values of m20 are proportional to the eigenvalues σ˜
of the evolution operator B¯r4s, according to Eq. [3.252]. A specimen with a per-
fectly known rest mass is therefore described by the corresponding eigenfunction
a
(σ˜)
r4s, which, according to Eq. [3.250], always has the form
a(σ˜)r4s(r4, s, σ) = α
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s)e
iσ˜σ. (3.264)
We see that a specimen with a rest mass that is known to be zero would be
described by a wave function of the form a
(σ˜)
r4s(r4, s, σ) = αr4s(r4, s)
(σ˜), which
does not depend on the evolution parameter σ. Then it cannot depend on re-
lational time t either, since σ is a proxy for t. Such a wave function therefore
corresponds to a static, timeless contextual state SC . This fact cannot depend
on the choice of spatio-temporal coordinates r4, and it should therefore remain
true after a Lorentz transformation. [Since we restrict our interest to coordinate
systems in which the specimen is free, we do not consider more general diffeo-
morphisms r′4 = f(r4).] This would possible only if the spatio-temporal part of
the wave function were a plane wave
a(0)r4 (r4, σ) ∝ eir˜4·r4 . (3.265)
However, such a wave function is not normalizable according to Definition 3.43.
Therefore there cannot be any specimen whose rest mass is observed within some
context and is found to be zero, before some other properties of the specimen
are observed.
The fact that we can never be sure that the rest mass is zero means that we
can never exclude a non-zero rest mass. Can we go a step further and exclude
the zero rest mass? Let us formulate the question more precisely. Let Σm0=0
denote the hypothetical set in state space of all exact states Z such that there
is an observational setup O with a specimen OS with zero rest mass (using the
concepts in Fig. 3.15). Can we be sure that SOS ∩Σm0=0 = ∅ for all specimens
that we can ever investigate?
The property m0 that we have identified in the formalism presented in the
preceding sections (Definition 3.38) seems to conform precisely with the tradi-
tional concept of rest mass. We have assumed that any object can be repre-
sented in terms of a set of minimal objects. If we accept that m0 shares all
the qualitites of the rest mass, we can therefore write m0[OS] ≥
∑
lm0[(OM )l],
where {(OM )l} is any set of minimal objects whose collective state can properly
represent SOS . This means that we have m0[OS] > 0 for all specimens OS if
there is no minimal object (OM )l whose rest mass can possibly be zero when
it is free. We have concluded that we can never exclude the possibility that
m0[(OM )l] > 0. We have to argue that the two possibilites m0[(OM )l] > 0 and
m0[(OM )l] = 0 are mutually inconsistent for a single minimal object.
Objects with zero rest mass always travel at the speed of light, i.e. v = c.
In contrast, we have v < c for any object with non-zero rest mass. These
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two possibilities are qualitatively different. We argued in the preceding section
that m0 is invariant under any diffeomorphism r
′
4 = f(r4) (Eq. [3.260]). In
particular, it is invariant under a Lorentz transformation. Therefore there is a
valid reference frame in which any minimal object with non-zero rest mass is at
rest. This possibility is indeed inconsistent with a minimal object that always
travel at the speed of light. Since we cannot exclude m0[(OM )l] > 0 we must
exclude m0[(OM )l] = 0, and therefore we can be certain that m0[OS] > 0 for
any specimen OS.
In these considerations we can equally well talk about ‘objects’ instead of
‘specimens’ and conclude that there cannot be any object with zero rest mass.
This small semantic leap is possible since any object whose mass we would like
to determine becomes a specimen within an observational context.
Statement 3.59 (No object has zero rest mass). No object under study
can be known to have zero rest mass. Furthermore, we can always exclude the
possibility that the object has zero rest mass.
It is intuitively clear why the plane massless wave like that in Eq. [3.265] can
never describe a specimen in any observational context: it is completely delocal-
ized in space, and also in time! Since the evolution equation can be meaningfully
constructed only in contexts with a specimen that has been actually observed
at some previous time n0, such solutions cannot arise for finite σ if we define
SC(n) = SC(σ = 0), where n ≥ n0 is the time at which the context is initiated,
as usual. The reason is simply that the observation of the object at time n0
means that far away parts of the possible values of the relational attributes can
be excluded at this point in time, and also at time n.
Let us complicate the picture a little bit. The spatio-temporal support Dr4
of the wave function is obviously finite if the specimen is directly perceived
at the initial time n. Then it will also remain finite for all finite σ. But the
specimen may also be a quasiobject. It may, for instance, be a quantum of
radiation that is expected to be emitted from a radioactive sample placed in
the experimental setup at time n. In this case we may define a spatio-temporal
coordinate system such that t = 0 at sequential time n, and r = 0 at some point
inside the radioactive sample. The context will then be such that all negative t
can be excluded as possible detection times for the radiated specimen, and we
also know that |r| < R for some finite R whenever the quantum of radiation is
actially detected. However, in this case the support Dr4 nevertheless has infinite
volume, since we cannot exlude that t → ∞. We must be prepared to wait an
arbitrarily long time before the first quantum is emitted from the sample.
The directionality of time, as expressed in Eq. [3.196], leads to Eq. [3.198].
This relation implies that the energy always has the same sign if we define
it to be proportional to the reciprocal temporal position r˜4, as we have done
above. With the sign convention b < 0 (Eq. [3.201]) and the choice of a positive
constant of proportionality in Eq. [3.220], we have E ≥ 0. It follows from
Statement 3.59 that m20 > 0. Thus we can use the relation [3.222] between
energy mass and momentum for a free specimen to conclude that E > 0.
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Statement 3.60 (The energy of a free specimen is positive). Energy E,
as defined in Eq. [3.220], is either always negative or always positive for a free
specimen. With our sign conventions it becomes positive.
To ensure in the formalism that energy E always stays non-negative, we
could try to follow the same path as in the case of the squared rest mass m20
and look for an operator X¯ such that E¯ = X¯X¯. The eigenvalues of X¯ would
correspond to the square root of the energy, and this would become the basic
energy measure. However, energy is not relativistically invariant, and neither
would be the operator X¯. Thus the additional constraint on the wave function
that would arise (analogous to Eq. [3.210]) would not be relativistically invariant
either. Therefore it cannot be part of fundamental physical law.
The issue of negative energies must be handled in terms of antimatter, as
usual. The picture that antimatter are objects travelling backwards in time is
particularly suitable from the present perspective. We found that E > 0 if and
only if d〈t〉/dσ > 0. In the same way, we may deduce that E < 0 if and only if
d〈t〉/dσ < 0. The solutions to the evolution equation with E < 0
ar4s(r, t, s, σ)
− =
∫
a˜r4s(p,−E, s,E20)e
i
~ (p·r+Et+
E20
2〈E〉σ)dpdEdE20 . (3.266)
may thus be seen as specimens that travels backwards in time, but in all other
respects are identical to the corresponding specimens with E > 0 and wave
function
ar4s(r, t, s, σ)
+ =
∫
a˜r4s(p, E, s, E
2
0)e
i
~ (p·r−Et−
E20
2〈E〉σ)dpdEdE20 . (3.267)
Let us clarify what we mean by ‘travelling backwards in time’ in this setting.
It means that as sequential time n increases, the relational time t decreases.
The antimatter specimen OS− is assigned a time coordinate t(n + m) when
observed at time n + m that is smaller than the time coordinate t(n) it was
assigned at the initiation of the context, at time n. To me, the meaning of the
idea of objects travelling backwards in time becomes clearer in such a picture,
in which we separate sequential and relational time. The separation makes it
possible to say that the object travels backwards in time (t decreases) in relation
to something that travels forward by definition (sequential time n).
We will discuss the separation of sequential and relational time in connection
with antimatter further in section 3.6, where we suggest an epistemic interpre-
tation of antimatter that demystifies the concept altogether. Since that inter-
pretation is quite hard to swallow, we continue here with a more conventional
narrative.
As usual, we may use the CPT-theorem to reinterpret the antimatter spec-
imen OS− from being identical to the matter specimen OS+, but travelling
backwards in time, to being identical to OS+ except from having inverted charge
and parity, and travelling forwards in time. (Note that, strictly speaking, the
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CPT-theorem applies only in quantum field theory, which we do not consider
here.)
From our epistemic perspective, the equivalence of this picture to that of the
‘Dirac sea’ becomes apparent. This is so at least if we assume that all minimal
objects with negative energy are quasiobjects, whose existence is deduced by
physical law from the state of those objects that we actually perceive. The
point is that we cannot exclude from the direct perception that there is a sea
of such quasiobjects, given that there is one such object in each possible state.
The reason is simply that the resulting infinite charge of the sea pulls any other
charged object (with positive energy) equally forcefully in all directions, so that
the net electromagnetic force is zero. In the same way, the rest mass of this sea
of negative energy objects surrounds any other object equally in all directions so
that the net gravitational pull becomes zero. Since we can never exclude neither
the picture of antimatter as holes in the Dirac sea of negative energy objects,
nor the picture of positive energy objects having opposite charge and parity, we
should describe the total state S as a union of those possibilites. That is, if we
deduce the existence of antimatter at time n, then
S(n) = Shole ∪ Sobject. (3.268)
However, since we can never discriminate between the two alternatives, we have
no reason to uphold this superposition in our mathematical representations,
but can choose whatever picture we like the most. More precisely, there never
appears a set of future alternatives (Definition 2.51) such that one picture or
the other is the outcome of the observation.
The introduction of the evolution parameter σ introduces a third basic com-
mutation relation, apart from the two familiar ones
[x, p¯x] = i~[
t, E¯
]
= −i~, (3.269)
namely,
[σ,E20 ] = 2i~〈E〉, (3.270)
in the natural parametrization, where we have defined E20 = c
4m20. To each
of these commutators it is possible to associate a corresponding uncertainty
relation
∆x∆px ≥ ~/2
∆t∆E ≥ ~/2
∆σ∆E20 ≥ ~〈E〉.
(3.271)
The separation of relational and sequential time makes it possible to interpret
the time-energy uncertainty relation in exactly the same way as the position-
momentum relation. In contrast, in traditional quantum mechanics time t is a
parameter rather than an observable. The present description is an improve-
ment since it respects the relativistic notion of space-time, in which the spatial
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Figure 3.45: In the present description, the interpretation of the temporal un-
certainty relation ∆t∆E ≥ ~/2 is the same as that of ∆x∆px ≥ ~/2, respecting
the symmetry between spatial an temporal coordinates inherent in relativistic
space-time. a) Relational time t in a coordinate system defined by objects ex-
ternal to the specimen OS. b) Relational time defined so that t = 0 at the
sequential time n at which the experiment starts. In this case we must have
∆t ≤ t.
and temporal coordinates are treated on equal footing and may be Lorentz-
transformed into each other.
Suppose that we observe a specimen OS at sequential time n, and study
its evolution as a function of σ (Fig. 3.45) in a family of contexts C(σ), where
time n corresponds to σ = 0. The evolution of t may be measured in some
external reference frame, in relation to some other event or object (panel a). It
may also be measured in relation to the observation of OS at time n (panel b).
In the first case, the uncertainty ∆t of t is typically non-zero for all σ ≥ 0. In
the second case, the uncertainty grows from zero as σ grows from zero. In the
natural parametrization we get ∆t ≤ σ.
Let us look at the most common illustration of the time-energy uncertainty
relation, namely the broadening of atomic spectral lines. Suppose that the elec-
tron was observed to be in the excited state at time n, and that the uncertainty
of its energy at this time was ∆E. The context is such that r4 = (r, ict) is
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observed at the moment n + m defined by the deexcitation of the atom. This
means that t is part of the final observation. Then the uncertainty ∆t of the
measured relational time t that has passed before deexcitation fulfils the relation
∆t ≥ ~/(2∆E). (3.272)
If we adopt the relative coordinate system in Fig. 3.45(b), we get 〈t〉 ≥ ∆t,
so that
T ≥ ~/(2∆E), (3.273)
where T ≡ 〈t〉 is the expected life-time of the excited state.
Statement 3.61 (Uncertainty relations for spatio-temporal observa-
tions). Consider a context C initiated at time n, and such that r4 = (r, ict)
is observed at time n + m. Let ∆px and ∆E be the uncertainties of the mo-
mentum and energy of the specimen OS in the evolved state umSOS(n). Let ∆x
and ∆t be the uncertainties of the spatio-temporal distance between the specimen
at times n and n + m, as observed at time n + m. Then ∆x ≥ ~/2∆px and
∆t ≥ ~/2∆E.
In traditional quantum mechanics the time-energy uncertainty relation is
a bit awkward to interpret since t is a parameter rather than an observable
attribute. In the same way, the analogous relation ∆σ∆E20 ≥ ~〈E〉 in the
present description is a bit awkward to interpret. To give it a physical meaning,
we note that it holds in the natural parametrization. In that parametrization
we may set σ = 〈t〉. Then we get
∆〈t〉∆E20 ≥ ~〈E〉. (3.274)
This inequality expresses the fact that it is not possible to know a priori
the expected relational time t between the initiation of the context at time n
and the final observation at time n+m, unless the rest energy of the specimen
E20 is completely unknown. This situation does not occur in realistic contexts,
and illustrates the conclusion expressed in Statement 3.42 that we can use 〈t〉
to parametrize the evolution only in idealized contexts.
Statement 3.62 (Rest energy uncertainty). Consider a context C initiated
at time n, and such that r4 = (r, ict) is observed at time n+m. Let ∆E
2
0 be the
uncertainty of the squared rest energy of the specimen OS in the evolved state
umSOS(n). Let ∆〈t〉 be the uncertainty of the relational time passed between
sequential times n and n+m, and let 〈E〉 be the expected energy of the specimen.
Then ∆〈t〉 ≥ ~〈E〉/∆E20 .
Suppose that the specimen at time n is in an excited state with an expected
life-time T . According to the above discussion we may identify T = 〈t〉, and
conclude that T cannot be exactly determined. We have 〈t〉 ≥ ∆〈t〉 and E ≥ E0,
so that we may write
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T ≥ ~〈E0〉/∆E20 . (3.275)
Therefore, if a specimen is expected to undergo a distinct change from state
SOS(n) to state SOS(n+m)∩SOS(n) = ∅ within a time interval T ≈ ∆σ, then
the rest energy of the original state SOS(n) has an uncertainty ∆E
2
0 ≥ ~〈E0〉/T .
The uncertainty of an object’s rest energy thus grows with its rest energy, and
also grows if its expected lifetime becomes shorter. Conversely, if we manage to
measure the rest energy of the specimen to arbitrary precision, then it cannot
be expected to undergo any perceivable change in a time span T that grows
arbitrarily large. In other words, rest energies are only perfectly known in a
static world. A static world is a world without time, since there will be no
subjective change that can define the temporal update n → n + 1. We regain
the conclusion that there can be no specimen in the real world which has a rest
mass that is knowably zero (Statement 3.59).
Statement 3.63 (The rest mass can never be exactly known). For all
objects O whose rest energy E0 is observed in an experimental context, we have
∆E0 > 0 both before and after the observation.
In the same way as in traditional quantum mechanics, we following statement
follows from the fact that the evolution operator B¯r4s commutes with the energy
and rest energy operators.
Statement 3.64 (The expected values of rest mass and energy are
conserved). Consider any free specimen in a joint family of contexts CC˜(σ)
in which four-position r4 and four-momentum p4 are observed. Then we have
d
dσ 〈E20〉 = 0 and ddσ 〈E〉 = 0
z
The uncertainty relations we refer to above are derived in the standard manner
from the properties of Fourier transforms. The position uncertainty ∆x is the
standard deviation of the probability density function |Ψx(x)|2, and the other
uncertainties are defined analogously. These Fourier transforms are defined for
continuous wave functions ΨP (p, σ). In traditional quantum mechanics this is
the basic layer of physical description. In contrast, in the present approach the
basic layer of physical description are states SO of objects O. These states are
sets in state space S. All concepts and quantities should therefore be based on
the physical state SO, rather than on a particular mathematical representation
S¯O of this state.
We have argued that the representation of the contextual state SC of the
specimen OS in terms of a continuous wave function ΨP (p, σ) with unbounded
support Dp is always an approximation (Definition 3.31). This is so for two
reasons: first, the number of values pj that can be observed in any detector OD
is always finite. Second, there is always a maximum value pmax and a minimum
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value pmin that can be observed in any given context C. The basic problem
is that observational contexts for relational attributes are never fundamental
(Definition 3.13).
For example, a position detector that were able to register positions arbi-
trarily far away would have to be infinitely large. The lack of registration of
a position within a finite range [xmin, xmax] in a realistic, finite detector corre-
sponds to the realization of the alternative ‘x is larger than xmax or smaller than
xmin’. Such a ‘negative’ alternative is necessary to make the set of future alter-
natives complete according to Definition 2.51, but at the same time it makes it
impossible to model the evolution of the contextual state SC with a continuous
wave function in these faraway regions of property value space.
Another problem with the standard definition of the uncertainty relations is
that the wave function is not universally defined, as discussed in the last part of
section 3.4.7, and summarized in Statements 3.52 and 3.53. The physical inter-
pretation of the Fourier transform as a change in the choice of which property is
to be observed, is only possible if the observational context C has a reciprocal C˜
(Definition 3.16). Then we can change basis in the common Hilbert space CC˜ at
will (Fig. 3.27). However, the reciprocal context exists only if C is neutral (Def-
inition 3.15). Neutral contexts are an idealization, just like the representation
of the contextual state by a continuous wave function is an idealization.
The difference between a realistic and an idealized context in which we ob-
serve a pair of not simultaneously knowable relational properties is highlighted
if we compare Figs. 3.39 and 3.46. In the realistic context shown in Fig. 3.39
we always have a finite support DPP ′ , observations with limited resolution, and
we have not shown any reciprocal context since there isn’t any. In contrast,
Fig. 3.46 shows a corresponding idealized context in which we let P be position
x, and P ′ be momentum px. It is only in this idealization that the standard
deviations can be related by the uncertainty relation ∆x∆px ≥ ~/2.
Even so, the interpretation of this relation is a bit awkward, since the support
Dxpx is unbounded. Any x is a possible outcome of the observation of position,
and any px is a possible outcome of the observation of momentum. In terms of
the widths ∆Dx and ∆Dpx of Dxpx , we always have
∆Dx∆Dpx =∞ (3.276)
in the idealized context in Fig. 3.46. The support Dxpx is nothing else than
the projection of the specimen state SOS onto the subspace of state space S
defined by the position and momentum axes. Clearly, a proper definition of
the uncertainty relations should be based upon the size Dxpx , since this is the
relevant physical quantity, in contrast to the abstract standard deviations ∆x
and ∆px. Therefore it is disappointing that the physical relation 3.276 gives no
useful information. However, the problem is just that we expressed the relation
for an unphysical, idealized context. It does give useful information about the
physical state in the realistic context in Fig. 3.39, in which case
0 < ∆Dx∆Dpx <∞. (3.277)
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Figure 3.46: An idealized context C in which position x and momentum px are
observed at times n+m and n+m′, respectively. The observations are perfectly
precise, and the detector is infinitely large, so that all values of x and px can
be observed. The context C is also neutral, so that the reciprocal C˜ can be
defined. These conditions imply that the support Dxpx has no boundary just
before an observation. No value x is excluded by the potential knowledge just
before we observe position, and no value px is excluded afterwards. In the same
way, no value px is excluded before a momentum observation, and no value x is
excluded afterwards. It is only in this situation that the relation ∆x∆px ≥ ~/2
has a well-defined physical meaning. Compare the realistic context in Fig. 3.39.
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Figure 3.47: Planck’s constant may be defined as (twice) the minimum state
space area A of the projection of the object state SO onto the plane spanned
by the x-components of position and momentum. The state space S is no
vector space, so the fact that the attribute axes are drawn perpendicular has no
particular meaning. The projection ΠxpxSO of the state SO is just the union of
the value pairs (x(Z), px(Z)) of all exact states Z ∈ SO.
The support DPP ′ does not need to be rectangular if there is conditional
knowledge that exclude some combinations (p, p′). It is therefore more appro-
priate to refer to the area A[DPP ′ ] of the support than the product of its two
widths, if we want to formulate a general uncertainty relation. We suggest the
following.
Statement 3.65 (A general uncertainty relation). Suppose that the prop-
erty pair (P, P ′) refers to (x, px), (y, py), (z, pz) or (t, E). Let ΠPP ′SO be the
projection Π of the object state SO onto the two-dimensional subspace of S that
is spanned by the axes defined by P and P ′. Also, let A[ΠPP ′SO] be the area of
this projected set in a given coordinate system that define units for the values p
and p′. Then we have A[ΠPP ′SOS ] ≥ ~/2, where ~ is expressed in these units.
The fact that ~ is very small in coordinate systems defined by units that
relate to everyday experience means that effects due to incomplete potential
knowledge (quantum effects) are very hard to discern in everyday experience.
The state space S is not in itself equipped with a coordinate system and an
associated set of units (Section 2.5). However, the uncertainty relation 3.65
defines a minimal area A ∼ ~ of certain two-dimensional slices of state space.
This minimal area is therefore the most natural area unit for such slices, in
concordance with the assignment ~ = 1 in the commonly used ‘natural units’.
The area A translates to the property ‘action’, and ~ is often called ‘the quantum
of action’. In our terminology we may equally well call it ‘a quantum of state
space area’.
Let us motivate Statement 3.65. In so doing, we turn it around so that it
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becomes more like a definition of Planck’s constant. We defined the properties
momentum and energy in a formal way in section 3.4.8, as proportional to the
reciprocal position r˜ and the reciprocal time t˜ in the Fourier expansion of the
continuous wave function Ψr4(r, t) (Eq. [3.188]). We were able to identify these
expansion coefficients as values of properties because they appear as eigenvalues
of self-adjoint wave function operators (Statement 3.51). From this perspective,
Planck’s constant is just an arbitrary constant of proportionality that relates
the expansion coefficients r˜ and t˜ with the corresponding properties p and E.
The wave function operators for the components of (p, E) do not commute with
the wave function operators for the components of (r, t). Therefore the same is
true for the corresponding property operators (Statement [3.47]), and thus the
four property pairs listed in Statement 3.65 are not simultaneously knowable
(Statement 3.47). This means that the area A[ΠPP ′SO] has to be larger than
zero, where ΠPP ′SO is the projection of the object state SO onto the plane
spanned by the axes that correspond to the property pair (P, P ′), and we let
this property pair correspond to any of the four pairs listed in Statement 3.65.
The notation is illustrated in Fig. 3.47. We may write
A[ΠPP ′SO] ≥ Amin(r, t,p, E) > 0, (3.278)
allowing in general that the minimum area Amin may depend on the values of
the properties at which this area is located in state space S. However, the
translational invariance, together with the Lorentz invariance that apply to
appriopriate combinations of these properties means that there can be no such
dependence, so that
A[ΠPP ′SO] ≥ Amin > 0, (3.279)
where Amin is a positive constant. Then we may simply define Planck’s constant
according to
~ ≡ 2Amin. (3.280)
If we use this definition as a starting point, we may say that we introduce
~ in the constants of proportionality that define p and E from the reciprocal
variables r˜ and t˜ in such a way that the conventional uncertainty relations
∆x∆px ≥ ~/2 and ∆t∆E ≥ ~/2 resemble the more fundamental relation in
Statement 3.65 as much as possible.
Alternatively, we could use the minimum area Amin directly in all equations
instead of ~, including those that define momentum, energy and rest mass.
Then we would get ∆x∆px ≥ Amin, [x, p¯x] = 2iAmin and correspondingly for
the other pairs of conjugate variables. The plane wave solution [3.234] to the
evolution equation would read Ψr(r, σ) ∝ exp[ iAmin (p4 · r−
E20
2〈E〉σ)].
z
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In the following paragraphs we discuss the rest energy or rest mass of min-
imal objects, which we identify with elementary fermions. We argue that the
rest masses of these elementary fermions might be possible to determine from
the eigenvalue equation of the rest energy operator, acting in a suitable Hilbert
space, corresponding to a suitable choice of observational context. The discus-
sion will be superficial, tentative and somewhat meandering.
The fact that the rest mass cannot be exactly known (Statement 3.63) must
be true for minimal objects also, of course.
Statement 3.66 (The rest mass of a minimal object cannot be exactly
known). Let a minimal object species Ml be defined by the values of an array
of discrete internal attributes. Suppose that Ml is an element in a minimal set
M (Definition 1.21) with more than one member. Then we have ∆E0[OMl] > 0
in all physical object states SOMl , where OMl is a minimal object of species Ml.
In section 2.9 we discussed minimal objects in some detail, and tried to
identify the concept with that of elementary fermions. We argued that one
or several arrays υ of internal attributes may correspond to the same minimal
object species Ml (Eq. [2.61]). According to the discussion in section 2.16 we
expect that the internal attributes take discrete values. We are therefore talking
about a finite set M of m minimal objects species Ml, which each correspond
to a finite set of arrays υ, which all have the same finite length, and in which
each array component can take a finite number of discrete values.
The rest energy E0 must also be considered to be an internal attribute. It is
defined by the evolution equation for any specimen, including minimal objects
OMl. But it has a different status as compared to the discrete internal attributes
that are connected to the conservation laws that apply when minimal objects
divide and merge (section 2.16). In particular, there is nothing in the evolution
equation that makes it possible to exclude a priori any positive value of E0,
just as there is nothing a priori that makes it possible to exclude any positive
value of spatio-temporal distance. In other words, the rest mass E0 of an object
is chosen from a continuous set of possible values.
In the following, we do not include the rest energy in the specification of a
minimal object species Ml; it is defined exclusively by the values of its discrete
internal attributes. This is a matter of choice, but the notation becomes simpler
in this way. We know that at least different rest energies are possible for each
minimal object, corresponding to the three known generations of elementary
fermions. In our notation there is then, apparently, just four minimal object
species (so that m = 4), namely two quarks with different electric charges, the
electron and the neutrino.
Suppose that we construct an observational context C in which it is de-
termined which minimal object we are dealing with, if we know to begin with
that it belongs to a minimal set M of distinguishable minimal object species
M1,M2, . . . ,Mm. The identification of the minimal object OMl corresponds to
the observation of the property value pl ↔ Ml of a contextual property PC ,
according to Definition 3.21. The fact that several arrays υ of attribute values
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may be consistent with a single minimal object corresponds to the fact that the
contextual property PC does not need to be fundamental (Statement 3.36).
Suppose further that we introduce a family C(σ) of such contexts. Then we
may express the evolution equation
d
dσ
aM(Ml, σ) = iB¯MaM(Ml, σ), (3.281)
with general solution
aM(Ml, σ) =
∫∞
−∞ α
(σ˜)
M (Ml)e
iσ˜σdσ˜
=
∫∞
−∞ α
(E20)
M (Ml)e
− iE
2
0
2~〈E〉σdE20 ,
(3.282)
where the second row holds only in the natural parametrization (Eq. [3.226]).
Defining the wave function operator for the squared rest energy as (E20)M =
2~〈E〉B¯M, we get the eigenvalue equation
(E20)Mα
(E20)
M (Ml) = E
2
0α
(E20)
M (Ml). (3.283)
We see that the contextual Hilbert space is seemingly m-dimensional, as it
is seemingly spanned by the property value state vectors S¯Ml corresponding to
the set of m minimal object species Ml. This would mean that there are m
eigenvectors
α
(E20)
M (Ml) = (α1, α2, . . . , αm), (3.284)
and m corresponding eigenvalues E20 . If this would be so, we could associate
one squared rest energy (E20)l and one eigenvector (α1l, α2l, . . . , αml) to each
minimal object species Ml.
The rest energy and the identity of the associated minimal object would
then be simultaneously knowable if and only if αil = δil. Otherwise there would
be several minimal objects that cannot be excluded given an observed squared
rest mass (E20)l for a specimen that is known to belong to the minimal set M.
But we concluded in Statement 3.66 that the rest energy of a minimal object
can never be exactly known. Therefore we cannot have αil = δil, since that
would mean that we could deduce the precise value (E20)l as the rest energy
of the observed minimal object OMl as soon as we have observed its internal
attributes and concluded that it belong to species Ml.
This means that in the tentative m-dimensional Hilbert space introduced
above, the rest energy and the identity of the associated minimal object are not
simultaneously knowable properties. In terms of commutators, we would then
write [M¯l, (E20)M] 6≡ 0, where M¯l is the minimal object species operator.
If the species Ml is known for σ = 0, the initial state of the wave function can
be written aM(Ml, 0) = (a1(0), . . . , al(0), . . . , am(0)) = (0, . . . , exp(iφl), . . . , 0).
The fact that [M¯l, (E20)M] 6≡ 0 then would mean that as σ increases there appear
non-zero amplitudes aj(σ) for j 6= l. That is, even if we would know that we
start out with one minimal object of species Ml, we would be able to find that
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this one minimal object has species Mj at a later time. This possibility violates
the conservation laws for the discrete internal attributes of minimal objects as
discussed in Section 2.16 and summarized in Statement 2.41. Therefore the
simple m-dimensional Hilbert space is insufficient to describe the evolution of
minimal objects in a family of contexts C(σ) in which the nature of the minimal
object is investigated.
What we have to do is to take into account that minimal objects can divide
into other minimal objects as time goes, as σ increases. Put differently, the
fact that the rest energy of an object can never be exactly known implies that
minimal objects must be able to divide and merge, that their number is not
conserved. This conclusion is the same as that reached from general epistemic
arguments in Section 1.7, in relation to Definition 1.21.
Therefore we let each set SMl of minimal objects that may arise via division
from one minimal object OMl of species Ml be one possible outcome of the
observation performed in the family of contexts C(σ). We may specify the set
SMl by a vector
SMl ↔ (N1l, N2l, . . . , Nml), (3.285)
where Nkl is the number of minimal objects of species Mk in the collection of
objects that have arisen from the division of the initial object of species Ml.
There are, of course, many possible sets SMl, so that we have to introduce
an index j when we speak in general about one example of such a set, writing
SMjl. In a proper Hilbert space representation we should allow one basis vector
or eigenstate SM jl for each such set. We have 1 ≤ l ≤ m, whereas the range
of j is possibly infinite. The dimension of HC is therefore possibly infinite. We
may write
HC = HC1 ⊕ . . .⊕HCl ⊕ . . .⊕HCm, (3.286)
where each subspace HCl is spanned by the set {SM jl}j . These subspaces are
invariant under the evolution
d
dσ
aSM(SMjl, σ) = iB¯SMaSM(SMjl, σ), (3.287)
meaning that
aSM(SMjl, σ1) ∈ HCl ⇒ aSM(SMjl, σ2) ∈ HCl (3.288)
for any σ2 ≥ σ1. The subscript SM of the evolution operator B¯SM indicates
that we are now dealing with a family of contexts C(σ) in which we do not
just observe the values of the overall set of m discrete internal attributes asso-
ciated with each minimal object species Ml, but also how these attributes are
distributed across a set of SMjl other minimal objects, in accordance with the
proper conservation laws.
Instead of Eqs. [3.282] and [3.283] we should write
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aSM(SMjl, σ) =
∫∞
−∞ α
(σ˜)
SM(SMjl)e
iσ˜σdσ˜
=
∫∞
−∞ α
(E20)
SM (SMjl)e
− iE
2
0
2~〈E〉σdE20 ,
(3.289)
and
(E20)SMα
(E20)
SM (SMjl) = E
2
0α
(E20)
SM (SMjl), (3.290)
where (E20)SM = 2~〈E〉B¯SM.
The fact that the squared rest mass cannot be negative means that we have to
require that the eigenvectors α
(E20)
SM (SMjl) obey a Dirac constraint, in addition to
Eq. [3.290], just like in the case of the spatio-temporal wave functions discussed
above (Statement 3.55). More precisely, there must be a square-root operator√
(E20)SM such that√
(E20)SMα
(E20)
SM (SMjl) = E0α
(E20)
SM (SMjl). (3.291)
Regarding the rest energy eigenvalues E0, we deduce from Statement 3.59
that we cannot have E0 = 0, that is, the rest masses must all be greater than
zero.
The eigenvectors α
(E20)
SM (SMjl) of the self-adjoint operator
√
(E20)SM are
expected to span HC , and we therefore expect equally many eigenvalues as
there are configurations SMjl, even though some of the eigenvalues may be
degenerate. Each such eigenvalue corresponds to a rest mass. We should then
be able to write each vector SM jl ∈ HC corresponding to the configuration
SMjl as a linear combination
SM jl = cν(αSM)ν + cν′(αSM)ν′ + cν′′(αSM)ν′′ + . . . , (3.292)
so that we can identify the incomplete knowledge of the rest energy (EO)jl of
SMjl with the knowledge that it belongs to the set of eigenvalues {(E0)ν , (E0)ν′ , (E0)ν′′ , . . .}.
These rest energy values are ideally bounded from below and from above.
The question is whether we can, with this method, associate such a rest
mass (EO)jl ∈ {(E0)ν , (E0)ν′ , (E0)ν′′ , . . .} to all configurations SMjl, including
those consisting of a single minimal object. It is the rest energy of these that is
of primary interest, of course. One problem is that a single minimal object of
the lightest species M1 cannot spontaneoulsy divide into another configuration
SMj1 containing more than one object. The evolutionary invariance of H1
according to Eq. [3.288] then means that SM1 corresponds to an eigenvector of
the rest energy operator, so that the rest mass becomes precisely known. This is
impossible whenever such a minimal object is actually observed at a given time,
according to the uncertainty relation involving rest mass and time (Statement
3.62). Such an observation is necessary to identify the minimal object in the
first place. Note that this is true even if the lightest minimal object is stable,
in contrast to the analogous case in which the energy of a stable ground state
of a bound composite system can be precisely determined, at least in principle.
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To overcome this problem, we could alter the Hilbert space HC by consid-
ering subspaces HCl according to Eq. [3.286] that correspond to the initial
existence of two minimal objects of species Ml instead of just one. In that case
we can consider collisions between these two minimal objects, so that other min-
imal objects may appear even when two minimal objects of the lightest species
collide and transform, converting kinetic energy into the required rest mass of
the new minimal objects.
Let us emphasize two main points at the basis of the above discussion.
Statement 3.67 (The species of a minimal object and its rest energy
are not simultaneously knowable). The species of a minimal object can be
known exactly, but its rest energy cannot. This means that species and rest mass
are two properties that are not simultaneously knowable. The same goes for sets
of minimal objects according to Eq. [3.285].
According to Statement 3.47 this means that the two corresponding wave
function property operators do not commute.
Statement 3.68 (The minimal object species configuration operator
SM l and rest energy operator (E20)SM do not commute). The wave
function operators SM l and (E20)SM act on the wave functions aSM in Eq.
[3.287], being defined in the Hilbert space HC according to Eq. [3.286]. We
have [SM l, (E20)SM] 6≡ 0.
Finally, we emphasize that all minimal objects must have non-zero rest mass,
since this is true for any object (Statement 3.59).
Statement 3.69 (All minimal object species have positive rest mass).
We can exclude the possibility that a minimal object has zero rest mass.
In section 2.16 we discussed briefly the role of the generation quantum num-
ber as an internal attribute of minimal objects. There is no conservation law
for generation number in elementary particle physics, despite the fact that we
argued that such conservation laws are necessary to uphold the identifiability of
minimal objects. Let us call the generation number g.
One possibility is that g emerges from the eigenvalue equation Eq. [3.291]
in a way that is analogous to the quantum number n in atomic physics. In
the hydrogen atom the state of the electron is specified by the attribute value
triplet (n, l,mz), where l is the angular momentum and spin direction quantum
numbers, respectively. There is no conservation law for n just as there is no
conservation law for g. To each triplet (n, l,mz) is associated one electronic
energy level E. This means that we could equally well specify the electronic
state by the triplet (E, l,mz), since E = f(n, l,mz). The number n is more
dispensable than l andmz since the latter two corresponds to observable physical
properties that are independent from E. In contrast, n is just a number that
is used to encode different energy levels. In this way we see that the non-
conservation of n is no more mysterious than the non-conservation of E, which
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just means that the potential energy stored in the atom may change by the
emission or absorption of a photon.
To be a little bit more concrete, the eigenvalue equation Eq. [3.291] may
over-determine the rest energies of the m minimal object species, since there is
potentially an infinite set of eigenvalues EO, given that the number of configu-
rations SMjl of minimal objects is possibly infinite, in which case the dimension
of HC becomes infinite. This opens up for the possibility that several distinct
rest energies can be associated to a single species Ml. These distinct rest ener-
gies can then be indexed by a generation quantum number g. However, most of
the rest energies that emerge as eigenvalues are associated with configurations
containing several minimal objects, so that the over-determination of the rest
energies of single minimal objects may be avoided. Nevertheless, the circum-
stance that there are several invariant subspaces HCl according to Eq. 3.286
suggests that the rest-masses may be over-determined after all, if the they can
be dedcued from the eigenvalue problem in each invariant subspace spearately.
In that case we might navely expect as many generations as there are basic
classes of elementary fermions, namely four.
3.6 Antimatter
Many readers may find some claims and arguments in this text strange or mis-
guided. In this section, a perspective on antimatter will be put forward that
even I find hard to swallow. I ask myself: can it really be that simple, or am I
swept away by a silly idea that does not hold water?
As discussed in section 3.5, for all families of contexts C(σ) described by the
evolution equation [3.54] we have
d〈t〉/dσ > 0 ⇔ E > 0
d〈t〉/dσ < 0 ⇔ E < 0. (3.293)
Basically, this is a consequence of the directionality of sequential time, as
parametrized by σ, together with the definition of energy E as proportional
to the Fourier expansion coefficient r˜4 (Definition 3.41).
Say that the event that marks the beginning of the context C is assigned
sequential time n, corresponding to σ = 0. Let us choose a relative scale for
relational time t according to Fig. 3.45(b), so that we have t(n) = 0.
In a family of contexts C(σ) which is parametrized so that d〈t〉/dσ > 0 we
will have t(n + 1) > t(n) = 0. Suppose that the specimen at time n belongs
to the present, so that PrOS(n) = 1, where Pr is the presentness attribute
introduced in section 1.10 (Definition 1.25). Then it will also belong to the
present the next time we observe at time n+m, since t(n+m) > t(n) and there
is not as yet any later observation of OS of which the observation at time n+m
can be a memory. That is, PrOS(n+m) = PrOS(n) = 1.
Statement 3.70 (Parametrization of observations of the present). Let
C+(σ) be a family of contexts such that the final observation at time n + m
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is an observation of the present state of the specimen OS at this time, so that
PrOS(n + m) = 1. Then the parametrization must be such that d〈t〉/dσ > 0.
Conversely, if we consider such a parametrization, then we consider such a
family C+(σ).
Consider instead a family of contexts C(σ) parametrized so that d〈t〉/dσ < 0.
What does this mean? Suppose again that PrOS(n) = 1. Since t(n+m) < t(n)
we must conclude that PrOS(n+m) = 0. That is, the observation at time n+m
must be a deduction about a past state of the specimen.
Statement 3.71 (Parametrization of observations that are deductions
about the past). Let C−(σ) be a family of contexts such that the final obser-
vation at time n + m is an observation of a past state of the specimen OS at
this time, so that PrOS(n + m) = 0. Then the parametrization must be such
that d〈t〉/dσ < 0. Conversely, if we consider such a parametrization, then we
consider such a family C−(σ).
An object that we deduce at time n+m to belong to the past is necessarily
a quasiobject. Only objects with Pr = 1 that we see here and now are directly
perceived objects.
Statement 3.72 (The specimen in a context C− is a quasiobject). Sup-
pose that we follow the evolution of specimen OS in a family of contexts C−(σ),
as defined in Statement 3.71. Then OS is a quasiobject.
However, any quasiobject O˜ that belongs to the past must be in one-to-one
correspondence to a directly perceived object O that belongs to the present, as
discussed in relation with Definition 2.1. The role of deduced quasiobjects of
the past is elaborated upon in connection with Eqs. [2.7] and [2.9]. Here we
skip the formal subtleties, for instance the fact that the deduction itself is an
event that corresponds to an object and a temporal update.
Definition 3.53 (The perceived object POS that corresponds to the
specimen in contexts C−). Consider a context C− as defined in Statement
3.71. Then POS is the perceived object O which defines the observation within
context at time n+m. The specimen OS is the quasiobject O˜ that corresponds
to POS according to Definition 2.1 and Statement 3.72.
This definition is illustrated in Fig. 3.48. Now we arrive at the identification
that is the main hypothesis in this section.
Definition 3.54 (Antimatter). If the perceived object POS in a context C−
is real (Definition 3.4), then POS is an anti-object.
Consider a family contexts C−(σ) that corresponds to deductions about the
past according to Statement 3.71. For this family we may define an anti-natural
parametrization that mirrors the natural parametrization defined for familes
C+(σ) according to Definition 3.43.
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Figure 3.48: In a context C+ (Statement 3.70), the specimen OS is a present
object (Pr = 1) at the time n + m of the final observation. The energy of OS
is positive. In a context C− (Statement 3.71), OS is a deduced quasiobject
belonging to the past at the time n+m of the final observation. The energy of
OS is negative. The object that corresponds to the actual observation at time
n+m is called POS (Definition 3.53).
Definition 3.55 (The anti-natural parametrization). The parametrization
of the family of contexts C(σ) is anti-natural if and only if d〈t〉/dσ = −1 for all
σ ∈ [0, σmax).
Assume that the specimen is free in the family C+(σ), and that we choose
a coordinate system so that 〈r4〉+(σ) = v0σ (Fig. 3.49). The expected energy
〈E〉+ will not depend on σ. Introduce a corresponding family C−(σ) such that
〈E〉− = −〈E〉+, in accordance with Eq. [3.293]. We have
〈E〉− = −〈E〉+ ⇒ 〈r〉− = −〈r〉+ + r0 (3.294)
according to Ehrenfest’s theorem (Eq. [3.228] or [3.229]). In the natural and
anti-natural parametrizations we get
〈t〉−(σ) = −〈t〉+(σ) + t0, (3.295)
where t0 is an arbitrary constant. These transformations are illustrated in Fig.
3.49.
Definition 3.56 (A pair of corresponding context families (C+(σ), C−(σ))).
Suppose that for each exact state Z+ ∈ S+OS(n + m) in which the specimen
OS+ has energy E > 0 in a context C+, there is exactly one exact state
Z− ∈ S−OS(n + m) in which the specimen OS− has energy −E in the context
C−, but in which all other attributes of the two specimens are the same. Then
the contexts C+ and C− is a corresponding pair. If this relation between the
contexts C+(σ) and C−(σ) holds for each σ ∈ [0, σmax), then (C+(σ), C−(σ))
is a pair of corresponding context families in the domain σ ∈ [0, σmax).
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Figure 3.49: If the energy of a free specimen changes sign, so does the expected
velocity. A negative energy also means that the direction of the expected relative
time t changes sign in relation to σ. The arrows show the direction of motion
of the object.
The following statement is a simple consequence of this definition.
Statement 3.73 (All contexts can be grouped in corresponding pairs).
The set {C} of all contexts allowed by physical law has the same elements as
the set {(C+, C−)} of all pairs of corresponding contexts.
Suppose that the free specimen OS+ is observed at time t = 0 in the context
C+, and that the free specimen OS− is observed in the corresponding context
C−. (Recall that we use the relative temporal time scale, as expressed in Fig.
3.45.) The state S−OS(n + m) of the specimen OS
− in the family C− can be
interpreted as the deduced history at the expected time −〈t〉 of the specimen
OS+ that is observed at expected time 〈t〉 in the corresponding context C+.
This is so since the constants r0 in Eq. [3.294] and t0 in Eq. [3.295] are
arbitrary. That is, we cannot exclude that r0 = 0 and t0 = 0 so that the dashed
arrow in Fig. 3.49 ends at the origin, where the solid arrow starts. Further,
the transformations [3.294] and [3.295] leave d〈r〉/d〈t〉 invariant, so that the two
arrows can be interpreted as a single world line of a free specimen, stretching
from the past into the future. If we cannot exclude that two objects are different,
then they should be considered the same, as discussed in section 2.10. Therefore
we may identify OS− with OS+.
Statement 3.74 (The specimens in a pair of corresponding context
families are the same object, projected into the future and into the
past). Consider a pair of corresponding context families (C+(σ), C−(σ)) in
which the specimens OS+ and OS− are free. Then these specimens are the
same object OS. The context family C+(σ) enables the direct observation of
future states of OS, whereas C−(σ) enables the observation of past states of
OS.
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The state of any object can be expressed in terms of minimal objects. Min-
imal objects are identifiable (Statement 2.29); they do not suddenly appear or
disappear. In other words, the state of potential knowledge must always be
consistent with the hypothesis that these minimal objects have existed as far
back in time as the world itself has existed, and will exist as far away in the
future as the world itself will exist. In this sense, every object has a history as
well as a future at any given moment n.
This statement has epistemic meaning if and only if there is a context in
which a future state of the object (or specimen) can be observed, as well as
a corresponding context in which a past state of the object can be observed.
Such a pair of contexts must exist for each pair of expected relational times
(〈t〉,−〈t〉) for the observations of the future and past states, respectively. (Of
course, physical law may restrict which values of t are possible. In that case,
we assume that the value −t is allowed if and only if t is allowed.)
Statement 3.75 (For each future state of an object, there is a corre-
sponding past state). Suppose that physical law allows an observation of a
future state of an object at the expected relative temporal distance 〈t〉 from the
present time. Then physical law must also allow an observation of a past state
of the same object at the expected relative temporal distance −〈t〉. The reverse
of this statement is also true.
Observations of past states of an object O, with Pr[O] = 0, may either be a
recollection of a memory, or a deduction from observations of other objects O′
belonging to the present, with Pr[O′] = 1. In the first case we have Dp[O] = 1,
and in the second case we have Dp[O] = 0 (Table 3.1).
Note the perfect congruence between the epistemic Statement 3.75 and the
formal Statement 3.73. The fact that each object has both a future and a past is
matched perfectly by the evolution equation and the Dirac equation, for which
there is exactly one solution with energy −E for each solution with energy E.
These two solutions correspond to the corresponding pair of contexts (C+, C−).
To me, this is one of many observations that supports the idea that all proper
mathematical expressions of physical law match the basic epistemic conditions
of perception.
This symmetry between looking forwards and backwards in time does not
imply that there are equal amounts of matter and antimatter, however. Recall
that we required that the present object POS is real (Definition 3.4) in the
definition of antimatter (Definition 3.54). This is not necessarily the case.
Consider, for example, a context C− in which the observation at time n+m
is a recollection of a memory. Imagine that you are watching a cloud passing by
in the sky. If you keep watching, you a realizing a context C+. If you close your
eyes for a moment and reacall where the cloud came from, you are realizing a
corresponding context C−. Then POS is the recalled image of the cloud OS.
The image POS is not real, according to the discussion in section 3.4.1. It must
be described in terms of more or less stationary minimal objects in the brain,
rather than minimal objects passing by in the sky.
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We may express this conclusion in another way. To account for the memory
of the cloud, it is not necessary to postulate the existence of real minimal objects
passing by in the sky at the moment of recollection. The image encoded by the
state of minimal objects in the brain is sufficient.
Sometimes it is necessary to postulate such minimal objects, however. Imag-
ine that a ball suddenly appears out of nowhere in a doorway. It comes bouncing
into the room where you are standing. You have no memory of it, and it turns
out to be impossible to deduce its past existence indirectly, say, from sounds of
bounces from the other room that you heard before it turned up before our eyes.
Simply put, the prior existence of the ball is outside potential knowledge. Since
you should have heard such bounces, the present knowledge even contradicts
the prior existence of the ball. In such a situation, at the same time as the ball
appears, there has to appear an object that makes it possible to account for its
history.
A more scientific example of the same phenomenon is the sudden appearance
of a track of an electron in the middle of a cloud chamber. The absence of a
prior track means that we have no evidence of the history of the new electron.
Furhermore, we should have seen such a prior track entering the cloud chamber
if it existed beforehand. To make it possible to account for the history of the
new electron, a track of a positron must appear at the same time.
The reason is the requirement that minimal objects should be identifiable.
They cannot appear out of nowhere, without a history. At each moment n
at which the existence of the minimal object is part of potential knowledge, a
possible history of the minimal object that is consistent with its present state
should also be part of potential knowledge. If the past existence of the minimal
object is completely unknown and even contradicts the existing evidence, then
the appearance of a new type of minimal object has to be postulated, the role
of which is to make it possible to account for the history of the original minimal
object. This new type of minimal object is the anti-object.
Statement 3.76 (Anti-objects must sometimes appear to uphold iden-
tifiability). Suppose that the potential knowledge PK(n) contains a new min-
imal object OMl, observed at time n + m as a (part of a) specimen OS in a
context C. Also, PK(n+m) excludes the existence of OMl at time n+m− 1,
in the sense that it does not allow an object state SOMl(n + m − 1) such that
SOMl(n + m − 1) ∩ SOMl(n + m) 6= ∅. Then it must be possible to observe an
anti-object in C at time n+m.
It may seem paradoxical to say that an anti-object appear to account for
the history of an object, at the same time as we say that the evidence exludes
the existence of such a history. The solution to this paradox is that in this case
the history is not a real object. This matter is discussed further in connection
with Fig. 3.50 and Statement 3.81.
Statement 3.76 expresses a situation where an anti-object must appear.
There are other situations where an anti-object may or may not appear.
Statement 3.77 (Anti-objects may sometimes appear to account for
an unknown history). Suppose that the potential knowledge PK(n + m) is
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greater than the preceding potential knowledge PK(n + m − 1) in the sense
that PK(n + m) contains a new minimal object OMl observed as a (part of a)
specimen OS in a context C, whereas PK(n + m − 1) does not contain this
particular minimal object. Then it may be possible to observe an anti-object in
C.
Returning to the ball, we may have a situation where the ball is again sud-
denly appearing in the doorway. This time it is silently rolling into the room
where you are standing. Again, there is no way to deduce the previous existence
of the ball from your present potential knowledge. But this time this knowledge
does not exclude its previos existence. There are no bounces that you should
have heard if it were there.
The corresponding situation in the cloud chamber is an electron track that
is present already at the chamber boundary. You cannot know for sure that
the electron existed before it entered the chamber, its prior existence is outside
potential knowledge, but you cannot exclude it either. In this case you may see
a positron track beside the electron track, making it possible to interpret this
positron as a representation of the history of the electron, but it is not necessary
in order to uphold the identifiablity of the electron.
If there is such a positron track, it must be present already at the chamber
boundary, of course, just like the associated electron track. This makes it possi-
ble to see such a positron track without the associated electron track. In such a
case it is not possible to identify the electron whose history the positron is sup-
posed to represent. It may be far away from the cloud chamber. According to
our interpretation of antimatter, it should still be possible to uphold the notion
that it represents the history of some electron.
Since minimal objects may divide and transform into each other, we have
to define what we mean by a ‘new minimal object’ OMl in Statements 3.76 and
3.77.
Definition 3.57 (New minimal object). If the conservation law 2.39 is not
fulfilled in a division of a minimal object, and this happens in such a way that
the sum of the values of some internal attribute is greater after the division than
before, then a new minimal object is created in the division. This situation also
occurs if a minimal object is apparently created out of nothing. Then we may
say that the prior absence of the object corresponds to a set of internal attributes
having zero value.
Apart from upholding identifiability, the appearance of the anti-object ac-
cording to Statement 3.76 is also necessary to make sure that the conservation
laws 2.39 are, in fact, fulfilled, provided that we take account of the internal at-
tribute values of the anti-object. This means, for example, that the anti-object
that appears together with a new electron must have the electric charge +e, so
that it can be identified with a positron.
Any minimal object can, in principle, be created out of nothing, provided
that a corresponding anti-minimal object is also created at the same time to
account for its history (Statement 3.76). To uphold the conservation laws in
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object division, the values of all internal attributes of anti-minimal object must
have the same magnitude but the opposite sign as those in the corresponding
ordinary minimal object. This observation was made already in connection with
Statement 3.57.
Statement 3.78 (To each minimal object species Ml corresponds an
anti-minimal object species M−l ). Suppose that Ml is specified by the set
{Υ1l, . . . ,Υml} of internal attributes. Then M−l is specified by the array {−Υ1l, . . . ,−Υml}.
The rest masses of Ml and M
−
l are the same.
Why are the rest masses the same? In the solution to the evolution equation
(and to the Dirac equation) that represents to the anti-object, we just flip the
sign of E, but do not change m0. Also, the interpretation of M
−
O as a history
of MO means that the rest masses must be the same. The rest mass is not an
internal attribute on the same footing as the array of attributes with discrete
values, as discussed in section 3.5. There is no conservation laws for rest masses
in object division that forces the rest mass of M−O to change sign.
In the present interpretation of antimatter, there is no reason to expect that
there are as many minimal anti-objects as minimal objects. Since any anti-
object is interpreted to be an imposed history of a present object, there cannot
be more anti-objects than objects. Some objects does not have an assiciated
anti-object since the first knowledge of this object may have appeared at a time
when the existence of the object did not contradict its existence even further
back in time. Without going into quantitative details, we may say that the forced
creation of matter and antimatter in equal amounts according to Statement 3.76
should be a rare event which requires carefully designed experimental contexts.
Hypothesis 3.1 (There is more matter than antimatter in the world).
There cannot be more anti-objects than objects in the world. There is no symme-
try principle that requires equal numbers of minimal anti-objects and minimal
objects. Knowledge of new objects may appear without any associated anti-
objects.
A condition for the appearance of new minimal objects is that the corre-
sponding increase of the potential knowledge about the past fulfils epistemic
consistency (Definition 2.2). The inferred past existence of the new object must
be such that it would not have caused a different present potential knowledge
PK(n) if it would have been part of PK(n −m) for some positive integer m.
Simply put, the new object must be so small and light that its existence does
not make any knowable difference for the state of its surroundings.
Thus it is very hard to create massive and composite new objects like balls
or houses close to aware subjects apparently out of nothing - together with their
associated anti-object. Such an event would almost certainly violate epistemic
consistency. If not, the large new object must have been extremely well isolated
in its (unknown) past. This is roughly the same line of reasoning that explains
why it is hard to observe interference between two potential evolutions of a
massive and composite object (say in a two-slit experiment). It is then very
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hard to keep the experimental setup isolated so that the choice of path is not
imprinted in its ‘walls’. If so, the path becomes part of potential knowledge
before the interference pattern is created. The appearance of interference in
such a situation would violate epistemic consistency. We would both have and
not have path information at the same time.
Say that a new minimal object OS appears out of nowhere at the time
n+m. In other words, we know that it did not exist at its present location the
moment before (Statement 3.76). Let the expected location of its appearance
define the origin in space-time. We may then say that it follows the world line
towards the upper right in Fig. 3.49. In this situation, the mirrored world line
towards the upper left must be interpreted as a real anti-object POS. The lower
dashed arrow pointing towards the origin must be interpreted as the history of
OS that the appearance of the anti-object POS makes it possible to deduce.
Because of the identifiability condition, there can be no temporal gaps in the
ability to deduce the history of OS. Therefore the lower dashed arrow must
point approximately at the origin, so that the deduced historical state S−OS(σ)
overlaps the present state S+OS(σ) as σ → 0. (We consider here the pseudo-
internal assignment of spatio-temporal coordinates, as described in Fig. 3.45.)
This means that we must choose x0 ≈ 0 and t0 ≈ 0 in Eqs. [3.294] and [3.295].
Statement 3.79 (Pair production). Suppose that the family of contexts
C+(σ) is such that a new free minimal object OS = O
(n)
M appears out of nowhere
at time n + m (Statement 3.76), and that we observe it the next time n + m′
at the position r4[OS]. Then, to uphold the identifiablity of minimal objects,
C+(σ) must also be such that the position of a real anti-object POS is observed
at time n + m′. The position of POS must fulfil r4[POS] = −r4[OS] in a
fundamental context.
Recall that a fundamental context (Definition 3.13) is such that there is one
alternative for each value allowed by physical law, so that the observed value of
r4 is exact.
We see that in a context C+ such as that in Statement 3.54, we observe
the new present object OS at the same time as we are able deduce its past via
POS. Since POS is real, it can be described by a set of minimal objects that
‘move along’ with it. If the new object OS is an electron, then POS must be
described as a single positron, as discussed above.
Statement 3.80 (Corresponding contexts coincide if we observe pair
production). Suppose that we have a context C+ such as that described in
Statement 3.79. Consider the corresponding context C− in the pair (C+, C−)
according to Definition 3.56. We have C+ = C−.
A pair-producing family of contexts is shown in Fig. 3.50(b). If POS is real
(an anti-object), then the history of OS cannot be real. We cannot have two
different real minimal objects that represent the same thing. One of them must
be an ‘image’ of the real thing. In a pair production event, it is the history of
OS that is the image of the real object POS. In a recollection of a memory, or
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Figure 3.50: In a context C−, either the directly percevied present object POS,
or the history of the specimen OS is real. a) The history of OS is real, and POS
is just an image of this history. b) POS is real, which means that it is an anti-
object, and the history of OS is just an image of POS. In both cases, the OS
has both a history and a future, as required by the requirement of identifiability.
The world tubes represent the spatio-temporal positions that are not excluded
by potential knowledge (Fig. 3.2). The pseudo-internal temporal scale is used
(Fig. 3.45).
a deduction of a historical fact, it is the present object POS that is an image
of the real historical object OS. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.50(a).
Statement 3.81 (The reality of the past state of OS and the present
state of POS is mutually exclusive). Consider a context C−. If POS is
real according to Definition 3.4, then OS is not real, and vice versa.
Instead of considering a family of contexts C(σ) in which we observe a new
object at time n+m and check that there is an object as well as an anti-object
at time n+m′, we may track the object and the anti-object during a sequence of
observations in a family C(σ1, σ2, . . .), corresponding to observations at times
n + m,n + m + 1, n + m + 2, . . .. These sequential times will correspond to
relational times t(n + m) = 0, t(n + m + 1) = t1, t(n + m + 2) = t2, . . .. If the
new object appearing at time n+m is free, the outcome of such a context will
look like that in Fig. 3.51.
Since the anti-object is assumed to be real according to Definition 3.4, it
can be described in terms of a set of minimal objects that share the relative
attributes with the anti-object (it ‘moves along’ with it, as compared to the
surroundings). Since all minimal objects are identifiable, they can, in principle,
persist indefinitely. This means that we may have contexts in which we study
an anti-object which were created a long time ago, so that it exist already at the
start of the context at time n. It also means that the anti-object does not have
to be accompanied by a corresponding ordinary object within context. Since
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Figure 3.51: A context in which the temporal update n + m − 1 → n + m is
defined by the appearance of a new object. This object and the corresponding
anti-object is tracked in a series of observations. The observation of real objects
is marked by filled circles. The history of the object, as deduced from the anti-
object, is not real. The corresponding observations are marked by hollow circles.
Compare Fig. 3.50.
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these anti-minimal objects can be studied independently from ordinary minimal
objects, they should be given the same status of reality.
We have talked about pair production. Let us talk a bit about the reverse
of this process, namely pair annihilation. The picture of pair production that
we have presented is the following: at a certain time n + m, a new object
and its history appears. The present and the past side of the coin appear
simultaneosly because of the identifiability requirement. In plain language, this
just the requirement that the amount of matter is preserved. We may look at
pair annihilation in the same way. At a certain time n + m, an object and
its history disappear simultaneoulsy. At the next time instant n + m + 1, the
object is missed by nobody, so that the requirement that matter is preserved is
apparently fulfilled.
From the epistemic perspective, this apparently is all there is. Recall that
all potential knowledge at time n + m is contained in PK(n + m), including
knowledge about the past and possible deductions about the future. At time
n + m we cannot peer back at PK(n + m − 1) and say: ”hey, one object is
missing!” Pair annihilation is the perfect crime: you kill the victim - the object
- and erase all evidence that it ever existed - the anti-object. Then no one will
miss it - the preservation of matter is apparently upheld. Since no one will ever
know that you broke the law, you did not actually break it, from the epistemic
point of view. In the same way, in a pair production, you add an uninvited
guest to the party who behaves in such a way that everyone thinks she belongs
there.
Is this allegoric description really consistent with the formalism? Consider
Fig. 3.52(a). The natural point of view is that the annihilating object O and
the anti-object O′ are two different objects. But the constant t0 in Eq. 3.295 is
arbitrary (Fig. 3.49). We can move the history of the object O′ that is deduced
from its anti-object back in time so far that we cannot exclude the possibility
that it is, in fact, the history of O. That is, we cannot exclude that O′ and O
are the same object. Then the interpretation of the annihilation conforms with
the allegoric description above. According to our view on identifiability, if the
identity of two objects cannot be excluded, they should be regarded to be the
same. Thus O′ = O. This conclusion may seem far-fetched, but reflect the basic
difficulty in keeping track of individual minimal objects (elementary fermions).
Note that, in the same way, we have arbitrarily moved the dashed line segments
between −t2,−t1 and t = 0 in Fig. 3.51 up and down along the temporal axis
to make them form a connected historical world line of a single object.
The photons associated with pair production and annihilation may be seen
as book-keeping symbols that take care of the conservation of the expected
momentum and energy as time passes, in the absense of the objects themselves.
To realize a pair production, there has to be enough energy to withdraw from
your account to buy the rest energy of these objects. Conversely, if you let two
objects annihilate, the amount of energy in your account grows, energy that
may be exchanged for new objects in the future.
Since the rest mass of a photon is strictly zero, we cannot, according to the
discussion in section 3.5, see them as minimal objects, as building blocks of other
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Figure 3.52: a) Pair annihilation of object O and the anti-object that represents
the history of object O′. The freedoom in the choice of how far back in time we
should place the history O′ means that O′ and O can be identified. The object
O and its history disappear together. b) Pair production. The object O and
the anti-object that represents its history appear together.
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Figure 3.53: Two equivalent descriptions of beta plus decay. A process which
is knowably of the second kind is called K-capture. In that case we can deduce
that the process took place in an atomic nucleus, and that the electron was
taken from the K-shell of the atom. Otherwise we can only deduce the history
of the electron via the apparent presence of a positron.
objects. In fact, if we insist on looking at photons as objects, we have to wait
an infinitely long time before we can actually observe them, according to the
uncertainty relation [3.275]. They cannot be localized in time and space accord-
ing to Eq. [3.265]. The only information they carry is energy and momentum,
as already stated. The interpretation of elementary bosons is discussed further
in section 3.10.
Of course, there are other processes involving anti-objects in which objects
merge or divide than pair production and annihilation. Figure 3.53 shows beta
plus decay. If we insist on the interpretation that anti-objects always represent
the unknown history of other objects, the two processes shown in the figure
should be seen as one and the same. A positron may be emitted if the existence
of the electron that went into the reaction was outside potential knowledge
before the reaction. Otherwise, the process should be described as in the right
panel. Indeed, this process occurs in the atomic nucleus exactly when we have
a previously knowable electron in the K-shell of the atom that is captured by
the u-quark in the nucleus. Then there is no need to introduce a positron to
account for the history of the electron - it is already known. The occurrence of
electron capture can be deduced via the associated emission of X-rays or Auger
electrons. If we check for such particles but do not see them, then we have to
see a positron emission.
To summarize, the basic difference between the traditional and the present
view on antimatter is that instead of speaking about particles travelling back-
wards in time (whatever that means), we speak here about particles whose
histories we track backwards in time. This tracking sometimes requires the
appearance of anti-particles.
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The reasoning behind this conclusion rests upon the epistemic perspective
on time. We use the distinction between present and past as an input in the
physical description, and get as output the distinction between matter and anti-
matter. In other words, the present intepretation of antimatter is an application
of epistemic completeness (Assumption 1.13). The structure of the evolution
equation and the Dirac equation honors this distinction in the sense that they
allow pairs of distinct solutions with energies E and −E.
3.7 The reciprocal evolution equation
The purpose of the present and the next section is to explore the symmetries be-
tween the equations that hold for the position and the momentum properties of
a specimen, respectively, and to discuss some consequences of these symmetries.
From Eqs. [3.183], [3.184] and [3.192], we see that we can express the evo-
lution equation for the continuous wave function for a free specimen as
dΨr4
dσ
= −ibr4Ψr4 (3.296)
for some real constant b, with
r4 ≡ −
4∑
k=1
∂2
∂r2k
=
1
c2
∂2
∂t2
− ∂
2
∂x2
− ∂
2
∂y2
− ∂
2
∂z2
. (3.297)
To derive this equation, we assumed that the parametrization is such that
d〈r4〉/dσ is a constant. However, once we have established Eq. [3.296], we may
lift this condition, and make an arbitrary re-parametrization σ′ = f(σ). This is
so since the general evolution operator A¯r4 = iB¯r4 does not depend explicitly
on the evolution parameter σ (see Eq. [3.185]). The wave function evolution
operator cannot have such a dependence since σ is just an unphysical parameter
that interpolates between the repeated action of the basic evolution operator u1
according to Eq. [3.7]. We may thus write
dΨr4
dσ
= −ib(σ)r4Ψr4 (3.298)
for an arbitrary continuous, real function b(σ). It is easily checked that the
energy-momentum relation [3.222] still holds for this equation, if we generalize
the definition of rest mass (Definition 3.39) to read m20 ≡ −~σ˜/b(σ)c2.
We may expand the wave function as a Fourier integral
Ψr4(r4, σ) = (2pi)
−5/2
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ˜)e
i(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ)dr˜4dσ˜ (3.299)
with inverse
Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ˜) = (2pi)
−5/2
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψr4(r4, σ)e
−i(r˜4·r4+σ˜σ)dr4dσ. (3.300)
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Consider the evolution equation [3.296]. By mere symmetry, we may expect
that the reciprocal wave function Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ˜) fulfils the equation
dΨ˜r4
dσ˜
= −ib˜(σ˜)r˜4Ψ˜r4 (3.301)
for some continuous, real function b˜(σ˜), with
r˜4 ≡ −
4∑
k=1
∂2
∂r˜2k
. (3.302)
But is this really so? We motivated the evolution equation for a free speci-
men from the two conditions at the beginning of section 3.4.8. The condition
d〈r˜4〉/dσ˜ = const. that is ‘reciprocal’ to the second of these conditions cannot
be used to motivate Eq. [3.301], since it does not (yet) have any physical in-
terpretation. Recall that we defined momentum, energy and rest energy from
the Fourier expansion coefficients (r˜4, σ˜), and that we should not use any other
knowledge about the behaviour of these physical quantities to motivate an equa-
tion that the expansion coefficients may fulfil.
Another way forward is to note that the evolution equation [3.298] implies
Eq. [3.199], which we repeat here:
− r˜24 =
σ˜
b(σ)
+ r˜21 + r˜
2
2 + r˜
2
3. (3.303)
This relation holds for all allowed quantity pairs (r˜4, σ˜). In the same way, Eq.
[3.301] implies
− r24 =
σ
b˜(σ˜)
+ r21 + r
2
2 + r
2
3 (3.304)
for all allowed quantity pairs (r4, σ). In fact, the implication goes both ways,
so that Eq. [3.304] implies Eq. [3.301]. We may interpret Eq. [3.304] as the
definition of the Lorentz distance
l2 = c2t2 − x2 − y2 − z2 (3.305)
if we let
l2 =
σ
b˜(σ˜)
. (3.306)
This interpretation is allowed if and only if
b˜(σ˜) > 0 (3.307)
for all σ˜, since, by definition, the evolution parameter σ is non-negative. In
this way we get l2 ≥ 0, and the distance element
√
l2 in Minkowski space-time
becomes invariant under Lorentz transformations, as required. We conclude
that Eq. [3.301] follows from special relativity.
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Note that the parametrization [3.306] is different from the natural parametriza-
tion [3.226] that we used to express the evolution equation (Statement 3.54) with
the Dirac constraint (Statement 3.55). The former parametrization means that
σ = t + σ0 for some constant σ0, whereas the latter parametrization means
that σ ∝ t2 + σ′0 for some other constant σ′0. We are allowed to use a differ-
ent parametrization to motivate Eq. [3.301] than that we used to motivate Eq.
[3.296] since the parametrization is arbitrary, as expressed in Eq. [3.298].
z
To interpret Eq. [3.301] physically, it is natural to try to identify the reciprocal
wave function Ψ˜r4 for a context C in which we are about to observe r4, with the
wave function Ψ˜p4 in the reciprocal context C˜ in which we are about to observe
p4. It is the latter wave function that has physical meaning. Let us discuss how
to do this.
Let us form the scalar product 〈S¯r4(r4), S¯CC˜〉 using Eq. [3.176], with the
choice of properties P = r4 and P
′ = p4. We get
Ψr4(r4, σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ˜p4(p4, σ)dp4〈S¯r4(r4), S¯p4(p4)〉, (3.308)
since 〈S¯r4(r4), S¯r4(r′4)〉 = δ(r4 − r′4) according to Eq. [3.173].
In the definition of four-momentum (Definition 3.42) we identified the cor-
responding wave function operator to be
(p4)r4 = i~r4 . (3.309)
This expression holds for a free specimen in the context C in which we are
about to observe r4, before we are going to observe p4. Consider a context C
such that the value of the four-momentum is exactly known to be p′4 before
the observation of r4 takes place. Then, according to Definition [3.35], the
contextual state S¯C is described by an eigenfunction to the continuous wave
function operator (p4)r4 at this moment, that is
ψr4(r4) ∝ e
i
~p
′
4·r4 . (3.310)
The contextual state S¯C˜ of the reciprocal context C˜ will, on the other hand,
be described by the wave function
ψ˜p4(p4) = βδ(p4 − p′4) (3.311)
just before the observation of p4, for some complex constant β such that |β| = 1.
This relation follows from Definition 3.35 in the case P = P ′.
If we insert the relations [3.310] and [3.311] in Eq. [3.308] we see that
〈S¯r4(r4), S¯p4(p4)〉 = (2pi)−2e
i
~p4·r4 . (3.312)
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In the general case when we do not assume that the initial state in C or
C˜ is such that the four-momentum is exactly known, we may insert the above
relation in Eq. [3.308] to find the following relation between the wave functions
Ψr4 and Ψ˜p4 :
Ψr4(r4, σ) = (2pi)
−2
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ˜p4(p4, σ)e
i
~p4·r4dp4. (3.313)
The factor (2pi)−2 appearing in the two equations above arises because of the
condition that all wave functions should always be normalized (Statement 3.50).
Let us define the reciprocal wave function Ψ˜r4(p4, σ) as the kernel that
appears in the Fourier expansion
Ψr4(r4, σ) = (2pi)
−2
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ˜r4(r˜4, σ)e
ir˜4·r4dr˜4. (3.314)
Comparing Eqs. [3.313] and [3.314] we see that
Ψ˜p4(p4, σ) =
1
~
Ψ˜r4(
p4
~
, σ). (3.315)
That is, the reciprocal wave function associated with the context C can be
identified with the wave function associated with the reciprocal context C˜.
We may now define a wave function Ψ˜p4(p4, σ˜) associated with a family
C˜(σ˜) of reciprocal context C˜ as follows:
Ψ˜p4(p4, σ˜) ≡ (2pi)−1/2
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ˜p4(p4, σ)e
−iσ˜σdσ. (3.316)
We see that a given reciprocal context in the family C˜(σ˜) does not correspond
to a given reciprocal context in the family C˜(σ), but is a function of the entire
family. In other words, if the reciprocal evolution parameter σ˜ has a given exact
value, then the value of the evolution parameter σ is completely undetermined.
Of course, the same statements hold if we let σ˜ and σ change roles.
If we consider Eqs. [3.299], the inverse of [3.314], [3.315], and [3.316], we see
that
Ψ˜p4(p4, σ˜) =
1
~ Ψ˜r4(
p4
~ , σ˜)
= (2pi)
−5/2
~
∫∞
−∞Ψr4(r4, σ)e
− i~ (p4·r4+~σ˜σ)dr4dσ.
(3.317)
Let us insert this relation in Eq. [3.301]. We get
dΨ˜p4
dσ˜
= −ib˜(σ˜)~p4Ψ˜p4 , (3.318)
with
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p4 ≡ −
4∑
k=1
∂2
∂p2k
= c2
∂2
∂E2
− ∂
2
∂p2x
− ∂
2
∂p2y
− ∂
2
∂p2z
. (3.319)
We call this equation the reciprocal evolution equation. It is an equation that
relates physical quantities and therefore expresses physical law, in contrast to
Eq. [3.301], in which the abstract kernel Ψ˜r4(r4, σ˜) in the Fourier expansion
[3.299] appears. We may say that Eq. [3.318] is the physical interpretation of
Eq. [3.301], where we relate the Fourier expansion coefficients r4 with four-
momentum, and the kernel Ψ˜r4(r4, σ˜) with the wave function that describes the
reciprocal context C˜.
Statement 3.82 (The reciprocal evolution equation). Equation [3.318]
holds whenever we parametrize the evolution so that σ fulfils Eq. [3.306]. It
specifies the probabilities for the possible outcomes of an observation of p4 in
the family of contexts C˜(σ˜), defined by Eq. [3.316], at some time n + m given
the contextual state at initial time n.
Note that the reciprocal evolution equation makes a statement about tem-
poral evolution even though the reciprocal evolution parameter σ˜ is not related
to temporal (or spatial) distances. The statement concerns sequential time, no
matter if the parameter that defines the family of contexts refers to relational
time or not. Below we will relate σ˜ to the expected energy of the specimen
before we actually observe it (as part of the observation of p4).
For an exactly known four-position r′4 we have Ψr4(r4) = βδ(r4−r′4) for some
constant β such that |β| = 1. We see from Eq. [3.317] that in this situation we
have
i~
(
∂
∂p1
,
∂
∂p2
,
∂
∂p3
,
∂
∂p4
)
Ψ˜p4 = r
′
4Ψ˜p4 . (3.320)
That is, the known position r′4 is the eigenvalue of the self-adjoint operator on
the left hand side. This operator can therefore be interpreted as the continuous
wave function operator (r4)p4 .
Statement 3.83 (The wave function operator for four-position). The
continuous wave function operator for four-position r4 for a free specimen is
(r4)p4 = i~
(
∂
∂p1
,
∂
∂p2
,
∂
∂p3
,
∂
∂p4
)
. (3.321)
when the wave function Ψ is expressed in terms of four-momentum p4.
This statement should be compared with Definition 3.42.
The reciprocal evolution equation as given by Statement 3.82 contains one
arbitrary parameter, namely b˜. In the ordinary evolution equation, we got rid of
the corresponding arbitrary parameter b by choosing the natural parametriza-
tion
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d〈t〉
dσ
= 1. (3.322)
By symmetry, the natural parametrization for σ˜ becomes
d〈E〉
dσ˜
= 1. (3.323)
The relation that corresponds to Eq. [3.194] in the reciprocal picture is
d〈p4〉
dσ˜
= −2b˜〈r4〉. (3.324)
This relation can be verified straightforwardly by an evaluation of the left hand
side, using the reciprocal evolution equation. We may use Eq. [3.324] to express
a ‘reciprocal Ehrenfest theorem’ (compare Eq. [3.229]). Namely, if we again
define m as the relativistic mass according to E = mc2, we get
d〈p〉
dσ˜
/
d〈m〉
dσ˜
=
〈r〉
〈t〉 . (3.325)
This relation simplifies to d〈p〉/d〈m〉 = 〈r〉/〈t〉 in the natural parametrization
[3.323]. If we apply this parametrization to the fourth component of Eq. [3.324]
we get
b˜ = − 1
2c2〈t〉 . (3.326)
In the pair of natural parametrizations [3.322] and [3.323], we may therefore
express the pair of reciprocal evolution equations as follows.
dΨr4/d〈t〉 = ic
2~
2〈E〉r4Ψr4
dΨ˜p4/d〈E〉 = i~2c2〈t〉p4Ψ˜p4
(3.327)
Here we have replaced the derivatives on the left hand sides with respect to
σ and σ˜ with derivatives with respect to the expected time and energy, in order
to get equations that relate physical properties only. We have to remember,
however, that the expected time or energy is never exactly known in any real
context (compare the disscussion in section 3.4.6).
We may say that the ordinary equation expresses the change of the proba-
bilites for different outcomes in the family of contexts C(σ) as we increase the
expected value of the relational time to be measured at sequential time n+m.
The reciprocal evolution equation, on the other hand, expresses the change of
the probabilites in the family C˜(σ˜) as we increases the expected energy of the
specimen to be measured at sequential time n+m.
In the reciprocal family C˜(σ˜), the expected values of the spatio-temporal
properties r, t, l2 do not change as the expected energy increases, or when p4 is
finally observed. They are ‘passive passengers’ in the family. In the same way,
in the family C(σ), the expected values of the momentum-energy properties
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p, E,E20 do not change as the expected passed time increases, or when r4 is
finally observed. The are passive passengers in the family C(σ).
We may express the general solutions to Eqs. [3.327] as follows.
Ψr4(r4, 〈t〉) = (2pi)−5/2
∫
Ψ˜p4(p4, E
2
0) exp[
i
~ (p4 · r− E
2
0
2〈E〉 〈t〉)]dp4dE20
Ψ˜p4(p4, 〈E〉) = (2pi)
−5/2
~
∫
Ψr4(r4, l
2) exp[ i~ (p4 · r− l
2
2c2〈t〉 〈E〉)]dr4dl2
(3.328)
Note that the function Ψr4 that appears in the first equation is not the
same as that appearing in the second equation; they are the result of different
parametrizations, as discussed above. In the first equation we use σ ∝ 〈t〉, and
in the second equation we use σ ∝ l2. Likewise, the functions Ψ˜p4 that appear
in the first and second equations are the result of the different parametrizations
σ˜ ∝ E20 and σ˜ ∝ 〈E〉, respectively.
Put differently, Ψr4(r4, l
2) represents the state in a hypothetical context C
such that the spatio-temporal distance l2 between the initial and final positions
of the specimen is exactly known just before the observation of r4 is made. On
the other hand, no such exact a priori knowledge is assumed in any realistic
family of contexts C(〈t〉) described by Ψr4(r4, 〈t〉). Likewise, Ψ˜p4(p4, E20) de-
scribes a hypothetical context C˜ in which the rest energy is precisely known just
before the observation of p4, whereas Ψ˜p4(r4, 〈E〉) describes a realistic family
of contexts C˜(〈E〉) in which we have no such a priori knowledge.
It may seem confusing to have both the value of a property and its expected
value appearing in the same equation. In the evolution equation both t and
〈t〉 appear, and in the reciprocal evolution equation both E and 〈E〉 appear.
The interpretation is that the evolution equations determine the probabilities
for different property values (t or E) given their expected values just before they
are actually observed.
It is clearly seen in Eq. [3.328] that the squared spatio-temporal distance l2
plays the same role in the reciprocal evolution equation as does the squared rest
mass m20 or rest energy E
2
0 in the evolution equation. They are symmetrically
chosen as
l2 = σ/b˜(σ˜)
m20c
2/~ = σ˜/b(σ) (3.329)
in the pair of reciprocal evolution equations, reflecting their analogous roles in
the relations
l2 = −|r4|2 = c2t2 − |r|2
m20c
2 = −|p4|2 = c−2E2 − |p|2. (3.330)
In other words, we may say that l2 is conjugate to m20 on the same way as
r4 is conjugate to p4, or, dividing the four-vectors into their Newtonian parts:
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Figure 3.54: Two possible coordinate systems in reciprocal space that are anal-
ogous to the two possible coordinate systems in ordinary space shown in Fig.
3.45. a) Energy E in a coordinate system defined so that the reciprocal evolution
parameter σ˜ has no particular relation to E, except for the requirement E > 0.
b) Energy defined in relation to a parametrization such that σ˜ = 0 corresponds
to E = 0. In this case we must have ∆E ≤ E because of the condition E > 0.
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r ↔ p
t ↔ E
l2 ↔ m20
(3.331)
This list of conjugate properties naturally leads us back to the commutators
and uncertainty relations discussed in section 3.5. To be precise, we should re-
formulate Statement 3.61 as follows, since we are now dealing with observations
of p4 rather than r4.
Statement 3.84 (Uncertainty relations for momentum-energy observa-
tions). Consider a context C˜ initiated at time n, and such that p4 = (p, iE/c)
is observed at time n + m. Let ∆x and ∆t be the uncertainties of the position
(x, t) in space and time of the specimen OS in the evolved state umSOS(n). Let
∆px and ∆E be the uncertainties of the momentum and energy observed at time
n+m. Then ∆px ≥ ~/2∆x and ∆E ≥ ~/2∆t.
Note that here we use the pseudo-internal coordinate system shown in Fig.
3.45(b) in space and time, whereas we use a relational coordinate system for
energy and momentum, as illustrated in Fig. 3.54(b).
We may re-express the commutator [3.270] in the natural parametrization
as
[〈t〉, (E20)r4 ] = 2i~〈E〉, (3.332)
where we have added an index to the squared rest energy operator to indicate
that it applies to the family of contexts C(σ) in which r4 is observed. The
corresponding uncertainty relation is
∆〈t〉∆E20 ≥ ~〈E〉. (3.333)
By symmetry, we find the following corresponding relations in the reciprocal
family of contexts C˜(σ˜) in which p4 is observed.
[〈E〉, (l2)p4 ] = 2ic2~〈t〉, (3.334)
and
∆〈E〉∆l2 ≥ c2~〈t〉. (3.335)
Statement 3.85 (Lorentz distance uncertainty). Consider a context C˜
initiated at time n, and such that p4 = (p, iE/c) is observed at time n + m.
Let ∆l2 be the uncertainty of the squared Lorentz position l2 = c2t2 − r2 of the
specimen OS in the evolved state umSOS(n). Let ∆〈E〉 be the uncertainty of
its expected energy 〈E〉 observed at sequential time n + m, and let 〈t〉 be the
expected passed time. Then ∆〈E〉 ≥ c2~〈t〉/∆l2.
Since 〈E〉 ≥ ∆〈E〉 and 〈t〉 ≥ 〈l〉 we may express the following counterpart
to Eq. [3.275]:
350 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
Figure 3.55: Symmetry of the r4- and p4-spaces. Consider a context C
+ in
which the present state of a free specimen is observed (section 3.6). Then we
always have E > 0. Since sequential time is directed by definition, we may define
t(n+m) ≥ t(n), so that we always have t ≥ 0 in the relative coordinate system
(Fig. 3.45). The fact that c is an upper speed limit implies that c2t2 − r2 ≥ 0.
The Dirac equation implies that E2 − c2p2 ≥ 0. Compare Fig. 3.56
〈E〉 ≥ c2~〈l〉/∆l2. (3.336)
Simply put, this means that in a context in which a small (positive) energy
is measured, the uncertainty of the spatio-temporal position of the specimen
with this energy must be large. Conversely, if the position is precisely known,
the measured energy must be large.
The symmetry of the physical relations between variables in ordinary and
reciprocal space can be illustrated as in Fig. 3.55. Let us explore this symmetry
in order to motivate a reciprocal Dirac equation.
The ordinary Dirac equation (Statement 3.55) can be seen as a relation that
guarantees that E2 − c2p2 ≥ 0. This property can therefore be set equal to
the square of another property - the rest energy - whose allowed values are the
eigenvalues given by the Dirac equation. Equation [3.199] is the reason why we
have to make sure that E2−c2p2 ≥ 0. This equation implies that the reciprocal
evolution parameter σ˜ always has the same sign - which we chose to be negative
with our sign convention [3.201]. This motivates the introduction of a rest mass
according to m20 ∝ −σ˜. Basically, the reason why σ˜ always must have the same
sign is that time is directed, and that the derivative in the evolution equation
with respect to the evolution parameter σ is first order, whereas they are second
order with respect to the components of the four-vector r4.
In a similar way, the fact that c is an upper speed limit means that we
have to make sure that c2t2 − r2 ≥ 0. This condition is not automatically
fulfilled by the reciprocal evolution equation [3.318]. To fulfil it, we have to
introduce the additional constraint on the reciprocal wave function Ψ˜p4 given
by a reciprocal Dirac equation. The lines of reasoning are analogous to those
in section 3.4.8, where we arrived at the ordinary Dirac equation from the
requirement E2 − c2p2 ≥ 0.
The symmetry of the equations means that the solutions to the reciprocal
Dirac equation are spinors, just as the solutions to the ordinary Dirac equation.
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Therefore we have to abandon the single continuous reciprocal wave function Ψ˜
and work with a general reciprocal wave function a˜.
Statement 3.86 (The reciprocal Dirac equation as an additional con-
straint on the reciprocal wave function). Each reciprocal wave function
α˜p4s((p4)i, sj , l
2) exp
(
− il22~c2〈t〉 σ˜
)
in the general solution
a˜p4s((p4)i, sj , σ˜) =
∫ ∞
−∞
α˜p4s((p4)i, sj , l
2)e
− il2
2~c2〈t〉 σ˜dl2 (3.337)
to the reciprocal evolution equation in the natural parametrization
i~ ddσ˜ a˜p4s((p4)i, sj , σ˜) =
1
2c2〈t〉 (l
2)p4 a˜p4s((p4)i, sj , σ˜)
= −12c2〈t〉 [(r4)p4 · (r4)p4 ] a˜p4s((p4)i, sj , σ˜)
(3.338)
must be an eigenfunction to the continuous Lorentz distance operator lp4s:
lp4sαp4s((p4)i, sj , l
2) = lα˜p4s((p4)i, sj , l
2), (3.339)
where (l2)p4 = lp4slp4s.
With both Dirac equations in place, we may continue the exploration in Fig.
3.55 of the symmetries between ordinary space {r4} and reciprocal space {p4}.
Figure 3.56 includes both contexts C+ looking at the present, and contexts C−
looking into the past, so that a complete light cone is created. This light cone
is mirrored by a cone in reciprocal space. We associate the past part of this
cone with antimatter, as discussed in section 3.6. (We should keep in mind,
however, that not all past contexts C− contains antimatter.) The two Dirac
equations create the two cones in the sense that they exclude the space-like
parts of ordinary space, and the ‘momentum-like’ parts of reciprocal space.
The uncertainty relations (Statements 3.61 and 3.84) can also be used to
highlight the symmetries between ordinary space {r4} and reciprocal space {p4}.
Consider an idealized, fundamental context C such as that in Fig. 3.46. The
four-position r4 is observed at time n + m and the four-momentum p4 is sub-
sequently observed at time n + m′. If we plot the projection Πr4SOS of the
specimen state SOS onto ordinary space and the projection Πp4SOS onto recip-
rocal space at these time instants, we get the picture in Fig. 3.57. The fact
that the position measurement is perfectly precise means that the position in
reciprocal space is completely undetermined at sequential time n + m. Con-
versely, the precise momentum measurement at time n + m′, means that the
position in reciprocal space is perfectly known at this time, whereas the position
in ordinary space has become completely undetermined. This can be seen as an
illustration of Bohr’s complementarity principle.
At each time instant we know, however, that the state is contained in the
upper parts of the two light cones. We have assumed that we are dealing with
a context C+ that tracks the present attributes of the specimen forwards in
time. Note also that since all objects have non-zero mass (Statement 3.59), the
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Figure 3.56: More symmetries of the r4- and p4-spaces. The association of
contexts in which d〈t〉/dσ > 0 with matter, and contexts with d〈t〉/dσ < 0
with antimatter, is discussed in detail in section 3.6. The present illustration is
simplified. See text for further explanation.
Figure 3.57: Projections of the specimen state onto ordinary and reciprocal
space in an idealized context such as that in Fig. 3.46. The projections cor-
respond to the black points and the grey areas. The symmetry between the
projections onto the two spacs can be seen as an expression of Bohr’s comple-
mentarity principle. Compare Fig. 3.58.
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Figure 3.58: Projections of the specimen state onto ordinary and reciprocal
space in a real context such as that in Fig. 3.39. The projections correspond
to the grey areas. The width of the grey belt in reciprocal space at time n+m
represents the uncertainty of the rest energy E0. The width of the grey belt in
ordinary space at time n+m′ represents the uncertainty of the Lorentz position
l. Compare Fig. 3.57.
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boundaries of the two cones defined by ct = |r| and E = c|p|, respectively, are
never part of the projected states Πr4SOS and Πp4SOS .
No real context in which position or momentum is observed is fundamental.
If these properties are observed in succession, we are dealing with contexts such
as that in Fig. 3.39 rather than that in Fig. 3.46. Then we get projected
specimen states like those in Fig. 3.58 rather than the idealized ones in Fig.
3.57.
At time n+m, the grey ball in ordinary space represents the possible values
of four-position just after the measurement of this property, whereas the grey
‘belt’ in reciprocal space represents the possible values of four-momentum. The
diameter of the ball is inversely proportional to the squared width of the belt
according to Statement 3.62.
Analogously, at time n+m′, the grey ball in reciprocal space represents the
possible values of four-momentum just after the measurement of this property,
whereas the grey ‘belt’ in ordinary space represents the possible values of four-
position. The diameter of the ball is inversely proportional to the squared width
of the belt according to Statement 3.85.
3.8 Bound states and the spectrum of space-
time
In a bound state, the energies allowed by physical law form a discrete set. In
unbound states, on the other hand, no values of the energy can be excluded a
priori. The set of allowed energies is continuous. Given the extensive symme-
tries between ordinary space and the reciprocal space - and the corresponding
evolution equations - one may ask if this is true for spatio-temporal distances
also. Are they discrete in bound states, and continuous in unbound states?
To answer this question, we must first make clear what a bound state means
in terms of the properties that span reciprocal space. Definition 3.49 expresses
what is meant by a bound state in terms of the properties that span ordinary
space. Finding the corresponding expression in repciprocal space can be seen
as a step in our ongoing exploration of the symmetries between the two spaces.
Loosely speaking, we defined a bound state of two parts OS1 and OS2 of
a specimen to be such that the spatial distance between these parts remains
bounded as the evolution parameter σ goes to infinity together with time t
[Fig. 3.59(a)]. A direct translation of this condition to reciprocal space would
read as follows: a bound state is such that the relative momentum of the two
parts remains bounded as the reciprocal evolution parameter σ˜ goes to infinity
together with energy E [Fig. 3.59(b)].
Is this statement reasonable? Yes, it means that increasing energy in the
composite specimen is absorbed as increasing rest energy, rather than momen-
tum. This is exactly what we would expect in a bound state.
Statement 3.87 (A bound state of a specimen in reciprocal space). A
specimen OS is in a bound state according to Definition 3.49 if and only if 1)
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Figure 3.59: A bound state of a specimen OS with two parts OS1 and OS2,
expressed with the help of a) a family of contexts C(σ) in ordinary space, and
b) a family of contexts C˜(σ˜) in reciprocal space. In the contexts C, the spatial
position r12 is defined so that the origin is the spatial position of OS1. The
time t is the relational time passed between the initiation of the context and the
sequential time n at which r4 is observed. In the contexts C˜, the momentum
p12 is the relative momentum of the two parts OS1 and OS2. The energy E is
measured so that σ˜ = 0 corresponds to E = 0.
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Figure 3.60: Illustration of the concept of a bound specimen in reciprocal space
(Statement 3.87). The reciprocal wave function domains Dp1 or Dp2 correspond
to the specimen states SOS1 and SOS2 according to Fig. 3.37. Compare Fig.
3.43.
the domain of σ˜ can be extended to Dσ˜ = [0,∞] in a natural parametrization,
2) OS can be knowably divided into at least two objects OS1 and OS2, which
are identifiable for all σ˜ ∈ Dσ˜, 3) there is a finite upper bound Pmax of the
magnitude of the relative momentum p12 of OS1 and OS2.
The existence of a bound Pmax should be known at the time n at which the
observational context is initiated (corresponding to σ˜ = 0). The magnitude of
the momentum p12 is defined as follows (Fig. 3.60). Let p1 ∈ Dp1(σ˜), where
Dp1(σ˜) is the domain of the part of the reciprocal wave function that describes
OS1, and let p2 ∈ Dp2(σ˜). Then p12 = |p2 − p1|. Condition 3) means that for
each σ˜ ∈ Dσ˜ we have p12 < Pmax for each possible pair of points (p1,p2).
According to the formalism of quantum mechanics, there is a ground state
with the greatest possible binding energy in any bound state. This means that
there is a state SOS that has the smallest possible rest energy. We let E
(G)
0
denote this ‘ground state rest energy’. In a context C in which r4 is about
to be observed, the ground state is described by a wave function α
(G)
r4s that is
an eigenfunction to the rest energy operator according to the Dirac equation
(Statement 3.55) that is associated to the eigenvalue E
(G)
0 .
(E0)r4sα
(G)
r4s = E
(G)
0 α
(G)
r4s (3.340)
From the symmetry of the Dirac equation and its reciprocal (Statement
3.86), we see that there is another ground state that is associated with a smallest
possible value l(G) of the Lorentz distance l.
lp4sα˜
(G)
p4s = l
(G)α˜(G)p4s. (3.341)
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Figure 3.61: In a bound state of a composite specimen, the spectra of rest
energy and Lorentz distance are discrete. In an unbound state, these spectra
are continuous.
What distance are we talking about? It is the Lorentz distance between an
event corresponding to the observation of OS1 and another event corresponding
to the observation of OS2. This means that there is a smallest Lorentz distance
between any pair of bound objects that is possible to observe. Physical law
forbids the observation of any smaller distance.
Note that there is one fundamental asymmetry between the two eigenvalues
equations given above, amid all the symmetries between ordinary and reciprocal
space. To define the Lorentz distance we need a composite object with two parts.
The rest mass, on the other hand, is defined for all objects, composite or not.
The structure of the distance and energy spectra of a given composite specimen
is sketched in Fig. 3.61.
Given a finite set of minimal objects, and a given set of interactions, there
will be a finite set of specimens composed of these minimal objects. For each
such composite specimen, there is one smallest ground state Lorentz distance.
Among these ground state distances, there will be a smallest one. This distance
will be the smallest distance lmin that is possible to measure (Fig. 3.62). In
the present superficial discussion, we do not attempt to determine this distance,
but just point out its existence.
Statement 3.88 (There is a smallest observable distance). There is a
Lorentz distance lmin such that for any two objects or events O1 and O2, it is
never posible to know that the Lorentz distance between them is smaller than
lmin.
We may use the terminology in section 2.7 to express the same thing, saying
that it is not a realizable property to have l < lmin (Definition 2.46). A prop-
erty that is not realizable cannot correspond to a present or future alternative
(Definitions 2.48 and 2.50). These realizable alternatives are the ”nodes” in
the directed network of alternatives that define a context (Fig. 3.20), and con-
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Figure 3.62: To measure a distance, we need a ruler. To make the scale of the
ruler fixed and known a priori, any pair of tick marks must correspond to a
bound state of two objects with a given relative Lorentz distance. Since there
is a smallest such distance lmin, there is a smallest scale we can ever be able to
measure. This is true even if we measure the distance between objects O1 and
O2 that are not bound to each other. The distance between such objects can,
in principle, take any value.
tribute to superpositions and amplitudes in quantum mechanical calculations.
Therefore we should not treat two states which differ less than lmin in the spatio-
temporal position as two terms that contribute separately to the amplitude in
such a calculation. In other words, we get a natural cutoff scale.
Statement 3.89 (The ultraviolet cutoff). Consider a Hilbert space context
representation u¯C S¯C(n) =
∑
j ajS¯Pj according to Statement 3.33, where S¯Pj
is the property value state that corresponds to property value pj. Let P be the
Lorentz distance between two parts OS1 and OS2 of a composite specimen. Con-
sider the representation of pj given in Eq. 3.168. Then we must have ∆pj ≥ lmin
for all j.
In the rest frame of the specimen, we get a maximum temporal resolution of
two events t ≥ lmin/c. This statement should be relevant in particle physics, for
example. Calculating the total amplitude of a certain reaction, we should not
include contributing loops that occurs on a shorter spatial and temporal scale
(Fig. 3.63).
It is important to stress, however, that this finite spatio-temporal resolution,
the lack of absolute locality, does not mean that space-time is fundamentally
discrete. In bound states, it is indeed discrete, but not so in unbound states.
In those states we cannot exclude any distance between two objects or events,
however small, but we cannot confirm any distance shorter than lmin.
The truly discrete nature of space-time in bound states should have conse-
quences when it comes to the calculation of energy levels in such states. This
is so since it involves finding the eigenfunctions αr4s(r4, s, E
2
0) with the corre-
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Figure 3.63: Processes taking place on shorter scales than lmin cannot be re-
solved. Therefore we should not treat object divisions and mergings on such
small scales as realizable alternatives. The hypothetical processes marked by
dashed lines can be ignored when we construct superpositions of alternatives,
and the path of a minimal object can be treated as a world-tube in space-time
(compare Fig. 2.59).
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sponding (rest) energy eigenvalue E0. Traditionally, we let a continuous spatio-
temporal eigenfunction ψr4k(r, t, E
2
0) represent each component in the spinor
(compare Eq. 3.240). In bound states, this is not quite correct, not even in
idealized, fundamental contexts, since the eigenfunction ψ is defined only for
arguments r4 that are allowed by physical law (Fig. 3.61). In the same way,
we should only include values of p4 that correspond to the discrete spectrum of
binding energies E as arguments in the reciprocal four-momentum component
ψ˜p4k(p, E, l
2) of the eigenfunction α˜p4s(p4, s, l
2), obeying the reciprocal Dirac
equation (Statement 3.86).
To determine the spectrum of bound Lorentz distances we therefore need
the spectrum of binding energies, and to determine the spectrum of binding
energies we need the spectrum of bound Lorentz distances. We get a pair of
eigenvalue equations that have to be solved self-consistently.
Statement 3.90 (Self-consistent spectra of energy and distance). Sup-
pose that we want to find the set {(p4)i} of allowed four-momenta in a bound
state of a specimen (Definition 3.49 and Statement 3.87), together with the set
{(r4)j} of allowed four-distances. These sets are determined self-consistently
from the Dirac equations specified in Statements 3.55 and 3.86.
lp4sα˜p4s((p4)i, l
2
j ) = ljα˜p4s((p4)i, l
2
j )
(E0)r4sαr4s((r4)j , (E0)
2
i ) = (E0)iαr4s((r4)j , (E0)
2
i )
(3.342)
We have argued that there is no minimum Lorentz distance l2 = c2t2− |r4|2
in unbound states. However, there is always a smallest possible time difference
t between any two objects that belong to different sequential times n and n+ 1.
This is true regardless whether the objects are in a bound state or not. In
contrast, if the events or objects belong to the same sequential time n, there is no
such minimum time difference. In conventional terminology, there is a minimum
time difference tmin between events with time-like separation, but there is no
such minimal time difference between events with space-like separation. Let us
argue why this is so, using the method of reductio ad absurdum.
At the beginning of section 3.1 we argued that relational time t is a mean-
ingful attribute because physical states S that belong to adjacent sequential
times n and n+ 1 tend to be more similar than are physical states separated by
more than one time step. Therefore, to give meaning to the hypothesis that t is
continuous and can take arbitrary small values, we have to allow the difference
between S(n+ 1) and S(n) to become arbitrarily small.
We may use the continuous evolution parameter σ to parametrize the differ-
ence between these two states. Let us write
S(n+ 1) ⊆ u1S(n) = u(σ1)S(n), (3.343)
where the parametrization is such that
S(n) = u(0)S(n) (3.344)
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Figure 3.64: The reason why there has to be a smallest relational time differ-
ence tmin between sequential states S(n) and S(n + 1). The incompleteness of
knowledge means that the volume of S(n+ 1) is non-zero. This means that the
grey region ∆S(σ1) must have non-zero volume. This volume grows from zero
as σ1 grows from zero. Thus σ1 and the corresponding time difference t must
be non-zero.
and let
∆S(σ) ≡ u(σ)S(n)/S(n) (3.345)
according to Fig. 3.64. Further, let
V (σ) = V [∆S]. (3.346)
If t is continuous, we are allowed to take the limit t→ 0. In this limit, σ1 → 0,
leading to V (σ1) → 1 according to Eq. [3.343]. This necessarily means that
∆S → Z, for some exact state Z. In that case we get S(n + 1) = Z, since we
must have S(n+1) ⊆ ∆S because of the condition S(n+1)∩S(n) = ∅. But the
incompleteness of knowledge means that this cannot happen. Therefore there
has to be a minimum state space volume
V (σ1) ≥ Vmin > 1, (3.347)
leading to σ1 ≥ σmin (where σmin > 0 is parametrization dependent), and a
minimum time difference
t ≥ tmin > 0. (3.348)
Clearly, this non-continuity of relational time is a consequence of the incom-
pleteness of knowledge (Statement 1.3).
Statement 3.91 (There is a smallest relational time between sequential
events). Consider two objects O1 ∈ PKN(n) and O2 ∈ PKN(n+ 1), directly
perceived by a subject j. Let t(n) and t(n + 1) be the relational times that j
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assign to O1 and O2, respectively. Then t(n + 1) − t(n) ≥ tmin for some real
constant tmin > 0.
Is the existence of tmin consistent with Lorentz invariance? Recall from
section 1.10 that sequential time n is updated to n + 1 if and only if the two
events or objects that define these two time instants have a time-like separation
(Definition 1.26 and Fig. 1.25). Otherwise they are judged to belong to the
same time n. Further, a given subject j assigns the same relational time t(j)(n)
to all events or objects that belong to sequential time n. This is the ‘personal
klock’ of subject j, which may be said to belong to the rest frame of j (Fig.
3.65). Thus, if j measures the time difference t(n + 1) − t(n) = t(j) ≥ tmin
between the events occurring at time n and n+ 1, then all other subjects j′ will
measure a time difference t(j
′) ≥ t(j) ≥ tmin due to time dilation. Thus tmin is
Lorentz invariant.
The requirement that the two events or objects O1 and O2 are directly per-
ceived by subject j is the crucial fact that makes an unambiguous temporal
ordering possible, and makes tmin Lorentz invariant. Both these beneficial qual-
ities dissappear if we consider deduced quasiobjects QO1 and QO2. If these
quasiobjects have space-like separation, two subjects j and j′ may assign dif-
ferent temporal ordering to them, and the time difference may be arbitrarily
small. Note, however, that it is sufficient to consider directly perceived objects
in our epistemic approach. They make it possible to specify the physical state
S(n) completely, as discussed in relation to Fig. 2.1, and also the physical law
that governs its evolution.
In any case, it may be a good idea to illustrate the difference between our
‘subjective’ minimal time difference tmin and Lorentz transformations of ordi-
nary time differences t, which may apply to quasiobjects. We use the familiar
example where two light pulses are sent in opposite directions inside an air-
craft or spaceship (Fig. 3.65). The events that the light rays hit the rear and
front walls of the vessel are two quasiobjects QO1 and QO2 with space-like
separation. The corresponding directly perceived objects are the events when
information about these quasievents reach some subject. Suppose that this in-
formation reaches a subject via light signals that are emitted immediately after
the quasievents have occurred. A subject j′ located in the middle of the vessel
receive the information about QO1 and QO2 at the same time. These events
correspond to two objects O′1 and O
′
2 that belong to the same sequential time
n. Another subject j at the ground will agree that these two perceived events
are indeed simultaneous. This subject will judge, however, that the quasievents
QO1 and QO2 are not simultaneous. He will receive information that QO1 has
occurred before he receives information that QO1 has occurred. These events
correspond to two objects O1 and O2 that belong to different sequential times,
say n and n+ 1. The relational time difference must be greater than tmin. The
subject j′ inside the vessel wll agree that O1 occurs before O2 and that the time
difference is greater than tmin.
Statement 3.92 (Subjective and objective time differences). Let t(j) be
the time difference that subject j measures between any two objects O1 and O2
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Figure 3.65: The time difference between two directly perceived objects is ei-
ther greater than tmin (like that between O1 and O2), or zero (like that between
O′1 and O
′
2). All subjects agree on these statements. The fact that the tem-
poral ordering of the quasiobjects QO1 and QO2 is ambiguous has no primary
importance in our epistemic approach.
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Figure 3.66: Suppose that we track a minimal object O during a sequence of
times n, n+1, n+2, . . .. Let SO(n
′) be the projection of the state of O on space-
time. The existence of tmin makes it necessary to have a minimum resolvable
Lorentz distance lmin that is at least as large. Otherwise we cannot be sure that
all successive states SO overlap. The minimal object would lose its identifiability
(section 2.10).
that she directly perceives. Then t(j) = 0 or t(j) ≥ tmin. Any other subject j′
agrees with these statements. Let t be the deduced time difference between two
quasiobjects QO1 and QO2 in a given reference frame. Then t can take any
value.
To be precise, we note that from the perspective of subject j′, the objects
O1 and O2 are quasiobjects. When he agrees that t
(j) ≥ tmin, it is a deduced
conclusion.
There is a fundamental connection between the existence of a smallest dis-
tance tmin and a smallest resolvable lmin on the one hand, and the identifiability
of minimal objects on the other. Namely, the existence tmin makes it necessary
to have a minimum resolvable Lorentz distance lmin of the same order of magni-
tude to uphold the identifiability of minimal objects. Figure 3.66 makes it clear
why.
Statement 3.93 (The minimum resolvable Lorentz distance is nec-
essary for identifiability). Given tmin according to Statement 3.91, the ex-
istence of identifiable minimal objects (Statement 2.29) makes it necessary to
have a minimum resolvable Lorentz distance lmin (Statement 3.88) which fulfils
lmin ≥ tmin.
We have argued that Lorentz distances are discrete in bound states, and that
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we can never resolve any shorter distances. We have also argued that there is
a smallest time difference between perceptions that can ever be measured. Do
these observations mean that space-time must be considered discrete? No, we
cannot treat the discreteness or the continuity of space-time as two mutually
exclusive possibilites. What we can say is that in some aspects and circum-
stances the continuous description of space-time is inadequate. This ambiguity
is no mystery if we stick to the basic ingredients of physical states: objects,
their internal and relational attributes, and the changing potential knowledge
about these. The mystery appears only if we confuse the landscape with the
map, where the map is the smooth manifold in which we represent the set of
relational attributes. This map seems to be redundant at small scales, just as it
is redundant in the sense that translations and rotations of the map has no epis-
temic meaning - a fact sometimes described as the homogeneity and isotropy of
space. If a sailor finds an old map from the 15th century and uses it to navigate,
he should not be frightened when he approaches a position where a sea monster
is painted on the map.
We end this conceptual discussion with another conceptual note. The dis-
creteness of space-time in bound states might shed some light on the paradoxes
that arise in connection with black holes and space-time singularities.
3.9 The orientability of space
We argued in section 1.9 that the dependence of physical law on distances
and angles is not enough to give epistemic meaning to the parity operation
r → −r. In other words, there has to be something else that makes it possible
to distinguish between left and right at a fundamental level. In this section we
discuss the idea that it is the directionality of time that makes space orientable
in this sense. We will motivate this statement in two ways. First, we try to
relate temporal directionality and spatial orientability directly, and second, we
try to relate the two qualities via the spin degree of freedom.
To give meaning to the parity operation, there must be a way to identify
a spatial interchange of two objects O1 and O2 that are identical except for
their spatio-temporal position r4. We also need a coordinate system with an
origin. Such a coordinate system requires external objects, so that the state of
knowledge that we consider must contain more objects than O1 and O2.
If these two objects are not identical in such a situation, it is trivial that
the state after their interchange is different from the state before (Fig. 3.67).
Only if we investigate the effect of an interchange of identical objects do we
investigate the orientability of space itself. If we find an identifiable effect, we
have a vector space. Otherwise it is sufficient to describe physical space as a
metric space in which distances and angles between objects are defined, but in
which there is no other structure.
Definition 3.58 (Orientable space). Consider two objects O1 and O2 that
have identical states SO1 and SO2, but different spatio-temporal positions r4(O1)
and r4(O2). Physical space is orientable if and only if the spatial interchange of
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Figure 3.67: a) The parity operation r → −r corresponds to the spatial inter-
change of identical objects O1 and O2 that have different environments. These
different environments correspond to a coordinte system. b) We do not need the
parity operation to describe the effect of the interchange of two non-identical
objects.
O1 and O2 can lead to a new physical state. More precisely, there should exist
two such objects O1 and O2, with spatial positions r(O1) and r(O2), such that
r′(O1) = r(O2)
r′(O2) = r(O1)
}
⇒ S′ 6= S. (3.349)
Say that the temporal positions t(O1) and t(O2) of the identical objects O1
and O2 differ, as well as the spatial positions. We treat the directed nature of
time as fundamental (Assumption 1.21). This means that the temporal inter-
change of these objects does make a knowable difference. That is, we have, by
assumption,
t′(O1) = t(O2)
t′(O2) = t(O1)
}
⇒ S′ 6= S. (3.350)
whenever O1 and O2 are placed in a spatial coordinate system that corresponds
to the different environments in Fig. 3.67(a). Such a temporal interchange is
identical to a spatial interchange according to Definition 3.58, so that space is
indeed orientable.
We might argue that we should not involve time when we discuss the ori-
entability of space. That is, we should not allow different spatio-temporal posi-
tions r4 of O1 and O2 in Definition 3.58, just different spatial positions r. But
relativity has taught us that the spatial and temporal parts of space-time cannot
be separated. An object should be described as an event, and two events that
are judged to be simultaneous by one observer are not simultaneous as judged
by another.
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Figure 3.68: We say that space is orientable whenever we may know the differ-
ence when two identical objects O1 and O2 change positions (Definition 3.58).
Then we may define a directed spatial arrow that starts at O1 and ends at O2.
The parity operation x→ −x acquires meaning if we introduce an origin halfway
between O1 and O2, and let −x ≡ x1 and x ≡ x2. a) A temporal difference
between the objects allows us to let the arrow start at the early object. b) Spin
dependent weak interactions allow us to let the arrow start at the object from
which the intensity of electrons emitted along the corresponding dashed arrow
is the highest.
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The fact that we allow temporal differences makes it possible to attach a
spatial arrow that points from the early object to the late object [Fig. 3.68(a)].
We may let the arrow start at the origin halfway between the two objects rather
than at the position of the early object. Let us denote such an arrow by r. If
we interchange the spatial position of the two identical objects, the direction of
the arrow is reversed, whereas the starting point at the origin is preserved. We
may denote the reverse arrow by −r. We have given physical meaning to the
parity operation.
Let us change focus and approach the orientability of space via the Dirac
equations and the spin inherent in all objects. The fact that wave functions
have to obey the Dirac equations, in addition to the evolution equations, can
be seen as a direct consequence of the directed nature of time. Let us discuss
why this is so.
Equation [3.196] is a consequence of the directionality of time. This equa-
tion leads to Eq. [3.198], which in turn leads to Eq. [3.200], stating that the
reciprocal evolution parameter σ˜ always has the same sign. This condition is
not fulfilled by the evolution equation ddσΨr4(r4, σ) = iB¯r4ΨP (r4, σ) itself (Eq.
[3.212]. It can only be fulfilled if we require that B¯P is the square of another
operator Mr4 according to Eq. [3.209], and that each stationary state ψ(r4, σ˜)
to the evolution equation is an eigenfunction to this square root of the evolution
operator. This is the Dirac equation (Statement 3.55).
We defined energy and momentum from the Fourier expansion coefficients
of the wave function Ψr4 . This definition implies the familiar relation E
2 −
c2p2 ≥ 0. If we consider this inequality as given beforehand, we can derive
the Dirac equation from this relation. The corresponding ‘reciprocal’ relation
is c2t2 − r2 ≥ 0. When we motivated the reciprocal Dirac equation (Statement
3.86), we considered this relation as given beforehand from special relativity,
and used it to derive the reciprocal Dirac equation. The relation c2t2 − r2 ≥ 0
can be regarded as a condition that all observers agree on the direction of time.
Therefore we can see the reciprocal Dirac equation as a consequence of the
directionality of time in the same way as the ordinary Dirac equation.
Statement 3.94 (Directed time implies the Dirac equations). Both the
ordinary and the reciprocal Dirac equations are constraints on the corresponding
wave functions that are forced upon us by the directed nature of time.
This means that the directionality of time implies an internal (spin) degree
of freedom of each minimal object that couples to space-time. According to the
principle of explicit epistemic minimalism, there has to be a knowable distinction
between the two possible states of this degree of freedom in relation to a given
spatial z-direction. Since this spin degree of freedom is independent of other
attributes, such a distinction must be possible to make even if we have two
minimal objects which are identical except for the spin direction in relation to
the chosen z-direction. Further, since spin is an internal atribute in the sense
that is defined without reference to other objects, the distinction should be
possible to make even if we disregard interactions with other objects. For this
reason we disallow the separation of objects with different spin directions in an
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Figure 3.69: We argue along two different lines that an oriented space follows
from the directionality of time. Compare Fig. 3.68. See text for further expla-
nation.
external magnetic field as the basic knowable distinction that we are looking
for.
If we do not allow reference to other objects when we look for a fundamental
distinction, we have to look for a distinction in relation to space itself. In this
way we arrive at the conclusion that there has to be a knowable transformation
of the object itself (Definition 3.47) that depends on the spin direction. Of
course, we know that there are such object transformations, caused by weak
interactions. These makes it possible to associate the binary spatial operation
z → −z with the knowable difference between the two spin values in relation
to z. In this way we have arrived at the orientability of space via the Dirac
equations.
Statement 3.95 (Parity and spin). The binary parity operation r → −r is
epistemically well-defined if there is a binary (spin) degree of freedom associated
with minimal objects defined in relation to a spatial direction, and there are also
knowable object transformations (Definition 3.47) that depend on the value of
this spin.
Looking at Fig. 3.68(b), we see that we can use such a spin-dependent object
transformation to tell the difference when the spatial locations of two identical
(minimal) objects O1 and O2 are interchanged, assuming that the spin directions
are also identical. In weak interactions, the intensity of electrons emitted from
O1 and O2 along the two dashed lines may be different. In this way, we can
define a spatial arrow between the two objects, going from the object with the
higher emission intensity to the object with lower emission intensity. This is
analogous to the case shown in Fig. 3.68(a), where we used a temporal ordering
of the objects to define the arrow. The conclusion is the same in both cases:
the ability to define such an arrow corresponds to the orientability of space.
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A further clarification might be in order here. When we interchange the
positions of O1 and O2 in Fig. 3.68(b), we should imagine that we interchange
the spinning (minimal) objects together with the entire observational setups
with which we observe electron emissions (Fig. 3.15). This means that object
O1 is moved from position x1 to position x2 together with the dashed arrow
that starts at O1 and defines the direction in which the apparatus detects the
emitted electrons. Consequently, after the objects are interchanged, the dashed
arrows point towards each other rather than away from each other.
The reason why we have to interchange the entire experimental setups is
that the minimal objects that decay in spin-dependent weak interactions are
quasiobjects. The setups are necessary to deduce the existence of the minimal
objects and their electron emissions. Without the setups the interchange of O1
and O2 would not be epistemically well-defined.
The reader may object that O1 and O2 are no longer identical if we include
the observational setups, since the two dashed arrows point in different direc-
tions in relation to the spin direction - the angle between them is different. But
the spin direction is not defined a priori ; if that were the case we would know
beforehand that space is orientable. Rather, we should see the marked spin
direction that forms different angles in relation to the dashed arrows just as an
indicator of the fact that the interchange of identical object in this case indeed
makes a knowable difference - the intensity of the electron emission at position
x2 increases, and the intensity at x1 decreases.
Figure 3.69 summarizes in a flow diagram how we can associate an orientable
space with a directed time along the two paths discussed above.
Statement 3.96 (Directed time implies oriented space). The fact that
each set of relational times {tk} can be ordered in a directed sequence {t1, t2, . . .}
gives epistemic meaning to the parity operation r→ −r.
3.10 Fermions and bosons
In sections 3.4.8 and 3.7 we have argued that any object obeys the Dirac equation
and its reciprocal. This means that all objects should be described as particles
with spin quantum number s = 1/2. How does this go together with the fact
that the spin of composite objects may be larger than 1/2, and that some
elementary particles are bosons with integer spin?
The first question is resolved if all objects can be described as being com-
posed of minimal objects with spin 1/2. Note that, in deriving the evolution
equation and the Dirac equation, we considered a fundamental context in which
a single four-position r4 was observed. The assumed fundamentality of the con-
text means that the description of the specimen in terms of a single position
vector r4 should hold to arbitrary high spatio-temporal resolution. Therefore
the Dirac equation is not exactly valid for composite specimens. In the same
way, the reciprocal Dirac equation is not valid for composite specimens, since it
presupposes the observation of a single four-momentum p4 to arbitrarily high
resolution in reciprocal space.
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A further limitation of the applicability of the Dirac equations was discussed
in section 3.8. They do not hold exactly in bound states, where the spectra of
ordinary and reciprocal space become discrete. Then the differential operators
are not properly defined.
Statement 3.97 (Applicability of the Dirac equations). The Dirac equa-
tion (Statement 3.55) and its reciprocal (Statement 3.86) hold exactly if and
only if the specimen is an unbound minimal object.
Any minimal object that can be found in a bound state can also break away
from this state. To be able to say that any object can be described as a set
of minimal objects that are bound together, there must be a way to verify this
statement by breaking the bindings and observe the minimal objects one by one,
or in new constellations, in other bound states. If the minimal objects can be
observed one by one, they obey the Dirac equations according to Statement 3.97.
If this is not possible, as for quarks, they may nevertheless be excited to bound
states in which the spectra of space-time and the reciprocal momentum space
are continuous to arbitrarily good approximation. This means that all minimal
objects obey the Dirac equation in some situations. The Dirac equations imply
s = 1/2. Therefore all minimal objects always have spin 1/2, since this attribute
is internal and does not depend on the relational attributes that defines whether
the minimial object is bound or unbound.
Statement 3.98 (All minimal objects have spin 1/2). All minimal objects
are fermions with spin quantum number s = 1/2.
This statement excludes elementary bosons from the family of objects and
quasiobjects. If we believe in the reasoning that leads to this conclusion, what
role can be given to such bosons?
Let us first discuss the notion of ‘pseudoobject’ that was introduced in sec-
tion 3.4.9. These are objects that are emitted by a knowably interacting object
according to Definition 3.46 and Fig. 3.41. Since the object that is knowably
interacting preserves its identity throughout the division process, the emitted
pseudoobject can have no internal attributes. Its role is to make sure that the
conservation laws of relational attributes are fulfilled in the division. This means
that the pseudoobject must carry momentum and angular momentum.
Definition 3.59 (Pseudoobject). Consider an object O that is knowably in-
teracting during the time period [n, n + m] and divides at some time n ≤ n′ ≤
n+m. The entity O′ that is emitted in the division according to Fig. 3.41 is a
pseudoobject.
Definition 3.60 (Minimal pseudoobject). If the object O in Definition 3.59
is a minimal object, then O′ is a minimal pseudoobject.
The preservation of angular momentum, and the fact that all minimal objects
have total spin quantum number s = 1/2, imply that a minimal pseudoobject
should be able to carry spin angular momentum sz = −1, sz = 0 or sz = 1
along a given z-direction. In contrast, it should not be able to carry any half
integer spin.
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Statement 3.99 (Minimal pseudoobjects have integer total spin). The
spin quantum number s of a pseudoobject is a non-negative integer.
Any object that follows a curved trajectory can be equivalently described as
a knowably interacting object where the change of velocity is accounted for by
the emission of pseudoobjects that carry a certain amount of momentum. This
is discussed in section 3.4.9, and it is a consequence of epistemic invariance.
In particular, such a description is possible regardless the energy (or energy)
change of the object that is accelerating. To uphold energy conservation in the
division process, we must therefore require that pseudoobjects are massless, if
we are to assign any specific rest mass to them at all.
Statement 3.100 (Pseudoobjects are massless). The rest mass m0 of a
pseudoobject is zero.
The masslessness of pseudoobjects implies that they cannot be located, ac-
cording to the discussion in section 3.5.
Statement 3.101 (Pseudoobjects are not localized). Consider the pro-
jection Πr4SPO of the state SPO of a pseudoobject PO onto space-time. This
projection has no boundary ∂Πr4SPO.
Since pseudoobjects cannot be located, they cannot be observed in the same
sense as objects or quasiobjets can. This fact motivates the label ‘pseudo’ in the
name chosen for these entities. But if they cannot be observed, what role can
they possibly play in a physical model? The answer is, of course, that they can
deliver attribute values from one object to another. This role is fulfilled when a
pseudoobject emitted from an object O1 is absorbed by another object O2 in a
merging (Section 2.17). Since a pseudoobject carries relational attributes only,
the receiving object O2 preserves its identity in the merging process, just as O1
preserves its identity in the division process.
Statement 3.102 (A knowable interaction takes place between two
objects). When a knowably interacting object O1 emits a pseudoobject, this
pseudoobject is always absorbed by another knowably interacting object O2.
We argued in section 1.9 that the existence of a unique upper speed limit c
can be regarded as a consequence of epistemic minimalism and epistemic invari-
ance. Further, we concluded that there must be some objects that travels at this
speed, and that all observers must agree on this fact. However, we concluded
in section 3.5 that all objects and quasiobjects are massive and therefore travel
at a lower speed v < c. Further, different observers may disagree on the value
of v. This means that the only kind of ‘objects’ that may travel at the speed
v = c are pseudoobjects. This goes together well with the conclusion that they
are massless (Statement 3.100).
Further, the information carried by pseudoobjects cannot travel slower than
c. The role of the pseudoobject is to associate the two interacting objects.
This can only be done if their attributes change in well-defined manner that
3.10. FERMIONS AND BOSONS 373
may be interpreted as an attribute transfer. Only in that case can we give
meaning to the statement that this particular pair of objects are interacting.
(We will elaborate further on these matters below.) A pseudoobject that travels
slower than c would mean that different observers would disagree about the
relational time difference between the events where O1 changed state (emitted
the pseudoobject), and O2 changed state (absorbed the pseudoobject). This
would make the association between O1 and O2 ill-defined. We could never be
sure which pairs of objects to associate in an interaction. The concept of a
knowable interaction would lose its meaning. Any concept or entity that is an
essential part of physical law must be possible to express in a Lorentz invariant
way.
Statement 3.103 (pseudoobjects travel at the speed of light). All pseu-
doobjects travel at the universal upper speed limit c.
It does not make sense to talk about pseudoobjects that divide into other
pseudoobjects, or two or more pseudoobjects that merge into one. This is so
since they do not possess any internal attributes apart from the spin quantum
number s = 1. This attribute is of the type 2) in Eq. [2.80], just labeling the
type of entity involved in the division process. Such attributes cannot be used
in themselves to define a division. To do so, we must have at least one internal
attribute that can be divided into two or more ‘bags’, according to the additive
rule 1) in Eq. [2.80].
Statement 3.104 (Pseudoobjects are linear). Pseudoobjects do not divide
or merge. In other words, they do not interact with each other.
We argued in section 3.4.9 that the evolution of each object should be con-
sistent with a description in which it is interacting as well as a description in
which it is knowably interacting. This means that to each force that gives rise
to an interaction there should be an associated pseudoobject.
Statement 3.105 (Pseudoobjects are force carriers). To each force that is
able to bend the trajectory of an object without changing its identity is associated
a minimal pseudoobject.
The forces of this type that are known today are electromagnetism and
gravity. Going through the above list of qualities of pseudoobjects, we see that
they are consistent with those of photons.
Statement 3.106 (The photon). The photon is the minimal pseudoobject
associated with electromagnetism.
Statement 3.105 implies that there must be a pseudoobject associated with
gravity, and the necessary qualities of gravitons are consistent with those of
pseudoobjects.
Statement 3.107 (The graviton). The graviton exists. It is the minimal
pseudobject associated with gravity.
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To get a better understanding of pseudoobjects, let us analyse their role in
the interaction of objects from a purely epistemic perspective. To give opera-
tional meaning to the statement that two objects O1 and O2 are interacting,
there must be a connection between these two objects that is possible in prin-
ciple to decide by means of observations. It must be possible to say that these
two objects are potentially interacting, independently from other objects. The
only way this can be done is to say that O1 and O2 are potentially interacting
when the attribute values of O1 change by the amount ∆υ, and the attribute
values of O2 change by the opposite amount −∆υ.
In effect, we are saying that if the balance of one bank account decreases
by a certain amount, and the balance of another account increases by the same
amount, then a potential transfer has taken place between these two accounts.
Note that the balance of the attributes is all the information that we have about
objects. There are no account numbers, and there is no one giving transfer
orders, so we can never be sure that a transfer has actually occurred between
these particular accounts.
The idea is illustrated in Fig. 3.70. The states of two objects O1 and O2
are observed at times n and n + m. It is found that the change of internal
and relational attributes ∆υ of O1 balances the change −∆υ of the same set
of attributes of O2. This means that we can imagine an ‘transfer quantum’
that carries the set of attributes ∆υ from O1 to O2. Equivalently, we can
imagine an transfer quantum that carries the attributes −∆υ from O2 to O1.
The direction of motion of the quantum has no epistemic meaning since, by
definition, it fulfils the imagined journey from one object to the other between
two subsequent observations of the involved objects.
We may generalize this picture according to Fig. 3.71. Here the update of
sequential time n + m′′ − 1 → n + m′′ that is defined by the observed change
of the state of O2 may occur later than the update n + m − 1 → n + m that
is defined by the observed change of the state of O1. This situation occurs if
m′ > m. In this case the directional symmetry of the interaction is broken. If
an interaction is actually taking place between O1 and O2, the transfer quantum
must transfer the bag of attributes −∆υ from O1 to O2.
However, the qualifier ‘actually’ in the above sentence has no epistemic con-
tent. All we can ever know is that the attribute changes of O1 and O2 match
when conservation laws are taken into account. This fact may be interpreted
as a potential pairwise interaction. Consequently, the imagined quantum that
carries the attributes ∆υ between the two objects has no physical reality. It is
neither an object, nor a quasiobject. It is just a book-keeping device that keeps
track of attribute changes.
For the same reason, there are no conservation laws that apply to the imag-
ined vertices in Figs. 3.70 and 3.71. Conservation laws apply to observed
changes of objects at sequential time instants n, n+ 1, n+ 2, . . ., whereas these
vertices are placed in an imaginary world in between these time instants. They
do not correspond to object divisions or mergings, but are just graphical illus-
trations of our book-keeping efforts.
In section 2.10, we defined a quasi-identifiable object as an object that can
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Figure 3.70: A quasi-identifiable interaction between objects O1 and O2. a) The
attribute change ∆υ of the two objects match. b) This fact can be interpreted
as a potential interation between them, mediated by a transfer quantum that
carries the attributes ∆υ. There are no observations that can be used to assign
a direction of motion of the transfer quantum. The potential knowledge about
the distance between O1 and O2, and the time difference between n and n+ 1,
has to be consistent with information transfer at the speed of light. Compare
Fig. 3.71.
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Figure 3.71: A directed quasi-identifiable interaction between objects O1 and
O2, to be compared with the interaction shown in Fig. 3.70. In this case, the
observed change of object O2 occurs after the observed change of O1, so that
a direction of motion of the transfer quantum from O1 to O2 can be assigned.
The potential knowledge about the distance between O1 and O2, and the time
difference between n and n+m, has to be consistent with information transfer
at the speed of light.
be modelled by identifiable minimal objects, even though we cannot be sure that
the object is the same when we come back and look at it a later time (Definition
2.58). In a similar way, we can define a quasi-identifiable interaction between
two objects as a change of the states of these objects that can be modelled
by a pair-wise interaction of the kind we have discussed above, mediated by a
transfer quantum, even if we cannot be sure that these two objects are actually
interacting.
We introduced pseudoobjects as force carriers, entities that bend trajec-
tories of identifiable objects. After that, we introduced transfer quanta from
the epistemic consideration that an interaction can only be deduced indirectly
from matching attribute changes of two objects. Obviously, we can identify
pseudoobjects with transfer quanta. This provides another condition for which
objects can be part of a quasi-identifiable interaction, since we concluded that
all pseudoobjects have to travel at the speed of light (Statement 3.103). Apart
from the condition that the changes of the attribute accounts of two potentially
interacting objects have to balance each other, we must therefore require that
the distance between the two objects is such that the attribute transfer can be
modelled as taking place at the speed of light.
Definition 3.61 (Quasi-identifiable interaction). Let υ = (υ1, υ2, . . .) be
an array of exact values of a set of attributes {A1, A2, . . .} that specify object O1
as well as object O2. Let Z1 = (υ11, υ21, . . .) be an exact state of object O1, and
let Z2 = (υ12, υ22, . . .) be an exact state of object O2. To any pair of exact states
Z
(n)
1 ∈ SO1(n) and Z(n+m)1 ∈ SO1(n+m) corresponds an attribute value change
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∆υ = Z
(n+m)
1 −Z(n)1 . Suppose that there is a pair of exact states Z(n)2 ∈ SO2(n)
and Z
(n+m)
2 ∈ SO2(n + m) such that ∆υ = Z(n)2 − Z(n+m)2 . Suppose also that
there is such a pair that fulfils r(Z
(n+m)
2 ) − r(Z(n)1 ) ≤ c[t(n + m) − t(n)] or
r(Z
(n+m)
1 ) − r(Z(n)2 ) ≤ c[t(n + m) − t(n)]. Then there is a quasi-identifiable
interaction between O1 and O2 during the time interval [n, n+m].
This definition corresponds to the intuitive process shown in Fig. 3.70. The
following definition formalizes the generalized process shown in Fig. 3.71.
Definition 3.62 (Directed quasi-identifiable interaction). To any pair of
exact states Z
(n)
1 ∈ SO1(n) and Z(n+m)1 ∈ SO1(n+m) corresponds an attribute
value change ∆υ = Z
(n+m)
1 − Z(n)1 . Suppose that there is an integer m′ > m
and a pair of exact states Z
(n+m′)
2 ∈ SO2(n+m′) and Z(n+m
′′)
2 ∈ SO2(n+m′′)
such that ∆υ = Z
(n+m′)
2 −Z(n+m
′′)
2 . Suppose also that there is such a pair that
fulfils r(Z
(n+m′)
2 )− r(Z(n+m)1 ) ≤ c[t(n+m)− t(n)] and r(Z(n+m
′′)
2 )− r(Z(n)1 ) ≥
c[t(n + m) − t(n)]. Then there is a directed quasi-identifiable interaction from
O1 to O2 during the time interval [n, n+m
′′].
A quasi-identifiable interaction between two objects may be interpreted as
a truly identifiable interaction if we can exclude the existence of any other pair
of objects that fulfils one of the above definitions. Or, as Sherlock Holmes put
it: ”Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth.”
[18]
Definition 3.63 (Identifiable interaction). An interaction between a pair
of objects (O1, O2) is identifiable if and only if the pair fulfil the conditions in
Definition 3.61 or 3.62, and if there are no other pairs (O′1, O2) or (O1, O
′
2) that
fulfil the same conditions.
The difference between a quasi-identifiable interaction and an identifiable
interaction is illustrated in Fig. 3.72.
There is one basic situation in which we have to say that the interaction is
identifiable, almost by definition. It is the interaction that takes place between
the outside world and the body of the subject, making perceptions possible.
We can perceive two different objects O1 and O2 if and only if two dif-
ferent transfer quanta ∆υ1 and ∆υ2 carry information about these objects to
two objects that belong to the body (Fig. 3.73). These objects are groups of
quasiobjects according to the discussion in section 2.11 (see Fig. 2.35). The pos-
sibility to link a given external object to a given (composite) object in the body
is necessary to uphold detailed materialism and intertwined diualism. Without
such an explicit identifiablity there would be no well-defined relation between
the body and the world. Consequently, there would be no well-defined relation
between subjective perceptions and the objects that are perceived.
But are we allowed to speak about a truly identifiable interaction in this case?
We argued above that in general we can only speak about quasi-identifiable
interactions. Two objects may be potentially linked by an interaction, but we
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Figure 3.72: The difference between a quasi-identifiable and an identifiable in-
teraction. Two objects in the upper group change their attributes by the same
amount ∆υ1, and two objects in the lower group change their attributes by the
opposite amount −∆υ1. This situation can be described in terms of exchanges
of pseudoobjects along any of the dashed lines. Here we choose a particular
model with two such exchanges. The freedom of choice means that the interac-
tion is quasi-identifiable. One object change its attributes by the amount ∆υ2,
and one object change its attributes by the amount −∆υ2. We are forced into a
model where a pseudoobject transfer the attributes between these two objects.
The interaction is identifiable.
Figure 3.73: The perception of external objects must consist of a one-to-one
link between the observed object and a group of quasiobjects in the body whose
change of state corresponds to the perception. Such a link can only be achieved
by an identifiable interaction.
3.10. FERMIONS AND BOSONS 379
Figure 3.74: A pseudoobject mediates the quasi-identifiable interaction between
two objects O1 and O2. These objects can be decomposed into two sets of min-
imal objects {O1i} and {O2j}. Analogously, the interaction can be decomposed
into pairwise interactions between these minimal objects, mediated by minimal
pseudoobjects POij . These carry the attributes ∆υij from O1i to O2j .
can never be sure that an interaction is actually taking place between these two
particular objects. A quantum of information ∆υ carried to the body could in
principle have come from several different external object that changed their
attributes in the same way.
However, this is an empty statement from the epistemic point of view, since
the transfer of the attribute values ∆υ to the subject is the only way to define
an external object. We cannot say that there may be several different external
objects that may have transferred these attributes to the body since we have to
allow different transfers ∆υ,∆υ′, . . . to speak about different external objects
in the first place.
Statement 3.108 (Interactions between the external world and the
body are identifiable). All interactions between the external world and the
body are directed and identifiable. They are mediated by pseudoobjects that link
a given external object to a given composite quasiobject that belong to the body.
We judge that all interactions between the body and the objects that are
perceived are directed, since the flow of information has to go from the observed
objects to the perceiving subject, not the other way around.
We have noted the similarity between quasi-identifiable objects and quasi-
identifiable interactions. In section 2.10 we stated that all quasi-identifiable
objects can be decomposed into identifiable minimal objects (Statement 2.29).
In an analogous manner, we will state here that all interactions between two
objects can be decomposed into knowable, pairwise interactions between the
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minimal objects that constitute the two objects. These pairwise interactions
define minimal pseudoobjects (Fig. 3.74).
The very fact that any object can be described in terms of minimal obects
means that any interaction can be described in terms of interactions between
minimal objects. One may imagine that these decomposed interactions are not
necessarily pairwise decomposable, but redistributed attributes between two
groups of minimal objects. However, this cannot be the case since all pseu-
doobjects are linear according to Statement 3.104. Interactions that cannot be
decomposed into pairwise interations would have to be modelled by pseudoob-
jects that interact with themselves along the way between the two hypothetical
groups of minimal objects. Therefore any knowable interation between two min-
imal objects can be modelled as a directed, identifiable interaction mediated by
a minimal pseudoobject.
Statement 3.109 (All interactions are decomposable). Consider any
knowable interaction between objects O1 and O2, where the attributes −∆υ are
carried from O1 to O2. These two objects can be decomposed into two sets of
identifiable minimal objects {O1i} and {O2j}. In this description, the inter-
action can be modelled as mediated by minimal pseudoobjects traveling between
pairs of minimal objects (O1i, O2j). Each of these carries the attributes ∆υij,
and these attributes filfil −∆υ = ∑ij ∆υij.
We have painted a picture in which all minimal objects are elementary
fermions with spin 1/2. We have also introduced minimal pseudoobjects, cor-
responding to photons and gravitons. These are the elementary bosons in our
description. There is a clear distinction between these fermions and bosons. The
former are objects, whereas the latter represent interactions between objects.
But doesn’t these mediators of interactions have some characteristics of ac-
tual objects after all? Is the distinction that clear? We have stated that pseu-
doobjects have no location. But the diffraction and interference of light follows
the same quantum mechanical principles as the diffraction and interference of
electrons. When the electro-magnetic field interacts with itself after having
passed the two slits in a double-slit experiment, doesn’t that represent a kind
of locality? We are tempted to say that a given part of the wave actullay passes
a given slit.
There is a basic difference between the interference of electrons and photons,
though. We can never investigate which slit a photon actually passed. We must
always treat this as unknowable; we always have an experimental setup where
these two alternatives have knowability level 1 (Table 2.1). The reason is simply
that in order to investigate whether a photon is present, it must be absorbed by
an object. Then another photon is emitted that may reach our eyes, or another
detector. The first photon is no longer defined. A photon can never be tracked
and at the same time preserve its identity. It is only the object that absorbs
the photon that can be localized. Therefore we have to stick to a more abstract
interpretation of the electro-magnetic field. In a double-slit experiment it simply
provides the probability that an object at a given position in the detector screen
will change its attributes by the amount ∆υ, given that the object corresponding
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to the radiation source has changed its attributes by the opposite amount −∆υ.
In that case there is a quasi-identifiable interaction between them, encoded as
the exchange of a photon. We get an apparent interference pattern since the
photon is an inherently non-local entity. Physical law must therefore contradict
a description in which we assign a definite path to it, according to explicit
epistemic minimalism, just as we get interference in a double slit experiment
arranged so that it is forever unknowable which slit the object actually passed,
making the object non-local in relation to the slits.
The fact that interactions travel at a given speed c may be regarded as
another trait which makes the carriers of these interactions similar to objects.
But this speed can be interpreted in a more abstract way, just as the electro-
magnetic field itself. We should regard the speed of light simply as a number that
encapsulates another condition that has to be fulfilled by two objects that are
involved in a quasi-identifiable interation. Namely, the distance between them
divided by the observed relational time passed between the attribute changes
of the first and the second object should equal c. In this way we avoid one of
the paradoxes of special relativity - that observers that move in relation to one
another nevertheless mesure the same speed c of a passing object. The photon
simply is no object.
z
Pseudoobjects are identified as elementary bosons. These elementary bosons
are described as book-keeping devices that are useful to express knowable in-
teractions between identifiable objects. The other kind of knowable change an
object can undergo is that of transformation (Definition 3.47). The basic dif-
ference is that in a transformation the object changes identity. Do we need
to introduce another kind of elementary boson than pseudoobjects in order to
represent knowable transformations?
The basic reason why we need pseudoobjects is that two objects that in-
teract are most often separated spatio-temporally. We can make a subjective,
spatial distinction between Jupiter and Mars, or between the comb and the hair
that is attracted to it by static electricity. The projections of their states onto
space-time do not overlap. To describe such a situation as a knowable, quasi-
identifiable interaction, we have to create a hypothetical link between the two
objects. We have given these links the name pseudoobjects.
In contrast, in an object transformation there is no knowable spatio-temporal
separation between the objects that exist just before the transformation and the
objects that exist after the transformation. The projections of the states of the
ingoing and outgoing objects onto space-time overlap in these processes, as
illustrated in Figs. 2.58 and 2.59. They can be identified and linked without
the help of entities similar to pseudoobjects.
However, to be able to represent such processes mathematically, there is
still a problem that needs to be resolved. Exactly how should we link the
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Figure 3.75: Three-legged vertices can and should be used to describe all know-
able transformations, since we can never verify that a transformation corre-
sponding to a vertex with four or more legs has actually taken place. a) An
object observed at time n, and three objects observed at time n + m, deduced
to be the result of a division of the first object. Such a 1 → 3 transformation
can be the result of more or less complex sequences of divisions and mergings
that are not observed within context. The simplest allowed alternative that
describes a 1 → 3 transformation can be represented by a graph that consists
of two three-legged vertices. b) The same goes for 2→ 2 transformations. The
three shown graphs of this type must be treated as a single alternative since
they cannot be distinguished in any context.
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incoming and outgoing objects? To discuss these questions, we use the following
definition.
Definition 3.64 (A q → r transformation). Consider a knowable transfor-
mation in which q objects observed at time n or earlier can be identified with r
objects observed at time n+m or later in a knowable transformation. Suppose
that no member in the set of involved objects Oqr ≡ {O1, . . . , Oq+r} is observed
at any intermediate time n < n′ < n + m. Then we are dealing with a q → r
transformation.
Figure 3.75 illustrates 1 → 3 and 2 → 2 transformations. At time n + m
there is a state reduction
umSOi(n)→ SOf (n+m) ⊂ umSOi(n), (3.351)
where SOi(n) is the initial state, SOf (n+m) is the final state, Oi ≡ {O1, . . . , Oq}
and Of ≡ {Oq+1, . . . , Or}. Since the objects are not observed between times
n and n + m, we cannot know exactly when and how the objects transform.
In a family of contexts C(σ) we can speak about a continuous evolution of the
world tube from the initial state SOi(n), but it should be noted that this world
tube does not divide or merge until time n + m. Only then do we know that
a transformation has actually taken place. The illustrations in Fig. 3.75 are
therefore a bit misleading. This observation justifies the statement that a state
reduction has to take place at time n + m; we cannot have SOf (n + m) =
umSOi(n), since there is no transformation at all in such a situation.
Before the state reduction, all alternatives that are not excluded by the initial
state should be included in the state representation u¯mS¯Oi in a superposition.
These alternatives can be grouped into topological classes according to those
divisions and mergings that occur. These classes can be defined by a graph
with directed edges embedded in space-time. A few such graphs are shown in
Fig. 3.75. Only those topologies or graphs that can in principle be observed
should be included. That is, there should exist another family of context C ′(σ)
such that the topology in question can be verified in the sense that no simpler
graph is consistent with the sequence of observations made within C ′(σ). Only
in that case is the corresponding alternative realizable. This condition excludes,
for example, graphs with edges shorter than the minimum resolvable Lorentz
distance lmin (Fig. 3.63).
Explicit epistemic minimalism (Assumption 1.19) provides the reason why
we should only include graphs that correspond to realizable alternatives. Phys-
ical law should be inconsistent with models that incorporate processes that
cannot be verified even in principle. The inclusion of such entities should give
the wrong answer when such a model is used to predict the outcome of an
experiment.
For the same reason we should demand that all internal vertices have degree
three, that is, three legs. Since there is a smallest observable Lorentz distance
lmin, we can never exclude the possibility that a vertex that appears to contain
an internal vertex with a degree larger than three in reality corresponds to a
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Figure 3.76: Graphs Gqr that describe possible topologies in q → r transforma-
tions. a) A graph G22, and another graph G
−
22, created from G22 by removing
one edge. In so doing, two internal vertices lose their meaning and can be re-
moved [compare Fig. 3.75(c)]. These graphs represent two classes of realizable
alternatives in a given 2→ 2 transformation. b) Another context C ′ in which a
sequence of five observations realizes the alternative represented by G22.
sequence of transformations that each correspond to a vertes with degree three.
Examples of such decompositions of vertices with degree four are shown in Fig.
3.75.
Definition 3.65 (Irreducible transformation graph). Let Grp be a trans-
formation graph that is consistent with a r → p transformation. Let G−rp be a
graph constructed from Grp by removing edges. Grp is irreducible if and only if
there is a context C ′ such that Grp is consistent with a sequence of observations
that can be made within C ′, but no graph G−rp is consistent with this particular
sequence of observations.
The graph G22 in Fig. 3.76 is irreducible by this criterion, since the context
C ′ makes it possible to detect two objects in an intermediate observation, which
correspond to the internal loop in G22.
Statement 3.110 (Realizable transformation alternatives). An alterna-
tive consistent with a given q → r transformation that may be the outcome of
a context family C(σ) should be included in a state representation u¯(σ)S¯Oi if
and only if it corresponds to an irreducible transformation graph in which all
internal vertices have degree three.
The rule that all internal vertices must have degree three implies that each
object transformation q+r > 3 should be represented by transformation graphs
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in which there is at least one edge that does not correspond to the world tube
of an observed object. These edges are dashed in Fig. 3.75.
The addition rule for angular momenta means that exactly one of the three
edges must carry integer spin. Since all observed minimal objects have spin
1/2 according to the Dirac equations, it is the dashed internal edges that must
be ascribed this integer spin value. This observation also implies that 1 → 2
transformations are forbidden.
Definition 3.66 (Cryptoobject). A cryptoobject is an edge in a transforma-
tion graph that connects two internal vertices v1 and v2. The edge is such that
all other edges that are connected to v1 and v2 correspond to objects.
Figure 3.75 shows the cryptoobjects as dashed lines.
Statement 3.111 (Cryptoobjects mediate all object transformations).
There is at least one cryptoobject associated with each knowable object transfor-
mation.
We argued above that cryptoobjects must be ascribed integer spin. Conser-
vation of the invariant mass implies that they must be ascribed non-zero rest
mass.
Statement 3.112 (Cryptoobjects are massive elementary bosons). An
integer total spin and a non-zero rest mass can be associateed with each cryp-
toobject.
The picture that emerges is that all elementary massive gauge bosons can
be interpreted as cryptoobjects. These cryptoobjects are as ‘unreal’ as pseu-
doobects in the sense that they can never be observed. They appear only as
internal edges in transformation or interaction graphs that properly describes
the outcome of an observational context. Their introduction as elements in the
mathematical representation of physical law is necessary in order to fulfil two
basic requirements in our epistemic approach to physics: epistemic minimalism
in the case of cryptoobjects, and identifiability in the case of pseudoobjects.
The fact that cryptoobjects and pseudoobjects cannot be observed means
that there is no irreducible graph (Definition 3.65) such that these elementary
bosons form loops among themselves. All loops involve edges that correspond to
observable objects (Fig. 3.76). Elementary bosons may transform among them-
selves in a restricted way, though. Cryptoobjects carry mass and are localized
in the sense that they are confined to the known region in space-time in which
the transformation takes place. We may therefore have an irreducible graph
corresponding to a quasi-identifiable interaction in which the cryptoobject emit
a pseudoobject, which is absorbed later by an object that undergo a knowable
interaction. In this way the concepts of transformations and interactions can
be mixed (Fig. 3.77).
However, the ‘transformation-interaction’ in Fig. 3.77 is indistinguishable
from a process in which the transformation is separate from the interaction,
and the pseudoobject is emitted from one of the vertices that correspond to one
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Figure 3.77: Cryptoobjects, which mediate transformations, can be modelled
as being able to emit pseudoobjects, which mediate interactions. However, this
model is indistinguishable from a model in which the pseudoobject emanate
from any of the four objects involved in the transformation (solid lines). These
possibilities should therefore be treated as a single realizable alternative.
of the four objects involved in the transformation. These two possibilities are
therefore just two representations of the same alternative. As such, they should
be assigned the same amplitude a in a wave function, and they should not be
double-counted when the wave function is normalized. The same goes for the
three indistinguishable possibilites shown in Fig. 3.75(b).
Statement 3.113 (The use of indistinguishable, irreducible graphs in
wave functions). Suppose that there are m irreducible graphs {G1, . . . , Gm}
that conform with a set of transformations or interactions observed within some
context C. Suppose further that there is no other context C ′ in which the same
set of transformations or interactions are observed, such that some of the m
graphs are excluded. Then, if graphs are used to define alternatives S¯j in a
wave function a(j) that are defined for C, the entire set of graphs {G1, . . . , Gm}
corresponds to a singe alternative S¯j.
3.11 The spin-statistics theorem
In section 2.10 we defined an identifiable object O to be such that its state
SOO(n) at time n overlap its state SOO(n+ 1) at time n+ 1. Since we cannot
distinguish the two states, we have to say that they describe the same object.
We simply cannot justify a claim that the object we observe at time n + 1 is
different from that we observed at time n.
Consider the states SOO1(n) and SOO2(n) of two objects O1 and O2, which
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Figure 3.78: Identifiability and the Pauli exclusion principle. a) If the states
of two objects O1 and O2 at subequent times overlap, the objects must be
considered to be the same. We speak about an identifiable object that we can
track as time passes. b) If the states of two objects O1 and O2 at the same time
overlap, they must also be considered to be one and the same object, if the states
are represented in object state space SO. They cannot be distinguished. From
an epistemic point of view, the statement that the states of two objects overlap
is paradoxical. If the overlapping states cannot be reduced to non-overlapping
states by future observations, then we can exclude the possibility that the object
will divide and turn out to be two objects at a later time. See Fig. 2.23 for
further explanation.
we observe at the same time n. Since we have given the objects different names,
there must be a way to distinguish them. This means that the state SOO1(n)
does not overlap the state SOO2(n) (Fig. 2.23). If they do overlap, on the other
hand, we cannot justify the claim that the two objects are different, in the same
way as we cannot justify that the identifiable object O at time n+ 1 is different
from that at time n. For the same reason, we must judge that O1 and O2 is
one and the same object. We may say that these two objects fulfil momentary
identifiability, and that the objects described by the two states SOO(n) and
SOO(n+ 1) fulfil temporal identifiability. These considerations are illustrated in
Fig. 3.78.
Even if we cannot distinguish two objects at the present moment, it may be
possible to observe them more closely in the future, in order to decide that we
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are indeed dealing with a composite object with two parts. In other words, we
may observe object division. We have to distinguish between the cases when
this is possible in principle, and when it is not. In the first case it is meaningful
to speak about the potential existence of two distinct objects, and in the second
case it is not.
In the latter case explicit epistemic minimalism requires that a proper rep-
resentation of a contextual state should not contain terms with two factors that
represents a specimen consisting of two objects, since it is impossible in prin-
ciple to decide whether two objects are really present. In the former case the
representation should contain such terms, since they represent possible states
of potential knowledge.
We may compare these considerations to those discussed in section 3.8, in
relation to the discreteness of the set of possible states in bound states. The
Lorentz distances are discrete in such states, meaning that it is impossible in
principle to measure any other distance. Therefore we should not include terms
in the contextual state that corresponds to distances that do not belong to the
discrete spectrum. This means that it is not quite correct to use a continuous
spatial wave function (Statement 3.90). Similarly, the impossibility to measure
arbitrarily short distances means that we should not include processes on shorter
scales as terms in representations of possible particle reactions (Statement 3.89).
In general, we may express as follows a contextual state in which the al-
ternatives Sj are realized with probability |aj |2, and in which the specimen is
possibly composite (see section 3.4.5):
S¯C =
∑
j
aj
∑
m
δ(j,m)
(m)∏
kl
S¯Pkl. (3.352)
This can be seen as an expression of the form [3.126], where we observe a
collective property cP with property value states
S¯cPj =
∑
m
δ(j,m)
(m)∏
kl
S¯Pkl. (3.353)
The property value states S¯Pkl, on the other hand, refer to the individual objects
Ol that the specimen is potentially made of. In a fundamental description, these
are minimal objects. In the following, we let the individual property P refer
to the array of all attributes of Ol that can be known simultaneously with the
collective property cP , which defines the alternatives Sj . We let k be an index
that numbers all the property values of the array P of simultaneously knowable
individual attributes. The state S¯Pkl thus corresponds to a state of maximum
potential knowledge about a minimal object that is part of the specimen OS,
given that the value of the collective property cP is also known.
S¯Pkl ↔ state of maximum knowledge about object Ol, (3.354)
This means that the product corresponds to a state of maximum knowledge
about the entire specimen OS:
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(m)∏
kl
S¯Pkl ↔ state of maximum knowledge about specimen OS, (3.355)
where m is an index that points to a given such state of maximum knowledge
among all possibilities. These states may contain a varying number of minimal
objects OM , so that the product may contain a varying number of factors.
The binary function δ(j,m) equals one if the collective maximum knowl-
edge state
∏(m)
kl S¯Pkl is consistent with the collective property value cPj that is
observed when alternative Sj is realized, and δ(j,m) equals zero otherwise.
Statement 3.114 (The Pauli exclusion principle). Consider a representation
of a contextual state of the form 3.352. We have δ(j,m) = 0 whenever the
product
∏(m)
kl S¯Pkl contains a factor S¯PklS¯Pkl′ .
Such a factor S¯PklS¯Pkl′ would correspond to identical property value states
of two different objects, without any hope to tell the objects apart via further
observations. This would be paradoxical from the epistemic point of view, as
discussed at the beginning of this section.
Consider the classical illustration of the Pauli exclusion principle, the fact
there is only room for two electrons in each atomic shell, corresponding to one
electron with spin sz = 1/2, and one electron with spin sz = −1/2. We let
S¯C represent a context in which the specimen OS is the entire atom. Say
that we know which element we are dealing with, but we don’t know which
isotope. Thus the number of minimal objects OM that are part of the product
[3.355] is not fixed by our knowledge a priori. Let the context be such that the
rest energy of the atom is measured. This is the collective property cP whose
possible values define the alternatives Sj . It is possible to measure the spin
of an individual electron in the atom along any given z-direction at the same
time as the rest energy of the atom; this particular individual property and
the collective property cP are simultaneuously knowable. Therefore the spin
direction of an electron is an element in the array of individual attributes P .
According to Statement 3.114 we should thus exclude all maximum knowledge
states [3.355] that contain more than one individual maximum knowledge state
[3.354] that represents an electron with a given spin direction. Therefore, in
any proper representation of S¯C there are at most two electrons which have
identical quantum numbers, if we disregard the spin direction. Note that this is
true even if we do not explicitly determine the spin directions of all the eletrons.
The only property that we actually observe in our example is the atomic rest
mass, and therefore the different possible outcomes of this observation are the
only property values that are assigned probabilities |aj |2.
What about elementary bosons, that is, minimal pseudoobjects and cryp-
toobjects? Let us repeat the main messages of the preceding section. Elemen-
tary bosons are book-keeping devices, and as such they have no individuality
when it comes to actual perceptions. We cannot expect the Pauli exclusion
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principle to hold. Since both pseudoobjects and cryptoobjects must be assigned
integer spin, we get a primitive version of the spin-statistics theorem.
Let us discuss the case of pseudoojects in more detail for the sake of illustra-
tion. They identify pairs of potentially interacting minimal objects. According
to Statement 3.109, all interactions are decomposable into such pairs. It may
be possible to pin down exactly which elementary object is interacting with
which, in which case the interaction is identifiable. The interactions may also
be quasi-identifiable. In this case we can just say that a there is a group of N
minimal objects, each of which may be interacting with any the minimal objects
in another group of N minimal objects. Each object in the first group changes
its attributes by the same amount ∆υ, and each object in the second group
changes its attributes by the opposite amount −∆υ.
In Fig. 3.72, there are two such groups containing N = 2 objects each.
Attributes can be modelled to be transferrred from one group to another along
any of the dashed lines. Even if we cannot determine exactly which paths they
take, we know that the number of pseduoobjects involved in the interaction
must be N .
The main point to be made in the present section is that all these N pse-
duoobjects can be described as being identical, carrying the same array of at-
tributes −∆υ. To say that there is a group of N > 1 identical pseudoobjects
is just another way to say that we have an interaction that is observed to be
quasi-identifiable rather than identifiable. There is no epistemic reason to rule
out this situation, since each of the 2N objects we observe to deduce that there
are N identical pseudoobjects is distinct from all the other objects. Therefore
the Pauli exclusion principle does not hold for pseduoobjects.
Statement 3.115 (The spin-statistics theorem for elementary fermions and bosons).
Minimal objects with spin quantum number s = 1/2 obey the Pauli exclusion
principle, but minimal pseudoobjects with integer spin quantum number do not.
One may argue that it is not meaningful to construct a contextual state like
that in Eq. [3.352] when we are dealing with a collection of pseudoobjects, since
we cannot compose a specimen out of pseudoobjects. It may nevertheless be
done, if we reinterpret the meaning of some of the symbols.
Consider a context in which we observe the way in which two objects O1 and
O2 interact, assuming that they actually do. The specimen is the composite
object consisting of O1 and O2. The alternatives Sj correspond to different
attribute changes ∆υj and −∆υj of these two objects. Then we may write
S¯C =
∑
j
aj
∑
m
δ(j,m)
(m)∏
k
Nk∆SPk. (3.356)
The ‘differential state’ ∆SPk = ∆υk represents the state of a mimimal pseu-
doobject whose attributes are determined to the maximum precision that is
possible to know simultaneously with ∆υj . These states are distinct in the
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sense that ∆SPk ∩∆SPk′ = ∅ whenever k 6= k′. The product
∏(m)
k Nk∆SPk
represents a specific decomposition of the interaction between O1 and O2 in
terms of pairwise interactions between minimal objects belonging to these two
objects. The number Nk is the number of pairwise interaction with attribute
transfer ∆υk in this particular decomposition. The binary function δ(j,m) has
a similar interpretation as in Eq. [3.352] and has to be introduced to make sure
that the condition ∆υj =
∑
kNk∆υk is fulfilled (Fig. 3.74).
Looking at Fig. 3.72 from this point of view, we may interpret the upper
group of objects as a composite object O1, the lower group as O2, and all
object as the specimen OS. We have observed the overall attribute change
∆j = ∆υ1 + ∆υ2, and we have N1 = 2 and N2 = 1.
The total number of minimal objects that change their attributes may be
impossible to determine within context. This corresponds to the statement that
the total number of observed pseudoobjects cannot be predicted; there is no
conservation law for the number of elementary bosons.
z
The spin-statistics theorem, as stated above, holds only for elementary fermions
and bosons. More precisely, it holds for minimal objects on the one hand, and
minimal pseudo- and cryptoobjects on the other. The traditional formulation
of the spin-statistics theorem is more general. It accounts for the statistics of
composite fermions and bosons as well. An object that can be decomposed into
an even number of minimal objects obeys Bose-Einstein statistics. Several such
objects can occupy the same state, at least if we consider collective properties of
the entire object. From our perspective, it may seem strange that a composite
object can behave as if it were not an object at all, but a pseudo- or cryp-
toobject. To be able to account for this behaviour we will express ourselves in
terms of evolving, spatio-temporal wave functions Ψr4(σ) rather than the more
fundamental and general property value states S¯P .
We start by considering property value states, however. Let Pl be the array
of all properties of object Ol that is simultaneously knowable with its position
r4. Then we can express a state of maximum knowledge about Ol as S¯Pkl(r4)
(compare Eq. [3.354]). A state of maximum knowledge about the entire speci-
men can be written
S¯Pk1(r4)S¯Pk′2(r
′
4)S¯Pk′′3(r
′′
4) . . . . (3.357)
For simplicity, consider a specimen that consists of just two minimal objects
O1 and O2. These are observed in a family of contexts C(σ) such that the
projections Dr41 and Dr42 of the two object states onto space-time do not
overlap at the time n when the context is initiated, corresponding to σ = 0
(Fig. 3.79). The context C(σ) is assumed to be idealized or fundamental, and
to be such that the exact positions r4 and r
′
4 of the two objects are observed.
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Figure 3.79: A context in which the spatio-temporal positions of two objects
O1 and O2 are observed. The support Dr4 of their wave functions start to
overlap as these evolve. Since they do not overlap for σ < σc we can decide
that we are dealing with two objects even if they share the same values of all
the other attributes. For σ > σc we may find the two objects in the same
position. However, this is forbidden by the Pauli exclusion principle if all the
other attributes are also equal. This fact motivates the choice of anti-symmetric
wave functions.
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These two positions are simulataneously knowable, so that a combined wave
function
Ψr4(r4, r
′
4, σ) (3.358)
exists according to Definition 3.30. At the intial time n we can separate the
objects spatio-temporally, order them in a list, and associate the first argument
in the wave function to the position of O1 and the second argument to the
position of O2. Such a wave function continues to de defined even above a
critical value σc > 0 of the evolution parameter at which Dr41 and Dr42 starts
to overlap. The knowledge that there are two objects cannot be erased by the
evolution.
Let us assume that the contexts C(σ) are such that P is already known at
time n, so that the specimen is in a state of maximum knowledge of the form
[3.357] after the position observations. Then, if there is a critical value σc > 0 as
described above, the Pauli principle excludes the collective maximum knowledge
state
S¯Pk1(r4)S¯Pk2(r4) (3.359)
for σ ≥ σc. For these σ we must add the condition
Ψr4(r4, r4, σ) = 0 (3.360)
by hand if the two objects are identical, meaning that k′ = k. For σ < σc we
know before observation that r4 6= r′4, so that this condition is not necessary.
The left hand side of Eq. [3.360] is nevertheless well-defined, since the wave
function [3.358] still exists for σ ≥ σc.
Next, let us relate the meaning of expression [3.358] to the meaning of the
same expression with interchanged arguments:
Ψr4(r
′
4, r4, σ). (3.361)
The former expression denotes the probability amplitude for the event that
the object with property array pk is found at position r4, and the object with
property array pk′ is found at position r
′
4. Naturally, the latter expression then
denotes the probability amplitude for the event that the object with properties
pk is found at r
′
4, and that the object with properties pk′ is found at r4.
Let us again assume that the two minimal objects are identical, so that
k = k′ and pk = pk′ , and study the effect of such object swapping in this case.
Since nothing knowably changes in the operation, we must have
|Ψr4(r4, r′4, σ)|2 = |Ψr4(r′4, r4, σ)|2 (3.362)
for all position pairs (r4, r
′
4) and for all σ in the domain [0, σmax]. If we denote
the object swapping operation by pi, we may therefore write
|piΨr4(r4, r′4, σ)|2 = |Ψr4(r4, r′4, σ)|2
pi2Ψr4(r4, r
′
4, σ) = Ψr4(r4, r
′
4, σ).
(3.363)
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The only solutions to these equations are pi = I or pi = −I, where I is the
identity operator. That is,
Ψr4(r
′
4, r4, σ) = Ψr4(r4, r
′
4, σ), (3.364)
or
Ψr4(r
′
4, r4, σ) = −Ψr4(r4, r′4, σ). (3.365)
The evolution parameter σ is introduced to allow a continuouos description
of the evolution between discrete events. Therefore we should require that the
wave function changes continuously with σ. This means that if the wave function
is symmetric according to Eq. [3.364] or anti-symmetric according to Eq. [3.364]
for a given σ, it sticks to the same kind of symmetry for all σ. Similarly, the
wave function should change continuously with the position arguments.
This means that the symmetry type of a wave function that describes a pair
of identical minimal objects is a global quality that does not depend on the
arguments. To ensure that Eq. [3.360] is always fulfilled, we have to choose
anti-symmetric wave functions, regardless whether σ < σc or σ ≥ σc. In this
way we have arrived at the traditional defining characteristic of a fermionic wave
function.
Note that we are not allowed to use this characteristic as a starting point for
the discussion in this section, since wave functions are not fundamental entities
in the epistemic formalism. Rather, the fundamental entity is the physical state
S. Consequently, we started out with a discussion about object states that were
overlapping or non-overlapping.
Note also that to we have to consider wave functions to be able to introduce
the minus-sign that defines the anti-symmetry that characterizes fermions. In
other words, we have to consider contexts in which the positions of the fermions
are actually measured, so that there are probability amplitudes for all the pos-
sible outcomes, amplitudes that may be negative. In the general expression
[3.352] of the contextual state in terms of property value states S¯Pkl, the plus-
sign is defined according to the discussion on section 3.4.5, but we have given
no meaning to the minus-sign. Therefore minus-signs cannot appear in such
expressions.
It is not essential to use spatio-temporal wave functions to arrive at the
conclusion that they must be anti-symmetric. We may consider any property
P , and argue along the same lines that for any pair of identical minimal objects
we must have
ΨP (p
′, p, σ) = −ΨP (p, p′, σ), (3.366)
if we assume that all other attributes P˘ that are simultaneously knowable with
P are indeed precisely known at the initiation of the context at time n. Put
another way, we assume that the initial state SOl of each minimal object fulfils
SOl(n) ⊆ SP˘ kl, where SP˘ kl is a state of maximum knowledge about Ol according
to Eq. [3.354].
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Definition 3.67 (The co-property P˘ to P ). Consider any property P that de-
scribes an object Ol. A co-property P˘ associated with P is an array of properties
that is simultaneously knowable with P , and such that there is no simultaneously
knowable property that is independent from the array of properties (P, P˘ ), in the
sense that the value of any property P ′ is a function of the values of (P, P˘ ). All
properties in this array are assumed to be independent from the others.
Let us give a couple of examples, focusing on relational attributes. If P = t,
then P˘ may be chosen as (r, sz), where sz is the spin along some z-direction. If
P = E, then P˘ may be chosen as (p, sz).
Above we have considered a specimen that consists of two minimal objects
only. The same reasoning holds for any specimen, as long as the number of
minimal objects in the specimen is known at the initiation of the context (at
time n).
Statement 3.116 (Anti-symmetric wave functions for identical mini-
mal objects). Consider a family of fundamental contexts C(σ) in which the
specimen is known to contain N minimal objects Ol at the initial time n. The
individual property P of each of these minimal objects is observed, whereas the
value p˘kl of the co-property P˘ is already exactly known at time n for each object
Ol. Suppose that the minimal objects are identical, meaning that p˘l = p˘l′ for
all object pairs (Ol, Ol′). Suppose also that for each such object pair, there is a
σ > 0 for which pl = pl′ is a possible outcome of the observation. Then
ΨP (p1, . . . , pl′ , . . . , pl, . . . , pN , σ) = −ΨP (p1, . . . , pl, . . . , pl′ , . . . , pN , σ) (3.367)
for all such object pairs, for all property values (p1, . . . , pl′ , . . . , pl, . . . , pN ) al-
lowed by physical law, and for all σ in its domain [0, σmax].
Let us finally discuss the case of composite objects. Suppose that N is
divisible by M , and that we know at time n that all minimal objects in the
specimen can be grouped in bound states which contain M minimal objects
each. In the case M = 2 we can represent this knowledge in the wave function
as follows:
ΨP = ΨP (p1, p2; p3, p4; . . . ; pN−1, pN ), (3.368)
where the semi-colons separate minimal objects belonging to different bound
states. Now we cannot assume that all minimal objects are identical, just that
each group of M objects is identical to each other such group. This means that
we can order the minimal objects so that p˘l = p˘l+M = p˘l+2M = . . .. In Eq.
[3.368] this means that p˘1 = p˘3 = . . . = p˘M−1 and p˘2 = p˘4 = . . . = p˘M .
We may use Statement 3.116 in this situation if we restrict argument swap-
ping to the sets of arguments that correspond to identical minimal objects. In
the case M = 2 we get, for example,
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ΨP (p3, p2; p1, p4; . . . ; pN−1, pN ) = −ΨP (p1, p2; p3, p4; . . . ; pN−1, pN )
ΨP (p1, p4; p3, p2; . . . ; pN−1, pN ) = −ΨP (p1, p2; p3, p4; . . . ; pN−1, pN ).
(3.369)
If we perform these two swappings sequentially, we get
ΨP (p3, p4; p1, p2; . . . ; pM−1, pM ) = ΨP (p1, p2; p3, p4; . . . ; pN−1, pN ). (3.370)
The bound states correspond to composite objects. Let us call the first
composite object in the argument list Oc1, the second Oc2, and so on. We
may define a collective version cP of the observed property P . For instance,
if P = r4 in the case M = 2, then cP may be the center of mass position of
the two bound minimal objects. The contexts are assumed to be fundamental,
so that the value p of P is exactly known for each minimal object after the
observations. Then the same is true for the value cp of cP . We may therefore
define a wave function which has the collective property values as arguments.
For M = 2 we may write
ΨcP = ΨP (cp1, cp2, . . . , cpN/2), (3.371)
with
cp1 = f(p1, p2)
cp2 = f(p3, p4)
...
cpN/2 = f(pN−1, pN )
(3.372)
Equation 3.370 then implies
ΨcP (cp1, . . . , cpl′ , . . . , cpl, . . . , cpN/2, σ) =
ΨcP (cp1, . . . , cpl, . . . , cpl′ , . . . , cpN/2, σ)
(3.373)
in the case M = 2.
The symmetry of this collective wave function means that the Pauli exclusion
principle does not exclude that a set of composite objects that contains two
minimal objects each are found in the same state, meaning that cP and cP˘
have the same values for all composite objects in this set.
Generalizing to an arbitrary number M of minimal objects in each bound
state, we see that the collective wave function becomes symmetric for even M
and anti-symmetric for odd M :
ΨcP (cp1, . . . , cpl′ , . . . , cpl, . . . , cpN/M , σ) =
(−1)MΨcP (cp1, . . . , cpl, . . . , cpl′ , . . . , cpN/M , σ). (3.374)
The same line of reasoning as for the collective property cP can be followed
in order to define a collective co-property cP˘ (Definition 3.67) such that the
values cp˘ are exactly known a priori for all composite objects whenever the
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individual values p˘ are known a priori. This means that we can formulate a
collective version of Statement 3.116.
Statement 3.117 (Wave function symmetries for identical compos-
ite objects). Consider a family of fundamental contexts C(σ) in which the
specimen is known to contain N/M composite objects Ol at the initial time n,
containing M minimal objects each. The collective property cP of each of these
composite objects is observed, whereas the value c˘pkl of the co-property c˘P is
already exactly known at time n for each object Ol. Suppose that the composite
objects are identical, meaning that c˘pl = c˘pl′ for all object pairs (Ol, Ol′). Sup-
pose also that for each such object pair, there is a σ > 0 for which cpl = cpl′ is
a possible outcome of the observation. Then
ΨcP (cp1, . . . , cpl′ , . . . , cpl, . . . , pN/M , σ) =
(−1)MΨcP (cp1, . . . , cpl, . . . , cpl′ , . . . , cpN/M , σ) (3.375)
for all such object pairs, for all property values (cp1, . . . , cpl′ , . . . , cpl, . . . , cpN/M )
allowed by physical law, and for all σ in its domain [0, σmax].
Note that the arguments leading to Statement 3.117 rely on the fact that each
minimal object in the specimen can be attributed to a given composite object
Ol. This means that the composite objects have to be weakly interacting, so that
they hardly exchange or share any minimal objects. This condition excludes, for
instance, specimens in which the composite objects Ol are chosen to be atoms
in molecules, or in metals.
Statement 3.118 (The spin-statistics theorem for identical compos-
ite objects). Consider a family of context such as that described in Statement
3.117, in which the specimen consists of independent or weakly interacting com-
posite objects Ol. Assume that all these composite objects are identical, meaning
that c˘pl = c˘pl′ for all object pairs (Ol, Ol′) Suppose that each Ol contains an
even number of minimal objects, and has an integer collective spin quantum
number cs. Then the Pauli exclusion principle does not exclude the possibility
to observe cPl′ = cPl for some pairs of objects (Ol, Ol′). Suppose instead that
each Ol contains an odd number of minimal objects, and has a half-integer col-
lective spin quantum number cs. Then the Pauli exclusion principle excludes
the possibility to observe cPl′ = cPl for all pairs of objects (Ol, Ol′).
3.12 Symmetries and redundancies
Recall the notion of a mathematical representation S¯ of a physical state S, first
introduced in section 2.2. We may write
S¯ ↪→ S. (3.376)
The state S is a set in state space S, whereas S¯ is a string of symbols with
arithmetic, algebraic or analytic meaning.
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Definition 3.68 (Proper family of state representations). Let {S¯(ν)} be
a family of mathematical representations defined for all ν ∈ Dν , where ν is some
array of numbers. If any family member S¯(ν) is a representation of exactly one
state S(ν) for each ν ∈ Dν , then {S¯(ν)} is a proper family of representations
with domain Dν of the family of states {S(ν)} ⊆ PS. Here, PS is the power
set of state space S.
If a transformation R is applied to S¯, and RS¯ represents the same state S as
does S¯, then we call R a redundancy transformation. That is, for a redundancy
transformation R we have
S¯ ↪→ S ⇒ RS¯ ↪→ S. (3.377)
We use Defintion 3.68 to define a redundancy transformation that applies
not only to a single representation S¯, but to an entire family S¯(ν) within some
domain Dν .
Definition 3.69 (Redundancy transformation). Consider a family {S¯(ν)}
of proper state representations. R is a redundancy transformation with domain
Dν if and only if S¯(ν) ↪→ S(ν) ⇒ RS¯(ν) ↪→ S(ν) for each ν ∈ Dν , but for no
ν /∈ Dν .
Familiar examples are translations of all spatial coordinates in the entire
known world r→ r + r0, and rotation of all coordinates in the world any given
angle. It has no epistemic meaning to say that such coordinate transformations
correspond to physcial translations or rotations of the world itself, since it is
not possible to decide whether such operations have been carried out or not. To
do that we need a point of reference. We will return this this matter shortly.
Let us first discuss the effect on a representation of physical law of a redun-
dancy transformation. Physical law is embodied in the evolution operator u1,
defined so that S(n+ 1) ⊆ u1S(n). We may write
Su(n) ≡ u1S(n). (3.378)
It may seem unnecessary to re-write the evolved state in this way, but I think
it will make the following notation a little bit less confusing.
We may say that u¯1 is a mathematical representation of u1 whenever we
may write S¯u(n) = u¯1S¯(n) for all states S(n), where S¯(n) and S¯u(n) are repre-
sentations of S(n) and Su(n), respectively. Then we have
RS¯u(n) = Ru¯1S¯(n). (3.379)
This means that if Ru¯1 acts on S¯(n), which represents S(n), we get RS¯u(n),
which represents Su(n) according to Eq. [3.377]. Thus Ru¯1 is also a represen-
tation of u1. We may write
u¯1 ↪→ u1 ⇒ Ru¯1 ↪→ u1. (3.380)
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Statement 3.119 (Physical law is invariant under a redundancy trans-
formation). If u¯1 represents the evolution operator u1, then so does Ru¯1.
In other words, u¯1 and Ru¯1 represent the same physical law. We would also
like to express physical law in such a way that its form u¯1 does not depend on
any parameter r of any redundancy transformation R(r) that we may choose
to apply to S¯. Only in that case can we regard u¯ as a ‘generally valid’ or ‘true’
representation. The line of reasoning is similar to that which made us define
the evolution u1 so that is does not depend on the state S that we apply it to.
It should also be generally valid.
Definition 3.70 (A proper evolution representation u¯1). A representation
u¯1 of the evolution u1 is proper if and only if R(r)S¯u(n) = u¯1R(r)S¯(n) for any
redundancy transformation R. The evolved state Su(n) is defined by Eq. [3.378].
Combining the defining property of a proper evolution representation with
Eq. [3.379], we immediately conclude the following.
Statement 3.120 (A redundancy transformation commutes with a
proper evolution representation). For any redundany transformation R,
and any proper evolution representation u¯1, we have [R, u¯1] = 0.
Another way to express the same thing is, of course, to say thatR−1u¯1R = u¯1
for a proper evolution representation u¯1. If we make a change of coordinates
in the description of a state that does not change its epistemic content, evolve
the transformed state, and then undo the coordinate change, we should get the
same evolved state as if we did not fiddle with the coordinates in the first place.
z
Let us turn from transformations of the physical state S of the entire world
Ω to transformations of the state SO of an object within the world (Definition
2.5). This is a different matter at a qualitative level, since Ω is not an object
according to Statement 1.7.
A transformation of the state SO is never the same thing as a transformation
of S, since there is always a possible environment ΩO to any object O that can
act as a point of reference when SO is transformed. In contrast, there is never
such an external point of reference when S is transformed. The environment
ΩO may not be actually perceived or known (Statement 1.8), but it enters any
representation of the world Ω as exact states Z that cannot be excluded by our
knowledge, and therefore are elements in S.
The basic point is that if we transform the state of an object, we can change
its relation to the environment even if we do not change the state of the object
itself. If you rotate an apple in your hand we change its relation to the back-
ground we see behind the apple even if the internal state of the apple remains
the same. If there were no such background, and you were not there holdning
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Figure 3.80: Symmetry transformations of an object O. The object O′ belongs
to its environment ΩO. a) The final state of O is the same as the initial one, but
the final state of the world is different since it contains memories of intermediate
rotations. b) A marker dot in O makes it possible to decide that a rotation has
taken place. c) A marker dot in O′ makes it possible to decide that a rotation
has taken place.
it, it would be impossible to tell whether the apple has actually been rotated.
The operation would be a redundancy transformation.
Let us try to distinguish symmetry transformations T that act on object
states, as opposed to redundancy transformations R acting on such states. In
a symmetry transformation, something stays the same while something else
knowably changes. In a redundancy transformation, nothing knowably changes.
The only thing that changes is the representation of the object state.
More precisely, in a symmetry transformation something in the relation be-
tween the object and the environment stays the same, while something else in
this relation changes. (The object itself, seen in isolation, does not change.)
To have one thing in the object-environment relation changing and another re-
maining the same, either the object O or the environment ΩO must have two
parts that react differently to the transformation.
This reasoning is exemplified in Fig. 3.80. The object we transform is
O, whereas object O′ belongs to the environment; O′ ⊂ ΩO. In panel a) we
rotate O in three consequtive steps (40◦ each time) to finally find it back in
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Figure 3.81: Redundancy transformations of an object O. a) The state of
O does not change when it is rotated 120◦ in a single transformation. The
environment, as represented by the object O′, also stays the same, as well as
the relation between O and O′. No temporal update n→ n+ 1 can be defined.
b) Even if we introduce a marker in O, nothing knowably changes if the relation
between the environment and this marker is invariant under the transformation.
its original position. In this case it is the environment that has two parts that
react differently to the symmetry transformation. Object O′ stays the same
throughout the process, but there have also appeared new objects O′′ and O′′′
at time n+3 in the form of memories of the intermediate steps at time n+1 and
n+2. The existence of these objects makes the state S(n+3) different from the
state S(n). This is so even though SO(n + 3) = SO(n), SO′(n + 3) = SO′(n),
and the relation between O and O′ is the same. Note that if memories were not
formed, or the relation between O and O′ in the intermediate steps where not
knowably different than at the beginning and in the end, then the transformation
would be reduced to a redundancy transformation.
In Fig. 3.80(b) we give an example of the opposite situation, in which it
is the object O itself that has two parts that react differently to the transfor-
mation, rather than the environment. Here, O consists of the triangle contour
together with the black dot, which acts as a marker when O is rotated 120◦ in a
single transformation. The relation between the triangle and the environmental
object O′ does not change, but the relation between the marker and O′ does. If
the marker were removed, nothing would knowably change, and the symmetry
transformation would reduce to a redundancy transformation.
This fact can also be expressed as follows. If the marker were removed, the
transformation would not define a temporal update n → n + 1, since such up-
dates are defined by the appearance of a knowable change. This observation
further strengthens the picture that redundancy transformations are ‘unphysi-
cal’.
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Figure 3.82: Mirror symmetry. The parity-breaking parts of physical law corre-
sponds to the asymmetric environment O′ in Fig. 3.80, which makes it possible
to decide that something has changed (the position of the marker), while some-
thing else stays the same (the shape of the triangle).
This is illustrated in Fig. 3.81(a), where the arched arrow that indicates
the execution of the transformation is dashed, and we have not labelled the
initial and final states with different sequential times. Figure 3.81(b) shows
another situation in which the symmetry reduces to a redundancy. Here, the
circular environment is invariant with respect to all rotation transformations
T (φ), where φ is the rotation angle. This means that the relation between O
and O′ cannot change for any φ when T is applied to O. Of course, when we
look at the picture we can indeed see a change, but this is only because we
perceive additional environmental objects O′′, O′′′, . . ., which are not invariant
with respect to all rotations. We need only mention the text and drawings that
surround O and O′, and the frame of the paper (or the computer screen) on
which we look at the figure.
At this point it should be noted that a symmetry transformation T that acts
on an object can be equivalently described as a symmetry transformation that
acts on the environment ΩO ‘in the opposite direction’. We may denote this
transformation T−1. We may therefore say that a necessary condition for T
to be a symmetry transformation is that the environment is not invariant with
respect to T .
The possibility to let the object and the environment change roles in the
transformation is highlighted in Fig. 3.80(c). Here the ‘marker dot’ is moved
from the object to the environment, from O to O′. In this case any rotation T (φ)
becomes a symmetry transformation since the circular environmental object O′
is invariant to any inverse rotation T−1(φ)ΩO or T−1(φ)O′. The role of the
marker is to make the rotation angle −φ of the circle knowable. The symmetry
of the circle would reduce to a redundancy if the marker were removed. This
symmetry belongs to the same class as that in Fig. 3.80(a) in the sense that
the environment has two parts, one which changes its relation to O, whereas
the other does not. The changing parts of the environment in Figs. 3.80(a)
and 3.80(c) are the appearing memories of intermediate steps and the marker,
respectively.
Let us discuss the peculiar case of mirror symmetry in the context of the
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environment not being invariant to T . As discussed in section 3.9, parity break-
ing physical law is necessary to even define parity or mirror transformations M .
This means that the environment ΩO to any object O is inherently asymmetric
with respect to M . The state MSΩO is different from SΩO since the parity
breaking weak force causes them to evlove differently. To be able to evolve dif-
ferently, the states themselves have to be different, according to our definition
of the evolution operator u1. Even more, this asymmetry holds for any object
O′ ⊂ ΩO. We may say that all background objects are asymmetric with respect
to M just like the object O′ in Figs. 3.80 and 3.81(a).
Assume that we apply M to an object O (Fig. 3.82). Since the background
itself is mirror-asymmetric, we do not need to show any particular background
object O′ in Fig. 3.82 as a point of reference. Recall that in a symmetry
transformation T of an object O, either O or ΩO have to contain two parts that
react differently to T . One part remains the same and the other changes. We
have just argued that all background objects O′ ⊂ ΩO reacts in the same way
to a mirror symmetry M . Therefore, to make M a symmetry transformation,
O itself has to contain two parts that react differently to M . That is, it has to
contain a ‘marker’, just as in Fig. 3.80(b).
Statement 3.121 (Mirror symmetry). The fact that physical law is parity
breaking makes it possible for mirror transformations M to be symmetry trans-
formations.
Let us formalize the discussion about symmetry transformations.
Definition 3.71 (Symmetry transformation T ). Let T be a transformation
that is an evolution operator um for some state S and some m ≥ 1. Then
S(n+m) = TS(n) 6= S(n). Suppose that there is such a state S which contains
an object O with complement ΩO so that TSO = SO. Then T is a symmetry
transformation if and only if at least one of the following conditions is fulfilled.
1. T gives rise to a new object O′′ ⊂ ΩO such that TΩO 6= ΩO, but TSO ∩
(TSΩO )/SO′′ = SO ∩ SΩO .
2. There are two objects OA ⊆ O and OB ⊆ O such that T (SOA ∩ ΩO) =
SOA ∩ ΩO whereas T (SOB ∩ ΩO) 6= SOB ∩ ΩO.
3. There are two objects O′A ⊂ ΩO and O′B ⊂ ΩO such that T (SO ∩ SO′A) =
SO ∩ SO′A whereas T (SO ∩ SO′B ) 6= SO ∩ SO′B .
The first condition corresponds to the symmetry transformation shown in
Fig. 3.80(a), the second condition corresponds to Fig. 3.80(b), and the third to
Fig. 3.80(c).
As indicated above, we may split the three cases into two classes in two
different ways. Cases 1. and 3. belong to the same class in the sense that it
is the environment that has two parts, one of which canges its relation to the
transformed object whereas the other does not. Cases 2. and 3. belong to the
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same class in the sense that one turns into the other if we let the object and the
environment change roles.
If we have TSO = SO, but none of the three conditions are fulfilled and
and we have TS = S, then, of course, the symmetry reduces to a redundancy.
Such a redundancy would apply to an object rather than the entire world. Like
any redundancy, such an object redundancy transformation means that the
representation of the state changes, but not the state itself.
If we have a representation S¯ of a state which contains an object O. We
may write
S¯ = S¯(S¯O, S¯ΩO , PKR, PKC), (3.381)
where PKR and PKC represent the potential knowledge about the relations and
the conditions, respectively, that link O to its environment (see the discussion
in relation to Statement 2.2).
We use this notation to formalize the idea of an object redundancy.
Definition 3.72 (Object redundancy transformation RO). Consider a
transformation RO such that S¯O ↪→ SO ⇒ ROS¯O ↪→ SO. Then RO is an ob-
ject redundancy transformation if and only if S¯(S¯O, S¯ΩO , PKR, PKC) ↪→ S ⇒
S¯(ROS¯O, S¯ΩO , ROPKR, ROPKC) ↪→ S.
If the last sufficient and necessary condition is not fulfilled, then RO may
or may not represent a symmetry transformation T . Note again the difference
between ‘physical’ and ’unphysical’ transformations. To define a physical sym-
metry transformation T , we let it act directly on a physical object state SO. To
define an object redundancy transformation RO, we have to let it act on the
representation S¯O of the object state, since nothing physical changes.
Let us discuss some concrete examples of object redundancies and (object)
symmetries.
Suppose that an electron moves within an infinite, perfect lattice of atoms.
If we let it move exactly one lattice spacing, then the operation corresponds to
an object redundancy transformation RO. The translation does not change the
state of the electron O, so that S¯O ↪→ SO ⇒ ROS¯O ↪→ SO. Nothing knowably
changes in the overall state of the lattice with the moving electron, so that
S¯(S¯O, S¯ΩO , PKR, PKC) ↪→ S ⇒ S¯(ROS¯O, S¯ΩO , ROPKR, ROPKC) ↪→ S.
In this case RO corresponds to a transformation x→ x+xL of the spatial co-
ordinates of the electron, without making the same transformation of the lattice
coordinates. If we did make such an overall coordinate change, we would have a
redundancy transformation R rather than an object redundancy transformation
RO.
If the transformation x→ x + xL does not take the electron to an identical
position in another lattice cell, then S¯(ROS¯O) ↪→ S′ 6= S. We have induced a
physical change. This physical transformation is not a symmetry transforma-
tion, however.
The movement of the electron to an identical lattice position in a the lattice
becomes a symmetry transformation if there are other (finite) objects in the
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environment than the lattice. Then one aspect of the relation between the
electron and the environment stays the same (the position of the electron in
relation to the lattice), whereas another aspect changes (the position of the
electron in relation to the other objects). We have a symmetry of the type
shown in Fig. 3.80(c), where the circle O′ corresponds to the lattice, and the
marker dot to the other environmenal objects. Formally speaking, condition 3
in Definition 3.71 is fulfilled.
The rotation of an atom with a spherically symmetric electron distribution
is clearly an object redundancy transformation. Nothing knowably changes in
the relation between the object and its environment. If the electron distribution
is not spherically symmetric, then we get a physical transformation that is not
a symmetry transformation if we let it rotate an arbitrary angle along an axis
that is not a symmetry axis of the electron cloud. If we let the atom rotate 360◦
around such an axis in a gradual way, we get a symmetry transformation of the
type shown in Fig. 3.80(a). Formally, condition 1 in Definition 3.71 is fulfilled.
Since rotations of spherically symmetric objects are always (object) redun-
dancies, we may use explicit epistemic minimalism (Assumption 1.19) to con-
clude that such states cannot have any angular momentum. Physical law cannot
allow any angular momentum since there is no way to distinguish different values
of this attribute.
Statement 3.122 (Spherical symmetry implies zero angular momen-
tum). Any object whose state is invariant under all rotations has zero angular
momentum.
Physical law is invariant under object redundancy transformations, of course.
Formally,
u¯1S¯(S¯O, S¯ΩO , PKR, PKC) ↪→ u1S(SO, SΩO , PKR, PKC)
⇓
u¯1S¯(ROS¯O, S¯ΩO , ROPKR, ROPKC) ↪→ u1S(SO, SΩO , PKR, PKC).
(3.382)
In contrast, physical law is never invariant under symmetry transformations,
in the sense that the evolution of O, as well as of the environment ΩO, will be
different after the transformation T . Even if TSO = SO and TSΩO = SΩO
the evolution of these two parts of the world will be different since they are
part of the same world and their interactions depend on their relation, which
knowably changes under T . If no part of the relation would change, we would
have anobject redundancy rather than a symmetry. We may write
u1S(SO, SΩO , PKR, PKC) 6= u1S(TSO, SΩO , TPKR, TPKC) (3.383)
in a notation that should be self-explanatory, given the corresponding nota-
tion above for the mathematical representation of the states and the potential
knowledge.
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Evidently, the unavoidable relation between object O and its environment
is the reason for the inequality in the above equation (Statement 2.2). In the
idealized situation where O is isolated (Definition 2.7) we may write
u1S(SO, SΩO ) = S(u1SO, u1SΩO ). (3.384)
This is the approximation often made in scientific experiments. We want to
isolate the observed object O as much as possible from outside perturbations.
Ideally, the reaction of the specimen OS to a manipulation of the experimenter
OB is a function of the state SO only (Fig 3.15).
If Eq. [3.384] is fulfilled, then physical law is, in fact, invariant under sym-
metry transformations T . We may trivially write
u1S(SO, SΩO ) = u1S(TSO, SΩO ), (3.385)
since TSO = SO. This equation may be approximately fulfilled in carefully
designed experiments.
If we can isolate an experiment, then we have to get the same results in any
environment, for example in any spatial surroundings. This can be interpreted
as a statement about the homogeneity and isotropy of space. However, such
language is misplaced in an epistemic approach, in which space should not be
given any properties in itself.
Statement 3.123 (Space is homogeneous and isotropic). If an experi-
mental context C including the body of an observer OB and an observed object
O, with given states SOB and SO, can be isolated from the environment at two
different locations, then the expected outcome of the context is the same at these
two locations. This means that the relative volume v[S˜j ] of each future alterna-
tive S˜j is the same.
This is merely a tautology from the epistemic point of view, since the two lo-
cations are nothing more than two different environments, and we have assumed
that the system is isolated from the environment. One might try to escape the
tautological nature of the conclusion by formulating a practical version of State-
ment 3.123: the expected outcome is almost the same at the two locations if
the experimental context can be almost isolated at both places. However, there
is no way to define the meaning of the phrase ‘almost isolated’ other than to
refer to ‘almost the same outcome’ or ‘almost the same evolution’. That is, we
may say that SO is almost isolated from ΩO if and only if the evolution of SO is
almost the same regardless SΩs in the sense of Eq. [3.384]. We are stuck with
the tautology.
3.13 The gauge principle
The gauge principle is often expressed in the following way. Suppose that the
mathematical description of a physical system contains redundant degrees of
freedom, which do not correspond to different physical states. Then, in a proper
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description, there have to be global transformations associated with these re-
dundancies, which leave the form of the equations invariant. That these trans-
formations are global means that they affect all parts of the system in the same
way.
Suppose that we require that the form of the equations should also be invari-
ant under the corresponding local transformations. That the transformations
are local means that they may affect each part of the system individually. To
achieve such local invariance, an additional term must be introduced in the
equations, which absorbs the change introduced by the local transformation.
This term can be interpreted as an interaction between the parts of the system.
All known interactions in nature can be interpreted in this way.
In this section, we want to express these ideas as clearly as possible in terms
of the concepts we have previously introduced, in particular those discussed in
the preceding section 3.12. We also want to motivate from the epistemic point
of view why we must require invariance under a local symmetry transformation
whenever there is a corresponding global symmetry. In other words, we want to
motivate why gauge forces are inevitable in any mathematical representation of
physical law that contains redundancies.
Let us first return to Einstein’s elevator, discussed in relation to Fig. 1.14.
Let S be the physical state that corresponds to the state of knowledge where
we have no idea what is outside the elevator [Fig. 3.83(a)]. Further, let S1 be
the union of all physical states where the elevator is accelerating through space
without any gravitating body in sight. Correspondingly, let S2 be the union
of all states where the elevator is instead standing on such a body. We should
also consider states where the perceptions inside the elevator are the result of a
combination of acceleration and gravitation. Let us denote by S3 the union of
all possible such states. We clearly have
S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3, (3.386)
as illustrated in [Fig. 3.83(b)]. Clearly, these alternatives are mutually exclusive,
so that Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i 6= j.
According to epistemic invariance (Assumptions 1.17 and 2.4), the evolution
of the elevator in these three alternative external worlds should be consistent
with the evolution of the state S, in which we have no knowledge at all about
the external world. This condition implies that evolution is linear (Statement
2.14):
u1S = u1S1 ∪ u1S2 ∪ u1S3. (3.387)
This is Einstein’s equivalence principle.
Let us now choose particular mathematical representations of the evolution
operator and the involved states. We may then write
S¯ = S¯1 + S¯2 + S¯3, (3.388)
and
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Figure 3.83: Einstein’s elevator revisited (compare Fig. 1.14). a) The state
S corresponds to the absense of knowledge about the outside. In the state of
expanded knowledge S1, the elevator is accelerating in empty space. In the
state S2 it is standing on a gravitating body. To make the list of alternatives
complete, we add a state S3 where the perceptions inside the elevator are due
to a combination of acceleration and gravity. b) Einstein’s equivalence principle
corresponds to the linearity of the evolution.
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u¯1S¯ = u¯1S¯1 + u¯1S¯2 + u¯1S¯3, (3.389)
according to the general recipe in which we formally translate unions of sets
in state space to addition of mathematical representations in algebraic space
(Table 3.2).
We have R−1u¯1R = u1 for any redundancy transformation R according to
Statement 3.120, provided u¯1 is a ‘proper’ or ‘generally valid’ representation
of the evolution u1. Speaking about Einstein, it is natural to use the Lorentz
transformation L(v) as an example. Say that the elevator is set to move with
speed v relative its original state of motion. From inside the elevator it will be
impossible to decide whether anything has changed, since the apparent speed
of light is the same due to Lorentz invariance. Therefore L(v) is a redundancy
transformation when applied to S¯:
S¯ ↪→ S ⇒ L(v)S¯ ↪→ S. (3.390)
We may apply the same reasoning to representations of the states S1, S2, or
S3. In the first case we describe the accelerating elevator and all the surrounding
objects (such as the star indicated in Fig. 3.83(a)) with a set of spatio-temporal
coordinates in a representation S¯1. If we apply a Lorentz transformation L(v1)
to such a representation, we may write
S¯1 ↪→ S1 ⇒ L(v1)S¯1 ↪→ S1, (3.391)
just as we did for the representation of the ‘entire’ state S¯ in Eq. [3.390]. Note
that in both cases, the Lorentz redundancy transformation is global in the sense
that we apply it to all objects in the corresponding state. In the case of S¯, all
objects within the elevator are set to move with velocity v. In the case of S¯1,
the star, the elevator, and all the objects within it, are set to move with velocity
v1.
Consider the transformed representation
L(v1,v2,v3)S¯ ≡ L(v1)S¯1 + L(v2)S¯2 + L(v3)S¯3. (3.392)
Since each term L(vj)S¯j on the right hand side represents the corresponding
alternative Sj , we clearly have
S¯ ↪→ S ⇒ L(v1,v2,v3)S¯ ↪→ S. (3.393)
Also, since each L(vj) is a redundancy transformation and u¯ is assumed to
be a proper evolution representation, Statement 3.120 implies
u¯1L(v1,v2,v3)S¯ ≡ u¯1L(v1)S¯1 + u¯1L(v2)S¯2 + u¯1L(v3)S¯3
= L(v1)u¯1S¯1 + L(v2)u¯1S¯2 + L(v3)u¯1S¯3
≡ L(v1,v2,v3)u¯1S¯.
(3.394)
That is,
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[L(v1,v2,v3), u¯1] = 0. (3.395)
This is an example of the gauge principle. We can choose the velocity vj in
the Lorentz transformation of each alternative state representation S¯j indepen-
dently. The above commutator should still be zero. We are not restricted to
the common choice v = v1 = v2 = v3 that corresponds to
[L(v), u¯1] = 0. (3.396)
Equation [3.395] can be regarded as a condition that further restricts the
possible forms a proper evolution representation u¯1 can have. It must fulfil Eq.
[3.395] for any division of S into realizable alternative states {Sj}, and for any
set of velocities {vj} that specifies a set of independent Lorentz transformations.
The basic reason for this is the assumed epistemic invariance. If we can do
a redundancy transformation of a state representation S¯ without affecting the
evolution, we should be able to do it on the representation S¯′ of any specific
part S′ ⊂ S of this state, since this part can be seen as a state in its own right,
regardless the surrounding parts S \ S′ (Fig. 3.84). The evolution of a part of
the state should be consistent with the evolution of the whole state. Therefore,
if the evolution representation is unaffected by a redundancy transformation R
applied to S¯, it should be unaffected by any redundancy transformation applied
specifically to S¯′.
The only requirement is that Sj is a realizable alternative, so that the evo-
lution u1 can be applied to it in the first place. In other words, Sj should be
an observable state (Statement 2.12). This exludes redundancy transformations
applied to representations Z¯ of exact states Z.
Let us generalize the example with the Lorentz transformations of Einstein’s
elevator to a general statement of the Gauge principle.
Definition 3.73 (Family of redundancy transformations R(r)). Say that
R is a redundancy transformation of a certain type such that we need to specify
a parameter r in order to define it completely. Let Dr be the domain of values
of r for which R is defined. Then R(r) is a family of redundancy transformation
with domain Dr. The parameter r may be a scalar or a vector.
Apart from the Lorentz transformation where we need to specify the velocity
r = v, we may take as an example a rotation R along a given axis, where we
need to specify one angle r = φ. We have Dvx = Dvy = Dvz = (−c, c), and
Dφ = [0, 2pi).
Definition 3.74 (Proper state partition). The partition S =
⋃M
j=1 Sj is
proper if and only if Sj ∩Sj′ for all j 6= j′, and Sj is an observable state for all
j. An observable state can be defined according to Statement 2.12 as a state to
which the evolution operator u1 can be applied.
Definition 3.75 (Gauge transformation). Let S¯ =
∑M
j=1 S¯j be a represen-
tation of a proper state partition. Further, let R(rj) be a redundancy transfor-
mation in a family R(r), where rj ∈ Dr. Then R(r1, . . . , rM )S¯ ≡
∑M
j=1R(rj)S¯j
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Figure 3.84: Schematic illustration of the idea behind the Gauge principle. If we
can make a redundancy transformation R of the state representation S¯ without
affecting its evolution representation u¯1, we should be able to do the same on
the representation S¯′ of any specific part S′ ⊂ S of the original state S, leaving
the representation of the other parts S \S′ of S unchanged. See text for further
explanation.
is a gauge transformation. The gauge transformation is defined for any array
of parameters R(r1, . . . , rM ) such that rj ∈ Dr for each j.
Note that any gauge transformation is a redundancy transformation. This
is a direct generalization of Eq. [3.393].
The following statement generalizes Eq. [3.395].
Statement 3.124 (The gauge principle). For any gauge transformation
R(r1, . . . , rM ), and for any proper evolution representation u¯1 (Definition 3.70),
we have [R(r1, . . . , rM ), u¯1] = 0.
z
The discussion of the gauge principle so far may seem a bit abstract. To recast
it in more familiar terms, let us consider how it can be applied in experimental
contexts C in which a wave function Ψ is defined. (To make the notation familiar
and simple, we write Ψ(p, σ) in this section, even though a general wave function
is denoted aP (pj , σ) in section 3.4.7.)
Definition 3.76 (The field Φ). The field Φ is a representation of the potential
knowledge at initial time n about the complement ΩOS to the observed specimen
OS in an experimental context C, and of those attributes of OS that are not
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Figure 3.85: Elaborated version of Fig. 3.15, showing the necessary parts of
an experimental setup. OS is the observed specimen, and OA is the apparatus
used to measure the value p of the observed property P . The observer OB
is required to define alternative outcomes, and is thus necessary to define the
wave function Ψ(p, σ). The choice to observe property P , rather than another
property P ′, may be described as the choice to observe a certain aspect or part
of OS (smaller circle inside OS). This requires an interaction between this part
and the apparatus (double arrow). The other parts of OS that are not observed
may influence the probabilities |Ψ(p, σ)|2 of different values p of P in a way that
depends on the evolution parameter σ. These influences are modelled by the
field Φ(p, σ).
observed within context. Specifically, it is a representation of the part of this
knowledge that affects the evolution of OS in a way that depends on σ.
Figure 3.15 shows the schematic division of an experimental setup into the
specimen OS, the apparatus OA, and the body OB of the observer. This picture
is elaborated in Fig. 3.85. In an idealized context C, the experimental setup
is isolated from the environment, and the initial states SOA(n) and SOB(n) are
chosen so that the influence of the apparatus and the observer does not depend
on σ. In that case, we just need to include in Φ the potential knowledge at time
n of those attributes of the specimen OS that are not observed within context.
In the terminology of Fig. 3.15, the object O is the specimen OS together
with the apparatus OA. We may represent the state of this object as follows:
S¯O(σ) =
[
Ψ(p, σ)
Φ(σ)
]
, (3.397)
where Ψ is the wave function that describes the possible observed property
values p of the specimen. It is necessary to include both the specimen and
the apparatus in this representation, since the set of alternative outcomes that
define the wave function Ψ depends on the state of the apparatus.
The two parts of this state representation can ‘trade content’ with each
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other. Referring to section 3.4.9, a specimen with a given state SOS may be
free in one context, whereas it is interacting in another. In the former case the
field is zero, while it is non-zero in the latter. In general, the evolution can be
expressed as [
Ψ(p, σ)
Φ(p, σ)
]
= u¯1(σ)
[
Ψ(p, 0)
Φ(p, 0)
]
. (3.398)
Note that, in this evolution equation, we let the field depend both on the
value p of the property P that we observe within context, apart from the evo-
lution parameter σ. The field encapsulates the initial knowledge about those
aspects of OS that affect the outcome p of the observation of P . The way these
aspect affect the outcome depends on the actual outcome p. If we toss a ball
so that it bounces down along stony slope, the way in which the topography
of the slope affects the course of the ball depends on which course it actually
takes. This may not be known until its position p at the bottom of the slope is
observed.
In contrast to the conventional understanding of fields, Φ is only defined
within a context C, just like the wave function Ψ. It does not exist per se.
From the epistemic perspective it is meaningless metaphysical baggage to say
that there are fields floating around in the universe when we do not perform
any experiments that are affected by these fields. They just represent those
environmental attributes known at the start of the experiment that affect the
probabilities for different outcomes, as collected in Ψ. These environmental
attributes are not themselves observed within context. Therefore the knowledge
about them is not updated during the course of the experiment.
Another way to put it is to recall from section 3.4.7 that the evolution of
Ψ with respect to σ does not correspond to an actual history of the specimen
between the initial time n and the time of observation n + m. It is just a
parametrization of a family of experiments C(σ) in which different relational
times t are expected to pass between the start and the end of the experiment.
In the same way, the interplay between the wave function and the field in the
evolution equation 3.398 does not represent an actual, continuous interaction.
It all comes down to the basic fact that physical law does not say anything
about what happens in between the observations at times n and n+ 1. It just
provides the operator u1 that maps the system from time n to time n + 1.
Everything is fixed when the experiment set sails. To model an actual influence
from the environment (the field) on the evolution of the observed attribute P
of the specimen between the times n and n+ 1 is therefore inappropriate, or at
least unnecessary.
Formally, we may write u¯1(σ) = exp(A¯σ), so that we can recast Eq. [3.398]
in the differential form
d
dσ
[
Ψ(p, σ)
Φ(p, σ)
]
= A¯
[
Ψ(p, σ)
Φ(p, σ)
]
. (3.399)
Comparing with Eqs. [3.183] and [3.184], we see that
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A¯
[
Ψ
Φ
]
≡
[
A¯ΨΨ
A¯ΦΦ
]
=
[
iB¯PΨ
A¯ΦΦ
]
. (3.400)
It does not make sense to let the evolution of Φ depend on Ψ in the second
component of the right hand side of the above equation. The probabilities for
different outcomes is a function of the field, but not vice versa. This is the role
we have given to the field by definition. Therefore we can always write
B¯P = B¯P (Φ)
A¯Φ 6= A¯Φ(Ψ). (3.401)
Consider a context in which the spatio-temporal position (and spin) is ob-
served. Since the differential evolution operator B¯r4s can always be written
B¯r4s = −b+ B¯(int)r4s according to Eq. [3.247], we may identify
Φ = B¯(int)r4s (3.402)
so that
B¯r4s(Φ) = −b+ Φ. (3.403)
For such contexts we therefore have
d
dσ
[
Ψ(p, σ)
Φ(p, σ)
]
=
[ −ib(+ Φ(p, σ))Ψ(p, σ)
A¯ΦΦ(p, σ)
]
. (3.404)
We may equally well use Definition 3.51 to write
B¯r4s =
b
~2
((p4)
(0)
r4 + (p4)
(int)
r4 )
2, (3.405)
where (p4)
(0)
r4 = −i~(∂/∂r1, . . . , ∂/∂r4), so that another valid representation of
the field Φ is
Φ′ = (p4)(int)r4 . (3.406)
Then the evolution equation [3.404] transforms to
d
dσ
[
Ψ(p, σ)
Φ′(p, σ)
]
=
[
ib
~2 ((p4)
(0)
r4 + Φ
′(p, σ))2Ψ(p, σ)
A¯′ΦΦ
′(p, σ)
]
. (3.407)
In general, the field Φ must be described as an operator. Sometimes it can
be described as a function of the evolution parameter σ and the attribute value
p that is observed within context. If the field representation Φ′ in Eq. 3.407
is a function, we can identify it with the electro-magnetic or the gravitational
potential.
Consider a proper partition of the initial state SO(n) of a context C into a
set of states Sj(n) (Definition 3.74). Let the partition be such that it divides SO
of the wave function exactly along those lines that defines the set of property
values {pk} that can be observed within context. In this way we know that the
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Figure 3.86: A state SO that corresponds to an experimental context C in which
property P is observed. The probability of each value p is encoded in a wave
function Ψ(p) with domain D = {p1, . . . , p9}. A partition of SO into states
Sj which corresponds to contexts Cj . The probabilities of each value in these
contexts are encoded in wave functions Ψj(p) with domains D1 = {p1, p2, p3},
D2 = {p4, p5} and D1 = {p6, . . . , p9}. We have Ψj(p) = νjΨ(p) whenever
p ∈ Dj , where the normalization constant ν is given in Eq. [3.408]. Compare
Fig. 3.83.
partition is proper, since each value pk corresponds to an observable state, by
the definition of a wave function. Thus we know that the evolution operator u1
can be applied to each state Sj . Such a partitioned initial state means that we
have defined a new experimental context Cj .
Further, assume that for each state Sj(n) of increased initial knowledge,
nothing is knowably changed in the experimental arrangement, as compared to
SO(n). The only change is an increase in the knowledge about the initial state
of the specimen OS. Some alternative outcomes pk are ruled out right from the
start. The domain D of the wave function shrinks to Dj ⊂ D. This means that
the state space volumes V [pk] of those alternatives that are still possible is the
same in each context Cj as in the original context C. We may therefore define
a partitioned wave function Ψj(p) such that
Ψj(p) =
V [SO]
V [Sj ]
Ψ(p), ∀p ∈ Dj , (3.408)
The real constant V [SO]/V [Sj ] is needed to keep Ψj normalized.
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Definition 3.77 (Neutral context partition). Consider a context C in which
property P is observed. Let D be the domain of the wave function. Suppose that
we increase the initial state of potential knowledge PKOS(n) about the specimen
OS in such a way that only a subset Dj ⊂ D of the property values p ∈ D are
now possible to see in C at time n+m. There is no other change of PKOS(n),
no change of PKOA(n), and no change of the potential knowledge that relates
OS, the apparatus OA and the body OB of the observer. These prescriptions
define a new context Cj. A set {C1, C2, . . . , CM} of such contexts is a netural
partition of C if and only if D =
⋃M
j Dj.
Let us apply an object redundancy transformation RO (Definition 3.72) to a
representation S¯O of the state SO that corresponds to the experimental context
C. Say that we have defined a neutral partition {C1, . . . , CM} of C. Suppose
that RO belongs to a family RO(r) according to Definition 3.73. The gauge
principle (Statement 3.395), together with Eqs. [3.397] and [3.398], makes it
possible to write
RO(r1, . . . , rM )
[
Ψ(p, σ)
Φ(p, σ)
]
= u¯1(σ)RO(r1, . . . , rM )
[
Ψ(p, 0)
Φ(p, 0)
]
=
∑M
j=1 u¯1(σ)RO(rj)
[
Ψj(p, 0)
Φj(p, 0)
]
=
∑M
j=1 u¯1(σ)
[
RΨ(rj)Ψj(p, 0)
RΦ(rj)Φj(p, 0)
]
(3.409)
The second line follows because S¯j = [Ψj(p, 0),Φj(p, 0)]
T is a representation of
Sj (compare Eq. [3.394]). We write Φj rather than Φ in this representation
since it is only necessary to consider those parts of the field that affect the
reduced set of possible values p ∈ Dj .
What does Eq. [3.409] say? We assume that RO is a redundancy transfor-
mation in the sense that RO[Ψ(p, 0),Φ(p, 0)] represents the same experimental
setup as [Ψ(p, 0),Φ(p, 0)]. Then the equation says that we can break up the
domain D of Ψ (and Φ) into pieces in whatever way we like, apply RO with an
individual parameter choice RO(rj) for each piece, and the collection of ‘trans-
formed pieces’ still represents the same experimental setup.
Having performed this partition, we may glue the transformed pieces to-
gether again, forming an overall transformed wave functionRΨ(r1, . . . , rM )Ψ(p, 0).
Recall that the piecewise wave functions Ψj are normalized individually accord-
ing to Eq. [3.408], so that the bare sum
∑M
j=1RΨ(rj)Ψj is not a normalized
transformed wave function defined in the entire domain D =
⋃
Dj . This is
merely a technicality, and we can regain the proper normalization if we replace
Ψj(p) with Ψ(p ∈ Dj), where the latter expression is understood as the piece of
an overall wave function defined in Dj (Eq. [3.408]). In this way each individ-
ual state representation S¯j we glue together obtains the appropriate weight in
3.13. THE GAUGE PRINCIPLE 417
Figure 3.87: The gauge principle for wave functions. Here we consider a context
C described by Ψ in which the position r4 is observed. We may choose an
arbitrary piece of the spatio-temporal domain D, cut it out and treat it as the
initial state of another context C1. We may perform an overall change of phase of
the corresponding wave function Ψ1. Since this is a redundancy transformation,
we can glue the transformed piece back into Ψ. Compare Fig. 3.84.
terms of relative state space volume (contemplate Fig. 3.86). These considera-
tions amount to the statement
RO(r1, . . . , rM )
[
Ψ(p, σ)
Φ(p, σ)
]
=
∑M
j=1 u¯1(σ)
[
RΨ(rj)Ψ(p, 0)
RΦ(rj)Φ(p ∈ Dj , 0)
]
≡ u¯1(σ)
[
RΨ(r1 . . . , rM )Ψ(p, 0)
RΦ(r1, . . . , rM )Φ(p, 0)
]
(3.410)
The second row merely defines a short-hand notation for the expression in
the first row. In this notation, the technical, somewhat pedantic, discussion
in the preceding paragraphs just motivates the movement of the redundancy
transformations inside the square bracket: RO(r1, . . . , rM )[Ψ(p, 0),Φ(p, 0)]
T =
[RΨ(r1, . . . , rM )Ψ(p, 0), RΦ(r1, . . . , rM )Φ(p, 0)]
T . Note also that the normaliza-
tion problem does not apply to the field Φ, so that we gladly exchange Φj(p)
with Φ(p ∈ Dj) in the gluing together of the pieces.
A simple illustration of the process is given in Fig. 3.87. We first break
up the domain D in two parts, look at the pieces as two independent states of
the experimental setup, apply a phase transformation to one piece, and then
glue the pieces together again. In this example, the redundancy transformation
is chosen to be an overall change of phase of one of the two individual wave
functions Ψj .
Let us consider a neutral context partition {C1, . . . , CM} such that each
state Sj corresponds to exactly one property value pj . In the example shown in
Fig. 3.86 this means that S1 is the part of SO that defines property value p1,
S2 is the part that defines p2, and so on. In short, Sj ↔ pj . Then we may write
RO(rj) = G(r(pj)). (3.411)
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We may spell out the meaning of G(r(pj)) as a gauge transformation G that is
specified by a parameter r, the value of which depends on the property value
pj . In this notation, and for a context partition such that Sj ↔ pj , we may
rewrite Eq. [3.410] as[
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, σ)
GΦ(r(p))Φ(p, σ)
]
= u¯1(σ)
[
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, 0)
GΦ(r(p))Φ(p, 0)
]
. (3.412)
Here, the meaning is that for each p ∈ D, the Gauge transformation G is
performed, as specified by the parameter r(p) that can be independently chosen
for each p. The differential form of Eq. [3.412] is
d
dσ
[
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, σ)
GΦ(r(p))Φ(p, σ)
]
= A¯
[
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, σ)
GΦ(r(p))Φ(p, σ)
]
. (3.413)
This can be seen as a generalization of Eq. [3.399], which corresponds to the
case G(r(p)) = I.
For contexts in which the sptio-temporal position r4 is observed, we may
choose one of the expressions [3.402] or [3.406] of the field to narrow down
the form of the evolution equation further. The most common choice is Φ =
(p4)
(int)
r . Adopting this field representation we get
d
dσ
[
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, σ)
GΦ(r(p))Φ(p, σ)
]
=
=
[
ib
~2
(
(p4)
(0)
r +GΦ(r(p))Φ(p, σ)
)2
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, σ)
A¯ΦGΦ(r(p))Φ(p, σ)
]
.
(3.414)
with (p4)
(0)
r = −i~(∂/∂r1, . . . , ∂/∂r4). To avoid cluttered notation, we have
kept the general property value symbol p in Eq. [3.414], keeping in mind that
p = (r4, s), where s is the spin. If the field is ‘static’ in the sense that it does
not depend on the evolution parameter σ, we get
d
dσ
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, σ) =
ib
~2
(
(p4)
(0)
r +GΦ(r(p))Φ(p)
)2
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, σ).
(3.415)
The parameter r that specifies the gauge transformation must somehow be
present in the wave function. It may correspond to a property value that de-
scribes the specimen, but it may also be an abstract parameter that appears in
the state representation.
An example of the latter case is when r is chosen to be the phase θ of
the complex amplitudes in the wave function of a context in which the spatio-
temporal position r4 is observed (Fig. 3.87). Then
GΨ(θ(r4))Ψ = e
iθ(r4)Ψ
GΦ(θ(r4))Φ = Φ− ~
(
∂θ
∂r1
, . . . , ∂θ∂r4
)
,
(3.416)
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and Eq. [3.415] expresses the gauge invariance of the evolution equation of an
object moving in the electromagnetic potential Φ(r4). In other words, we have
demonstrated that the electromagnetic interaction follows from the fact that
exp(iθ) is a redundancy transformation when applied to a spatio-temporal wave
function: [
Ψr4
Φ
]
↪→ SO ⇒
[
eiθΨr4
Φ
]
↪→ SO (3.417)
for any constant θ ∈ [0, 2pi). This is a conventional line of reasoning, of course.
The new thing is that we have used epistemic invariance to motivate why we are
allowed to take the step from a ‘global’ redundancy transformation to a ‘local’
gauge transformation.
Statement 3.125 (The gauge principle for wave functions). Let C(σ) be
a family of contexts in which property P is observed, and let O be the specimen
OS together with the apparatus OA. Suppose that S¯O = [Ψ(p),Φ(p)]
T ↪→ SO,
and that S¯O = S¯O(r) depends on the parameter r in such a way that RO(r) is
a family of object redundancy transformations. Then [u¯1(σ), G(r(p))] = 0 for
any ‘appropriate’ function r(p), where G(r(p))S¯O ≡ [GΨ(r(p))Ψ, GΦ(r(p))Φ]T .
The meaning of the operators GΨ(r(p)) and GΦ(r(p)) is defined in relation to
Eq. [3.412].
Note that G(r(p)) is an object redundancy transformation as well as a gauge
transformation. The operator G(r(p)) is just a special case of a general gauge
transformation according to Definition 3.75, and we argued that all such trans-
formations are redundancy transformations. That is,[
Ψ(p)
Φ(p)
]
↪→ SO ⇒
[
GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p)
GΦ(r(p))Φ(p)
]
↪→ SO. (3.418)
Therefore, the fact that the wave function and the field both changes in a gauge
transformation does not mean that the physical state changes.
We need to elaborate on the vague phrase ‘for any appropriate function r(p)’
in Statement 3.125. If r is an abstract parameter in the state representation,
and the set Dp of allowed property values p is discrete, then r(p) may be any
function r(p) : Dp → Dr. The same is true if r corresponds to a property value,
and Dp is still discrete. If P is a property that can take a continuity of values
p in principle, and we are dealing with an idealized context (Fig. 3.46), then
we can restrict our interest to differentiable functions r(p). This is so since any
meaningful idealized context is constructed as an approximation to an actual
context. These actual contexts always have a finite number of alternatives,
to which a differentiable function r(p) can always be matched in the idealized
approximation.
If r is a property, it may correspond either to a relational or to an internal
attribute, for example color charge. The three possible values of color charge
are cyclic, and a translation of their values r is therefore the same thing as a
rotation. The strong interaction is invariant under such rotations, so that R(r)
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Figure 3.88: A gauge transformation G(r(p)) derived from a family of redun-
dancy transformations RO(r) in which the parameter r is cyclic. It may, for
example, correspond to the phase θ of the wave function Ψ, or the color charge
of the observed part of the specimen. That the gauge symmetry of the evolution
representation u¯1 is ‘local’ means that we can rotate the value of r independently
at each value p that is possible to observe within context. u¯1 stays the same
nevertheless.
is a redundancy transformation. We may therefore perform the corresponding
‘local’ gauge transformation G(r(p)).
The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3.88. Note that an independent rotation
of a cyclic internal attribute r at each possible value p of the observed property
is analogous to the independent rotation of the abstract wave function phase θ
at each such value p.
Note that the term ‘local’ gains its normal meaning only if we let p be the
spatio-temporal position, i.e. p = r4. In other words, saying that a gauge
symmetry is local pressupposes that we are dealing with a context in which r4
is observed.
If r is a property value, it may or may not be observed within context.
Suppose that we are dealing with a context in which both the values r and p
are observed, and that the corresponding properties are simultaneously know-
able. Then we should express the wave function as Ψ(p, r) (Definition 3.30).
The transformed wave function GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p, r) is then typically different than
Ψ(p, r). On the other hand, if the property that has values r is not observed
within context, then the gauge transformation cannot act on Ψ(p), since r is not
a variable that appears in this wave function. We get GΨ(r(p))Ψ(p) = Ψ(p).
The field Φ may depend on the propery value r that defines the gauge trans-
formation even if r is not observed. That is, we typically have GΦ(r(p))Φ(p, r) 6=
Φ(p, r).
A special case occurs when r = p. Then we may write G(r(p)) = G(p′(p)),
where p′ is the transformed value of the property P . We have assumed that the
possible values of any attribute can be ordered (Definition 2.20 and Assumption
2.5). This means that if v2 is found between v1 and v3 in one coordinate system,
this should remain true in any other appropriate coordinate system. Therefore,
a gauge transformation G(p′(p)) cannot be allowed to change this ordering. We
have to require that the function p′(p) is invertible, that it is monotonically
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increasing or decreasing.
Let us discuss the case when r = p = r4. The underlying redundancy
transformation RO(p) may correspond to a spatial translation or rotation of
the entire experimental setup. The derived gauge transformation G(p′(p)) then
becomes a local spatial translation or rotation that is applied independently to
each point r4. The requirement that p
′(p) is invertible means that space-time
can be stretched and compressed in an arbitrary manner, but that it is not
allowed to be folded.
Since we can approximate any invertible function p′(p) in any actual context
(offering a finite number of alternative values pj) by a diffeomorphism in a
corresponding idealized context, we may, without loss of generality, restrict our
interest to those transformations of space-time coordinates that are, indeed,
diffeomorphisms. We arrive a the diffeomorphism-invariance assumed in general
relativity. This is true at least in the idealized description in which space-time
is treated as a continuum.
However, we argued in section 3.8 that there is a smallest distace that can
ever be measuerd, even if we cannot exclude a continuum of larger distances
between unbound objects. On the one hand, this fact validates the restriction
to diffeomorphisms: since we cannot measure arbitrary small distances, it has
no epistemic meaning to speak about cusps and tears in the transformed fabric
of space-time, defined as points at which ddpp
′(p) is not defined. On the other
hand, this fact makes it clear that the treatment of space-time as a continuum
is, indeed, an idealization.
Statement 3.126 (All monotonic coordinate changes are allowed in
gauge transformations). Let C be an actual context in which one of the
values pj in the finite set {pj} is observed. Suppose that r = p in a gauge
transformation G(r(p)), so that we may write G(p′(p)). Then any monotoni-
cally increasing or decreasing function p′j(pj) is ‘appropriate’, in the sense that
[u¯1(σ), G(p
′
j(pj))] = 0 (Statement 3.125).
In the above statement we have presupposed that the attribute p for which
we are allowed to change coordinates (as long as we respect the attribute value
ordering) is a parameter r in a family of redundancy transformations RO(r). Is
this always so? In other words, are coordinate translations p → p + r always
redundancy transformations, for any attribute P?
For relative attributes, like distance and momentum, it is easy to conclude
that this must be so. To fix a symbol, a number, a position, to a single object
in order to describe its relation to another inevitably introduces a redundancy.
It is only the relation between two such symbols that matters.
What about internal attributes? Actually, these are also relational in a sense.
They determine how the object interact with other objects. Electric charge is
one example. To find out its value we have to let another object with a known
charge interact with the first object. If the charges are the same the two objects
repel each other, and if they are different they attract each other. Again, the
value of the charge per se does not matter, what matters is the relation between
the charge values of the two interacting objects.
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Therefore I would like to answer the question affirmatively: yes, attribute
value translations are redundancy transformations for all attributes. If the set of
possible attribute values is compact, this means that they have to be arranged in
a circular manner (Definition 2.21), so that the translation can also be described
as a rotation. This is true for the three color charges, and it may also said to be
true for the two fundamental electric charges. (In the latter case the rotation
degenerats into an interchange.) Note that we have to exclude the zero charge
from these considerations. That is, we should rather say that an object lacks
the attribute charge than saying that the value of its charge is zero.
If all translations indeed are redundancies, we can use the gauge principle to
constrain the form of the evolution operator representation in a specific way for
each attribute. Such a constraint can be seen as an interaction or transformation
(section 3.4.9). This is to say that to each degree of freedom corresponds a gauge
force.
We used the relational nature of all attributes to come to this conclusion. But
to define a relation we need an interaction. Therefore, it would be a satisfying
epistemic closure if the above conclusion holds true. Such a closure would also
mean that all interactions or transformations are possible to derive from the
gauge principle.
It may seem disturbing to be able to derive the laws of nature from redun-
dancies alone. Redundancies are not the real thing - rather the opposite. But
here we mean derivations of mathematical representations of the laws of nature.
In such representations, we cannot do without coordinates. And as soon as we
have coordinates, we have redundancies, as we argued above. Then comes the
gauge principle, and the gauge forces. Therefore there is no arbitrariness in the
use of redundancies to derive equations that describe physical law, even if these
redundancies are unphysical in themselves. The set of attributes defines the
set of possible redundancy transformations; we cannot choose them freely. At
the basic level, we may say that it is from the set of degrees of freedom of our
perceptions that we derive the form of physical law, rather than from the set of
redundancy transformations that follows from any attempt to represent these
degrees of freedom symbolically.
We close this section with a basic observation. It is the finite support of
the wave functions (Fig. 3.37) in the present epistemic approach that makes
it possible to motivate the gauge principle in the way we have done. Only if
supports are typically finite it is possible to cut out any given patch of the wave
function and treat it as the entire wave function in another context. Only then
can a phase change in this patch be treated as a global phase change in the
other context, allowed because because it is a redundancy transformation.
3.14 Entropy
In this section we define the entropy of a state as the logarithm of the state space
volume of this state. The state space volume is given by Definition 2.43. In this
way entropy becomes closely related to probability, in the sense of the word
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introduced in section 3.2. The relative volume of an alternative as compared to
the present state gives the probability of the alternative, whereas the absolute
volume of the alternative gives its entropy. We will discuss similarities and
differences between the present and the conventional notion of entropy.
Definition 3.78 (Entropy). The entropy of the physical state S is E [S] ≡
log(V [S]). The entropy of the object state SO is E [SO] ≡ log(V [SO]). The
object entropy of SO is EO[SO] ≡ log(VO[SO]). Here V is the volume in state
space S, and VO is the volume in object state space SO.
The incompleteness of knowledge (Statement 1.3) means that we always have
E [S] > 1. Since it is impossible in practice to relate a state space volume to
the unit volume of an exact state, we have to resort to relative volumes, and
consequently to entropy differences ∆E = E [S2]− E [S1] = log(V [S2]/V [S1]).
According to Definition 3.78, the entropy of the entire world E [S] is always
smaller than the entropy of each object in the world. Let O and O′ be two
objects. We have S ⊆ SO ∩ SO′ , so that V [S] < V [SO] and V [S] < V [S′O].
These relations hold provided O and O′ are not identical, which they cannot be
if they can be distinguished and be given different labels or names.
Statement 3.127 (The entropy of the world is bounded from above by
the entropy of its objects). Suppose that the world contains the two distinct
objects O and O′. Then E [S] < E [SO] and E [S] < E [SO′ ].
This statement means that if we increase the knowledge of the objects in
the world, if we sharpen our perception by putting on better glasses, we may
force the total entropy to decrease. This means that we cannot expect any strict
adherence to the law that entropy must increase with time.
Nevertheless, Definition 3.78 is, on the surface, very similar to the conven-
tional definition of entropy: E = k log(Ω), where Ω is the number of microstates
consistent with a given macrostate, and k is Boltzmann’s constant. We simply
replace ‘microstate’ with ‘exact state’, and ‘macrostate’ with ‘physical state’.
The problem with the conventional definition is that the terms ‘microstate’
and ‘macrostate’ are poorly defined. In particular, the evolution of the macro-
scopic constraints such as pressure, temperature and energy that specify the
macrostate is not clearly defined in terms of fundamental physical law. This
fact obscures the relation between physical law and the evolution of entropy.
In contrast, in our conceptual framework, the physical state S is the funda-
mental object on which the evolution operator u1 acts. The evolution of the
entropy is therefore well-defined; there is no bridge to cross between the micro-
scopic and the macroscopic descriptions. On the other hand, the evolution of
exact states Z is not defined at all. These states do not belong to the domain
of the operator u1. In the conventional picture, physical law acts on the entity
analogous to the exact state, namely the ‘microstate’. We may therefore say
that we turn the coin upside down: we let physical law act on the ‘macrostate’
rather than the ‘microstate’.
The fact that the evolution of entropy is not clearly defined in the con-
ventional picture makes the second law of thermodynamics ill-defined in this
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Figure 3.89: A perfect gas is confined by two partitions to a small region of a
long tube, after which the partitions are removed. a) The free expansion of the
gas corresponds to an increasing entropy. b) This conclusion relies on the fact
that we disregard the known evolution from time 0 to time t, which makes it
possible to exclude some regions in the classical phase space envelope volume
Ve.
picture. Consider a perfect gas contained by removable walls in a small segment
of a long tube (3.89). When the walls are removed, the gas diffuses in both
directions. After some time t the volume V of the region in which gas molecules
can be found doubles: V (t) = 2V (0). Then the number of microstates consistent
with the confinement also doubles: Ω(t) = 2Ω(0). We get E(t) = log(2) + E(0).
However, this conclusion is a comparison of two static macroscopic states; it
does not take into account the evolution from the first state to the second. Our
knowledge of the initial state of the gas makes it possible to exclude some mi-
croscopic states at time t. Consider Fig. 3.89(b). Let us assume the knowledge
that the position in phase space of all molecules at time 0 is confined to the
rectangular gray region with volume Vxp. We assume no knowledge about the
distribution of positions within this rectangle. At time t, this rectangle is de-
formed so that the volume Ve of the smallest envelope rectangle that covers the
gray region is twice as large as that of the initial gray rectangle: Ve(t) = 2Vxp(t).
This fact corresponds to the increase of entropy.
If we take into account our initial knowledge and knowledge about physical
law, however, we can exclude the white regions within the envelope rectangle.
The volume Vxp of the gray region is a constant of motion in classical mechanics.
Therefore we can argue that the entropy should stay constant. If we nevertheless
insist that the entropy should depend only on the macroscopic contraints that
define the envelope, we face the fact that the result depends on the details of
the initial state. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.90.
In what sense then does the entropy increase in the conventional picture?
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Figure 3.90: Entropy, in its conventional sense, is a function of variables that
define the macrostate. It will be a function of the volume Ve of the envelope in
phase space that covers the ensemble of microscopic states (gray regions). Mi-
crosopic details of the initial state may then affect the evolution of the entropy.
Clearly, it is not related to our actual knowledge about the state of the gas, but
to the evolution of a set of pre-chosen intervals of macroscopic variables that
constrains this state. The product of these widening intervals define the entropy,
regardless the dynamics of the gas. If the dynamics is non-linear, we may end
up with very complex gray regions in phase space (Fig. 3.90). The volume Vxp
is still the same, but the region must be covered with a much larger envelope
rectangle. One may argue that the shape of the gray microscopic state ensemble
in phase space typically becomes so complex after a while that the covering box
becomes a good approximation of our ‘knowledge in practice’. However, this
is a hand-waving phrase, and we should not rely on such vague concepts if we
want to use entropy to say something fundamental about Nature. Even if the
complicated shape of the ensemble becomes harder and harder to compute by
us humans as time goes, it is nevertheless a function of our initial knowledge.
To make the notion of an evolving, increasing entropy more precise, we may
focus on the growing complexity of the ensemble in phase space rather than its
envelope. This notion comes closer, it seems to me, to the everyday illustration
of the second law of thermodynamics: that things tend to become more and
more disordered as time passes. A common picture is that of a vase that falls
from a table and breaks into a thousand pieces. It is hard to decide whether the
number of microscopic states consistent with the sad mess we see on the floor is
smaller or larger than the number of such states consistent with the intact vase,
but it is certainly harder to describe the mess in its details - it is more complex.
There is a sense in which the entropy of the vase actually decreases when
it breaks. The shape of the ensemble in phase space is often very sensitive to
the initial conditions, to the boundaries of our initial knowledge. If this sensi-
titvity is present at all times, the dynamics is chaotic. Then, as the ensemble
grows more complex, we learn more and more about the initial conditions; the
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sensitivity acts as a magnifying glass. Fewer and fewer initial conditions be-
come consistent with what we observe. This gain of knowledge may be said to
correspond to a decreased entropy of the initial state.
The vase might have had invisible cracks along which it breaks. These
weaknesses may become knowable only after the breaking. We are able to
conclude afterwards that fewer microscopic states are consistent with the intact
vase we remember with regret. On the other hand, if the vase does not break
when it falls, we learn nothing new about its initial state. Its entropy does not
change.
In our terminology, these considerations become almost self-evident from the
definition of the physical state S, its evolution u1S, and the concept of a state
reduction: u1S(n)→ S(n+ 1) ⊂ u1S(n).
Statement 3.128 (Knowledge cannot decrease as a result of an ob-
servation). Suppose that a knowable change of object O defines the temporal
update n → n + 1, so that S(n) ∩ S(n + 1) = 0. Then u−11 SO(n + 1) ⊆ SO(n).
Correspondingly, u−11 S(n+ 1) ⊆ S(n).
If the invisible cracks in the vase was outside potential knowledge, it is
tempting to say that we gain potential knowledge about the vase in retrospect,
as we examine the fragments. However, this is an incorrect statement in a formal
sense. We can seldom gain new potential knowledge of the past. This tends to
violate epistemic consistency (Assumptions 1.6, 2.1 and 2.2, illustrated in Fig.
2.3). What we can say without any risk of contradiction is that if we apply the
inverse evolution operator to the state of the broken vase, we get a state which
is a subset of the state of the intact vase. We get u−11 SO(n + 1) ⊂ SO(n), in
accordance with Statement 3.128.
Sometimes the increase of retrodicted knowledge may be very small when
an observation is made, or even non-existent. It is non-existent if and only if
no state reduction of the object state takes place, meaning that SO(n + 1) =
u1SO(n). We claimed above that we do not learn anything new if the vase does
not break as it falls. But this is not quite so. We may learn that is had no
critical cracks to begin with. However, if we observe the vase anew while it is
still standing, we can be more confident that we learn nothing new.
Let us discuss another situation in which little is learned by an observation.
Suppose that the opening of a vault of a gas tube at time n allows high pressure
gas to fill a large empty chamber. Let the object O be the chamber with the
gas and the tube. Say that we open the chamber at time n + m and finds
that it is evenly filled with gas. The gain of knowledge in this observation is
extremely small, meaning that V [umSO(n)] ≈ V [SO(n+m)]. This is so because
a very, very small fraction of the unknown microstates compatible with SO(n)
leads to subsequent states SO(n+m) where the gas is unevenly distributed on
a macroscopic scale, or is even still hiding inside the tube. Only a very small
fraction of the state space volume V [SO(n)] is thus excluded by the observation.
We may convert this conclusion to a reformulation of the law of thermody-
namic equilibrium. Let us assume that we have no prior potential knowledge
about the state SO of an object O, except that it can be divided into a very large
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number of objects. We also now the values of a set {cP} of collective properties
that describe the entire object O, such as mass or temperature. Suppose that
we partition the object O into N different pieces in a context C, and observe the
property P in each piece Ol at time n+m. That is, we observe a vector-valued
property
P = (P1, P2, . . . , PN ). (3.419)
Just like O, we assume that the piece Ol can be divided into a very large number
of objects. Suppose finally that
cp = p1 + p2 + . . .+ pN (3.420)
is the value of one of the collective properties cP known a priori (at time n),
where pl is the observed value of Pl. Then we will find
p1 ≈ p2 ≈ . . . ≈ pN ≈ cp/N (3.421)
with probability q ≈ 1. We express this statement sloppily since it the result
of conventional reasoning in statistical mechanics. The number V [S1] of exact
states Z that conform with Eq. [3.421], given the knowledge at time n expressed
in Eq. [3.420], is very much larger than the number V [S2] of exact states that
do not conform with this equation.
Note that, to reach this conclusion, we do not have to assume that a ther-
malization process takes place before the observation at time n + m. The lack
of prior potential knowledge about P means that we start with tabula rasa, and
can apply the principle of a priori equal probabilities (Section 3.3). Thus, even
if the reasoning behind Eq. [3.421] is conventional, the meaning of the state-
ment and its range of applicability is not conventional, since we have used our
own concepts as input, rather than the usual thermodynamic ones.
We may write q1 = V [S1]/(V [S1] + V [S2]) and q2 = V [S2]/(V [S1] + V [S2]),
so that we may re-express our conclusion as
q1  1− q1. (3.422)
Statement 3.129 (Law of expected thermodynamic equilibrium). Sup-
pose that an object O is divided in N  1 pieces Ol, each of which can be
divided into Ml  1 smaller pieces. Suppose that the value p of property P of O
is known, but that we have no potential knowledge about the corresponding value
pl of any piece Ol, except that pl is consistent with p. Let S1 be the alternative
that Eq. [3.421] is fulfilled, and let q1 be the probability that this alternative
comes true in a context C in which property P is observed, as defined in Eq.
[3.419]. Then q1  1− q1.
This statement can be applied to the large scale distribution of matter (and
radiation) in outer space. Consider Fig. 3.91. Suppose that the first astro-
nomic observation that makes it possible to decide whether this distribution is
isotropic and homogeneous takes place at time n+m. This observation may not
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Figure 3.91: Illustration of Statement 3.130. S(n) is the state just before we de-
cide whether the distribution of matter and radiation in the universe is isotropic
and homogeneous or not. S/S(n) is the part of state space S that consists of
exact states not consistent with local observations with naked eye on a planet
with intelligent life. P1 is the part of S that consists of exact states with homo-
geneous and isotropic large scale matter distribution, whereas P2 correponds to
inhomogeneity or anisotropy. The corresponding two alternatives are denoted
S1 and S2. We get V [S2]/V [S1] << 1 by the usual line of reasoning in statistical
mechanics.
3.14. ENTROPY 429
necessarily have been done by humans on earth. Even before that observation,
at time n, some properties of the matter distribution follows by physical law
from local observations with the naked eye (or less sophisticated astronomical
instruments). For example, we can deduce by simple means that there has to
be a countless number of stars, exoplanets, gas clouds, galaxies, and so on. In
this way we can exclude at time n parts of the state space S that correspond to
exact states that lack such deduced properties. We are left with the state S(n).
Independently, we can divide the entire state space in two parts: in one part
P1 the matter distribution is fairly homogeneous on sufficiently large scales, in
the other part P2 it is not. We ratio V [P2]/V [P1] will be extremely close to zero.
(Figure 3.91 is misleading in this respect for the sake of illustration.) Therefore
we will have q1 ≡ V [S1]/(V [S1] + V [S2]) ≈ 1, where S1 and S2 are the two
alternatives that define the question about the matter distribution answered
at time n + m. In other words, the probability that we would have seen an
anisotropic matter distribution was essentially zero.
Statement 3.130 (Matter distribution in the universe). The chance that
we would have seen anything else than an isotropic and homogeneous distribution
of matter and radiation on sufficiently large scales was essentially zero.
If we accept the choice of fundamental concepts used in the present work,
the above statement is almost self-evident. The prize we pay, though, is that
we deprive the universe any definite matter distribution before the first aware
beings cared to investigate it. However, this is no different from the conclusion
that the test object used in a double slit experiment does not pass any definite
slit unless we actually investigate which slit it passes. In the language used here,
there will be interference between these two alternatives if the path information
is outside potential knowledge, just as we assume above that the large scale
matter distribution is outside potential knowledge until time n+m.
There has to be such a critical time n+m at which the question about the
matter distribution is settled. Otherwise we have to assume that an isotropic
and homogeneous distribution is necessary for the emergence of aware organ-
isms, so that potential knowledge about this distribution is present as soon as
the first aware beings emerge. This seems highly unlikely. (The relation be-
tween the emergence of aware beings and the emergence of the universe will be
discussed below.)
Let us turn to the evolution of entropy. Recall from section 2.4, and in
particular from Definition 2.11, that a state evolves deterministically if and only
if it is exact. We often illustrate exact states Z as points with volume V [Z] = 1,
and actual states S as hollow circles with volume V [S] > 1 containing a set
{Z} of such points. However, if such a ‘hollow’ state evolves without any state
reductions according to S(n+m) = umS(n) for all m, then it becomes exact by
definition and should rather be illustrated as a point. We therefore concluded
in Statement 2.7 that state reductions must occur.
In fact, the must occcur regularly; the state volume V [S] must decrease by
a substantial amount at finite time intervals. Otherwise we cannot distinguish
the evolution of S(n) from that of a deterministic state (Definition 2.10) in
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Figure 3.92: The evolution of the state space volume or entropy of an object
state SO. In a context family C(σ1, σ2, . . .) the continuous evolution operator
u(σ) is expected to make volumes increase, even though exceptions may occur.
State reductions decrease the volume, and enables knowledge gain of the pre-
ceding state via the repeated application of u−11 . They occur regularly, counter-
balancing the effect of u(σ), so that the sequence (V [SO(n)], V [SO(n+m)], . . .)
does not have to be growing.
any knowable sense. That is, to give the statement that the evolution is non-
deterministic epistemic meaning we must require that 〈V [S(n)] − V [u−1m S(n +
m)]/V [S(n)]〉n differ substantially from zero for large enough m, where 〈. . .〉n is
an average over all sequential times n. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 3.92
for an object state SO and for m = 1.
Statement 3.131 (Substantial state reductions occur regularly). There
is a constant gA[TS ] > 0 such that 〈V [S(n)] − V [u−11 S(n + 1)]/V [S(n)]〉n ≥
gA[TS ] for all trajectories TS = (S(1), S(2), . . . , S(n), S(n + 1), . . .) given any
initial state S(1).
We may reformulate this statement as follows: The expected knowledge gain
in the sense of Statement 3.128 at each time instant is a positive constant g.
In a long sequence of observations, this means that the knowledge about the
initial state will grow forever. This can in turn be interpreted as a law of ever
increasing entropy. This interpretation is justified by the idea mentioned above
that entropy may be said to increase when an ensemble in classical phase space
grows forever more complex, requiring a forever larger envelope (Fig. 3.90).
The sensitivity of such an ensemble Σ(t) to its initial condition Σ(0) is the
source of the knowledge growth; it acts as a magnifying glass that zooms in
more and more on the initial ensemble as time passes. (However the image of
the initial condition becomes more and more distorted in the process.) This
situation occurs when the dynamics is chaotic, in classical mechanical sense of
the word. In that context, our increasing entropy corresponds to the notion of
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positive metric or topological entropy [42].
Statement 3.132 (Law of increasing entropy A). As sequential time passes,
the retrodicted potential knowledge about the initial physical state S(1) grows
without bound in the following sense: V [u−1n−1S(n)]→ 1 as n→∞.
In other words, the retrodicted knowledge approaches a state of potential
knowledge that corrsponds to an exact physical state Z. This statement does not
contradict the fact that knowledge is always incomplete, since the retrodiction
of knowledge via the inverse evolution operator u−1n−1 does not correspond to
actual knowledge at the initial time 1.
Statement 3.132 expresses the evolution of entropy in terms of state space
volume changes associated with observations, with temporal updates n→ n+1.
What can we say about the volume changes associated with the application of
the evolution operator u1?
Given Statement 3.131, we see that the expected value of V [u1S] must be
substantially larger than V [S]. Otherwise we expect V [S(n)] to decrease steadily
towards V [S(n)] → 1 as n → ∞. This would contradict the perpetual incom-
pleteness of knowledge.
Statement 3.133 (Evolution increases volumes substantially). There is
a constant gB [TS ] > 0 such that 〈V [u1S(n)]− V [S(n)])/V [S(n)]〉n ≥ gB [TS ] for
all trajectories TS = (S(1), S(2), . . . , S(n), S(n + 1), . . .) given any initial state
S(1).
Just as in Statement 3.131, 〈. . .〉n is an average along the trajectory of the
state starting with S(1) = S. To avoid that V [S(n)] → 1 as n → ∞, we must
require
gB [TS ]
gB [TS ] + 1 ≥ gA[TS ], (3.423)
for each initial condition S(1). This inequality follows from Statements 3.131
and 3.133, together with the observation that 〈V [u1S(n)]/V [S(n + 1)]〉n =
〈V [S(n)]/V [u−11 S(n+ 1)]〉n.
The overall situation is illustrated in Fig. 3.92 in the case of an object
state SO that is observed within a context family C(σ1, . . . , σn, σn+1, σn+2, . . .).
The presence of the continuous evolution parameter make it possible to depict a
continuously growing state space volume between the observations. The volume
does not have to be growing monotonically as a function of σn. The requirement
expressed in Statement 3.133 just means that it has to grow in the mean. In a
similar way, Statement 3.131 does not mean that a discernible state reduction
takes place at each observation, just that such reduction take place at regular
intervals. (In Fig. 3.92, no discernible state reduction takes place at time
n+m′.)
An important observation in Fig. 3.92 is that there is no clear trend in the
sequence of volumes (V [SO(n)], V [SO(n+m)], V [SO(n+m
′)], . . .). We cannot
exclude the possiblity that the increasing volumes caused by the evolution, and
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the decreasing volumes caused by observation counterbalance perfectly in the
long run. In that case we have gB [TS ]/(gB [TS ] + 1) = gA[TS ] in Eq. [3.423].
Entropy does not have to increase in the sense that the volumes in a sequence
(V [S(n)], V [S(n+m)], V [S(n+m′)], . . .) grow steadily.
There is another sense, though, in which entropy grows, apart from that
expressed in Statement 3.132. In a state reduction at time n + 1 where one of
several alternatives S1, S2, . . . is realized, the expected volume growth due to
evolution ‘between’ times n+ 1 and n+ 2 expressed in Statement 3.133 can be
applied to each of these alternative, not only that which is realized (compare
Fig. 2.13 and Fig. 3.93(a)). This means that we do expect a steadily growing
trend in the sequence of volumes (V [S(n)], V [u1S(n)], V [u2S(n)], . . .).
Statement 3.134 (Law of increasing entropy B). We have 〈V [umS]〉S >
〈V [um−1S]〉S for each m ≥ 1.
Here we let u0 ≡ I, and let 〈. . .〉S be an average over all states S ∈ PS that
belong to the domain of u1. With this interpretation of the concept of entropy,
it stays the same, becoming a constant of motion, if and only if the evolution is
deterministic, meaning that S(n+ 1) = u1S(n).
In what way does the sequence (V [S(n)], V [u1S(n)], V [u2S(n)], . . .) grow?
As noted above, a growth factor related to gB applied at each sequential time
can be applied to all alternatives at each time step, regardless whether these
alternatives are realized or not. In Fig. 3.93(a), alternative S1 is realized at
time n + 1, meaning that S(n + 1) = S1. This state evolves according to
u1S(n + 1) = S11 ∪ S12, where S11 and S12 are two alternatives that can be
realized at time n + 2. However, the other alternative S2 also belongs to the
domain of u1, so that we may write u1S2 = S21 ∪ S22, where S21 and S22 are
two alternatives that could have been realized at time n+ 2, if S2 were realized
at time n+ 1. We conclude that
〈V [umS]〉S ∝ V [S]egm, (3.424)
for some average growth factor g > 0, where it is understood that u0 ≡ I, where
I is the unit operator.
This conclusion relies heavily on the fact that the evolution u1 is unique and
invertible (Assumption 2.3), as illustrated in Fig. 2.11. If distinct alternatives
S1 and S2 defined at time n may evolve so that umS1 and umS2 overlap at some
later time n+m, then the exponential volume increase may come to a halt.
This possibility arises if we consider object states SOO represented in object
state space SO, rather than the full physical state S itself [Fig. 3.93(b)]. In this
case two alternatives S1 and S2 can equally well be interpreted as two different
objects. As such they can merge (Section 2.17). This means that two distinct
states start to overlap, the reverse of the process shown in Fig. 2.54.
Recall that in the full state space S the states SO1 and SO2 of two different
objects O1 and O2 must always overlap; otherwise there would be no physical
state S consistent with the existence of both objects, as we perceive them (Fig.
2.23). On the other hand, in the object state space SO two different object states
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Figure 3.93: The evolution operator u1 can be applied to each possible alterna-
tive, even if they are not realized. a) For a state S in state space S this means
that V [umS] grow exponentially, since distinct alternatives cannot overlap at a
later time. b) In contrast, for an object state SO represented in object state
space SO, the alternatives may start to overlap, halting the exponential volume
increase.
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Figure 3.94: The evolution in object state space SO of an object state SOO,
which we do not observe during a time interval [m,M ]. Even if we do not observe
it during this time, we know that it must comply with certain constraints; there
is a set of properties {Pk} such that pmink ≥ pk(n) ≥ pmaxk for each k whenever
m ≤ n ≤M . The object may be a light ball that bounces inside a chamber with
massive walls that we cannot see through. It may also be a gas that expands
within the same chamber. In the former case the state expansion is reversible,
and in the latter case it is irreversible.
SOO1 and SOO2 cannot overlap - if they do the objects cannot be perceived as
different (Fig. 3.78).
This means that the exponential volume increase may be interrupted, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.93(b). This is typically the case, since there are most often
known overall constraints that limit the growth of the object state (Fig. 3.94).
These constaints may correspond to knowlege that the object is located some-
where in a physical container. More generally, this corresponds to knowledge
that the object is in a bound state. We may also have knowledge that macro-
scopic properties such as pressure or temperature stays within given limits.
In contrast, it does not make sense to talk about such constraints on the
physical state S, on the world as a whole. By definition, there is nothing outside
the universe that is able to constrain its evolution.
The foregoing considerations are similar to a discussion about sensitivity
to initial conditions, non-linearity and chaos in dynamical systems theory. To
explore the analogies we identify classical phase space with our state space (S or
SO). The fact that the volume of any alternative tends to increase as it evolves
correponds to the sensitivity to initial conditions - most phase space ensembles
are stretched in some direction. The growth factor g in Eq. 3.424 is similar
to a Lyapunov exponent λ. That different evolving alternatives represented in
SO eventually may overlap corresponds to the folding of the stretched phase
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space ensemble. This process is necessary to keep all variables finite, to contain
their values inside some large box. Folding can occur in non-linear systems only,
and is the hallmark of chaos. No overlap analogous to this folding can occur
for states represented in the full state space S. The dynamics resembles that
of a linear system with sensitivity to initial conditions, where any phase space
ensemble explodes exponentially along some direction in phase space. For the
physical state S this means that the boundary ∂S approaches infinite values
of some set of attributes at exponential speed. We return to these matters in
Section 3.15.
The expansion of the object state SOO in object state space SO can be either
reversible or irreversible. Suppose that the object O whose state is shown in
Fig. 3.94 represents a light ball that bounces inside a chamber that constrains
its motion. If we do not look inside the chamber during a long time interval
[n,M ], all we can say after that is that the ball is somewhere in the chamber.
In other words, the state SOO(n + M) fills the entire chamber. If we open the
chamber at time n+M + 1, we will find the ball somewhere. The object state
immediately reduces to its original size:
VO[SOO(n+M + 1)] ≈ VO[SOO(n)] VO[SOO(n+M)]. (3.425)
The expansion is clearly reversible. Note that this state reduction is guaranteed
only if it is part of potential knowledge at time n that the ball will stay intact
at least during the time interval [n,M ], and so will the chamber that encloses
it.
The situation is different if we replace the ball with gas that is released from
a small region defined by SOO(n) at time n, and is allowed to expand to fill the
entire chamber. If we open the chamber at time n + M + 1 and measure the
density of the gas in different regions of the chamber, we will almost certainly
find that it is the same everywhere (Statement 3.129). If we let O represent
an individual gas molecule, we will not be able to see any substantial state
reduction at all:
VO[SOO(n+M + 1)] ≈ VO[SOO(n+M)] VO[SOO(n)]. (3.426)
The state expansion is clearly irreversible.
Of course, we could see the gas spontaneously recollected in a small region
in the chamber, but the probablity that this happens is essentially zero. Prob-
abilites are volumes of a complete set {S˜j} of future alternatives. Therefore we
can distinguish between reversible and irreversible expansion of object states in
the following way.
Definition 3.79 (Reversible and irreversible object evolution). Suppose
that the object state SOO evolves without observation between times n and n+M
with M  1, but that O is observed at time n + M + 1. Suppose also that
VO[SOO(n+M)] VO[SOO(n)]. Then the evolution is reversible if and only if
436 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
Figure 3.95: Reversible and irreversible object evolution. In a reversible evolu-
tion we can reduce the volume of the object state to its original size VO[SOO(n)]
in an observational context C with a set of possible outcomes S˜j of com-
parable volumes VO[S˜j ] ≈ VO[S˜j′ ] . VO[SOO(n)]. In an irreversible evolu-
tion no such context C is possible. There is typically one alternative S˜j with
VO[S˜j ] VO[SOO(n)], which is realized with overwhelming probability. A ball
bouncing in the chamber in Fig. 3.94 illustrates the reversible case, and the gas
expanding in the same chamber illustrates the irreversible case. The dominating
alternative Sj′ correponds to the observation of the gas evenly distributed in
the chamber.
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Figure 3.96: Two similar states that evolve into two complex states that have
no details in common. This behaviour can arise due to the irreducible nature of
the evolution operator. In contrast, the evolution is pointwise in classical phase
space, so that identical segments of the boundary of different ensembles remain
identical as they evolve (Fig. 3.90). The coarse-grained state space volume Vcg
is calculated in units of the volume VC of the coarse-grained cells in state space.
Vcg increases more rapdly with time than the actual state space volume V .
it is possible to construct an observational context C with alternative outcomes
{S˜j} such that we have VO[S˜j ] . VO[SOO(n)] for some j such that there is no j′
for which qj′  qj. Here, qj = V [S˜j ]/V [SO(n+M)] and qj′ = V [S˜j′ ]/V [SO(n+
M)] are the probabilities for the two alternatives.
The idea behind this definition is illustrated in Fig. 3.95. The existence of
irreversible object evolution is what makes us expect that the entropy E [S] =
log(V [S]) of the entire world tends to increase with time. However, according
to Statement 3.127 it is sufficient that some objects evolve reversibly in order
to ensure that E [S] stays small.
z
In this connection, we noted above that we cannot say anything definitive
about long term trends among the volumes in the sequence (V [S(n)], V [S(n +
1)], . . .). This fact seemingly contradicts the conventional notion that entropy
always increases as time passes. However, we can restore this conclusion if we
introduce a coarse-grained entropy, or take the incomplete knowledge about
the physical state into account, together with the fact that the evolution is
irreducible.
Paul and Tanya Ehrenfest introduced the concept of coarse-grained entropy
in 1911 [20]. We may partition the classical phase space into compartments
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and count the number Vcg(t) of such compartments that intersects an evolving
ensemble of points in this phase space (Fig. 3.96). Even if the volume V (t) of
these points stays constant due to Liouville’s theorem, Vcg(t) tend to increase
since the shape of the ensemble becomes more and more complex.
In classical mechanics, this procedure can be used to deduce that entropy
increases, under an assumption of ergodicity. The problem is, however, that it
can also be used to deduce that entropy increses in the past, as −t grows, from
a given present value at t = 0 where it is at a minimum.
This will not be a problem in our description, with our different treatment
of time. (However, we will discuss an analogous problem below, in relation to
Fig. 3.101, concerning the evolution of the support of wave functions.) We
replace t with sequential time n, and V (t) with V [S(n)]. We have not proven
any counterpart to Liouville’s theorem for the state space volumes V [S(n)], but
we know that they cannot tend to zero as n→∞ because of the incompleteness
of knowledge. There is a minimum volume Vmin such that
V [S(n)] ≥ Vmin (3.427)
for all n and all initial conditions S(1). (The projection of Vmin onto (x, px)-
space in the case of object states is associated with Planck’s constant ~ in Fig.
3.47).
In the classical case we expect Vcg(t) → ∞ as t → ∞ if the evolution is
ergodic and unconstrained. By analogy, we expect the following hypothesis to
hold true.
Hypothesis 3.2 (The coarse-grained entropy increases without bound).
Consider a collection of covering sets Σ(n) ≡ {ΣCk(n)} such that ΣCk(n) ∩
ΣCk′(n) = ∅ and S(n) ⊆
⋃
k ΣCk(n). Suppose that the state space volume of
each covering set is the same, and that it is independent of n; V [ΣCk(n)] = VC .
Let N [Σ(n)] be the smallest possible number of elements in such a collection
Σ(n). For each fixed VC , and for each initial condition S(1), we have N [Σ(n)]→
∞ as n→∞.
In classical physics, the counterpart of this hypothesis is at the basis of the
second law of thermodynamics. In this picture we have to assume that the
initial condition of the universe is very special in the sense that the ensemble in
phase space is ‘simple’, like the square in Figs. 3.90 and 3.96. Then it becomes
more and more complex as time passes.
This fact does not mean that physical law in itself has to be time-asymmetric.
It may just reflect the fact that there are more complex ensembles than simple
ones, and that a simple ensemble typically evolves into a more complex one,
regardless whether you apply the evolution rule forwards or backwards. Put
another way, the set Ssf of simple ensembles in phase space that stays simple
when we evolve them forwards is very small as compared to the set Ss of all
simple ensembles. The same goes for the set Ssb of simple ensembles that stays
simple when we evolve them backwards. The intersection Ssf ∩ SSb is even
smaller. This means that, to get the second law, we just have to choose a
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typical simple initial ensemble Si. Then we can be almost sure that it grows
more complex as time passes, so that the coarse-grained entropy increasees.
The situation is different in the present description. Statement 3.134 means
that physical law is inherently time-asymmetric. If we apply the evolution
operator u1 to a state, its volume tends to increase, whereas it tends to decrease
if we apply the inverse evolution operator u−11 . The only way to regain symmetry
would be to let u1 and u
−1
1 act one exact states Z, so that V [u
−1
1 Z] = V [Z] =
V [u1Z] = 1 and we achieve a precise trajectory Z(n) in state space. We know,
however, that exact states are not in the domain of u1 or u
−1
1 (Statement 2.8).
Statement 3.135 (Physical law is temporally asymmetric). The evolu-
tion operator u1 is different from its inverse u
−1
1 .
The coarse-grained entropy is helpful in the sense that it couples entropy
to physical law; it makes the concept dynamical. However, from the present
epistemic perspective, it is not satisfying to depend on a collection of covering
sets ΣCk in order to say something fundamental about the evolution of the
apparent volume of S(n). What do these covering sets represent in terms of
knowledge? They cannot be treated as a complete set of realizable alternatives
with equal probabilities 1/N (Statement 3.2), since their volume V [ΣCk] in part
represent regions of state space outside the physical state S(n).
Instead, we may consider the fundamental unknowability of the details of the
boundary ∂S of the physical state (Section 2.3). This means that the evolution
of S becomes fuzzy. Let {1S, 2S, 3S, . . .} be a set of possible physical states S,
given the potential knowledge PK. Then we may define a fuzzy state
fS(n) ≡ 1S(n) ∪ 2S(n) ∪ 3S(n), . . . (3.428)
such that S ⊆ fS. We may define
fmu[fS(n)] ≡ um[1S(n)] ∪ um[2S] ∪ um[3S] ∪ . . . . (3.429)
In a mathematical representation f S¯, we may want to replace ∪ with +
according to Table 3.2. This algebraic notation has limited value, however,
since there are no alternatives associated with the possible states jS - we can
never decide which state is the true one. Therefore there are no amplitudes ja
and no Hilbert space.
The crucial point is that in general we have
f1u[fS] 6= u1[fS] (3.430)
because of the irreducibility of physical law, making the state boundary act like
a membrane (Statement 2.11). The evolution of the state does not have to equal
the union of the evolution of its parts. The idea is illustrated in Fig. 3.97. Even
if the two states at the left are very similar, they may evolve into quite different
states, which share only global features such as the level of complexity and the
approximate volume of the envelope (Fig. 3.90). This means that the volume
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Figure 3.97: Two similar states that evolve into two complex states that have
no details in common. If none of the original states can be excluded as a repre-
sentation of the potential knowledge, none of the exact states in the superposed
complex state can be excluded as a representation of the evolved potential knowl-
edge. The superposed state space volume increases more rapidly with time than
that of an individual state. Compare Fig. 3.96.
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of the superposed evolved state may be much larger than the volume of each
individual evolved state. We may express this fact as the possibility that
V [f1u[fS]] > V [u1[fS]]. (3.431)
This situation may be contrasted with that in classical mechanics, where
the evolution of an ensemble in phase space is pointwise. In Fig. 3.90, there
is a small difference between the two simple emsembles to the left, leding to
a small difference between the evolved ensembles to the right. The removal of
a small part of the rectangle to the left causes the removal of a small part of
the complex ensemble to the right. If we superpose the two complex ensembles
we regain the ensemble that correspond to the evolution of the intact rectangle.
The volume of union of the two perturbed evolved ensembles is exactly the same
as the volume of the intact rectangle.
What can be said about the evolution of the sequence of volumes (V [fS(n)], V [fS(n+
1)], . . .)? We note first that we may have a state reduction
f1u[fS(n)]→ fS(n+ 1) ⊂ f1u[fS(n)] (3.432)
at time n+ 1 of the evolved fuzzy state, which takes place if and only if there is
a state reduction u1[jS(n)]→ jS(n+1) ⊂ u1[jS(n)] of each individual possible
state jS.
As discussed above, the existence of state reductions of makes it impossible
to decide in general whether the sequence (V [jS(n)], V [jS(n+1)], . . .) is growing,
even though (V [u1[jS(n)]], V [u2[jS(n)]], . . .) is indeed growing (Fig. 3.92). All
we can say is that the perpetual incompleteness of knowledge implies that there
is a constant gmin > 1 such that
gmin ≤ V [jS(n)] (3.433)
for each n and for each possible state jS. It may also be the case that V [jS(n)]
stays bounded so that
gmin ≤ V [jS(n)] ≤ gmax (3.434)
for each n and for each possible state jS. This situation occurs if the volume
increase caused by evolution is exactly balanced in the long run by the volume
decrease caused by state reductions.
If we accept the hypothesis that states jS tend to become more and more
complex in analogy with ergodic classical ensembles in phase space, then V [fmu[fS]]
will grow faster than V [um[jS]] with m, as expressed in Eq. [3.431] and illus-
trated in Fig. 3.97. Suppose that that there is no upper bound [jS(n)] ≤ gmax
according to Eq. [3.434]. Then there cannot be an upper bound V [fS(n)] ≤
gmax either. Suppose, on the other hand, that the bound [jS(n)] ≤ gmax ex-
ists. Then, if such a bound exists for [fS(n)] also, we would have to conclude
that Eq. [3.433] is not fulfilled as n → ∞, because of the different growth
rates of V [fmu[fS]] and V [um[jS]]. Therefore there can never be any bound
V [fS(n)] ≤ gmax as n→∞.
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Definition 3.80 (Fuzzy entropy fE). Suppose that we choose a set of phys-
ical states {jS(1)} with more than one member, such that each state jS(1) is
consistent with some initial state of potential knowledge PK(1). Then fE(n) =
log
(
V
[⋃
j jS(n)
])
.
Hypothesis 3.3 (Law of increasing entropy C). The fuzzy entropy increases
without bound. Suppose that aware subjects exist for arbitrarily long time, so
that the limit n→∞ is defined. Then, for a typical set of possible states {jS(1)}
with more than one member, we have fE → ∞ as n→∞.
This hypothesis is vague in the sense that it is not specify what is meant
by a ‘typical’ initial set of states {jS(1)}. It could mean that almost all states
of potential knowledge PK can be described by a set {jS(1)} that fulfils the
hypothesis.
If we accept detailed materialism (assumption 1.4), we accept that gradual
biological evolution is necessary to create aware beings. Then there must be an
initial sequential time n = 1 at which the first aware perceptions emerge, and
these perceptions must be rudimentary, corresponding to a small PK(1) and a
large physical state S(1) with V [S(1)] 1 (Fig. 1.12).
As the biological evolution goes on, and as the number of aware beings in-
crease, one may expect that the potential knowledge PK(n) grows steadily.
However, Hypothesis 3.3 implies that such a development eventually must come
to a halt. Just like in the conventional picture, thermodynamic equilibirum
finally settles, making meaningful distinctions impossible, so that potential
knowledge dissipates, approaching the ‘naked’ awareness in Fig. 1.6, before
nothingness sets in at some time nfinal.
These considerations mean that there ought to be a time nmax at which
the potential knowledge PK peaks, and the fuzzy entropy reaches a minimum.
A possible evolution of the fuzzy entropy between the initial time n = 1 and
n = nfinal is shown in Fig. 3.98.
Hypothesis 3.4 (There is a time at which the potential knowledge
peaks). If aware life persist for sufficiently long time, so that nfinal is large
enough, there will be a time 1 < nmax < nfinal such that fE(nmax) is at a global
minimum.
Suppose that we are living at some time nr before time nmax. We look at
the skies and try to retrodict the history of the cosmos. What we do is to apply
the inverse evolution operator u−11 repeatedly. The state space volume of each
possible retrodicted state u−1m S(nr) is expected to decrease steadily with m. In
fact, according to Eq. [3.424]
〈V [u−1m S(nr)]〉S ∝ V [S(nr)]e−gm. (3.435)
This means that the fuzzy entropy also shrinks towards one as we let m in-
crease. We get the usual conclusion that entropy becomes extremely small as
we approach Big Bang (Fig. 3.98). One attribute value that pops out of the
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Figure 3.98: A model of the evolution of the fuzzy entropy fE . The birth of the
universe corresponds to the appearance of the first aware subject at sequential
time n = 1. The entropy fE decreases as more advanced species develop and
they become more numerous. The potential knowledge peaks at some time
nmax, after which the entropy fE increases again, as the universe approaches
thermodynamic equilibrium. The universe comes to an end as the last subject
closes her eyes at time nfinal. The Big Bang is regarded to be nothing more
than an extrapolation backwards in time, using the inverse evolution operator.
In terms of the relational time t, it has to be positioned before the time t1 that
corresponds to n = 1.
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application of u−1m is the expected relational time: We may write 〈t〉(m), where
〈t〉 decreases as m increases.
It is perfectly allowed to let m > nr, meaning that we retrodict the state
of the universe to an epoch before the emergence of the first aware beings.
According to the strict epistemic perspective adopted here, such states have
no actual existence. The proper birth of the universe should be taken to be
the sequential time n = 1. Retrodiction towards the Big Bang becomes an
exercise in the repeated application of u−11 rather than a reconstruction of a
real situation. The extremely small entropy associated with the initial state
of the universe ceases to be a puzzle, as it can be regarded as a mirage, a
mathematical consequence of Statement 3.134.
Let us elaborate a bit on this point. We base the concept of entropy on
the present knowledge, which can be represented as a physical state. Then
we extrapolate backwards in time using physical law. The conventional line
of reasoning is the other way around. The initial condition of the universe
is regarded as the primary physical state. Then we extrapolate forwards in
time using physical law. The conclusion is that the initial condition must be
extremely fine-tuned in order to produce our perceptions today. We have an
apparent mystery.
What we have done, in effect, is to replace the mystery of the extremely
fine-tuned initial state with the mystery of our present existence. The primary
wonder is that we are aware, and that we can differentiate between well-defined
objects. We may extrapolate this wonder backwards in time using the inverse
physical evolution u−11 , getting an extremely fine-tuned initial condition that
enables such an existence, but this is a derived, secondary wonder. It is a
consequence, not a cause.
From our strict epistemic perspectie we have claimed that the proper birth
of the universe is the sequential time n = 1 when the first awareness emerges.
The gradual decrease of the fuzzy entropy from that time can be described as a
process in which the universe becomes more and more aware of itself, learning
like a child. In fact, since the size of physical states and the size of the state of
potential knowledge are reciprocal quantities (Fig. 2.4), it is natural to define
fE−1 as a measure of the amount of potential knowledge. Figure 3.98 then
expresses a cosmological model in which potential knowledge grows from zero,
peaks at time nmax an then falls back towards zero.
Since both the initial state S(1) and the final sate S(nfinal) ought to have
a very large volume, and presumably covers a substantial part of state space S,
one may ask if they overlap, so that
S(1) ∩ S(nfinal) 6= ∅. (3.436)
If this is indeed the case we get a cosmological model like that in Fig. 3.99. It is
tempting to call such a model cyclical, but this is not really the case. The initial
state S(1) must correspond to a state of knowledge PK(1) without memories,
without objects having presentness attribute Pr = 0 (Definition 1.25). If S(1)
and S(nfinal) do overlap, PK(nfinal) must also be a state of knowledge without
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Figure 3.99: A cosmological model in which the initial and the final physical
states overlap. This would mean that the end becomes indistinguishable from
the beginning.
memories. We get a picture of a universe that loses its memory like an old
person. Now, to say that we are dealing with a cyclical cosmology, there has to
be a way to distinguish the different cycles from each other and to order them.
This is not possible in the present model because of the lack of memory. The
model rather corresponds to a breakdown of time at the beginning and at the
end, which makes the meanings of the words ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ coincide. In
this interpretation, Eq. 3.436 does not contradict Statement 2.10.
z
So far, we have discussed the entropy of physical states S and object states
SO very generally, without referring to any experimental context C, or to any
specific mathematical representations S¯ and S¯O of these states. Let us check
that the conceptual framework can be properly applied in those circumstances.
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Consider a context C in which we have a complete set {S˜j} of future alterna-
tives defined at the intial time n, corresponding to a set {pj} of possible values
of property P . Let the observation of P in this context define the temporal
update n+m− 1→ n+m. We may write
u1SO(n+m− 1) =
⋃
j
u1Sj =
⋃
j
u1SO(n+m− 1) ∩ Pj , (3.437)
where {Sj} is the corresponding set of present alternatives defined at time n+
m− 1 according to Definition 2.48. Consequently,
SO(n+m) = u1Sj = u1SO(n+m− 1) ∩ Pj (3.438)
for some j.
To the observation of property P of object O at time n+m we can associate
a change ∆EO(P ) of the object entropy of O:
∆EO(P ) ≡ log(VO[SO(n+m)])− log(VO[u1SO(n+m− 1)]). (3.439)
The probability qj to observe the value pj can be expressed as
qj = v[S˜j , SO(n)] = v[u1Sj , u1SO(n+m−1)] = VO[u1Sj ]
VO[u1SO(n+m− 1)] , (3.440)
so that ∆EO(P ) = log(qj) (Section 3.2). The expected entropy change of object
O associated with the observation of P becomes
〈∆EO(P )〉 =
∑
j
qj log(qj), (3.441)
so that it equals the Shannon entropy H with a minus sign:
〈∆EO(P )〉 = −H(P ). (3.442)
In other words, the expected entropy decrease of object O equals the expected
information gain associated with the observation of a discrete random variable
P , as conventionally defined.
The Shannon entropy can be used to express the difference between reversible
and irreversible evolution in a more concise way than in Definition 3.79. Suppose
that the state SO of object O evolves with an average growth factor e
g > 1, that
is, 〈VO[u1SO]〉 = eg〈VO[SO]〉. Consider contexts C which are initiated at time
n and in which O is not observed again until time n+m. Then the evolution is
reversible if and only if we, for any m ≥ 1, can construct such a context C for
which
mg . H(P ), (3.443)
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Figure 3.100: A proper evolution equation for ΨP (p, σ) is such that the width of
the support DP (σ) typically becomes wider as σ increases. Ordinary evolution
equations like Eq. [3.232] cannot be tested in this way since they cannot be ap-
plied at a sharp boundary ∂DP (σ) where the second derivative ∂
2ΨP (p, σ)/∂p
2
is undefined. We have to use a smoothed wave function and calculate the evo-
lution of the standard deviation ∆p(σ) as an indicator of the true behavior.
Compare Fig. 3.37.
where P is the property of O that we observe within context at time n+m. In
short, we should be able to regain at least as much information about object O
as we lost when we did not keep track of it.
Let us next consider a family C(σ) of contexts in which P is observed in
the same manner. Then we can define a wave function aP (pj , σ) according to
Definition 3.23. Since we expect that the evolution operator expands volumes in
the object state space (Statement 3.134), we expect that the support DP (σ) of
the wave function expands when the evolution parameter σ grows. Any correct
evolution equation daP /dσ = A¯aP should reproduce this behavior (Fig 3.100).
Equation [3.232] gives the evolution of a free specimen in a fundamental
context in which the spatio-temporal position r4 is observed. The problem with
this equation is that it cannot be used to predict the evolution of a finite support
Dr4(σ), or, equivalently, of the boundary ∂Dr4(σ). It relies on the existence of
the second derivative ∂2Ψr4/∂r
2
k for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, whereas these derivatives are
not defined at a finite boundary ∂Dr4 .
This is not a fundamental problem, since it is impossible in principle to
arrange fundamental contexts in which Eq. [3.232] holds exactly. The use of
continuous wave functions is always an approximation, as discussed in section
3.4.7. Therefore the use of evolution equations for continuous wave functions
is always an approximation, too. We are therefore allowed to soften the sharp
boundary ∂Dr4(σ), allowing a small but nonzero value of |Ψr4(r4, σ)| for r4 /∈
Dr4(σ). Then we can use the evolution of the standard deviation
448 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
∆r4(σ) ≡
√
〈|Ψr4(r4, σ)|2〉 − 〈|Ψr4(r4, σ)|〉2 (3.444)
as an indicator of the evolution of the size of ∂Dr4(σ). It is well known that
∆r4 typically evolves as
∆r4(σ) ∝
√
1 + ασ2, (3.445)
indicating that the support Dr4(σ) is expected to expand, as required.
The problem to determine the evolution of the boundary Dr4(σ) is similar
to the problem to determine the Heisenberg uncertainty relations, as discussed
in section 3.5. From our epistemic perspective, we define such a relation as a
minimum area of a projection of the object state on a two-dimensional subset
of object state space, a subset spanned by two properties that are not simulta-
neously knowable (Statement 3.65). However, to derive these relations we tend
to rely on continuous wave functions that describe idealized, fundamental con-
texts. (Compare Figs. 3.39 and 3.46.) In that way we get inequalities relating
the product of two standard deviations, like ∆x∆px ≥ ~/2. These inequalitites
should be seen as nothing more than indicators of the true relations, just like the
evolution of ∆r4(σ) expressed in Eq. [3.445] is just an indicator of the evolution
of the true size of Dr4(σ).
The basic reason why ∆p typically increases with σ is that there are less
complex-valued functions Ψ(p, σ) that are well localized than those that are
poorly localized. This statement can be understood in terms of the Fourier
expansion
Ψ(p, σ) = (2pi)−1/2
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ˜(p˜)ei(p˜p+σ˜σ)dp˜ (3.446)
of the wave function Ψ(p, σ) of an object that has a precisely known rest mass,
which is a constant of motion. If you pick at random a Fourier transform Ψ˜(p˜)
that gives rise to a wave function Ψ(p, 0) with a given standard deviation ∆p(0),
then we will almost certainly have d∆p/dσ > 0 for σ > 0. This is so since we
have to fine-tune the phases p˜p in the Fourier expansion in order to keep Ψ(p, 0)
localized. This fine-tuning is almost certainly gradually lost as σ grows from
zero and the phase becomes p˜p+ σ˜σ.
Three notes are in order here.
First, there are exceptions. We may happen to pick a transform Ψ˜(p˜) that
makes the wave function become more and more localized as σ grows, but this
happens with zero probability. The spontaneous localization may happen in two
ways (Fig. 3.101). Either Ψ(p) become more localized also as σ decreases to
negative values from zero (evolution type 3), or it becomes less localized during
such a reverse evolution (evolution type 2b).
Second, the reasoning is invariant with respect to a reflection σ → −σ of the
evolution parameter. This invariance is captured in Eq. 3.445. More generally,
we typically have d∆p/dσ > 0 for σ > 0, but d∆p/dσ < 0 for σ < 0. This does
not contradict the fact that there are choices of Ψ˜(p˜) for which d∆p/dσ > 0 for
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Figure 3.101: A typical choice of wave function Ψ(p, σ) at σ = 0 evolves so that
its standard deviation ∆p(σ) increases regardless whether we evolve it forwards
or backwards with respect to σ (evolution type 1). Any deviation from this
behavior is expected to occur with zero probability if we pick Ψ(p, 0) randomly
from a function space with a prescribed value of ∆p(0). The evolution types
2a and 2b are equally (im)probable because of the invariance under σ → −σ,
whereas evolution type 3 is even more improbable. More precisely, given that
d∆p/dσ < 0 for σ > 0, we argue that the probability is zero that d∆p/dσ > 0
for σ < 0, and given that d∆p/dσ > 0 for σ < 0, we argue that the probability
is zero that d∆p/dσ < 0 for σ > 0.
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σ > 0 and d∆p/dσ > 0 for σ < 0 also. The probability to pick such a transform
by chance is zero, but they arise naturally as the evolution of a wave function
Ψ′(p) that has a deviation ∆p′ < ∆p(0), since we typically have d∆p/dσ > 0,
as discussed above. In this case we may write Ψ˜(p, 0) = Ψ˜′(p˜)eiσ˜σ
′
for some
σ′ > 0. The invariance with respect to the reflection σ → −σ is expressed by
the fact that to each such choice of Ψ˜(p˜) there corresponds one choice for which
d∆p/dσ < 0 for σ > 0 and d∆p/dσ < 0 for σ < 0. This means that it is equally
(im)probable to pick a Ψ˜(p˜) that gives rise to evolution of the types 2a and 2b
shown in Fig. 3.101.
Third, the wave function [3.446] is quasi-periodic, so that it returns arbi-
trarily close to its original shape if we let σ grow sufficiently large. This means
we must finally enter a region of values of σ in which ∆p(σ) shrinks. This
situation typically happens after such a long time that it has no practical conse-
quences; in any realistic context family C(σ) the maximum evolution parameter
σmax for which the context is defined is much smaller than the recurrence value
σrecurrence.
Several aspects of this discussion about the evolution of wave functions are
similar to commonly discussed aspects of the evolution of entropy. To see the
similarities, we regard the width ∆p of the wave function and the entropy as
analogous quantitites. To derive the second law of thermodynamics, the typ-
icality of the present state of the world is often assumed. That is, given the
macroscopic variables that specify our actual knowledge of the state of the world,
it is assumed that the microscopic state is typical given these known constraints.
More precisely, it is assumed that the microscopic state, which determines the
evolution, is picked at random from the subset of phase space which is consistent
with the macroscopic constraints. Then the probability that entropy increases
with time is essentially one, since there are many more microscopic states that
evolve into macroscopic states with larger entropy than the present macroscopic
state, than there are microscopic states that evolve into macroscopic states with
equal or smaller entropy. The problem with this argument is that it can be ap-
plied backwards in time as well as forwards. A typical present microscopic state
which is evolved backwards in time by a physical law that is invariant under time
reflections leads to an entropy that increases in both temporal directions, just
like the wave function evolution of type 1 in Fig. 3.101. In that case, the typical
choice of a microscopic state in phase space that conforms with the macroscopic
knowledge corresponds to a typical choice of wave function in function space
that conforms with the given width ∆p(0).
In the present approach to entropy, we avoid these difficulties. By construc-
tion, physical law is not invariant under time reflection (Statement 3.135). To
change sign of the evolution parameter σ does not mean that we change the
direction of time. It just means that we change the parametrization of phys-
ical law. The evolution equation [3.232] is invariant under time reflection in
the same way as the Schro¨dinger equation with a real Hamiltonian: if we let
σ′ ≡ −σ then
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d
dσ′
Ψ′r4(r4, σ) =
ic2~
2〈E〉Ψ
′
r4(r4, σ). (3.447)
with Ψ′ = Ψ∗. We start with an equation expressed in the natural parametriza-
tion d〈t〉/dσ = 1, and we get back the same equation expressed in the anti-
natural parametrization d〈t〉/dσ = −1 (see Definitions 3.43 and 3.55). This is
an expression of the fact that physical law is parametrization independent; it is
not a statement about physical law itself.
It simply has no meaning to evolve a wave function backwards in time to
make retrodictions about the past. A wave function is constructed from a known
present state of a specimen, together with a complete set of alternatives that
apply to this specimen, one of which is known to be realized at some time in
the future. It does not make sense to have a complete set of alternatives for the
past. All that can be said about the past is already known. An alternative rep-
resents something outside potential knowledge that may become known. That
something ‘may become known’ can be regarded, by definition, as a statement
of a possible future event.
The realization of an alternative corresponds to a state reduction. Basically,
it is the existence of these state reductions that makes physical law asymmetric
with respect to time reflections. This is neatly illustrated in Fig. 3.92. A
reversal of the direction of sequential time n makes the evolution of the state
space volume V [SO] look fundamentally different.
All of this means that we do not have to bother about the fact that the
typical choice of wave function become wider both as σ grows from zero and
as it decreases from zero, as indicated in Fig. 3.101. In this figure, σ = 0 is
taken to correspond to a given width ∆p. A given width means a known width,
so that it corresponds to the present state of the specimen. (Recall that the
present physical state is nothing more than a representation of the potential
knowledge.) Since the role of σ is to interpolate the evolution from the present
time n to the next time n + 1, we should only follow ∆p(σ) in one direction
from σ = 0. Which one is a matter of the choice of parametrization. In either
case we do obtain the correct behavior: a free specimen typically increases its
entropy as it evolves, when this evolution is modelled by Eq. [3.232].
3.15 Expansion of state space
Equation [3.424] asserts that the repeated application of the evolution operator
u1 typically causes the state space volume of a state S to increase exponentially.
This conclusion can be translated to a statement about the expansion of the
state space S itself. The evolved state u1S(n) defines what elbow room must
be present at time n+ 1 in the state space in which S lives, since any subset of
u1S(n) can potentially be a part of S(n+ 1). This follows from the minimality
condition used to define u1 (Definition 2.8).
Suppose that we partition the state space into a set of states
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Sˆ ≡ {Sˆk}. (3.448)
That is, we cover S with sets Sˆk such that Sˆk ∩ Sˆk′ = ∅ whenever k 6= k′, such
that ⋃
k
Sˆk = S, (3.449)
and such that the evolution operator is defined for each covering set (assuming
that this is possible). This means that the set u1Sˆk ∈ PS is uniquely defined
by physical law for each k.
It follows that we can define the evolved set of covering states
u1Sˆ ≡ {u1Sˆk}. (3.450)
We used the invertibility of physical law (Assumption 2.3) to conclude that
the volume of a physical state typically grows exponentially (Eq. [3.424]). We
can use it again to conclude that we must have u1Sˆk ∩ u1Sˆk′ = ∅ whenever
k 6= k′. We must also have ⋃
k
u1Sˆk = S. (3.451)
The last statement is an apparent contradiction, since we ought to be able
to write
V [S] = V [
⋃
k
Sˆk] =
∑
k
V [Sˆk] (3.452)
because of Eq. [3.449], as well as
V [S] = V [
⋃
k
u1Sˆk] =
∑
k
V [u1Sˆk] = e
g
∑
k
V [Sˆk] (3.453)
for some growth factor eg > 1, because of Eq. [3.451]. We seemingly get
V [S] = egV [S] > V [S]. (3.454)
The paradox can be resolved simply by saying that the volume of the entire
state space S is not defined. The measure V can be given meaning only as a
means to compare the size of two physical states S and S′, or, equivalently, the
amount of knowledge contained in two states of potential knowledge PK and
PK ′. It is true that we have defined an absolute scale for V by the assignment
V [Z] = 1 for all exact states Z, but this expression has a formal meaning only.
Since physical states cannot be exact we are unable to count the number of exact
states contained in a physical state, or in the entire state space. Since we can
use V to compare two states S and S′, one might argue that we should be able
to use it to compare two state spaces S and S ′. But the physical state S is the
only tool we have in our hands to explore the world. To say something about
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Figure 3.102: We may cover state space S with states Sˆk, like cells in a hon-
eycomb. The volume of each such cell is expected to grow when the evolution
operator u1 is applied. Therefore we may say that the entire state space grows
with a factor eg, defined as the average of the growth factor of each cell.
the state space itself, we have to use a state S = S. Such a state corresponds to
no knowledge at all. A comparison of the size of two state spaces is therefore a
comparison of two zeros, of two ‘states’ of nothingness. An equivalent statement
would be that the evolution operator u1 cannot be applied to S. The state space
is not in the domain of u1, just as the exact states are not in this domain.
In contrast, we can define the evolution of Sˆk, as expressed in Eq. [3.450].
Since the choice of covering states is arbitrary, this set can be used to define
the evolution of the size of state space, in a restricted sense. We may define a
growth factor eg[Sˆ] as follows.
eg[Sˆ] ≡ V [u1Sˆ]
V [Sˆ] ≡
〈
V [u1Sˆk]
V [Sˆk]
〉
k
. (3.455)
Statement 3.136 (The size of state space increases with time). We
define G by eG ≡ 〈eg[Sˆ]〉Sˆ > 1, where 〈. . .〉Sˆ is an average over all possible state
space coverings Sˆ according to Eq. [3.448]. Since G is not a functional of the
covering, we may write Size[u1S] = eGSize[S].
The statement is illustrated in Fig. 3.102. We may, at least formally, say
that the size of state space increases exponentially when the evolution operator
is repeatedly applied:
Size[umS] = eGmSize[S] (3.456)
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Figure 3.103: The continued expansion of the covering states Sˆk in Fig. 3.102
must be effected by an increased uncertainty ∆υr of the values of relational
attributes Ar. The uncertainty of the values of the internal attributes Ai that
specify a minimal object is bounded by the allowed range [υmin, υmax] of these
values. A continued expansion of the uncertainty ∆r4 of spatio-temporal dis-
tance r4 as u1 is repeatedly applied means that space-time itself expands indef-
initely.
To say that the size of state space increases means the same as to say that
the uncertainty ∆υ of the values υ of some attributes A increases. To make
this possible, the range [υmin, υmax] of possible values of these attributes must
become wider, since we must have [υmin, υmax] ≥ ∆υ. However, not all attribute
ranges can expand in this way.
We have assumed that all objects can be represented as a composition of
minimal objects (Assumption 1.16), and we have concluded that the evolution
can always be expressed as the evolution of a physical state expressed in terms
of such minimal objects (Statement 2.13). To make such a representation mean-
ingful, the minimal objects have to be identifiable (Statement 2.29); otherwise it
would not make any sense to speak about the evolution of these minimal objects.
Such identifiability relies upon the existence of fixed, discrete sets of possible
values of the internal attributes that specify the minimal objects, as discussed
in Section 2.16. Therefore, the ranges [υmin, υmax] of the possible values υi can-
not change as we apply u1. This means that set of possible minimal objects
stays fixed, as does their respective rest masses. Also, The Dirac equation holds
generally, so that the range of possible spin projection values [−1/2, 1/2] must
stay fixed.
Even if the range of possible values of the internal attributes (and the spin
projection) of a minimal object is fixed, the number N of minimal objects can
vary, and also the uncertainty ∆N of this number. The physical state S is
supposed to describe the entire world, and therefore we can never know the
total value υi(S) of an internal attribute Ai that describes a minimal object.
By the ‘total value’ of Ai we mean the sum the values of this attribute of all
the N minimal objects in the world.
3.15. EXPANSION OF STATE SPACE 455
Suppose first that we know that the universe is spatially closed, having a
finite volume. Let Υi(S) be the set of possible total values of υi(S) that are not
excluded by the potential knowledge encoded in such a physical state S. Then,
for each Ai, there is a pair of numbers (υ
min
i , υ
max
i ) such that
Υi(umS) ≡ [υmini (umS), υmaxi (umS)] ⊆ [υmini , υmaxi ] (3.457)
for each m ≥ 0 (defining u0 ≡ I). The finite range [υmini , υmaxi ] of possible ‘total
values’ is a simple consequence the finite volume and the assumption of finite
depth of knowledge (Assumption 1.8), leading to a finite total number N of
minimal objects. It is clear that a hypothetical initial widening of Υi(umS) for
small m cannot contribute to the exponential expansion of state space in the
long run because of the bound Υi(S) ∈ [υmini , υmaxi ] for all S.
Suppose next that the physical state S is such that it is impossible in prin-
ciple to exlude the possibility that N = ∞. This is true whenever it cannot
be excluded that the universe is spatially infinite. For some internal attributes
that can be both positive and negative, like electric charge, this means that we
cannot exclude any total value. We have
Υi(S) = (−∞,∞) (3.458)
for any S. Clearly, such a set cannot change volume under the application of
u1 and cannot contribute to the exponential expansion of state space.
We may also have internal attributes Ai for which the sign of υi(S) is known,
for example the baryon or lepton number (see Hypothesis 3.1). Then it is of
interest that we can set a lower bound Nmin(S) of N . The size of this bound
depends on the size of the visible universe, and is therefore a function of S.
Supposing that the sign of υi(S) is positive, this means that we can associate
to S a set Υi(S) of possible total values of Ai according to
Υi(S) = [υ
min
i (S),∞). (3.459)
It is possible that Υi(S) 6= Υi(umS), and we may imagine that υmini (umS)
decreases exponentially with m. However, such a process would not contribute
to the exponential increase of V [umS] in the long run, since we hit rock bottom
when υmini (umS) = 0. The value of m at which this happens may be very large,
however. Let us therefore argue in more detail why a dependence of υmini (umS)
on m is irrelevant.
The only way to compare two state space volumes V and V ′ is to calculate
their ratio V/V ′; they cannot be calculated separately in an absolute sense. The
ratio of the lengths of the intervals [υmini (S),∞) and [υmini (umS),∞) is one for
all m regardless the form of the function υmini (m). This is why a hypothetical
change of υmini cannot give rise to an exponentially increasing volume V [umS].
More formally, consider the attribute value space S(Ai, υi) according to Def-
inition 2.42. We have
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V [
⋃
υi∈[υmini (umS),∞)
S(Ai,υi)]
V [
⋃
υi∈[υmini (S),∞)
S(Ai,υi)]
=
∑
υi∈[υmini (umS),∞)
V [S(Ai,υi)]∑
υi∈[υmini (S),∞)
V [S(Ai,υi)]
=
∑
υi∈[υmini (umS),υmini (S))
V [S(Ai,υi)]∑
υi∈[υmini (umS),∞)
V [S(Ai,υi)]
+ 1
= 1
(3.460)
according to Definition 2.43.
To conclude, to account for the exponential state space volume increase,
we are left with changes of the ranges of possible values of purely relational
attributes (Fig. 3.103), spin projections excluded. We argued in Section 1.9 that
we should consider angles as a relational attribute that relates three objects O1,
O2 and O3, and that these angle should be treated as independent attributes in
the spirit of the Riemannian geometry of general relativity. In other words, they
are able to vary independently of the three distances r
(12)
4 , r
(13)
4 , r
(23)
4 that relate
O1, O2 and O3. However, it follows from the definition of the angle that the
range of possible values is always [0, 2pi). It cannot be altered by the application
of u1.
The only attributes whose range of possible values can expand are, as far as
I understand, the four-position r4 and the four-momentum p4. Let us call the
ranges of possible values of these attributes ∆r4 and ∆p4, respectively. These
ranges correspond to uncertainties of the attribute values in question. ∆r4 and
∆p4 are tightly connected. It is easy to see that one of these ranges expand
if and only if the other range expand. This means that both of them has to
expand to account for the expansion of state space.
Let us focus on the spatio-temporal attributes. Instead of speaking about
positions, which are ‘pseudo-internal’ attributes according to the terminology of
Section 2.16, we will speak about distances between two objects O1 and O2. By
Lorentz invariance we see that the uncertainty ∆r12 of the spatial distance r12
between the objects will expand exponentially under the repeated application
of u1 if and only if the uncertainty ∆t of the temporal distance t12 expands
exponentially. We concluded above that they do indeed expand in this way.
However, the spatial distance r12 and the temporal distance t12 need not both
behave in this way. Let us discuss each of them in turn. This separation
means that we break Lorentz invariance of the discussion, and choose a specific
reference frame, distances measured by a specific observer.
Consider first temporal distances t12 between two objects O1 and O2 that
both belong to the past at some time n. We say that they both have presentness
attribute zero: Pr[O1] = Pr[O2] = 0. Say that O1 occurred first, and that
this event is assigned the time t[O1] = 0 in a given reference frame. Then
t[O2] = t12 > 0.
Clearly, O1 and O2 are pushed further and further back into history as u1 is
repeatedly applied to S(n). In this process, 〈t12〉 must stay fixed (Fig. 3.104).
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Figure 3.104: Schematic illustration of the evolution of the temporal distance
t12 between two objects or events O1 and O2. The expected distance 〈t12〉
cannot change, but the uncertainty ∆t12 must change according to the general
exponential expansion of the spatio-temporal part of state space S under re-
peated application of u1. For large enough m, the temporal ordering between
the events O1 and O2 in the evolved state umS becomes ambiguous. The inverse
evolution u−1m can only be applied for small enough m. If we exceed a given m,
we retrodict a state before O1 or O2 occurred. Compare Fig. 3.106.
This follows from the very idea of relational time. It does not make sense to
define it so that the time difference between a pair of events that have already
occurred increases with time. This time difference should characterize a relation
between the two events, not the temporal distance from which we look at them.
This means that the ordering between the events may become ambiguous
in the state umS for large enough m, as indicated in Fig. 3.104. Going in the
opposite direction, the expected time difference 〈t12〉 becomes more an more
sharply defined when m increases in the retrodicted state u−1m S(n). This process
comes to a halt when we reach a value of m for which O2 is no longer defined.
We have reached a point in the retrodicted history before this event took place.
Let us philosophize a bit about our conclusions. Suppose that we would
like to define relational time t so that temporal distances expand under the
application of the evolution operator. It would not be possible to give such an
expansion epistemic meaning, since it would not be possible to measure it.
As discussed in Section 2.5, to measure a distance essentially means to place
a number of reference objects between the two objects O1 and O2 whose distance
from each other we want to determine. The number of reference objects that can
be fitted between O1 and O2 is the measured distance. In the case of temporal
distances, this means to count the number of reference events that takes place
between O1 and O2. These reference events may be heartbeats or ticks of an
artificial clock. But a general expansion of the time scale under u1 would mean
that the temporal distance betwen all events increase, including the reference
events. However, the number of reference events fitted between O1 and O2
would not change. Therefore the measured distance would not change.
We may extend this reasoning to argue that it does not make sense to say
that the temporal distance between successive sequential times n and n+1 vary
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with n. Actually, t(n+ 1)− t(n) cannot be measured at all, since, by definition,
we can put no reference objects between the two events that follow imediately
after each other. If we would like to, we can define a basic unit of relational
time t0 and say that
〈t(n+ 1)− t(n)〉 = t0 for all n, (3.461)
and also
t(n+ 1)− t(n) ≥ tmin for all n. (3.462)
Note that such a basic unit of temporal distance has to be defined in a
reference frame that is at rest with respect to the two events O1 and O2 that
defines the temporal updates n − 1 → n and n → n + 1, respectively. If it is
the same subject k who experience both these events, the reference frame of
interest is the rest frame of this observer (compare the discussions in relation
to Figs. 1.25 and 3.65). We have also concluded that we are free to choose
a smallest observable time distance tmin. The necessity for such a minimum
distance reached from a slightly different point of view in Section 3.8, in the
form of Statement 3.91.
We can reformulate Eq. [3.461] to a statement about the uniform flow of
time under the repeated application of the evolution operator. That is, we can
without loss of generality define relational time t so that the following claim
holds true.
Statement 3.137 (Time evolves uniformly). For each pair of physical states
S and umS we have 〈t[Om] − t[O0]〉 = mt0 and t[Om] − t[O0] ≥ mtmin, where
Om is a present object in umS, and O0 is a present object in S.
Let us turn from the non-existent expansion of time to the hypothetical
expansion of space. We do not run into the same problem of lack of a reference
distance when it comes to measurement of the expansion of space. The reason
is the existence of bound states. If these are insensitive to the expansion, they
can be used as a fixed ruler to put in between the growing distance between
unbound objects (compare Fig. 3.62). This means that it may be possible to
have an epistemically well-defined exponential expansion of space.
We consider now the spatial distance r12 between pairs of objects O1 and
O2 that are present at some reference time n, having presentness attribute
Pr[O1] = Pr[O2] = 1. Suppose that they are identifiable, so that we can
track them as u1 (or its inverse u
−1
1 ) is repeatedly applied. This means that
SO1 ∩ u1SO1 6= ∅ and SO2 ∩ u1SO2 6= ∅ when the object states are represented
in object state space SO (Section 2.5). Regardless how many times we apply
u1, we always consider the present version of the objects, so that we consider
umSO1(n) and umSO1(n) when we speak about the distance between O1 and
O2 in the evolved state umS(n).
Let the expected distance between O1 and O2 in the state S(n) be 〈r12〉(n)
with uncertainty 〈∆r12〉(n). Then the evolved state u1S(n) must be such that it
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Figure 3.105: When the uncertainty ∆r12(n) of the distance r12(n) between two
objcts O1 and O2 increases due to the evolution um, the central value 〈r12〉(n)
of those allowed by the present physical state also has the potential to increase.
This is expected to happen if we have no additional knowledge at time n that
tells us whether small or large values are preferred in an observation at time
n + m with alternatives Sj . The expected value of 〈r12〉(n + m) is denoted
〈〈r12〉(n+m)〉.
allows an uncertainty eg〈∆r12〉(n), for some growth factor eg, which is expected
to be greater than one.
For some m ≥ 1 the evolved state umS(n) will be such that
um∆r12(n) = e
gm∆r12(n) 〈r12〉(n). (3.463)
As noted above, this means that umS(n) must allow for the elbow room to have
〈r12〉(n+m) ≈ egm〈r12〉(n). (3.464)
It does not mean, however, that the expected distance between the object has to
be increasing exponentially in this way. This will be the case only if there is no
additional potential knowledge at time n which tells us which of all the possible
distances within the range of uncertainty are more likely. In other words, it
will be the case only if all alternative distances have a symmetric probability
distribution, upon observation of 〈r12〉 at time n+m in a context C (Fig. 3.105).
In a fundamental context this would mean that the square modulus |Ψr(r12)|2
of the wave function is symmetric with respect to the middle point of its support
Dr12 .
Such an observation causes a state reduction that resets ∆r12(n + m) to a
smaller value. If 〈r12〉(n) is defined to be at the centre of the possible range
[rmin(n), rmax(n)] of distances at time n, then we may let 〈〈r12〉(n + m)〉 be
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the expected centre just before the observation at time n + m of the possible
range of distances just after the observation, given the probabilities specified
by |Ψr(r12)|2. The quantity may also be interpreted as the average value of
〈r12〉(n + m) after a large number of similar observations. We conclude that
without additional knowledge encoded in the state S(n) about the evolution of
r12 we have
〈〈r12〉(n+m)〉 = egm〈r12〉(n). (3.465)
Such an exponential expansion of distances can occur only if objects O1
and O2 are not in a bound state (Defintion 3.49). If we have knowledge at
time n that they are indeed bound to each other, and also knowledge about
the nature of the forces that keep them together, then nothing is expected to
change between times n and n+m. We have
〈〈r12〉(n+m)〉 = 〈r12〉(n). (3.466)
If O1 and O2 are not bound to each other, but there are nevertheless known
intercations or forces that attract them to each other, then 〈〈r12〉(n+m)〉 will
increase with time, but the separation may be slower than exponential. In cos-
mology, this happens becuase of the gravitational pull exerted on each object
by all the other objects. Still, since O1 and O2 are not bound to each other
by assumption, they are expected to fly farther and farther apart, so that fi-
nally the graviational force becomes negligible. Then the exponential separation
according to Eq. [3.465] sets in.
Statement 3.138 (Exponential expansion of space). If two objects O1
and O2 are in an unbound state, and if they are not attracted to or repelled
from each other by any known force, then the expected distance between them
increases exponentially with time. This situation occurs in unbound states after
sufficiently long time.
The statement starts with an ”If”. We have to assume that there are objects
in unbound states, that two objects farther apart than a certain large observable
distance are never bound to each other.
Suppose that all states are bound at some time n. For such states both 〈r12〉
and 〈∆r12〉 are stationary. In a situation described by the continuous evolution
equation [3.54], such stationary states are specified by the Dirac equation [3.55]
that do not depend on the evolution parameter σ and have a fixed rest mass
m0. More generally, 〈r12〉 and 〈∆r12〉 are invariant under u1. If all pairs of
objects were in bound states, there would be no uncertainty ∆r12 that increases
when u1 is applied to S. Since this is necessary to account for the exponential
expansion of state space, there would be no such expansion. The entire world
could be described as a stationary, bound state, so that u1S = S. This is
forbidden by the definition of u1, as illustrated in Fig. 2.12. We conclude that
there are indeed pairs of objects O1 and O2 at any time n that are not bound
to each other.
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Figure 3.106: Schematic illustration of the evolution of the expected spatial
distance r12 between two objects O1 and O2. In unbound states, both 〈r12〉 and
∆r12 increase when u1 is applied. Consequently, both these quantities decrease
when the inverse evolution u−11 is applied. In bound states, neither the expected
distance 〈r12〉 nor the uncertainty ∆r12 of this distance can change when u1 is
applied. Compare Fig. 3.104.
This means that at each time n there are distances r12 that are expected to
increase with time according to Fig. 3.105. We can remove the ”If” in Statement
3.138 and conclude the following.
Statement 3.139 (The cosmological constant is positive). There is a
sequential time n at which the expansion of space starts to accelerate. The ac-
celeration becomes exponential for large enough n, meaning that 〈r12〉(n) ∝ egn
for some constant g > 0, for large enough n, and for large enough distances
〈r12〉(n) between two identifiable objects O1 and O2 which have presentness at-
tribute Pr[O1] = Pr[O2] = 1 in the state S(n).
The above reasoning can be reversed. At each time n there are distances r12
and uncertainties ∆r12 between unbound states that are expected to decrease
under the application of the inverse evolution operator u−11 . There may also
be distances and uncertainties relating bound objects that stay constant. The
evolution of 〈t12〉 and ∆t12 was schematically illustrated in Fig. 3.104. Figure
3.106 provides the analogous illustration of the evolution of 〈r12〉 and ∆r12.
The existence of distances r12 in each state S that decrease under the appli-
cation of u−11 means that there are distances r12 between unbound, identifiable
and present objects in the state u−1m S such that
limm→∞ u−1m 〈r12〉 = 0,
limm→∞ u−1m ∆r12 = 0,
(3.467)
provided that the limit exists. To reach this conclusion, we must exclude the pos-
sibility that each distance r12 converge in a decreasing sequence (〈r12〉, u−11 〈r12〉, . . . , u−1m 〈r12〉, . . .)
462 CHAPTER 3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
Figure 3.107: The state space volume V [S] decreases as the inverse evolution
operator u−1m is repeatedly applied. Many states S, S
′, S′′, . . . have to converge
towards the same limit set ΣBB in a trajectory through state space S.
to a non-zero value limm→∞ u−1m 〈r12〉 = r(−∞)12 > 0. This is forbidden since it
would correspond to the entire world being in a bound limit state S(−∞) =
limm→∞ u−1m S with u1S
(−∞) = S(−∞). Such a fixed point state contradicts
the rule u1S ∩ S = ∅. In plain language, that something evolves means that
something changes.
Since distances between unbound objects go to zero according to Eq. [3.467],
we cannot have distances between bound states that stay constant in this limit.
All bound states have to be compressed and destroyed in this limit, if it exists.
Define
ΣBB(S) ≡ lim
m→∞u
−1
m S. (3.468)
Since u1 is assumed to be invertible (Assumption 2.3), it may seem natural
to assume that to each sequence (S, u−11 S, u
−1
2 S, . . .) corresponds exactly one
set ΣBB . However, ΣBB is a limiting set, and we cannot be sure that it belongs
to the domain of u1 (we will return to this matter below). Therefore, the
condition of invertibility may not apply to the limit expressed in Eq. [3.468],
and the hypothetical one-to-one correspondence may be broken. In fact, this
must be the case (Fig. 3.107).
What attributes can be used to characterize ΣBB? Can there be many such
limit sets? Clearly they all fulfil Eq. [3.467], so that spatial distances play
no role. Neither do temporal distances since t → −∞ according to Statement
3.137. What about momenta or velocities? Let v12 be the relative velocity
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between two present, identifiable objects O1 and O2. Then we may write, in a
notation that should be self-explanatory,
u−1m v12 ≡
∆r12(m)
∆t(m)
≡ u
−1
m r12 − u−1m+1r12
u−1m t− u−1m+1t
≤ u
−1
m r12 − u−1m+1r12
∆tmin
, (3.469)
where the inequality follows from Eq. [3.462]. Equation [3.467] then implies
that
limm→∞ u−1m 〈v12〉 = 0,
limm→∞ u−1m ∆v12 = 0.
(3.470)
Clearly, momenta can play no role either to distinguish different sets ΣBB(S)
and ΣBB(S
′), since they are all zero, just like distances. This means that
specific values of angular momenta and spin projections cannot be defined either.
Therefore the sets ΣBB(S) can be a function only of the purely internal values
of minimal objects.
Since spatial distances contract to zero as m→∞, all minimal objects must
undergo object merging (Section 2.17) until there is only one object left for high
enough values of m. This primordial ball will be characterized by the sets Υi of
possible total values of the internal attributes Ai that were discussed above (see
Eqs. [3.457], [3.458], and [3.459]). This is so beacuse of the additive conservation
law for internal attribute values in object division and merging that is expressed
in Eq. [2.80]. We may write
ΣBB(S) = ΣBB({Υi}). (3.471)
This means that all states S with given a given set {Υi} of allowed total values
of the internal attibutes Ai converge to the same limit set. Since there is a con-
tinuous infinity of possible values of the relational attributes that characterize a
physical state S, we conclude that the basin of attraction B(ΣBB({Υi})) ⊆ PS
contains a continuous infinity of elements S.
We have postponed the discussion about the existence of the limit limm→∞ u−1m S.
If we cannot make any sense of this limit, we cannot make any sense of ΣBB .
Recall that the evolution operator u1 is not defined for exact states Z, but only
for physical states S that encode a state of potential knowledge PK that can
actually be realized by some group of subjects (Statement 2.8). Already at
this point we conclude that the limit cannot exist. There cannot be any aware
observers in ΣBB . One basic reason for this is that there has to be more than
one object in any physical state that contains observers, since there has to be
a correspondence between the observed objects, and the objects of the body of
the observer that reacts to the observation (Section 2.11).
Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations (Statement 3.65) provide another reason
why ΣBB cannot be considered to be a physical state to which we can apply u1
or u−11 . Namely, Eqs. [3.467] and [3.470] show that ∆r12∆v12 = 0, contradicting
the condition ∆x∆px ≥ ~/2 that must be fulfilled for any object O with state
SO that is part of S.
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Figure 3.108: A model of the Big Bang, as described in Statement 3.140. The
Big Bang states SBB(S) are the first physical states, reached after M(S) ap-
plications of the inverse evolution operator u−11 to the present state S. The
singular Big Bang set ΣBB cannot be reached via physical law, but correponds
to an abstract extrapolation.
Instead, we must resort to the following picture. When we apply the inverse
evolution operator u−11 repeatedly to a state S, we finally reach a state SBB(S) =
u−M1 S such that u
−1
1 SBB(S) is not defined. The states SBB are perfectly normal
in the sense that we can apply u1 repeatedly to them and reach back to S. They
also have to fulfil SBB(S) ∩ SBB(S′) = ∅ whenever S ∩ S′ = ∅ like any other
state.
It is natural to depict the states SBB(S) as lying very close to each other
in a schematic sketch of state space S, since they are similar in the sense that
they are characterized by very small space-times (Fig. 3.108). Actually, the
space-time of SBB cannot contain any past objects, no time intervals ∆t12 > 0.
Therefore the space-time of SBB may be said to be degenerated.
Statement 3.140 (The Big Bang). For each physical state S there is a
positive integer M(S) such that SBB(S) ≡ u−1M(S)S is a physical state, but
u−11 SBB(S) is not defined. SBB is the ‘Big Bang state’ associated with S. A
set of Big Bang states can be associated with a single ‘Big Bang set’ ZBB.
We can define an invertible operator w1 such that limm→∞ w−1m SBB(S) = ZBB
whenever S ∈ B(ΣBB), where B(ΣBB) is a basin of attraction that contains a
continuous infinity of states S. However, w1 6= u1. The Big Bang state SBB is
abstract in the sense that it is a retrodiction via physical law that has not been
a physical state S(n) at any sequential time n ≥ 1. That is, S(n) 6= SBB(S) for
all n ≥ 1. The singular Big Bang set ΣBB is even more abstract in the sense
that we have to go outside physical law to reach it.
Chapter 4
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
In this section, I discuss some basic physical concepts and facts on which the
present approach may shed some new light. They are discussed item by item.
In this way the discussion takes the form of a summary of the main conclusions
reached in this study. I will focus more on the physical questions than on the
philosophical ones. In so doing, I will connect more clearly with the standard
vocabulary used by physicists than I have done in the main body of this text.
An example is the concept of entanglement, which I have not yet mentioned at
all. Nevertheless, I start with a brief summary of the philosophical perspective,
and of the crucial assumptions that makes it possible to use it as a tool.
Before that, I state my philosophical motto: to apply common sense. I have
tried to motivate the structure of physical law as a reflection of the structure
of our perceptions. Many physicists take the opposite road. They start with
the structure of physical law and argue that we should not try to relate it to
our everyday perceptions. Trying to do so is considered narrow-minded, and
purportedly leads to Newtonian mechanics, we we know is incorrect at a funda-
mental level. We are told that concepts such as entanglement and superpositions
cannot be understood in an ordinary sense, but should be regarded exclusively
as abstract, mathematical structures. I reject this view. In my view the lack of
everyday understanding of such formal concepts is due to the lack of a proper
dictionary of interpretation. I have tried to contribue to such a dictionary.
Philosophical perspective
The basic assumption is what I call intertwined dualism. Subject and object
are two indispensable aspects of the world, but it makes no sense to talk about
them separately. From this idea follows that the physical state can be described
as a state of knowledge. This knowledge can be seen as the tie between the
subjective and the objective aspect. This tie is assumed to exist at every level
of detail, meaning that there is no little object that is not rooted in a subjective
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perception, and there is no subjective perception that is not rooted in the state
of some objects. This is what I call the assumption of detailed materialism.
To be able to talk about knowledge, we have to add interpretatations to the
perceptions. Therefore a fundamental subjective ability to distinguish between
proper and improper interpretations has to be assumed, an ability that can-
not be analyzed further. To make the concept of knowledge a solid foundation
of a well-defined scientific world-view, we also have to distinguish between the
knowledge that we are aware of at a given moment, and the potential knowledge
that is possible to be aware of in principle. It is the latter that corresponds
to the physical state. Another requirement to make such a physical state well-
defined is that we let it correspond to the collective potential knowledge of all
perceiving subjects, rather than the potential knowledge of some random indi-
vidual. Implicit in this requirement is the assumption that the world is such
that it allows the existence of several subjects. The alternative is solipsism.
Regarding the structure of knowledge, it is assumed that all knowledge can
be expressed in terms of internal and relational attributes of a set of distinguish-
able objects. An internal attribute refers to a single object, whereas a relational
attribute relates two or more objects. Gain or loss of knowledge may cause ob-
jects to divide or merge. It is assumed that any given object can only be divided
a finite number of times, until we reach the level of minimal objects. These min-
imal objects can be identified with elementary particles. Minimal objects may
not be directly perceivable; their existence may have to be deduced from the
observation of other objects. Such deduced objects are called quasiobjects.
We may have complete or incomplete knowledge about the values of the
attributes that describe the objects. In the latter case there is a set of attribute
values (with more than one element) that cannot be excluded as the true one.
Any knowledge about the state of an object exludes some attribute values,
however. This exclusion may take the form of conditional knowledge. This
simply means the knowledge contained in an implication A → B. If A is a
value of one attribute, and B is a value of another, then we can exclude all
attribute value arrays of the form (A,¬B). Since the physical state is assumed
to correspond to a state of knowledge, any proper representation of the physical
state should allow the representation of incomplete and conditional knowledge
at the fundamental level.
To extract physics from the knowledge-based physical state we have to choose
an approach to the concept of time, so that we can express physical law appro-
priately. Here we treat time as an attribute that is fundamentally directed and
takes discrete values. That is, we treat it as a directed sequence of instants n.
Any change of perception experienced by a subject corresponds to a temporal
update from one instant to the next. If two subjects perceive changes, these
changes correspond to different temporal updates if and only if the separation
between the bodies of these subjects is time-like in the relativistic sense. The
physical state at any given time instant contains objects which belong to the
present, as well as those which belong to the past (like memories). Thus we
introduce a binary presentness attribute that applies to all objects. Any two
objects can be related with a measure of temporal distance t. If both the ob-
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jects have the value present of the presentness attribute, we always have t = 0.
The relational attribute t is analogous to the spatial distance r between any two
objects, and the two can be transformed into each other in a Lorentz transfor-
mation in the usual way. This means that we define an entire space-time for
each time instant n. In effect, what we do is to separate sequential time n from
relational time t. We use sequential time to define physical law as the mapping
of the physical state from one instant to the next.
A central concept in this study is that of identifiability and the associated
notion of identity. As time passes, we need a criterion to tell whether two objects
observed at different time instants is the same. This is necessary in order to
express physical law as the dynamics of objects. As indicated above, we have
adopted the usual reductionistic idea that all objects, and their dynamics, can
be modelled by minimal objects, and their interactions. That is, we assume
that the dynamics of all objects can be described in terms minimal objects
which preserve their identity as time passes. More precisely, we are never able
to exclude a model in which all individual minimal objects follow individual
trajectories. If two objects are observed at two different times, and the second
object can be modelled as the evolved state of the set of minimal objects that
model the first object, then the two objects are said to be one and the same.
The basic idea is that if we cannot exclude that they are the same, we have to
judge that they are the same. We say that the objects are quasi-identifiable.
To say that two directly observed objects are identifiable is a stronger claim.
This means that their states cannot be subjectively told apart at two successive
time instants, that they look the same, and therefore are judged to be the same.
The world preserves its identity as time passes if and only if there are some
objects that are identifiable in each temporal update. At each such update,
there has to some other objects that are not identifiable, that subjectively look
different. Otherwise we would be unable to define the passage of time. In the
same manner, a subject is said to preserve her identity as time passes if and
only if some of the objects she perceives stay the same while she perceives the
change of others. The objects that stays the same may be internal as well as
external; they may be related to her state of mind, her memories, as well as
things she sees. For example, a stem of a tree may stay the same as she watches
one of its leaves fall to the ground.
Philosophical assumptions
The above ideas are elements of a philosophical world-view, but cannot be used
to find the form of pysical law. To this end, we need another set of assumptions,
which constrains the form of such laws.
The most basic assumption is that of epistemic consistency. This simply
means that the potential knowledge at one time instant should not contradict
the potential knowledge at another, given the laws of physcis that determine
the evolution of the physical state from the first instant to the second. This
assumption may look like a tautology that adds no insight, provided the laws
of physics are always obeyed. However, it is no tatutology if we accept the idea
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that the physical state is a state of knowledge, and if we assume that knowledge
is inherently incomplete.
Namely, in that case we may deduce knowledge about a previous time instant
at a later time, and this knowledge changes the physical state at the previous
time, in a sense. In general we have to assume that two different physical states
at a previous time may evolve into two different physical states at a later time.
Therefore, the knowledge deduced afterwards could lead to an evolution that
creates a physical state at the later time that contradicts the state we actually
experience. An example is the interference pattern in a double slit experiment.
If we have seen such a pattern, it should be impossible to deduce afterwards
which slit the particle actually passed. Such knowledge would mean that no
interference pattern shows up, which contradicts the memory of this pattern in
the present state of knowledge. In essence, the condition of epistemic consistency
means that we cannot gain ‘too much’ knowledge about a situation afterwards.
A second important assumption is that of explicit epistemic minimalism.
This means that a proper representation of physical law does not allow entities
or processes that cannot be observed. A weaker form of this condition is that of
implicit epistemic minimalism. This means that the representation of physical
law does not require such entitites or processes. Another way to put epistemic
minimalism is to say that we should dismiss any expression of physical law that
makes use of distinctions that does not correspond to distinctions that can be
made subjectively, in the perception of the world and of ourselves. When we
write down physical law we are not allowed to make use of any fantasies, to
make anything up. All epistemic dead weight must be thrown overboard.
On the other hand, any proper expression of physical law must take into
account all entities and processes than can be observed in principle. We should
dismiss any expression of physical law that does not make use of all distinctions
that can be made subjectively, in the perception of the world and of ourselves.
We must take all epistemic baggage on board. We call this principle epistemic
completeness.
We may combine the conditions of epistemic minimalism and epistemic com-
pleteness to the the assumption of epistemic closure. Everything physical must
have an epistemic root, and everything epistemic must have a physical rep-
resentation. This principle embodies the assumption of intertwined dualism.
The subjective and objective aspects of the world are equally fundamental, and
cannot be separated.
Another constraint we put on physical law is that of epistemic invariance.
This is the idea that the evolution of an object should not depend on the amount
of knowledge we have about it. That is, gain or loss of knowledge about its
initial state cannot lead to a knowably different final state. We cannot affect
the evolution of an object just by taking on or off our glasses when we look
at it. Just like epistemic consistency, this principle is meaningful as a guide
to physical law only in the present epistemic approach, where we identify the
physical state with a state of knowledge, and this knowledge may be more or
less complete.
We also assume individual epistemic invariance. Just as the evolution cannot
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depend on how much knowledge we have about the evolving object, it cannot
depend who is having this knowledge. Physical law must be insensitive to a
change of perspective from one person to another when we look at a given
object. Again, this principle would not be necessary if the physical state did
not correspond to a state of knowledge, and this knowledge were not rooted in
a set of individual subjects.
Ontology
Even an epistemic approach to physics requires an ontology. Someone has to
exist who possesses the knowledge, as well as something which is the target of
the knowledge. Many people feel that quantum mechanics does not provide
a viable or coherent ontology. Therefore, these people argue, we must seek a
more fundamental model of the world. The present approach to physics does
not represent an alternative to quantum mechanics. Rather, it is an attempt
to motivate it from a set of philosophical assumptions. Here, we scrutinize
these assumptions to find their ontic basis. If the reader finds our motivation
of quantum mechanics convincing, she might consider the following short list of
four ‘beables’ to be a draft of the ontic basis of quantum mechanics.
First, we have emphasized that we must add an interpretation to get knowl-
edge from a subjective perception. This interpretation can be proper or im-
proper. The ability to distinguish between such interpretations must be as-
sumed in a knowledge-based approach to physics. Otherwise we do not get off
the ground. Further, in this approach, this ability must be seen as fundamen-
tal; it cannot be explained in terms of something else. This means, for example,
that we must assume the ability to distinguish dreams from reality. In terms
of the physical interpretation, this means the ability to locate the objects that
correspond to the subjective perception correctly: they belong either to our
own body, or to the external world. The existence of this fundamental ability
does not mean that we always make the correct interpretation. This fact gives
meaning to the word mistake. It just means that the distinction between correct
and incorrect interpretations exists as a basic quality of the world. To put it
solemnly: the truth is out there.
Second, the idea of intertwined dualism means that we assume the existence
of something outside our own body, the latter being a proper subset of the phys-
ical world. This ‘something’ matches the proper interpretation of some objects
as belonging to the external world, as discussed above. However, the knowledge
is incomplete about these external objects (as well as the knowledge about the
internal objects), as discussed under the next heading. Therefore they should
not be assigned precisely defined attribute values in proper representations of
the physical state, assuming that the physical state corresponds to a state of
knowledge. It should be stressed that these external objects and their attributes
are not assumed to exist objectively, regardless whether they are perceived by
any subject or not. Using the language of Kant, both the objects that are prop-
erly interpreted to belong to the body and those who belong to the external
world are things-as-they-appear-to-us rather than things-in-themselves.
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Third, physical law exists objectively. It is a quality of the world that tran-
scends ourselves in the sense that it cannot be changed or broken at will. It
also transcends our perceptions in the sense that it maps a state at time n to a
state at the different time n+1, whereas all our perceptions belong to the same
present time, even if some of these perceptions may correspond to memories of
past times. Under the heading epistemic closure we argue that physical law is a
reflection of the categories of perception that we are given, the distinctions that
we are able to make. This means that it should be possible in principle to deduce
the form of physical law from an analysis of such catergories and distinctions.
Much of the present text is devoted to this task. For example, we treat time
and its directed nature as fundamental categories of perception, and argue that
the Dirac equation emerges as a consequence. Such a connection between pure
thought an physics is viewed with suspicion by many, since it downplays the
role of experiment. However, it is unavoidable if we take materialism seriously.
Then our logic and the categories of perception are functions of the action of
the brain, which is a product of the action of physical law.
Fourth, there exist several subjects. You are not alone. This is acknowledged
by the fact that we treat the collective potential knowledge of all subjects taken
together as the entity that corrresponds to the physical state of the world. The
knowledge of each subject contribute to this knowledge, but is not sufficient as
a basis to construct a physical state to which physical law can be applied un-
ambiguously. Below we argue that the invariance of physical law under Lorentz
transformations is an expression of the fact that the world is arranged to ac-
commodate several subjects. If this is indeed so, the world continues to exist
after our individuality is lost, when we die.
The incompleteness of knowledge
I argue that potential knowledge has to be incomplete, since the bodies of the set
of all subjects is a proper subset of all objects in the world. Therefore the bodies
can never encode the exact state of the entire world. To reach this conclusion
we make use of the abovemnetioned assumption of detailed materialism. The
incompleteness of knowledge must be expressed in all representations of the
physical state and of physical law. This is the most basic conclusion in this
study. It opens the door for the philosophical assumptions discussed above,
gives them power, makes them useful as tools to chisel out the form of physical
law.
Physical states
We introduce the physical state S as the set of all states of complete knowledge
that are not excluded by our actual incomplete knowledge. This means that S
always has more than one element Z. From this fact follows that physical law
is not deterministic. If it were indeed deterministic despite the incompleteness
of knowledge, it would be impossible in principle to gain more knowledge at a
later time about those attribute values for which the knowledge is incomplete at
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the moment. It would be impossible to uphold the notion that these attributes
were independent variables. In effect, S would correspond to an exact state Z,
and the knowledge would be complete.
Trajectories of objects
Since two successive time instants correspond to a knowable change, we have
S(n)∩S(n+ 1) = ∅. We may also introduce the state SO of an object O. This
object is identifiable if and only if SO(n)∩SO(n+1) 6= ∅. The object we look at
at times n and n+ 1 is the same. Naturally, there has to be at least one object
O′ such that SO′(n) ∩ SO′(n + 1) 6= ∅, so that we get the required knowable
change.
An identifiable object does not have to be static, as illustrated in Fig. 2.33.
In contrast, in a world with complete knowledge, an object is identifiable only
if its state does not change: SO(n) = SO(n + 1) = SO(n + 2) = . . .. This
means that the existence of a well-defined, non-trivial notion of identifiablity
relies on a knowledge-based physical state in a world where knowledge is incom-
plete. Traditional discussions about the foundations of physics do not address
the problem of identifiability even though the notion of objects that we follow
through time is central to almost all attempts to formulate physical law.
Conservation laws
The concept of identifiability is central to our analysis of conservation laws in
particle reactions. If the nature of the incoming and outgoing particles is not the
same, we cannot use an overlap of their object states SO during a sequence of
time instants that contains the reaction as a defining criterion for the statement
that the outgoing particles are produced from the incoming ones, that they
should be associated to each other. However, the assumed difference in their
nature means that there is no such overlap.
Instead, the association of the incoming particles with the outgoing ones has
to be accomplished by a relation between the internal attributes that define
their nature. We argue that the only way to create an unambiguous association
is to postulate discrete values of the internal attributes, and conservation laws
that stipulate that the sum of their values in the set of incoming particles should
be the same as the sum of their values in the set of outgoing particles.
The conservation laws for energy and momentum has a different source.
They are simple consequences of the relational nature of these attributes. It
has no epistemic meaning to say that the total energy or momentum of a set
of particles isolated from the environment changes with time, since such an
environment is necessary to define the change. Since there is no basis for a
distinction between the values of these attributes before an after a reaction
among the set particles, the values have to be considered the same in any proper
numerical representation of their state and its evolution. Of course, in practice
there is always an environment to any system under observation. However, in a
carefully designed experiment we minimize the interaction between the system
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and the environment. This minimization corresponds to a minimzation of the
deviation from the conservation laws that hold in the idealized limit of complete
isolation.
Statistics of identical particles
It is epistemically meaningless to treat a permutation of a pair of identical par-
ticles as a new state. Therefore the assumption of explicit epistemic minimalism
implies that we get the wrong answer to physical questions if we do treat such
permutations as different. This is indeed the case, since no gas obeys Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution perfectly, and the deviation from this distribution grows
when the hypothetical effect of such permutations becomes more important.
Pauli’s exclusion principle
It does not make epistemic sense to say that two objects are found in the same
state. To say that we have two of something, we have to able to separate what
we are talking about into two parts. To do that the two parts must differ
in some respect. In our vocabulary, there has to be an attribute whose value
is knowably different in the two objects. Explicit epistemic minimalism then
requires that we get wrong physical answers if we treat a theoretical arrangement
with several objects in the same individual state as a possible collective physical
state. This is Pauli’s exclusion principle, which leads to Fermi-Dirac statistics.
What about bosons and Bose-Einstein statistics? We claim that all objects
are indeed composed of elementary fermions. Elementary bosons are different
kinds of entities, for which the above argument does not apply. We return to
this matter below.
Angular momentum and spherical symmetry
If an object is perfectly spherically symmetric, then it is impossible to tell
whether it is rotating or not. There is no marker that makes it possible to
trace the rotation. It would go against epistemic minimalism to assign a non-
zero angular momentum to such an object, since it is a value that cannot be
checked. Indeed, quantum mechanics always assign zero angular momentum
to an object in a bound state with a spherically symmetric spatial probability
distribution.
Relativity and the existence of many subjects
We argue that the finite speed of light can also be seen as a consequence of
explicit epistemic minimalism. Namely, since the idea of absolute speed has no
epistemic meaning, physical law should make it impossible to uphold this idea.
As long as the addition law for velocities (Eq. [1.1]) always hold, we can indeed
uphold such a notion, by choosing an arbitrary object as the origin at rest in
a universal spatial coordinate system. To exclude this possibility, we have to
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introduce a finite maximum velocity - the speed of light. To give such a speed
epistemic meaning, all subject must agree on the value of this velocity.
To arrive at the Lorentz invariance of physical law from such an invariance
of the speed of light, we have to make use of a thought experiment in which two
observers who are moving in relation to one another measure the spatial and
temporal distance between a given pair of events. We also have to make use
of the assumption that the results of both measurements are equally valid. We
have observer democracy. In our fancy terminology, we may say that we apply
the assumption of individual epistemic invariance.
This argument relies on the possibility that two subjects observe the same
object or event. This corresponds to the prescence of several subjects in the
same objective world. That is, Lorentz invariance means that the world is
arranged to accomodate many subjects. In other words, the fact that physical
law seems to be Lorentz invariant is an argument against solipsism. If you were
the only aware observer, there would be no need for Lorentz invariance to make
physical law consistent.
We may say that Lorentz invariance is an example of the fact that the content
of the physical state S is individual, whereas the form of physical law which acts
on S is collective. By the ‘content’ of the state we mean the measured values
of attributes, for instance the spatio-temporal distance r4 between two events.
These are always based on individual perceptions. By the statement that the
form of physical law is ‘collective’ we mean that it is neutral to any discrepancies
of measurements made by different individuals.
Another example of the interplay between the individual and the collective
in representations of physical law is the concept of straightness (Definition 2.33).
We regard the individual ability to distinguish the straight from the curved as
a fundamental assumption, and we try to use it as a tool to derive physical
law (see below). Without the use of straightness as a fundamental quality
it is impossible to talk about forces and interactions that bend trajectories.
Nevertheless, since acceleration cannot be defined in an absolute sense, the
judgement that something is straight cannot be transcended from the individual
to the collective realm. Different individuals may judge straightness differently.
Again, the form of physical law must be neutral to any such discrepancies.
This is the equivalence principle. We may therefore say that both special and
general relativity gives support to the idea that the world is arranged to host
both individual subjects and collections of subjects.
To conclude, the evolution of a world in which many individuals live cannot
depend on attribute values on which these individuals may disagree. Then the
world perceived by the different individuals would not stay the same, contrary
to assumption. Conversely, the fact that physical law is neutral to such dis-
agreements supports our identification of the physical state with the collective
state of potential knowledge, and also the common sense idea that we are many
people living in the same world.
As a side note, if the evolution of the world indeed depends on the collective
state of knowledge only, it does not lead to any epistemic inconsistency if an
individual subject transcends her personal knowledge and gains direct access to
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the knowledge of other subjects, or to the ‘pool’ of collective knowledge. Nothing
really changes in that case. In other words, the present approach to physics does
not exclude ESP, like remote viewing. However, any hypothetical knowledge
gained in such an unconventional way must still be within the collective potential
knowledge at the time it is acquired, meaning that it belongs to the personal
potential knowledge of someone. Otherwise we do risk inconsistencies.
In summary, the fact that different aspects of physical law can be successfully
represented in a way that takes into account the interplay between the individual
and the collective can be seen as a hint that the subjective aspect of the world
should be divided into several individual parts.
State representations, quasiobjects and reductionism
The definition of the physical state S given above is purely conceptual. To
do physics, we need a mathematical representation S¯ of S. There may be
several proper representations of the same state S. This means that two such
representations S¯ and S¯′ may encode the same state of knowledge. For example,
a rigid translation of all spatial coordinates changes the representation, but not
the physical state. The distinction between the state S and its representation
S¯ is used at several places in this study. It provides the basis for the motivation
of the gauge principle, for instance (see below).
A quasiobject is an object that is not directly perceived, but is deduced from
the observation of other objects. Elementary particles are examples of quasiob-
jects. It is sufficient to consider the directly perceived objects to specify the
physical state S, but its representation S¯ may contain quasiobjects as symbolic
elements. The advantage of using quasiobjects in S¯ is that physical law can
be efficiently expressed in terms of interactions between the small parts of the
perceived objects. If we divide an observed object into sufficiently small parts,
these inevitably become quasiobjects.
It is the principle of reductionism that allows us to express physical law
in terms of such small parts, ultimately elementary particles. We may look
at reductionism as a consequence of epistemic invariance. The evolution of a
state of enhanced knowledge attainable in principle should be consistent with
the evolution of the actual state of lesser knowledge. Loss or gain of knowledge
should not in itself enable different behavior.
An enhanced state of knowledge may correspond to the division of each
perceived object into smaller parts. Knowledge increases in such an imagined
process since the total number of perceived objects increase. Therefore we
may account for the behavior of the macroscopic objects we actually perceive
in terms of its microscopic constituents, even if we are not directly aware of
these constituents. However, we must first check in a spot test the extent
to which the perceived objects can actually be divided. If we try to express
the physical state and physical law in terms of even smaller parts, we get an
improper representation, which should be contradicted by experiment according
to the assumption of explicit epistemic minimalism.
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The superposition principle and the linearity of evolution
What we are saying is that the evolution u1 of a state S of lesser knowledge,
where we do not actually see the smaller parts of the observed object, is consis-
tent with the evolution of each possible state of greater knowledge, where we do
see the detailed composition of this object. Let us assume that there are only
two microscopic alternatives S1 and S2 that are consistent with what we see.
Then we may write S = S1 ∪ S2 and conclude that u1S = u1S1 ∪ u1S2. If we
choose particular representations S¯, S¯1 and S¯2 of these states, we may formally
write S¯ = S¯1 + S¯2 and u¯1S¯ = u¯1S¯1 + u¯1S¯2. These relations express the super-
position principle and the linearity of evolution. They are both consequences of
epistemic invariance.
Observations and measurements
Any perceived change can be regarded as an observation. Such observations are
the driving force of the flow of time, since they are responsible for each temporal
update n→ n+ 1.
A measurement is a particular kind of observation, in which the observed
system is prepared at time n so that it is known at that time that one of M
prepared alternative states Sj of the system will be observed at some later time.
Schro¨dinger’s cat
A superposition of two alternatives S1 and S2 means that they can both be
realized in principle, but that it is currently unknowable which is true. Therefore
a cat in a closed box, who dies if a radioactive nucleus decays, is not dead and
alive at the same time. A superposition of the two alternatives rather means
that nobody knows whether it is dead or alive. If the cat is a conscious being, it
may judge for itself. Someone knows whether the cat is dead or alive - the cat
itself. The perceptions of the cat contribute to the state of collective potential
knowledge in such a way that there cannot be any superposition between its life
and death. This resolution of the paradox relies on the assumption that it is
the collective state of potential knowledge that determines the physical state,
rather than the knowledge of a given individual, like the cruel experimenter.
If the cat is not a conscious being, then there is no mystery either. Then it is
just a big lump of matter that is in a superposed state. This may also be called a
mysterious state of affairs, however. How can a big object be in a superposition
between two very different macroscopic states? From the epistemic perspective,
this is not strange at all. We just have to isolate the object well enough so that
no aware being is able to decide, now or later, which is the true current state of
the object. Of course, it is harder to achieve the necessary isolation if the object
becomes bigger, or the observers gain access to more sensitive instruments. But
these are practical difficulties, in the end. We may have an entire galaxy in
a superposition between the alternatives that it is spiral or elliptical. This is
possible if there are no intelligent observers inside the galaxy or within a certain
very large distance.
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Probability
In a measurement, we may or may not know the probability of each alternative
Sj . Since we identify states of knowledge with physical states, probabilities are
defined only if they are known beforehand.
If the probability of an alternative state Sj of the observed system O exists,
then it can be identified with the volume V [Sj ] of Sj , divided by V [SO], where
SO is the state of O. The volume of a state is the number of exact states Z of
complete knowledge that is consistent with the actual knowledge.
Exact states Z cannot be counted. They are abstract entities with no indi-
vidual physical meaning, since, by the incompleteness of knowledge, they cannot
be observed. This means, for example, that the evolution of an exact state is not
defined. You may say that they are introduced just to dress the statement ”we
know that there is something we cannot know anything about” in set-theoretical
clothing. Consequently, only relative volumes can be known, like the probability
V [Sj ]/V [SO].
Born’s rule
Consider a measurement such as that in Fig. 3.11(c). It is known at the start
of the experiment at time n that the specimen OS that is going to be observed
realizes one of a given number of predefined alternatives in an intermediate
process before it is actually observed. However, it is also known at time n that
it is forever outside potential knowledge which of these alternatives is realized.
Then explicit epistemic minimalism says that we get wrong predicitions for the
final measurement performed on the specimen OS if we treat these intermediate
alternatives as if we could actually know which of them was chosen by OS. This
means that the multiplication law for probabilities (Eq. [1.2]) cannot be used.
We argue in Section 3.4.2 that the only alternative to that multiplication law
that is generally applicable is to assign complex probability amplitudes to each
alternative and use Born’s rule to calculate probabilities to the alternatives that
define the final outcome of the measurement.
We cannot assign probabilitites to the intermediate alternatives, since the
outcome of these are never checked, and such probabilities therefore would have
no epistemic meaning. In contrast, none of our philosophic assumptions prohibit
the use of complex probability amplitudes.
To motivate the introduction of probability amplitudes and Born’s law, we
could equally well appeal to epistemic completeness as epistemic minimalism.
Namely, there is a knowable, fundamental distinction between what is part of
potential knowledge and what is not part of this knowledge. Since knowledge
is incomplete we know that this demarcation line must exist, even if it may be
impossible to locate it exactly (Fig. 1.12). The existence of this distinction or
demarcation line must be reflected in the physical representation. Such a dis-
tinction is introduced in the formalism if we treat the calculation of probabilities
differently in the two cases.
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Properties and operators
A property P is a statement about attributes of objects. We may define a set
P that contains all those exact states Z such that the property can be defined
among the objects that are present in this state. Likewise, we may define sets
Pj ⊂ P containing all those exact states for which the value of property P is pj .
The sets P and Pj resemble the object state SO and the alternative outcomes Sj
of a measurement, respectively. However, there is a fundamental difference. The
sets associated with properties are abstract. They do not refer to any physical
state of a system, or to the possible results of an experiment performed on this
system.
Property values may or may not have an inherent ordering, even if the values
of all attributes are ordered. Property values that are not ordered are those
whose values are instances of a categorical property, like the species of birds. In
either case, we may formally label each attribute value with a number pj .
We may formally identify each property P with a linear, self-adjoint oper-
ator P¯ in the following sense. To each set Pj we associate an eigenvector P¯j
in a Hilbert space HP . The corresponding eigenvalue is pj . This construc-
tion is regarded as the basis for the association in quantum mechanics between
observable properties and self-adjoint operators.
The evolution parameter
Let us say that an experiment is started at time n, and that the measurement is
made at time n+m. The value of m is variable. We may introduce a continuous
evolution parameter σ that interpolates between the integer values of m. An
increase of σ means that the expected relational time t passed between the start
of the experiment and the measurement increases. In practice, a variation of
σ may correspond to a movement of the detector in the experimental setup, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.33.
The evolution parameter is no attribute, it is just an abstract parameter
introduced in order to express continuous evolution equations. In contrast,
relational time t is an attribute. It may be one of the observable properties
measured in the experiment. The essential difference between our approach
to evolution equations and the conventional one is that we release relational
time from its duty to evolve the state. It becomes an observable distance on
equal footing with spatial distances x. This liberation of t is enabled by the
separation of sequential and relational time, and makes it possible to express
evolution equations with full relativistic symmetry.
The wave function
There is a finite number M of possible outcomes of the measurement in any
experiment, corresponding to an alternative Sj . We may associate a complex
probability amplitude aj to each of these outcomes. If we consider a family
of experiments parameterized by σ, we may write aj = aP (pj , σ). The latter
function is the wave function. It is defined as soon as an experiment is started at
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time n in which the value pj of property P is known to be measured at som later
time n + m. Further, the probabilities |aP (pj , σ)|2 should be part of potential
knowledge already at time n. As soon as the measurement is performed at time
n+m, the wave function is no longer defined.
Continuous wave functions ΨP (p, σ) are just convenient approximations to
the actual, discrete wave function aP (pj , σ). They can be used to simplify
calculations whenever property P can take more or less continuous values, and
the number M of alternative outcomes is large.
Apart from their finite life time, the wave functions used here differ from
the conventional ones in another respect: they typically have finite support. A
spatial wave function that can take non-zero values arbitrariy far away corre-
ponds in the present approach to a specimen for which we have absolutely no
idea where it is located at the start of the experiment. This is seldom the case
in a controlled experiment. We may, for example, consider a specimen which is
emitted from a source with a known position, like an electron from an electron
gun. In general, we may regard the support of the wave function as the projec-
tion of the state SOS onto the plane in state space defined by the property P
we are about to observe (Fig. 3.37).
The state space and Hilbert spaces
We see that the wave function has a very limited range of validity in the present
approach to physics. It is only defined in carefully designed experimental situ-
ations during a limited amount of time. Even so, it is used in exactly the same
manner as in conventional quantum mechanics to extract probabilities for the
outcomes of such experiments.
This means that the Hilbert space is not the fundamental state space. It
ceases to exist as soon as the corresponding experiment is completed. We can
define a new Hilbert space in another experiment. This Hilbert space may look
different from the first one. This happens, for example, if we measure a different
property P ′, or use a detector with a different resolution, leading to a different
number M ′ of possible outcomes.
Rather, the fundamental state space is the set S of all possible states Z of
exact knowledge in which the physical states S live. The fundamental temporal
evolution S(n) → S(n + 1) can be expressed as a mapping from the power set
of S to itself.
State reductions and wave function collapse
By a state reduction we mean a temporal update n → n + 1 such that the ob-
served change that defines the update is not completely determined by physical
law, as expressed in the evolution operator u1. Symbolically, S(n+1) ⊂ u1S(n).
The physical state suddenly shrinks.
The Hilbert space in which one of the M possible values pj is measured is M -
dimensional, with a basis {S¯j}, where S¯j is a representation of the corresponding
alternative Sj . This representation takes the form of a vector that is orthogonal
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to all the other vectors S¯j′ in the set {S¯j}. The wave function is an element in
this Hilbert space, as usual.
When pj is measured, we might say that the wave function collapses. Such
a collapse always corresponds to a state reduction, since Sj ⊂ u1SO whenever
there are more than one ralizable alternative. However, after the measurement,
the wave function is no longer defined at all if no further measurements will take
place in the experiment. The wave function not only collapses, it is completely
lost.
We may, however, define an experiment such that we know from the outset at
time n that two or more measurements of different properties will take place in
succession. In such an experiment, the continued existence of the wave function
can be motivated. Then there is a pair of integers (m,m′) such that m′ > m,
and such that the measurment of property P takes place at time n+m and the
measurement of property P ′ takes place at time n+m′. Then we may say that
the wave function collapses in the ordinary sense at time n + m, and is lost at
time n+m′ (Fig. 3.38).
In summary, we may say that a wave function collapse is a state reduction
after the first measurement in a well-defined experiment in which two properties
are measured in succession. Clearly, the state reduction is the fundamental
concept.
Decoherence and wave function collapse
Some physicists seem to argue that state reductions or wave function collapses
are not necessary as a fundamental ingredient in proper physical models. They
are considered to be just an apparent effect of decoherence. It is true that the
measureable effects of a wave function collapse may look the same as those of
decoherence. In a double slit experiment, the interference pattern disappears in
a similar way if we gain knowledge about which slit the electron passed, as if
the electron is entangled with contaminations in the experimental setup.
But the causes of the loss of interference pattern are very different in the two
cases. In the first case it disappears since we gain knowledge about the electron
path. In the second case it disappears because we lose knowledge about the
electron phase. Decoherence and de-superposition are different things, and I
can see a conceptually important role to play only for the latter. The fact that
we lose the chance to confirm experimentally that the two paths are superposed
when decoherence destroys the interference pattern does not mean that the
paths are no longer superposed. That there is a mess of footprints in the mud,
obscuring the footprints of the murderer, does not mean that the murderer did
not pass.
Intention and choice
Given a choice of property P to be measured in an experiment, standard quan-
tum mechanics provides the probabilities for different outcomes. The theory
does not address how the choice of P comes about, which basis is chosen in
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Hilbert space. Nevertheless, this choice determines the future state of the world,
since it determines in advance from which set of orthogonal state vectors the
future state is to be picked. Quantum mechanics does not try to reduce this
choice to someting else, to a consequence of some other component of the theory.
In a sense, it therefore accepts free will as a starting point. Strangely, this fact
is seldom discussed. Most often, physicists say that free will is not relevant to
quantum mechanics since we cannot influence the probabilities for the alterna-
tive outcomes of a given experiment. However, the word given is crucial in that
sentence.
One may say that the choice of property P is the outcome of another ‘ex-
periment’ taking place in the experimenter’s head, and that probabilities are
defined for this meta-experiment. However, we argue that we end up in infinite
regress if we continue along this road. In particular, we argue that probabilities
must be knowable to someone in advance to deserve that name. This condition
cannot be fulfilled for such meta-experiments.
Just like many people have done before me, I define free will negatively:
as choices that cannot be predicted by anyone, neither deterministically, nor
probabilistically. The existence of such choices or events corresponds to a ‘white
hole’ in physical law, at least if the physical sate is identified with a state of
knowledge. I argue that intentionality can flow out of such white holes, from
the subjective to the objective aspect of the world, leading to objective effects
without knowable cause. I try to define individuals as aware entities capable of
independent intentions and choices. It is important to stress that a clear-cut
distinction between the individual and the collectice is necessary in the present
approach to physics. The interplay between the individual and the collective is
crucial in several places of the construction.
That said, my attempts to describe individuality, intention and choice with
the help of the epistemic formalism should be seen as provisional (Sections 2.11,
2.12, 2.13 and 2.14). The proposed definitions and statements are not heavily
used in the subsequent sections where the focus is on more traditional physics. I
include my attempts merely to stress that since I consider the subjective aspect
of the world to be as fundamental as the objective aspect, it should be possible
to formalize the structure of the subjective aspect in an analogous manner as
the structure of the objective aspect is formalized in traditional science. I do
not see these matters very clearly myself. However, even if some or all of the
proposed ideas along this line are misguided, there should be a way forward.
Entanglement
Consider a specimen OS such that we know at the start of the experiment at
time n that it has two parts O1 and O2 with physical object states SO1(n) and
SO2(n), respectively. Suppose that the object states SO1(n) and SO2(n) are
related by conditional knowledge. This may mean that we know at the start of
the experiment that if we learn something new about O1 at time n + m, then
we may automatically learn something new about O2, without actually looking
at it. Alternatively, it may mean that if we learn something new about O2 at
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time n + m, then we may automatically learn something new about O1. In
traditional language we say that the states of the two parts are entangled.
In the first case there is an exact state Z1 of part O1 and an exact state
Z2 of part O2 such that Z1 ∈ SO1(n) and Z2 ∈ SO2(n). However, if Z1 ∈
SO1(n + m) then Z2 6∈ SO2(n + m). In the second case we may use the same
pair of exact states to say that if Z2 ∈ SO2(n + m) then Z1 6∈ SO1(n + m).
The pair of exact object states (Z1, Z2) is excluded in the state SOS of the
entire specimen OS even though Z1 and Z2 are not excluded individually as
possible exact states of its parts O1 and O2, respectively. Formally, the condition
for the presence of conditional knowledge or entanglement at time n becomes
SOS(n) ⊂ SO1(n) ∩ SO2(n). In contrast, if there is no conditional knowledge
or entanglement between the parts of the specimen, then SOS(n) = SO1(n) ∩
SO2(n). These matters are discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.5.
In experiments in which measurements are made on both parts O1 and O2 of
the specimen, this definition of entanglement translates to the usual condition
that the combined wave function for the two parts does not factorize to a product
of two wave functions that describe each part individually.
In essence, we regard entaglement to be nothing more than the representation
in the physical state of the knowledge contained in a logical implication A→ B,
in the absence of any knowledge whether A is true. The pair of logical states
(A,¬B) is excluded just as the pair of exact physical object states (Z1, Z2). Of
course, this identification is made possible by our epistemic approach, in which
the physical state corresponds to a state of potential knowledge. In this way,
all the spookiness contained in the concept of entanglement evaporates. If we
consider entaglement spooky, we should also consider the conclusion B spooky,
after having learned A. In a way it is - it is a sudden leap of logic over an
abyss that we cannot look down into, that cannot be analyzed further, using as
a bridge the arrow of implication.
The reader might complain that the abstract objects in logical reasoning
which might have properties A and B are not material objects whose behavior
can be described by physics. Therefore they cannot be ‘entangled’, the reader
might argue. However, when we defined an object at the beginning of this
text, we did it in a very general way, as something we perceive that can be
distinguished from everything else we perceive. This quality is possessed by
logical objects as well, of course. Nowhere do we make use of any other qualities
of an object.
We have made one additional assumption though. We suppose that all
perceived objects corresponds to other perceivable objects in our bodies, and
we gave this assumption the name ‘detailed materialism’. In fact, the claimed
correspondence between entanglement and implications means that our logical
categories of thought are perfectly rooted in the material world, in accordance
with such a materialistic world-view.
We may even say that the existence of entangled physical states makes the
concept of logical implications meaningful. If there were no entanglement, there
would be no knowledge of A→ B without the additional knowledge whether A
is true. The implication iself would lose its independent meaning. The concept
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of physical law would also lose its meaning, since physical law can be seen as a
set of logical implications: ”If conditions A are fulfilled at time n, the physical
state will fulfil conditions B at time n+ 1.”
The existence of implications deduced from physical law are essential to vir-
tually all scientific experiments. When we observe a change in a macroscopic
detector, we can conclude that this corresponds to a well-defined event in a mi-
croscopic specimen only by means of knowledge a priori about the entaglement
between the states of the detector and the specimen.
Evolution equations
Consider an experiment such that probabilites of the alternative outcomes are
knowable beforehand. Then there is a Hilbert space and a wave function. In that
case we should be able to express an evolution equation for the wave function.
We can use the abstract evolution parameter σ in order to express a differential
evolution equation
dΨP
dσ
= iB¯PΨP , (4.1)
where B¯P has real eigenvalues, using the fact that the evolution must be unitary
since the probabilites of all alternatives must add to one regardless the value of
σ.
It should be stressed that differential evolution equations of this type are
always approximations. They apply exactly only in idealized experiments in
which the spatio-temporal resolution is perfect, so that the number M of al-
ternative outcomes becomes infinite. They also presupposes that an infinite
support of the wave function is allowed, corresponding to an detector that is
infinitely big.
In Section we 3.4.8 motivate the form of such an evolution equation in the
case where the measured property P is the spatio-temporal distance r4 traveled
by the specimen OS between the start of the experiment and the measurement.
We make use of the fundamental subjective distinction between straight and
curved trajectories. We may say that a specimen that is expected to travel with
constant speed along a straight trajectory is free; it does not interact with any
other objects as judged by the individual who performs the experiment. For
such a specimen we arrive at
B¯r4 =
c2~
2〈E〉. (4.2)
In so doing, we use the additional requirements that the evolution equation
must be Lorentz invariant and that the differential evolution operator B¯P cannot
depend explicitly on σ. This is so since σ is no attribute or property - a change of
its value does not change the physical state, whereas the evolved physical state
depends only on the previous physical state. Apart from Lorentz invariance,
we also use the self-evident fact that the equation must be invariant under
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stiff coordinate translations r4 → r4 + c, since we are dealing with relational
attributes.
Furthermore, to arrive at Eq. [4.2], we make use of what we call the natural
parametrization for which d〈t〉/dσ = 1. This means that we choose an evolution
parameter that mimics, in an averaged sense, the conventional evolution equa-
tions in which the relational attribute t is used as evolution parameter. Here
〈t〉 is the time that is expected at the start of the experiment to pass until the
measurement of r4 (including t) is performed.
Construction of momentum and energy
The quantity 〈E〉 in Eq. [4.2] can be identified as the expected energy of the
specimen. This is a constant that does not depend on σ, and it is not measured
in the experiment.
In our approach, momentum, energy and rest mass are not properties of
objects that are defined in the Newtonian sense via spatio-temporal relations
such as velocities and accelerations, in combination with the concept of force.
Rather, they are defined via the fact that certain operators always correspond to
properties. In our approach a property is defined simply as a region P in state
space S which can be divided into disjoint subsets Pj . These subsets correspond
to the property values pj , which must be observable in the sense that there must
be an object O whose state SO can fulfil SO ⊆ Pj for each j.
We argue in Sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.7 that a self-adjoint operator that acts on a
wave function can be associated with a property in this sense. The eigenvalues
are the property values pj . Performing a Fourier decomposition of the wave
function Ψr4 and using the evolution equation [4.2], we see that the triplet of
eigenvalues (p, p′,p′′) of the three self-adjoint operators
P¯r4 = i~ ∂∂t
P¯ ′r4 = − 2i~〈E〉c4 ddσ
P¯ ′′r4 = −i~∇
(4.3)
that share the same plane wave eigenfunctions fulfils the relation
p2 = p′c4 + |p′′|2c2. (4.4)
This equation is fulfilled for any choice of triplet (p, p′,p′′). Since we recognize
Einstein’s relativistic relation between energy, rest mass and momentum, we
can identify
p = E
p′ = m20
p′′ = p.
(4.5)
We may combine the first and third operator in Eq. [4.3] to a four-momentum
operator for a free specimen. By generalizing its definition according to Eq.
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[3.51], we may retain the form of the evolution equation according to State-
ment [3.54] even if the specimen is interacting, following a curved trajectory in
space-time.
The Dirac equation
Since Eq. [4.4] is fulfilled for any eigenvalue triplet (p, p′,p′′), we must have
p′ ≥ 0. However, there is nothing in the evolution equation [4.2] that guarantess
that this is the case. Indeed, for each wave function that solves the equation
with p′ = α there is another solution with p′ = −α. The only way to ensure
that p′ ≥ 0 is to say that the corresponding property P ′ is the square of another
property. This requirement is fulfilled by the identification of P ′ with the square
of the rest mass.
In the same way as we argued that any self-adjoint operator acting on the
wave function can be associated with a property, any property can be associated
with such a self-adjoint operator. This means that we can write
P¯ ′r4 = P¯
′′′
r4 P¯
′′′
r4 , (4.6)
where P¯ ′′′r4 is the operator associated with the rest mass, having eigenvalues m0.
Just as in conventional quantum mechanics, we can decompose a general
wave function into a sum of stationary states. In our approach this means
stationary wave functions ψr4(r4, p
′) that does not depend on σ. To ensure
that we always have p′ ≥ 0, we must make sure that this is true for each such
stationary state. This is done by requiring
P¯ ′′′r4ψr4 = p
′′′ψr4 = m0ψr4 . (4.7)
This is the Dirac equation. It is a constraint on stationary wave functions
that has to be fulfilled in addition to the defining condition
P¯ ′r4ψr4 = p
′ψr4m
2
0ψr4 , (4.8)
given by the evolution equation.
In essence, the Dirac equation follows from the directed nature of sequential
time n. This nature is reflected in the fact that the derivative with respect
to σ is first order in the evolution equation. In contrast, the derivatives with
respect to x and t are second order, reflecting the undirected nature of space
and relational time. It follows that p and p′′ are squared in Eq. [4.4], but not
p′. The absence of the last square means that we have to make sure ‘by hand’
that p′ stays positive, so that Eq. [4.4] becomes generally valid.
The structure of space-time
The release of t from the burden to evolve the wave function, from the double
task of being both a parameter and an observable, releases the full symmetry
between space-time and four-momentum space. A major conclusion along this
line is that the spectrum of space-time has both continuous and discrete parts,
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just as the spectrum of four-momentum. The discrete parts of space-time appear
in bound states, just as the energy levels become discrete in such states. More
precisely, if two objects are not bound to each other, we cannot exclude a priori
any spatio-temporal distance between them. In contrast, if they are are bound
to each other, we can exclude small enough distances even before we check them.
We need a bound state as a ruler when we measure distances (Fig. 3.62).
The discrete spectrum of space-time in bound states means that there should
be a minimum Lorentz distance lmin that can ever be measured. This means
that we can never confirm smaller distances in unbound states, but we cannot
exclude them either. It is therefore improper to say that space-time is discrete
per se.
The basic relation between space-time and momentum space is given by the
Fourier transform, of course. We may expect that the Fourier transform of
the wave function Ψr4 fulfils a reciprocal evolution equation with an evolution
operator that has the same form as Eq. [4.2], with the space-time derivatives
replace by four-momentum derivatives. To show that this is indeed the case, we
reverse the reasoning that led to the ordinary evolution equation above. In so
doing, we are able to derive the Einstein relation
E2 = m20c
4 + |p|2c2, (4.9)
provided we make the accurate association between these properties and the
corresponding operators. In deriving the reciprocal evolution equation, we go
the other way around, assuming the relativistic relation
c2t2 = l2 + |r|2. (4.10)
In this way we arrive at the reciprocal evolution equation, as displayed in Eq.
[3.327] together with the ordinary evolution equation, in order to make their
symmetry manifest.
It must be stressed that the reciprocal evolution equation does not express
the evolution with respect to time, but rather to energy. In the ordinary evolu-
tion equation a change of the evolution parameter σ represents a change in the
experimental setup such that the expected passed time 〈t〉 until measurement
changes. In the natural parametrization we may say sloppily that σ = 〈t〉. In
contrast, in the reciprocal evolution equation we imagine a continuous change
in the experimental setup such that we change the expected energy 〈E〉 at the
moment just before it is measured.
The conclusion mentioned above that space-time becomes discrete in bound
states is based on the possibility to make conjugate definitions of what a bound
state means. Using spatio-temporal coordinates it means that the distance be-
tween two objects is bound from above as t→∞. Using momentum coordinates
it means that their relative momentum is bound from above as E →∞. In other
words, the energy increase is absorbed as an increasing rest mass. The discrete
spectrum of space-time follows from symmetry of the conjugate pair of evolution
equations and their corresponding stationary states.
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We see in these considerations the conjugate roles played by t and E. This
is conventional wisdom, just like the conjugate roles played by r and p. What
is a little bit new, I think, is to see the Lorentz distance l and the rest mass
m0 as a conjugate pair of variables. The association makes sense since both are
relativistically invariant.
Just as we derived the Dirac equation from the fact that the rest mass
squared must be non-negative, we may derive a reciprocal Dirac equation from
the fact that the Lorentz distance squared must be non-negative (Statement
3.86). We argued that, in essence, the Dirac equation follows from the directed
nature of time. This becomes even more clear in the case of the reciprocal Dirac
equation. A negative squared Lorentz distance would mean that we leave the
light cone, so that the temporal ordering between events become ambiguous.
The roles of the pair of conjugate Dirac equations as constraints on space-time
and momentum space are illustrated in Fig. 3.56.
Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations
The conventional uncertainty relations ∆x∆px ≥ ~/2 and ∆t∆E ≥ ~/2 can
be derived in the usual manner from the wave function, using general qualities
of Fourier transforms. The only difference is that the time-energy relation can
now be interpreted in exactly the same simple way as the position-momentum
relation, since t has been released from its assignment as evolution parameter. It
can therefore be treated like any other observable, and may have an incompletely
known value.
Its successor σ is matched with the rest mass or rest energy in a conjugate
pair. Consequently, we get a new uncertainty relation ∆σ∆E20 ≥ ~〈E〉. In
the natural parametrization we may write ∆〈t〉∆E20 ≥ ~〈E〉. This relation
can be interpreted as to say that the uncertainty of the expected time until
measurement is inversely proportional to the uncertainty of the rest mass of
the specimen on which we make the measurement. This fact has consequences
regarding the possible masses of elementary particles, as discussed below.
Since wave functions are not always defined, the conventional derivation of
the uncertainty relations via Fourier transforms cannot be the fundamental one.
Even when the wave function is indeed defined, we should keep in mind that it
is never truly continuous, and that it typically has a finite support. That is, the
conventional treatment is an approximation at best.
To get to the bottom of things, we should look directly at the state space.
The fact that knowledge is always incomplete means that there are pairs of at-
tributes whose values cannot be known simultaneously. The conjugate attribute
pairs above are examples of such pairs. We may consider the projection of the
state of an object onto the plane in state space spanned by the members of such
a pair (Fig. 3.47). Basically, Planck’s constant is the minimum area of such a
projection. The existence of such a minimum area, a quantum of action, reflects
the fact that the state can never shrink to a point, to an exact state Z.
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The equivalence principle
So far, we have mainly talked about the evolution of a free specimen, which
is expected to travel along a straight line at constant speed. We have men-
tioned, however, that the quality of straightness is not absolute. To uphold
the distinction between straight and curved trajectories at least at the individ-
ual, subjective level, we need forces or interactions. These can be derived from
the gauge principle. Let us first discuss Einstein’s equivalence principle as an
example of the underlying reasoning.
The assumption of epistemic invariance means that it should be possible
to account for the perceptions of a subject locked into an elevator without
referring to specific unknown objects outside this elevator. The evolution of
her perceptions should be consistent with many different relations between the
elevator and the outside world. The amount of potential knowledge should
not matter. A feeling of being pressed against the floor should be consistent
with both gravity and acceleration. The existence of this subjective feeling is
treated as fundamental, whereas its interpretation as gravity or acceleration
is not. This approach conforms with the fact that it is impossible to define
absolute acceleration without referring to such a feeling. We fail if we refer to
spatio-temporal attributes alone; it is impossible in that way to judge whether
a body is accelerating or its entire environment is accelerating in the opposite
direction.
The gauge principle
Let us choose symbolic representations S¯1 and S¯2 of each of the two possible
environments to the elevator. This means, among other things, that we choose
two coordinate systems, one in which the elevator is gravitating towards an
outside body, another in which it is accelerating in empty space. To each of
these coordinate systems we may apply a global Lorentz transformation. Such
a pair of transformations just change the coordinate systems, not the physical
states themselves. They are redundancy transformations. We have seen that a
representation of a state of lesser knowledge can be represented as the sum of
the representations of each possible state of greater knowledge consistent with
the former state. We may therefore apply an individual Lorentz transforma-
tion L¯1 = L¯(v1) to S¯1 and another Lorentz transformation L¯2 = L¯(v2) to S¯2
without changing the physics, that is, the evolution of S = S1 ∪ S2. This may
be interpreted as the invariance of physical law under a local symmetry trans-
formation, that is, as the invariance under a gauge transformation. Therefore
the gauge principle can be seen as a consequence of epistemic invariance, since
this assumption is at the heart of the superposition principle and the linearity
of evolution.
We may say that the gauge principle makes it possible to derive gravity
as a necessary alternative explanation of the feeling of acceleration, given that
acceleration cannot be defined in any absolute sense. It is well known that
electromagnetism can be derived in an analogous way. The physical invariance of
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a global phase change in the wave function corresponds to the physical invariance
of a Lorentz transformation applied to a global coordinate system. They are
both redundancy transformations. The superposition principle, as stated above,
means that each small part of the wave function can be seen as a representation
of a state with more exact knowledge about the position of the particle. A
local phase change in this part of the wave function is therefore allowed, since
it corresponds to a global phase change in a possible state of larger knowledge.
Electromagnetism follows from the requirement that the evolution is invariant
under any such a local phase change.
We put forward the idea that the values of all attributes are inherently
ordered, and that any numerical translation of the entire set of ordered values
of each attribute is a redundancy transformation. That is, the numerical values
of the attributes have no physical meaning, only their ordering. If this is so, we
can use the gauge principle to constrain the form of physical law in a specific
way for each attribute, for each degree of freedom. Such a constraint can be
seen as an interaction or transformation. This is to say that to each degree of
freedom corresponds a gauge force. An example of such a degree of freedom
is the feeling of acceleration. The values of this degree of freedom are ordered
in the sense that we an decide subjectively the strength of this feeling. The
corresponding gauge force is gravity.
When we say that a rigid translation of the set of values of each attribute
is a redundancy transformation, we speak about attributes that are assigned
to individual objects. The reason why such translations are always redundancy
transformations is that numerical values of attributes only have meaning in
relation to other objects. In other words, the relation between two objects is
represented by one mathematical object pointing at one object, and another
mathematical object pointing at the other object. This is obvious when it
comes to relational attributes such as distance between two objects, which is
replaced by one position for each object. But the same situation occurs for the
internal attributes, giving rise to internal redundancies such as invariance with
respect to rotations in color space. In these cases, it is only the relation of the
values of the internal attributes of two interacting objects that is relevant: if
we rotate color space of all present baryons, the interactions between them stay
the same. The same invariance holds if we switch sign of the electric charges of
all particles in a system. The forces between them stay the same, and it cannot
be epistemically decided that the charge transformation has taken place.
The set of attributes or degrees of freedom that can be assigned to individual
objects defines the set of possible redundancy translations; we cannot choose
them freely. At the basic level, we may therefore say that it is from the set of
degrees of freedom of our perceptions that we derive the form of physical law,
rather than from the set of redundancy transformations that follow from any
attempt to represent these degrees of freedom numerically.
The statement that the values of each attribute are inherently ordered means
that they have an inherent relation. But to define a relation we need an inter-
action. We may say that we need a force to activate a degree of freedom, just
like we need to exert some force to open a chinese fan. Therefore, it would be
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a satisfying epistemic closure if there is a one-to-one correspondence between a
force and a degree of freedom. Such a closure would mean that all interactions
or transformations are possible to derive from the gauge principle. At an even
more basic level, we may say that there is an epistemic closure between the ex-
istence of forces and the ability, at the individual level, to distinguish between
straight and curved lines.
One may ask the following question: Since interactions are the result of the
redundancies that are created when the relation between several objects are
described by attribute values pointing at each individual object, wouldn’t the
interactions go away if we use a strictly relational representation of the physical
state? No, nothing would change, since interactions are changes in the states of
those individual objects we perceive, something which can only be defined in the
traditional, object-based representation. We naively associate a position to each
object in our field of vision, and define forces according to this representation.
In a strictly relational state representation, we would not be able to use the
gauge principle to derive forces, but on the other hand, the notion of force
would lose its intuitive meaning. In short, an object-based state representation
that deals with the resulting redundancies is the most natural way to represent
the physical state and physical law.
Classical and quantum description of forces
As long as we do not observe the trajectory of a specimen, we can always
describe it as if it is bending in response to an external force. This means that
we can use a description according to classical mechanics, or treat it according
to old-school quantum mechanics, where the evolution of the wave function is
affected by a potential. We get a continuous change of the expected direction
of motion as a function of the evolution parameter σ.
When we actually observe a change of direction, we can say that the dif-
ference between its initial and final momentum has been ‘emitted’ from the
specimen, finally to be ‘absorbed’ by another object. This is merely a game of
words as long as we allow arbitrarily small changes. But there is an inherent
discontinuity in the very concept of change. We must actually perceive a dif-
ference. This is why we treat sequential time as a discrete sequence of instants
n, rather than a continuous temporal axis with an arrow. We may therefore
speak about ‘quanta of change’. In the case of an observed change in the state
of motion of a specimen, we may speak in a meaningful way of a ‘quanta of in-
teraction’ that are emitted from from the specimen. They carry a given amount
of momentum, and possibly a given amount of other attributes such as angular
momentum, in order to fulfil the conservation laws for relational attributes.
This discrete description is more reminiscent of quantum field theory. The
continuous (classical) and discrete (quantum) descriptions are complementary.
Which description is appropriate depends on the experimental setup, the obser-
vations we are about to make, the detail of our knowledge. According to the
assumption of epistemic invariance the two descriptions cannot contradict each
other, since the amount of knowledge should not matter when we use physical
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law to predict the future.
Quantum mechanics and general relativity
The separation between sequential time n and relational time t means that the
so called ‘problem of time’ disappears in attempts reconcile quantum mechanics
and general relativity. There is no longer any conceptual contradiction between
the evolution equations in quantum mechanics and the static trajectories in the
space-time of general relativity. For each n there is an entire space-time (r, t),
possibly curved.
The static trajectories in space-time can be parametrized by the evolution
parameter σ according to (r(σ), t(σ)) to get motion into the relativistic picture.
For each sequential time instant n we get a snapshot (r(σn), t(σn)). Strictly
speaking, at each instant n, the points (r(σn−1), t(σn−1)), (r(σn−2), t(σn−2))
represent the memory at time n of the coordinates of the previous part of the
trajectory. Different observers may disagree about the value of the distance r4 =
(r(σn−1), t(σn−1))− (r(σn−2), t(σn−2)) between the two events that correspond
to the observation of the object along the trajectory at times n− 1 and n− 2.
Some observers may judge that the trajectory is straight, others may judge that
is curved.
Taking quantum mechanics into account just means that we allow for in-
complete knowledge about the position (r(σn), t(σn)) of the observed object. It
becomes a four-dimensional sphere rather than a point. We should also allow
for the memory of an event to get fuzzier and fuzzier as time goes, so that the
volume of the sphere that correponds to all points (r(σn−2), t(σn−2)) that are
not excluded by the potential knowledge at time n is expected to be greater
than that of all points (r(σn−1), t(σn−1)) not excluded by potential knowledge
at the same time.
The points (r4)j that define such a sphere should be read as follows: ”The
position of the object is (r4)1, or (r4)2, or (r4)3, or...” In an algebraic represen-
tation, the word ‘or’ is formally translated to ‘+’, so that the state of incomplete
knowledge is represented by a superposition. Some people reads the quantum-
mechanical ‘+’ as ‘and’, which leads to all sorts of nonsensical interpretations of
the formalism. This is the reading at the heart of the ‘many-worlds’ interpreta-
tion, as well as the idea that the shape of space-time undergoes wild fluctuations
at tiny scales, creating a ‘space-time foam’.
To observe the detailed structure of space-time, to determine whether it fluc-
tuates wildly or not, we need a massive apparatus. Only then are we allowed to
define a wave function that represents a superposition of more or less fluctuating
alternative space-times. The smaller scales we wish to probe, the more energy
we need to focus on this small area. This, in itself, means that space-time will
be wildly deformed, according to general relativity. But this is a result of our
actions, of our assembly of a powerful apparatus, our focusing of a high energy
beam on a small spot, rather than a property of space-time itself (whatever
that would mean). There is no storm in the sea of space-time if we do not start
blowing the wind ourselves.
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Elementary fermions and bosons
We have motivated the Dirac equation from the directed nature of time without
making any assumptions about the nature of the specimen to which it applies.
How does this go together with the fact that there are bosons with integer
spin? Are they not invited to the party? Are they not allowed as objects of
experimental inquiry?
Let us first distinguish between elementary and composite fermions. Implicit
in the derivation of the Dirac equation is the assumption that the specimen is
not spatially extended. This is so since we are considering a continuous wave
function specified by differential operators. Such an approximation is justified
only if the position of the specimen can be specified to arbitrary precision with
a single 4-vector r4. This means that it can apply to elementary fermions only.
We can compose bosons out of an even number of elementary fermions. Such
composite bosons can therefore be used as specimens in experiments, and they
can be observed as ordinary objects by the naked eye if they are large enough.
Therefore, we need to explain only why the elementary bosons should not be
regarded as proper objects.
What we try to do is to account for all such bosons as bookkeeping devices
without independent existence. We regard massless elementary bosons, such
as photons or gravitons, as abstract lists of attributes that make it possible
to say that object O1 is interacting with object O2. This is possible only if
the relational attributes of O1 changes by the amount ∆υ and the relational
attributes of O2 changes by the opposite amount −∆υ, given the conservation
laws for such attributes (Fig. 3.70). The elementary boson is just the list ∆υ
together with a hypothetical link between O1 and O2, indicating that these
objects may have been interacting. We call such an entity a pseudoobject. If
there is only one pair of objects whose attributes are observed to change by
the opposite amount, then the interaction is identifiable. If there are many
candidate object pairs, then we say that the interaction is quasi-identifiable.
The basic reason why we need such pseudoobjects is that two interacting
objects are most often separated spatio-temporally. We can make a subjective,
spatial distinction between Jupiter and Mars, at the same time as we say that
they interact gravitationally. The projections of their states onto space-time
do not overlap. An additional link is necessary to identify them as possibly
interacting.
By definition, two interacting objects preserve their identity in the process.
Their rest masses are not changing. Their energies may change, but does not
have to. If we are to assign any specific rest mass to a pseudoobject, we must
therefore set it to zero.
We have argued that implicit epistemic minimalism implies a finite upper
speed limit about which all subjects agree. What kind of entity can travel at
this speed? Any object is potentially perceivable, and by continuous observation
we can follow its trajectory. It may appear to travel very fast. But velocities
are relative, and we may equally well imagine that the object is at rest and that
you, the observer, is travelling equally fast in the opposite direction. A second
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observer who is moving in relation to yourself will always judge the speed of the
object differently than you do. It is clear that the upper speed limit cannot be
associated with any object.
On the other hand, the conclusion that two objects are potentially interact-
ing cannot depend on the state of motion of the observer. All subjects must
agree about that, according to individual epistemic invariance. If different sub-
jects had different opinions about the interactions of objects, universal physical
law would break down. We have two problems with one solution: it is the
pseudoobjects which travel at the speed of light, making the judgement which
objects are interacting with which unambiguous and universal.
In fact, it is not appropriate to say that pseudoobjects are travelling at all,
since they are no objects. Rather, we should express ourselves as follows. Con-
sider two events A and B, where A is the event where object O1 changes its
attributes by the amount ∆υ, and B is the event where object O2 changes its at-
tributes by the opposite amount −∆υ. Objects O1 and O2 should be associated
in an identifiable (or quasi-identifiable) interaction if only if the spatial distance
between A and B divided by the corresponding temporal distance equals c.
What about the massive elementary bosons? They may be associated with
object transformations. In this case there is no need to introduce an explicit link
to identify the involved objects, as in the case of interactions between spatially
separated objects. The states of the transforming objects overlap in space-
time, as indicated in Figs. 2.58 and 2.59, so that the identifiaction is automatic.
However, we can refer to explicit epistemic minimalism in order to argue that at
a fundmental level, we should consider only transformations in which one entity
divides into two, or two entities merge into one. That is, we should decompose
a more involved transformation into a set of such simpler transformations with
‘three legs’. We regard the massive bosons as a way to associate the different
members of such a set of simpler transformations with each other in this kind
of decomposition. We call the corresponding links cryptoobjects.
The reason why we allow three-legged transformations only is that it is
impossible in principle to verify the occurrence of transformation graphs with
degree four or higher. To be able to say that four or more legs meet at exactly one
point in space-time means that we must exlude all small-scale decompositions
into sets of vertices with three legs. This is impossible due to the presumed
existence of a minimum measurable Lorentz distance lmin. Explicit epistemic
minimalism states that any attempt to introduce physical processes that in
principle cannot be observed, or distinguished from other processes, should lead
to erroneous physical answers.
The fact that a given reaction involving elementary fermions can sometimes
be decomposed in several ways with the help of cryptoobjects means that the
cross sections of some fundamental reactions have to be equal, as exemplified
in Fig. 3.75. The decompositions are equally good, and their difference is
imaginary. Cryptoobjects can be assigned rest masses in a formal sense if we
apply the conservation law for the invariant mass to the corresponding link. At
the imagined time during which the link exists, the ingoing objects exist no
more, and the outging objects have not yet come into existence.
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In summary, we look at elementary bosons as tools that help us represent
physical law efficiently. The physical state on which physical law acts can be
efficiently represented in terms of elementary fermions and their relational at-
tributes. Elementary bosons and fermions cannot be mixed in superpositions,
meaning that our state of knowledge cannot be such that we know there is an
entity around, but we do not know whether it is an elementary boson or fermion.
Such a situation can arise only if we give up the distinction between physical
law and physical state.
The spin-statistics theorem
We have already motivated Pauli’s exclusion principle, which applies to any
directly perceived object, or any indirectly perceived quasi-object. Therefore it
applies to all elementary fermions of which these objects are composed. Thus
all elementary fermions (with spin 1/2) obeys Fermi-Dirac statistics.
Pseudoobjects and cryptoobjects must be assigned integer spin, if we ap-
ply the conservation of angular momentum to the vertices at which they are
‘emitted’ and ‘absorbed’ by ordinary objects. We must bear in mind, however,
that these processes are purely imaginary bookkeeping exercises that are in-
troduced to express physical law in a pictorial way. Since they are imaginary
entities, there is no reason why they should obey Pauli’s exclusion principle.
For example, two pseudoobjects being in the same state just means that there
are two objects which change their attibutes by the same amount ∆υ, and two
other objects which change their attibutes by the opposite amount −∆υ. This
is perfectly allowed, of course, as long as the four involved objects can be dis-
tinguished both before and after the change, that is, if they are all in different
states both before and afterwards (Fig. 3.72). In other words, all elementary
bosons obey Bose-Einstein statistics.
The spin-statistics theorem applies to composite bosons as well as to ele-
mentary bosons. One may argue that a boson composed of an even number of
fermions is an object just like any other, and should therefore abide by Pauli’s
exclusion principle. However, we present an argument in Section 3.11 that aims
to show that such composite bosons escape Pauli’s exclusion principle at least
in a controlled experiment in which a property that applies to the composite
boson as a whole is observed, and a wave function for a collection of such com-
posite bosons can be defined. We also assume that the composite bosons in this
collection are identical and weakly interacting.
Particle masses
In principle, it should be possible to determine the (squared) rest masses of
all elementary fermions as eigenvalues of an evolution operator B¯P (Eq. [4.1]).
These matters are discussed superficially in Section 3.5. The specimen OS in
a corresponding experiment is an elementary fermion, and the observed prop-
erty P is its species. If we assume that such a fermion species is specified by
m internal attributes (like charge), then B¯P becomes an m ×m-matrix. Since
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the rest mass cannot be known exactly according to the Heisenberg relation
for rest masses discussed above, the matrix is not diagonal. This means that
the operator that corresponds to the particle species property P does not com-
mute with the evolution operator. In other words, elementary fermions need
not be stable, and may be found to transform into each other upon repeated
observation. Since rest masses are always non-negative, we get a Dirac equa-
tion, meaning that the (non-squared) rest masses must be eigenvalues to the
square-root operator
√
B¯P .
The fact that rest masses of objects cannot be determined precisely according
to a Heisenberg uncertainty relation means that there cannot be any fermion
with zero rest mass. Such a mass is special, and a particle with zero mass can
in principle be distinguished from massive particles by its qualitatively different
behavior. We cannot form a superposition between a massless and a massive
particle. Simply put, all elementary fermions are massive.
We have already argued above, from our conceptual perspective, why pho-
tons and gravitons must be massless, whereas gauge bosons involved in weak and
strong transformations must be massive. We called these entities pseudoobjects
and cryptoobjects, respectively.
The second law of thermodynamics
As discussed above, we identify probability with a relative volume, with the state
space volume V [Sj ] of an alternative Sj divided by the volume of the state SO of
the system O to which the alternative applies, before we learn which alternative
comes true. Similarly, we relate the entropy E of a state S or SO to the absolute
volume of this state, according to E = log(V [S]) or EO = log(V [SO]).
The physical state S corresponds to a state of potential knowledge in such a
way that V [S] increases when the knowledge shrinks, and vice versa. Therefore
we expect the entropy of the entire world to have been decreasing in the process
during which intelligent life developed. However, we argue in Section 3.14 that
it will finally start to increase again, according to Fig. 3.98. The detailed
argument is a little bit involved, but basically it is the same as the usual one.
After sufficiently long time we approach thermodynamic equilibrium, so that
the distinctions of perception can no longer be upheld. The knowledge shrinks
and the entropy increases without bound, as the boundary ∂S of the state S
recedes towards infinity.
We may look at the personal death in the same way. The knowledge of each
of us can be encoded in a personal physical state Sk. The physical state of the
world is the intersection of the personal states of all subjects S =
⋂
k S
k. When
we are about to die we may say that ∂Sk expands until its boundaries disap-
pear. In the absence of the distinctions and contrasts of perception, nothing is
excluded. I come to think of the first few rows in the poem There is a lake and
nothing ever more by the Swedish poet Hjalmar Gullberg: 1
1Translated by Judith Moffett, Poetry Magazine (June 1976). The poem was first published
in Hjalmar Gullberg’s collection Do¨dsmask och lustg˚ard (P. A. Norstedt & So¨ners Fo¨rlag,
Stockholm, 1952). The Swedish original reads: Det finns en sjo¨ och sedan aldrig mer / och
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There is a lake and nothing ever more,
and the river is smoothed out in the gray mirror
no strand frames, no oar strokes
will ever crack
This is the opposite to the distinctions of life expressed so vividly in the song
by Violeta Parra cited in the preface.
In any case, we see that the second law of thermodynamics is not valid in
an absolute sense in our conceptual framework. There is a slightly different
sense in which it is upheld more strictly, though. State reductions S(n) →
S(n + 1) ⊂ u1S(n) occur quite regularly. They correspond to moments when
we learn something new, when something happens that is not bound to happen.
Repeated such reductions are necessary to avoid determinism, which is not
consistent with the deduced incomplete knowledge. On the other hand, the same
incomplete knowledge never goes away, meaning that the volume V [S(n)] cannot
decrease steadily as n → ∞; it is bounded from below. We have V [u1S(n)] >
V [S(n+ 1)] whenever a state reduction takes place. This volume decrease must
therefore be countered by an expected volume increase caused by the evolution
u1:
〈V [S]〉 < 〈V [u1S]〉 (4.11)
This expected volume increase corresponds to an expected entropy increase, of
course.
We may also turn our eyes backwards, and conclude from the above equation
that whenever we use physical law to retrodict the past from the present physical
state S(n), we are expected to see an entropy that decreases towards zero. This
fact explains the minuscule entropy at the Big Bang that puzzles som many
people. It does not correspond to the entropy of an actual physical state, just to
the entropy of the deduced state that results after applying the inverse evolution
operator u−11 many times to S(n). In fact, there cannot be an actual physical
state that corresponds to the Big Bang, since there cannot be any aware subjects
in such a state. There is simply no place for intertwined dualism in a singularity.
In other words, the actual creation of the world, at which subject and object
emerge together, occur at later time than that assigned to the Big Bang. We
may say that we trade the mystery of the extremely low entropy just after the
Big Bang for the mystery of the appearance of aware beings who are able to
make distinctions.
The postulate of a priori equal probabilities
While talking about statistical mechanics, we may take the opportunity to dis-
cuss briefly the perspective given by the present approach to the postulate of
a priori equal probabilities. Loosely speaking, the postulate states that each
microstate compatible with given macrostate should be assigned equal proba-
bilities when statistical weights are calculated.
floden sla¨tas ut i den gr˚a spegeln / som ingen strand inramar, inga roddarslag / ska spra¨cka.
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We may translate a macrostate to the physical state SO of a system of
interest, and a microstate to an exact state Z that is an element of the set SO
in state space. However, we should avoid explicit reference to exact states, since
they are not observable. Instead, we may associate a microstate with a well-
defined group Σ of exact states that can in principle be observed as a state of
a microscopic object that is part of the system of interest. These groups Σ can
be chosen to be equivalent in the sense that they contain the same number of
exact states. They provide a unit in which the volume V [SO] can be measured.
Now, in the present approach we cannot assign probabilities to microstates,
but only to macrostates that correspond to an alternative Sj in a future obser-
vation. The alternative Sj is a division of SO in a limited number of ‘slices’,
and corresponds to a directly perceived macrostate just as much as SO does.
Different alternatives Sj may have different volumes (different probabilities),
but it has no meaning to assign different volumes (different ‘probabilities’), to
different exact states Z or groups of such states Σ. They are the units in which
volumes (probabilities) are measured, by definition.
In other words, the postulate of equal a priori probabilities is a self-evident
consequence of the way in which we have defined probability to be proportional
to state space volume.
Conservation of information
In traditional approaches to physics, we can translate the reversibility or invert-
ibility of physical law at the fundamental level to the statement that information
is conserved. If a physical state can be evolved forward from time t1 to time t2,
then the information contained in the state at time t2 is inherent already in the
state at time t1. No new information can be obtained. If the physical state can
also be evolved backwards from t2 to t1, then the information contained in the
state at time t1 is still there in the state at time t2. No information is lost. In
short, information is conserved.
In classical mechanics, physical law evolves a point in phase space to another
point in this space along a well-defined trajectory. In quantum mechanics,
physical law evolves a vector of unit length in Hilbert space to another vector
of unit length. Its tip traces out a well-defined trajectory just as in classical
mechanics. In both cases the evolution is point-wise. The only difference is
that the evolving point belongs to different kinds of state spaces. Information
is conserved in both cases according to the general consideration above.
In the present approach we abandon this pointwise description of the physical
evolution, and therefore information does not have to be conserved. Neverthe-
less, we keep the reversibility or invertibility of physical law. As we see it, the
evolution u1 can be applied only to physical states S that correspond to ac-
tual states of knowledge, or states that in principle can be realized as states
of knowledge. Since knowledge is incomplete, such states S are always sets of
several exact states Z. These states Z are the elements or ‘points’ of state space
S. Since the elements Z are not themselves in the domain of u1, the evolution
is not point-wise.
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Of course, we are not allowed to deviate from quantum mechanics when it
comes to physical predictions, even if we do not see it as the fundamental level of
description. How is it possible then to come to different conclusions as regards
information conservation? As we see it the conservation of information inherent
in the formalism of unitary quantum mechanical evolution is devoid of physical
content; it is a conclusion that stems from a misunderstanding of the meaning
of the formalism.
We have argued above that the Hilbert space and the wave function are
defined during a well-defined experiment C only. The evolution of the wave
function is taken care of by an abstract parameter σ. We may see a change of
σ as a proxy for a change of the experimental setup that changes the expected
time difference between the start of the experiment and the final measurement.
We may, for example, move a detector farther away from an electron gun. In
this way we define a one-parameter family of experiments C(σ). In this light,
the conservation of information just means that if we first move the detector
farther away and then back to its original position, we get the same probabilities
for different alternative outcomes as if we did not move it at all.
If we accept that the present approach allows a changing information con-
tent in the physical state, in what way does this information actually change?
We may identify the information with the inverse entropy E−1 = 1/ log(V [S]).
According to the above discussion about the second law of thermodynamics we
may therefore say that the evolution u1 tends to decrease the information con-
tent of the physical state, a tendency that is balanced by the information gain
in a state reduction. There is no general law that tells us for an arbitrary state
S(n) whether the information increases, decreases or stays constant as time n
goes.
By abandoning point-wise evolution in state space, we enable information
gain or loss at the same time as we keep the reversibility of physical law. A
crucial point is that we define the information and entropy via the same object
S as we use to define the fundamental evolution u1. No strain between ‘micro-
scopic’ reversibility (information conservation) and ‘macroscopic’ irreversibility
(information loss) can therefore arise.
The cosmological constant
The state space volume expansion expressed in Eq. [4.11] cen be expected to
hold for any state S. We may cover the entire state space S with a large number
of such states. Therefore we may say that the entire state space expands when
the evolution u1 is applied. On the average, we can expect the same expansion
factor each time u1 is applied, so that the expansion becomes exponential. The
increase of V [S] means that the uncertainty of the value of some attributes
increase. Not all attribute values can become more and more uncertain without
limit. We argue in Section 3.15 that only spatial distances can. The exponential
expansion of state space S is therefore taken care of by an exponential increase
of the uncertainty of spatial distances. If the forces that attract objects to each
other are weak, for example if they are located far away from each other, the
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exponential increase of the distance uncertainty translates to an exponential
increase of the expected distance in an actual measurement. In this way we try
to motivate a positive cosmological constant from general principles.
Chapter 5
OUTLOOK
In this chapter I let my thoughts wander, extrapolating from the material treated
in the main body of this study. I will not make any definite claims, just discuss
some possibilities.
5.1 The neurological basis of intention and choice
I have argued repeatedly that there seems to be a ‘white hole’ in physical law,
that allows intentions and choice to ‘flow out’, but no physical influences to ‘flow
in’ (Sections 1.11, 2.13 and 3.2). In other words, it seems that we must allow
for choices that have an effect but no cause. By saying that the choice has no
cause I mean that there is nothing in the physical state that precedes it that
makes it possible to deduce its appearance by means of physical law, neither in
a deterministic, nor in a probabilistic sense.
The assumption of detailed materialism (Assumptions 1.4 and 2.7) means
that every subjective change corresponds to a change in the state of some phys-
ical object (possibly a deduced quasiobject). The appearance of an intention in
a subject therefore means that the state of some object in her body changes. At
the same time, according to the discussion above, sometimes there is no cause
of this change of state. How is this possible?
It is self-evident that the potential knowledge of the body of any subject is
always incomplete, just like the knowledge of the entire world. Every elementary
particle in our bodies obeys the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. This provides
the room for a subjective change with no known cause, a state reduction of the
body that cannot be predicted.
But exactly where in the body does the crucial lack of knowledge reside
when it comes to intention? In this case the lack of microscopic knowledge
must somehow couple to macroscopic choices, just like in the Schro¨dinger’s
cat gedankenexperiment. In that case the lack of knowledge corresponds to
uncertainty when a single radioactive nucleus will decay. At the moment it
decays, when the state of the nucelus reduces, it triggers the death of the cat
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Figure 5.1: Microtubules are composed of tubulin molecules, which have two
distinct parts α and β. The relative orientation of these parts can change,
creating (at least) two conformations of the tubulin molecule (white and grey).
Environmental influences may affect the state of the microtubule, and so may
probably the water that fills it. One may speculate that the state of this water
is largely unaffected by the environment, at least far away from the two ends.
via some ingenious mechanism involving a gun or some poison. Returning to
intention, we should look inside the brain to find a corresponding magnifying
mechanism, of course. An intention followed by a choice must have its origin in
the organ in which the nerve signals that cause bodily action starts. In contrast
to the case of the decaying nucleus, it should not even be possible to assign
probabilities for the appearance of different intentions at the crucial location.
The existence of such a place in the brain where an unknowable seed of
intention can sprout is essential in the bodies of all subjects, at least if the web
of defintions that I have weaved is accepted. Namely, I have defined individuals
by their ability to form independent intentions, as discussed in Section 2.13
(Definitions 2.68, 2.70 and Assumption 2.8).
It seems to me that the appearance of traveling action potentials across
the cell membrane of neurons cannot be the basic layer in the process where
the physical change brought about by an intention is magnified. Neurons are
very comlex entities with a rich internal landscape, like most other cell types.
Furthermore, they are fairly large objects, whereas the structure in which the
seed for intention is formed has to be small and ‘well defended’, so that it cannot
be effectively probed from the outside to determine its state. (Of course, if the
probe is forceful enough it can penetrate the defences of any structure inside
which the seed may be formed, but if structure and seed are small and delicate,
this means that they are destroyed in the process. No actual knowledge is
gained. This is the same argument as that of the Heisenberg microscope, leading
to the conclusion that the position of the studied object becomes more and more
uncertain the smaller it gets, or the more energetic light is used as a probe.)
When I first read Roger Penrose’s account of microtubules in his book Shad-
ows of the mind [48] I was very intrigued. The idea that these structures con-
stitute a basic layer of information processing in the brain have been around
since the seventies [2], and Penrose argued persuasively for the case. I am just
an interested layman, and I will not try to review the morphology and function
of the microtubules in any detail. I would just distort the facts. Instead, the
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reader is referred to Penrose’s book, or a recent review by Hameroff and Penrose
[28].
Nevertheless, I will try to describe some of their features very superficially
(Fig. 5.1). I think that microtubules might fulfil the requirements for a structure
inside which unknowable seeds of intention may have their origin, and I want
to be able to discuss why this might be so. Microtubules are composed of the
protein tubulin. The circular circumference of the tube is composed of thirteen
tubulin molecules, whereas its length is arbitrary and may consist of a very
large number of molecules. The tubulin molecule is somewhat peanut-shaped
and can be divided into two parts, called α and β. There are at least two discrete
conformations of the molecule. These are related to the relative orientation of
α and β. A conformational change possibly corresponds to a discrete change of
the electric dipole moment.
These qualities suggest that the state of a tubulin molecule may correspond
to a bit of information in a computation that is carried out on its surface. In
that case the cylindrical tubulin lattice acts as a cellular automaton. Signals
might be processed and transmitted from one end of the microtubule to another.
This opens up the possibility that the computational power of the brain is vastly
bigger than that suggested by the number of neurons, since each neuron contain
about 109 tubulin molecules [26], which may change state 106 times faster than
a nerve signal is transmitted from one neuron to another.
The microtubule interior is mostly filled with water, but may contain some
other molecules as well. One may speculate that the state of this water is un-
knowable to a large extent, since it is shielded from the outside by the regularly
arranged tubulin lattice. This lattice may act like a kind of armor that protects
influences from the outside to reach the inside. This might be so because of the
rigid structure formed by the tubulin molecules, which only allows a discrete
number of collective states of the entire microtubule surface, corresponding to
the different possible combinations of tubulin conformations. The number of
possible states of the water inside the tube is probably much higher, maybe
forming a continous set. If this is really the case, some information about the
inside is necessarily lost at the surface.
Since microtubules are often very long, the amount of information about its
interior that can be tapped from its ends is probably much smaller than the
information stored in an exact knowledge of its interior state. One might speak
about a ‘penetration length’, the maximum distance that outside influences may
travel towards the center of the tube via the ends (Fig. 5.1). In the vocabu-
lary used in this text, we would say that there might be very little conditional
knowledge that relates the state of the microtubule interior with the state of
the outside world. In conventional quantum mechanical language, we would
say that there is little entanglement between the interior and the outside world.
If there is substance in these speculations, there might indeed be white holes
hiding inside microtubules.
Hameroff and Penrose speculate that there may be quantum computations
going on in the tubulin lattice. This would require that the tubulin lattice itself
is disentangled from the environment, so that ‘clean’ superpositions between
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different lattice conformations can be upheld. In the vocabulary of this text,
the conformation of the lattice would be unknowable. It should be emphasized
that my own perspective is different. I am arguing that it is the state of the
interior of the microtubules that is unknowable, not the state of its lattice
surface. In the conventional vocabulary, many such interior states coexist in a
quantum superposition.
Recent investigations of the microtubules isolated in vitro indicate anoma-
luous optical and electronic behavior. This may be seen as an indication that
quantum effects are indeed at play [51, 52]. It seems that the presence of water
in the microtubule interior is crucial for the appearance of these effects.
If it is indeed true that the microtubule interior is a white hole whose state
is largely unknowable, then it is impossible to predict how this interior affects
the conformation of the tubulin surface lattice. We get the effect without any
knowable cause that we are looking for. The effect, the change of the tubulin
lattice conformation, may act as input for a computation or a signal that is
transmitted along the microtubule. The output of this process may then be
amplified to a larger scale, affecting the entire organism and its environment.
We get an action A such as that indicated in Fig. 1.26.
This picture does not exclude, of course, that a large part of those phys-
iological processes that affect our aware state and determine choices do have
a knowable origin. It is well known that processes outside the microtubulues
determine their formation and dynamics. Such outside process may affect the
hypothetical computations and signal processing that goes on in the tubulin lat-
tice to a larger degree than the unknowable input from the interior. This fact is
indicated in Fig. 5.1 as an arrow of influence that point at the microtubule from
the outside. Such influences would correspond to those aspects of the behavior
of aware beings that are dictated by physical law.
The purported unknowability of the microtubule interior means that its ac-
tion on the surface may have non-local features. Conditional knowledge may
connect the interior state at one point A to another distant point B. In conven-
tional language, faraway points in the microtubule interior may be entangled.
The influence of the interior on the tubulin lattice that causes a conformation
change at point A may then dictate an immediate change at point B. Since
microtubules in brain cells are thought to reach lenghts of millimeters or even
centimeters, we may get non-local quantum effects that connect different parts
of the brain at macroscopic distances.
The idea that the microtubule surface acts as an armor behind which the
interior can hide may be seen as a mechanism that prevents perfect self-reference
(Fig. 5.2). Such a mechanism is necessary at two levels. First, the knowledge
about the body that is possible to deduce by observation of the objects it consists
of must be smaller than the knowlede of the body inherent in the state of
subjective perception via the assumption of detailed materialism. If this were
not so, the knowledge about the body would become a proper subset of itself
whenever we are aware of more things than the deduced knowledge about our
own bodies. Second, an indeterministic world requires an unknowable seed of
intention, as discussed above, for which not even probabilities can be assigned.
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Figure 5.2: Go¨delian microtubules? The tubulin lattice that forms the surface
of microtubules might be seen as an armor that prevents perfect self-awareness,
both in terms of the state of our own bodies and of our intentions. If this
picture is correct, and if the physical state can be identified with a state of
knowledge, then the appearance of some ideas, images, associations and conclu-
sions may lack a computational basis - a cause dictated by physical law acting
on a symbolic representation of the physical state.
Detailed materialism then demands a physical armor around this seed, since
it is assumed to be rooted in the physical world and cannot originate ‘in the
heavens’. This means that if microtubules cannot fulfil this role, there has to
be some other small scale structure in the brain that does the job.
5.2 Many worlds
Several subjects can perceive the same object. One subject can perceive several
objects. These basic facts are illustrated in Fig. 1.8. Can we replace the word
‘object’ with ‘world’ in these statements? It is clear that several subjects can
perceive the same world. But can one subject perceive several worlds? From
the epistemic perspective, the idea of a multiverse is meaningful if and only if
the answer to this question is positive.
This possibility is attractive from an aestethic point of view, since it would
make the roles of the subjective and objective aspects of the world more sym-
metric. In the previous section we discussed the possible symmetry sketched
in Fig. 1.26. The subjective aspect may influence the objective aspect via the
apperance of intention an choice, and the objective aspect influences the subjec-
tive aspect by observations that are determined (in part) by physical law. These
different kinds of influences in opposite directions are equally fundamental; one
of them cannot be explained in terms of the other. We could further add to
this symmetry by saying that just as one objective world may contain many
subjects, one subject may ‘contain’ many objective worlds (Fig. 5.3).
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Figure 5.3: Possible symmetries between the subjective and objective aspects
of existence. There may be several subjects. These are associated to several
bodies in the objective aspect, according to detailed materialism. Conversely,
we speculate that there there may be several worlds. In that case these are
associated to several independent sets of perceptions in the subjective aspect,
according to the epistemic approach to physics. The subjective and objective
aspects may also influence each other symmetrically, as discussed in relation to
Fig. 1.26.
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But what might it mean to say that a subject can perceive several worlds?
Clearly, we must make a clear distinction between the perception of two objects
that belong to the same world, and two objects that belong to different worlds.
We may say that two objects O1 and O2 are part of the same world W if and
only if they are associated by some relational attribute r12. Physical law couple
the evolution of two objects if and only if there is such a relational attribute.
This would mean that the statement that two objects belong to different worlds
means that the state SO1 of O1 does not influence any future state SO2 of O2,
and vice versa.
It may seem that this fact makes the notion that one and the same subject
can perceive different worlds inconsistent. To make such a notion meaningful,
the subject must be able to remember objects from world 1 at the same time as
she perceives objects from world 2, so that she can decide in practice that there
are indeed two worlds. If she cannot do that, she cannot preserve her identity
in the movement from one world to another, and the entire discussion loses its
meaning. This means that she can carry influences from one world to another.
We have introduced a possible relation between objects from different worlds,
in conflict with their definition.
Indeterminism provides a loophole. A subject can perform an action in world
2 ‘inspired’ by an experience in world 1 without presuming an influence between
the two worlds that is dictated by physical law. This is possible because of the
‘white hole’ in physical law that allows intentions, choices and actions that are
dictated neither by necessity, nor probability. We should introduce a relational
attribute that associate two objects only if physical law acts on this attribute,
changing its value as time goes. If influences between two worlds go exclusively
via a perceiving subject who makes use of the ‘white hole’, then we can uphold
the distinction between two objects belonging to the same world, and two objects
belonging to different worlds.
Let us formalize the discussion a bit, playing with indices. Let (SOl)
k
W denote
the state of an object Ol perceived by subject k in world W . The index k can
vary independently for given W and l, meaning that the notion that different
subjects perceive the same object in the same world is well-defined. Likewise,
the index l can vary independently for given W and k, meaning that the notion
that a given subject perceive different objects in the same world is well-defined.
In contrast, the notion that a given subject perceive the same object in different
worlds is nonsensical. We cannot let the index W vary independently for given
k and l.
What about letting the indices W and l vary jointly for a given k? That
is, can a given subject perceive different worlds? Is there a pair of objects Ol
and Ol′ with states (SOl)
k
W and (SOl′)
k
W ′? If there is, and the world W
′ obeys
the same laws of physics as W , then W ′ allows several subjects k and k′. Then
there is also a pair of objects with states (SOl)
k
W and (SOl′)
k′
W ′ . Note that we can
imagine such a pair even if there is no pair of states (SOl)
k
W and (SOl′)
k
W ′ . In
that case the presumed existence of the pair [(SOl)
k
W , (SOl′)
k′
W ′ ] just corresponds
to the speculation that there may be other worlds in which different beings live,
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Figure 5.4: A sketch of intertwined duality in the case a given subject may
perceive different worlds as her attention changes. Note that we must say that
she carries different bodies when she visits different worlds. Compare Fig. 5.5.
which we cannot know anything about.
If a pair [(SOl)
k
W , (SOl′)
k
W ′ ] exists, then subject k must have a different body
B′ when she experiences the object Ol′ in world W ′ than the body B that she
has when she experiences object Ol in world W . This is so since the body of
a subject must be associated by relational attributes to the objects the body
lets her perceive. The body must belong to the same world W as the objects
perceived in W . Since bodily objects in different worlds are not associated to
each other by any relational attribute, by definition of different worlds, the body
itself must be considered different, rather than being different parts of the same
body. The latter expression presupposes a relation between the different parts.
These considerations are illustrated in Fig. 5.4. We call the perceptions of
different worlds different ‘attentions’. The awareness of a single subject may
transcend a given attention. We should also allow different subjects in this
picture. In that case the relations between the concepts that we have used may
be illustrated as in Fig. 5.5.
It should be stressed that I am not arguing in favor of the existence of
different worlds in the abovse sense. I am just playing with the possibilities
provided by the structure of relations between different aspects of existence
that has been used as assumptions in this study.
5.3 Different worlds
The discussion above about the structure of a hypothetical multiverse offers no
conceptual difficulties as long as all the worlds have the same basic character-
istics as our own. By this I mean that the same categories of perception are
valid in all the worlds, as well as the same conditions for knowledge. In such a
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Figure 5.5: If both the worlds indicated in Fig. 5.4 allow several subjects, like
our normal world does, then that sketch has to be further elaborated in order
to capture all the relations that are involved.
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situation, there is time in all the worlds, time is inherently directed everywhere,
and at each instant each subject in each world may distinguish between mental
images that belong to the past, the present, and the future. Also, knowledge is
incomplete in all the worlds since the bodies of all subjects are a proper subset
of the world itself. This means that a clear distinction can always be made
between subject and object, between the observers and the observed.
It is a lot harder to conceive different worlds which have different basic
characteristics in this sense. We are stuck in the world we are born into and
cannot imagine a completely different kind of existence, for example one without
time. This is so, at least, if we accept detailed materialism. Then the degrees of
freedom of imagination are determined by the degrees of freedom of the brain,
which are determined by the physical law that applies to the world we live in.
This physical law is, in turn, expressed in terms of the fixed set of categories
and degrees of freedom that applies to this world.
Is it meaningful, then, to consider the possibility for different kinds of worlds
in a multiverse? Such a multiverse makes epistemic sense if and only if a given
subject can perceive these qualitatively different worlds and remember them as
her attention shifts from one such world to another. But how can this be done if
the categories of perception are different? If we assume epistemic closure in each
of these worlds, the structure of perception would vary from world to world. For
example, the very notion of ‘remembering’ relies on the same category of time
that we are used to. On the other hand, some ‘less severe’ variations might
be acceptable, for example, worlds with and without the distinction between
left and right, or worlds with and without the subjective distinction between
straight and curved lines.
In this connection, it may be appropriate to turn the perspective around and
discuss the possible perceptions of different subjects in the same world, rather
than the hypothetical perceptions of the same subject in different worlds. That
different subjects inhabit the same world means that they all possess bodies that
are part of this world. It must therefore be possible to represent all these bodies
by means of the same set of minimal objects (elementary particles) subject to the
same physical law. I have tried to derive the form of physical law from epistemic
principles that seem reasonable to me, and hopefully to other human beings as
well. If this project is judged to be successful, then we have established a direct
link between the form and limitations of our perceptions and the workings of
the objective world. In so doing, we have treated all subjects in this world as
equal; we have not given the preference to any particular kind of aware being
when it comes to whose subjective perceptions are to be linked to the workings
of the world. This picture can only be consistent if all aware beings that can
acquire knowledge have the same type of perceptions, regardless whether they
are humans or octopuses. For example, they must all have the same conception
of time.
We may imagine a pair of subjects that meet each other in two separate
worlds, as illustrated in Fig. 5.5. In so doing, they must see two different bodies
of their friend in the two worlds, as discussed above, even if these bodies belong
to the same subject. Apart from this oddity, there is nothing conceptually
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Figure 5.6: Roger Penrose’s three intertwined worlds. He does not seem to be
dogmatic about the details of the relations between these worlds, but the basic
picture is the following. The subjective world emerges from the objective world
via the body, which is a subset of the objective world. This is an expression
of materialism. The world of reason emerges from a subset of the subjective
world, acknowledging the fact that there are other facets of perception than the
systematization of experiences and the application of logic. The objective world
emerges from a subset of the world of reason, meaning that not all mathemat-
ical objects and models have relevance to the categories and laws of physics.
Compare Fig. 5.7
troubling in such a situation. Again, problems arise only if the two worlds
are qualitatively different in terms of physical laws and forms of subjective
perceptions.
5.4 The subjective world, the objective world,
and the world of reason
Roger Penrose’s [48] picture of ’three worlds’ (Fig. 5.6) has been a great inspi-
ration for me when formulating the idea of intertwined dualism. The basic idea
common to the ‘three worlds-picture’ and ‘intertwined dualism’ is, as I see it,
that there are several aspects of the world, none of which is more fundamental
than any other, each of which emerges from the others. The difference is that
there are only two such aspects in my picture of intertwined dualism, whereas
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there are three aspects in Penrose’s picture of three worlds. My departure from
Penrose’s picture may be compared to the departures discussed by Hut, Alford
and Tegmark [31].
The reason why I remove the world of reason from the triangle is that I think
the very construction of such a triangle relies on reason. What we do, after all,
is to try to sort out the logical and set-theoretical relations between abstract
aspects or categories. Figuratively speaking, the entire triangle in Fig. 5.6 baths
in a sea of reason. Therefore, I would like to let the world of reason emerge from
the subjective judgement in Fig. 5.6 to embrace both the subjective and the
objective worlds, as illustrated in Fig. 5.7.
We may look at the world of logic that emerges from the subject as a tool of
interpretation, a tool that transforms bare perceptions to knowledge (Fig. 1.2).
One may speculate about other tools of interpretation that emerge from other
parts of the subject. This means that we cannot exclude a priori that there is
something outside this ‘plane of reason’ in which we place our intertwined world,
that we can perceive and acquire knowledge by other means than science. The
structure of the world we see in the plane of reason should then be seen as a
projection in a wider space of possible interpretations. This would mean that
whenever we apply reason to our perceptions we see patterns that conform with
the structure in this plane, including physical law. Other interpretations would
never contradict these structures, however, partly because the term contradic-
tion would be undefined. Poetically speaking, this intertwined dualism may be
seen as a projection of the predicament of existence onto the logical, symbolic
subspace of knowledge. In short, I would like to open up for the possibility that
the world of reason is not as fundamental as the subjective and the objective
worlds.
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Figure 5.7: The relationships between the subjective and obective aspects of
the world, as sketched in Fig. 1.1, are defined within the world of reason only.
This world emerges from the analytical mind of proper interpretations according
to Fig. 1.2. We would like to leave room for non-analytical interpretations of
perceptions. These are neither proper, nor improper, and are not the subject
of this text. Compare Fig. 5.6.
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Chapter 6
DISCUSSION
6.1 The philosophical heritage
In this section I will discuss some ideas of a few thinkers who have inspired
me. I include some quotes from them that are relevant to this study. Without
shame, I choose quotes that express views similar to my own. The aim is not
to try to prove my points by saying ”look, these great authorities support me,
therefore I must be right”. Rather, the aim is just to make it clear that my
perspective on physics is part of a long tradition, and that many thinkers have
been troubled by the same blind spots and inconsistencies in the naive scientific
world view as I have been.
Since I was a teenager, I have had great respect for Kant. In fact, he is the
only metaphysician that I have ever found interesting. One might say that his
basic insight was that a proper ontology does not concern the general qualities
of those things that exist, but the general conditions for our knowledge about
those things. He introduced the strict epistemic perspective in philosophy that
I have tried to apply to physics. Such an epistemic perspective does not deny
ontology, it just changes its target.
It is popular among physicists to say that the aim of their subject is not
to unravel the ultimate nature of the world, just to ask well-posed questions
to nature, and to order the answers they are able to apprehend systematically.
That is, physics tries to describe what we can say about the world, not the world
itself. This attitude is Kantian, in a sense. Many of these physicists does not
seem to draw the philosophical consequences of the approach, however. Most
often it is no more than an modest attitude. Kant did draw the philosophical
consequences when it comes to metaphysics. He realized that a detailed analysis
of what can be said about our ability to form knowledge tells us something
fundamental about the structure of the world itself.
A well-known catchphrase in Kant’s philosophy is: ”We cannot know any-
thing about the thing in itself”. Every act of knowledge acquisition has a sub-
jective aspect; it is our intuition about the object that is the only possible target
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for our knowledge, not the thing itself, detached from the observer. Neverthe-
less, Kant is not an idealist in the sense that he denies the existence of the ‘thing
in itself’, he just states that its nature is beyond our knowledge; it cannot be
intuited or cognized. He motivates this conclusion at several places in his Cri-
tique of pure reason [32]. The most concise version of his arguments is possibly
the following.
[E]ven if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in them-
selves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves.
For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is
an appearance without anything that appears.
In the philosophical construction presented in this study, we have taken for
granted that the outside world exists in the sense that we have assumed the
fundamental ability to distinguish internal objects from external objects. In
other words, we are able to know that ‘something is out there’. The picture
of intertwined dualism needs this ability, but it does not need the properties of
this ‘something’, seen as things in themselves. It just needs the properties of
these things as they appear to us.
Since the only thing we can know about the thing in itself is that it exists,
it is not the subject of scientific inquiry, according to Kant. If this proposition
is accepted, it may seem that the only alternative is to say that all scientific
knowledge is empirical. But this is not so, according to Kant. There are certain
forms of perception and reason that must be given a priori to make sense of
empirical observations.
[A] light dawned on all those who study nature. They comprehended
that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to
its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judg-
ments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its
questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping
reason, as it were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental obser-
vations, made according to no previously designed plan, can never
connect up into a necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks and
requires. Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach
nature with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the
agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other
hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these princi-
ples - yet in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who
has recited to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an
appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the questions he
puts to them.
The apprehension of these principles, this design of our own reason, may
be said to constitute knowledge that is not empirical, but is discernible to us
as a distinct form into which all empirical knowledge fits. To focus on this
form rather than the objects that are observed within this form has been called
‘Kant’s Copernican revolution’.
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Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform
to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them
a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on
this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether
we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming
that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree
better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them,
which is to establish something about objects before they are given
to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who,
when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial
motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around
the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he
made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest.
I support this view wholeheartedly. In the preface I stressed that it is vain
to try to build physical models that do not use our fundamental categories of
perception as a basis, but instead try to invent another basis that either deny
the existence of our categories of perception (like the flow of time), or let them
follow as consequences. At best, we get an unnecessarily convoluted model. At
worst, we get a self-contradictory model.
Kant stresses the lesser importance of the contents of perception by saying
that it is given a posteriori, in contrast to its form, which is given to us a priori.
I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its mat-
ter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited
as ordered in certain relations a I call the form of appearance. Since
that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in
a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all
appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie
ready for it in the mind a priori , and can therefore be considered
separately from all sensation.
Another way to put it is to say that the contents of perception is forever
changing and possible to manipulate, whereas their form is absolute and given
to us once and for all. Therefore they are the best handle to hold on to if we
want to open the door to the underlying nature of the world.
In Kant’s vocabulary, judgments that make use of the forms of perception
but not their content are called synthetic a priori. He contrasts such judgments
with those that are analytic a priori. The latter are defined by Kant as mere
tautologies, where the conclusion is just a reformulation of the premise. The
idea behind Kant’s Copernican revolution can be expressed as the claim that
there are true judgments that are synthetic a priori, and that the corresponding
knowledge is the sound metaphysical basis for all knowledge a posteriori, that
is, knowledge about matter, about the content of the world as we see it.
This is the line of thought that is used in the present study. The epis-
temic assumptions that we use as input can be seen as an attempt to capture
those judgments synthetic a priori that are relevant to a proper formulation of
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physics, seen as a symbolic model for the behavior of our sensations, of matter
as it appears to us. Examples of such assumptions are intertwined dualism, the
directed, sequential nature of time, the existence of distinct objects, the distinc-
tion between internal and relational attributes of these objects, the concepts of
betweenness and straightness, and the possibility of object division. The last
assumption can be seen as a prerequisite to set theory, since it gives meaning to
the concept of a subset. Each of the daughter object in a division can be seen
as a proper subset of the mother object.
This statement about a connection between set theory and the ability of
physical objects to divide conforms with Kant’s claim that mathematical state-
ments are not analytic, but synthetic a priori. To arrive at a mathematical
conclusion logic is not enough, we need an intuition. He claims that this is true
in arithmetics, as well as in other branches of mathematics, such as geometry.
Just as little is any principle of pure geometry analytic. That the
straight line between two points is the shortest is a synthetic propo-
sition. For my concept of the straight contains nothing of quantity,
but only a quality. The concept of the shortest is therefore entirely
additional to it, and cannot be extracted out of the concept of the
straight line by any analysis. Help must here be gotten from intu-
ition, by means of which alone the synthesis is possible.
To say that intuition or visualization is a necessary ingredient in all of math-
ematics is the same as to say that no mathematics can be conceived indepen-
dently from the forms of our perceptions of the physical world. Mathematics is
slave to physics, in a sense. We have adopted this perspective when we try to
relate the orientability of space to the existence of parity-breaking weak inter-
actions, which we claim give meaning to the subjective distinction between left
and right. Without such a distinction it is impossible to intuition the parity
operation x → −x. The mathematical concept of a vector space would never
have been invented.
Kant himself uses a similar line of reasoning when he connects the concept
of measured value, or magnitude, to the existence of the form of perception we
call time.
No one can define the concept of magnitude in general except by
something like this: That it is the determination of a thing through
which it can be thought how many units are posited in it. Only this
how-many-times is grounded on successive repetition, thus on time
and the synthesis (of the homogeneous) in it.
Kant views the properties of space and time as essential forms of perception,
and thus as a basis of judgments synthetic a priori.
Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space syn-
thetically and yet a priori . What then must the representation of
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space be for such a cognition of it to be possible? It must origi-
nally be intuition; for from a mere concept no propositions can be
drawn that go beyond the concept, which, however, happens in ge-
ometry [...]. But this intuition must be encountered in us a priori ,
i.e., prior to all perception of an object, thus it must be pure, not
empirical intuition.
Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In
regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though
one can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is
therefore given a priori . In it alone is all actuality of appearances
possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself (as the uni-
versal condition of their possibility) cannot be removed.
As Kant sees it, time is a more fundamental form of perception than space.
Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general.
Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an a
priori condition merely to outer intuitions.
By outer intuitions Kant means perceptions of objects external to ourselves.
Internal perceptions such as fantasies does not have to have a spatial relation-
ship, but must still be ordered temporally.
As discussed above, Kant regards the forms of perceptions, such as space
and time, to be just that - forms for things as they appear to us. They have
nothing to do with the things in themselves, or their relations.
Space represents no property at all of any things in themselves nor
any relation of them to each other [...] We can accordingly speak of
space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint.
If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can
acquire outer intuition, namely that through which we may be affected
by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all.
This predicate is attributed to things only insofar as they appear to
us, i.e., are objects of sensibility.
[Time] is only of objective validity in regard to appearances, because
these are already things that we take as objects of our senses; but
it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sensibility of our
intuition, thus from that kind of representation that is peculiar to
us, and speaks of things in general. Time is therefore merely a sub-
jective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible,
i.e., insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the
subject, is nothing.
In our vocabulary, we regard space and time to be attributes that relate
objects, such as they appear to us. The more fundamental nature of time as
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compared to space is reflected in our treatement by the introduction of the
discrete, sequential time in addition to the relational time that is part of space-
time. We respect Kant’s assertion that none of these attributes or forms refer
to things in themselves, just to things as they appear to us as observing sub-
jects. These appearences, including the appearences of our own bodies, is the
only target of physics. The mathematical representation of physical states and
physical law should use numbers and symbols that corresponds to forms and
contents of perception only.
The fathers of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics stressed
this fact as much as I do, and as much as I think Kant would have done, had
he been around in the 1920s. Nevertheless, I have not seen these physicists
referring so enthusiastically to Kant as I have done above. For example, Werner
Heisenberg offers a wonderful chapter in his book Physics and philosophy [30]
that puts the concepts of modern science in the context of the concepts used
throughout the history of philosophy. Heisenberg devotes considerable space to
a discussion about Kant, but he does not seem to find any immediate parallells
between Kant’s concepts and ideas, and the concepts needed to interpret quan-
tum mechanics. My impression is that Heisenberg did not quite understand all
aspects of Kant’s philosophy. Most importantly, trying to find a counterpart
to the ‘thing in itself’, Heisenberg suggests the abstract and pure mathematical
representations of elementary particles as a candidate to the ‘thing in itself’. If
I were to speak for Kant, I would say that his view is that physical modelling
has nothing to do at all with things in themselves, only with appearances.
If I were to point to the ‘thing itself’ in my illustration of intertwined duality
(Fig. 1.1), I would say it is the paper on which the sketch is drawn, or something
like that. We cannot identify it with the ‘currently unknowable’ or ‘unknowable’
according to Fig. 1.12. The currently unknowable are things that can be known
in the future by choosing the appropriate experimental mode of observation.
The unknowable may be said to correspond to everything conceivable that is
not part of the world, to the complement to the world, to the negation of the
world. In contrast, the ‘thing in itself’ has no such relation at all to the world
as we see it, it cannot be conceived or described in the same terms, by the same
categories.
Maybe the ‘thing in itself’ can be identified with a philosophical incarnation
of God. Every child knows that we run into contradictions if we try to describe
a universal God with the same categories or attributes as we use to describe
objects that are part of the world we perceive. We cannot relate God spatially
to other objects, and we cannot relate him temporally to the sequence of worldy
events. If we try, we have to ask ourselves meaningless questions such as ”What
did God do before he created the world?” Such forms of perception cannot be
applied to God, just as they cannot be applied to the ‘thing in itself’.
One might say that what I have tried to do, in addition to what Kant did,
is to establish a one-to-one correspondence between the forms of perception
and the form of physical law, via the assumptions of ‘epistemic closure’ and
‘epistemic invariance’. I have tried to make physics out of metaphysics. One
parallell is undeniable: both the forms of perception and physical law are given
6.1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL HERITAGE 519
to us once and for all, they cannot be changed at will. Also, the parallell
between the contents of perception and the physical state is obviuos. Both can
be changed at will, to some extent. Formulating my project in Kantian terms,
one may say that I give arguments for the hypothesis that the form of physical
law is knowledge that is synthetic a priori ; it is possible to derive it from the
forms of perception. The derivation goes both ways, as I see it: we may equally
well say that the forms of perception follow from the laws of physics.
z
Leaving Kant and returning to the fathers of the Copenhagen interpretation,
they looked at quantum mechanics as a literal expression of the fact that physics
concerns what can be known about things, rather than the thing in itself. The
central role taken by the concept of knowledge in this interpretation of quantum
mechancis means that subject and object are both indispensable aspects of the
world. In the words of Bohr [6]:
[T]he finite magnitude of the quantum of action prevents an alto-
gether sharp distinction being made between the phenomenon and
the agency by which it is being observed.
We meet here in a new light the old truth that in our description of
nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phenom-
ena but only to track down, so far as it is possible, relations between
the manifold aspects of our experience.
Both Bohr and Heisenberg emphasizes that we must use the subjective form
of perception as a basis in every attempt to describe nature, as expressed in
natural language. Bohr puts it like this:
[T]he recognition of the limitation of our forms of perception by no
means implies that we can dispense with our customary ideas or
their direct verbal expressions when reducing our sense impressions
to order. No more is it likely that the fundamental concepts of the
classical theories will ever become superfluous for the description of
physical experience.
Heisenberg makes a similar point by saying that even if the concepts of sci-
ence will change in the future, their ultimate foundation in our natural language,
reflecting the way in which we perceive the world, will not [30]:
The general trend of human thinking in the nineteenth century had
been toward an increasing confidence in the scientific method and in
precise rational terms, and had led to a general scepticism with regard
to those concepts of natural language which do not fit into the closed
form of scientific thought - for instance, those of religion. Modern
520 CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION
physics has in many ways increased this scepticism; but it has at the
same time turned it against the overestimation of precise scientific
concepts, against a too-optimistic view on progress in general, and
finally against scepticism itself. The scepticism against precise scien-
tific concepts does not mean that there should be a definite limitation
for the application of rational thinking. On the contrary, one may
say that the human ability to understand may be in a certain sense
unlimited. But the existing scientific concepts cover always only a
very limited part of reality, and the other part that has not yet been
understood is infinite. Whenever we proceed from the known into
the unknown we may hope to understand, but we may have to learn
at the same time a new meaning of the word ‘understanding’. We
know that any understanding must be based finally upon the natual
language because it is only there that we can be certain to touch real-
ity, and hence we must be sceptical about any scepticism with regard
to this natural language and its essential concepts. Therefore, we
may use these concepts as they have been used at all times. In this
way modern physics has perhaps opened the door to a wider outlook
on the relation between the human mind and reality.
The inevitable foundation in natural language of all attempts to describe the
world, as emphasized by Bohr and Heisenberg, corresponds in our vocabulary to
the idea that the basic categories of perception are also be the basic categories
in any proper physical model. The fact that each sentence contains a subject
and a predicate corresponds to the basic categories of knowledge given by the
concept of objects and their attributes. To express knowledge in a sentence a
subject is not enough, we must say something about it using a predicate. To
define knowledge in a physical state it is not enough to refer to an object, we
must specify its properties using a set of attributes.
The crucial role of the personal pronouns in natural language corresponds to
the crucial role of the subjective aspect of the world assumed in this study. The
symmetry between the subjective and objective aspects inherent in the model
of intertwined duality is reflected, for example, in the fact that each personal
pronoun comes in two cases: subject and object. The division of the subjective
aspect of the world into individuals, and the fact that all knowledge has an
individual root, is reflected in the fact that the personal pronouns are divided
into first, second and third person. The fundamental nature of the past, the
present and the future in the physical formalism presented here, corresponds to
the fact that there are verb tenses in virtually all languages.
It is a common misunderstanding that the crucial role taken by the ob-
server in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics means that we
give up on objectivity. However, objectivity can be present at different levels,
and Heisenberg calls the level represented by a naive materialistic world view
metaphysical realism [30].
We ”objectivate” a statement if we claim that its content does not
depend on the conditions under which it can be verified. Practical
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realism assumes that there are statements that can be objectivated
and that in fact the largest part of our experience in daily life con-
sists of such statements. Dogmatic realism claims that there are no
statements concerning the material world that cannot be objectivated.
Practical realism has always been and will always be an essential part
of natural science. Dogmatic realism, however, is, as we see it now,
not a necessary condition for natural science. [...] Metaphysical re-
alism goes one step further than dogmatic realism by saying that ”the
things really exist.”
Wolfgang Pauli thinks along similar lines [47].
I agree with Bohr in the opinion that the objectivity of a scientific
explanation of nature should be defined as liberally as possible: Every
mode of looking at things which one can impart on others, which
others having the necessary preliminary knowledge can understand
and in turn apply, which we can talk about with others, shall be called
objective. In tis sense all physical theories and laws are objective.
A more detailed discussion about his views on ontology is the following [44].
In the new pattern of thought we do not assume any longer detached
observer, occurring in the idealizations of this classical type of the-
ory, but an observer who by his indeterminable effects creates a new
situation, theoretically described as a new state of the observed sys-
tem. In this way every observation is a singling out of a particular
factual result, here and now, from the theoretical possibilities, thereby
making obvious the discontinuous aspect of the physical phenomena.
Nevertheless, there remains still in the new kind of theory an ob-
jective reality, inasmuch as these theories deny any possibility for
the observer to influence the results of a measurement, once the ex-
perimental arrangement is chosen. Therefore particular qualities of
an individual observer do not enter the conceptual framework of the
theory. [...] In this wider sense the quantum-mechanical description
of atomic phenomena is still an objective description, although the
state of an object is not assumed any longer to remain independent
of the way in which the possible sources of information about the
object are irrevocably altered by obseration. The existence of such
alterations reveals a new kind of wholeness in nature, unknown in
classical physics, inasmuch as an attempt to subdivide a phenomenon
defined by the whole experimental arrangement used for its observa-
tion creates an entirely new phenomenon.
Niels Bohr also discusses the ‘wholeness’ in nature in terms of the indivisi-
bility of quantum phenomena [11].
[T]he whole experimental arrangement must be taken into account
in a well-defined description of the phenomena. The indivisibility
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of quantum phenomena finds its consequent expression in the cir-
cumstance that every definable subdivision would require a change of
the experimental arrangement with the appearance of new individual
phenomena. Thus, the very foundation of a deterministic descrip-
tion has disappeared and the statistical character of the predictions
is evidenced by the fact that in one and the same experimental ar-
rangement there will in general appear observations corresponding to
different individual processes.
Similarly [9]:
I advocated the application of the word phenomenon exclusively to
refer to the observations obtained under specified circumstances, in-
cluding an account of the whole experimental arrangement. In such
a terminology, the observational problem is free of any special intri-
cacy since, in actual experiments, all observations are expressed by
unambiguous statements referring, for instance, to the registration
of the point at which an electron arrives at a photographic plate.
These considerations are taken into account in the formalism used in this
study, since the physical state SO of the experimental setup corresponds to the
macroscopic perception of this setup. Likewise, the set of alternative outcomes
{Sj} of the experiment corresponds to the set of possible macroscopic percep-
tions of the experimental setup after the measurement has been performed, for
examples the set of distinguishable positions of a pointer in the measurement
apparatus. We assign probabilities only to such macroscopic states, not to the
states of the individual microscopic particles that we study in the experiment.
We can use such deduced quasiobjects O˜ in order to express a reduced state SˇO
where the microscopic composition of the experiment, including the observed
specimen, is taken into accout. However, the naked perception, symbolized by
SO, is always the necessary and sufficent foundation for the physical descrip-
tion. In contrast, the states of the individual quasiobjects O˜, detached from
the means of the observation that makes their deduction possible, are never a
sufficient foundation, just as Bohr and Pauli emphazises.
Bohr stresses the abstract nature of the elementary particles and other mi-
croscopic objects, just as we do when we call them quasiobjects [4].
[I]t must be kept in mind that, according to the view taken above,
radiation in free space as well as isolated material particles are ab-
stractions, their properties on the quantum theory being definable
and observable only through their interaction with other systems.
In this connection, it is interesting that Bohr [6] takes a similar view on
photons as we do when we degrade them even further to bookkeeping devices
called pseudoobjects.
In accordance with the classical electromagnetic conceptions we can-
not, however, ascribe any proper material nature to light, since ob-
servation of light phenomena always depend on a transfer of energy
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and momentum to material particles. The tangible content of the
idea of light quanta is limited, rather, to the account it enables us to
make of the conservation of energy and momentum.
Given a mcroscopic state S, we define its evolution u1S(n) as the union of
all states that can possibly be observed the next time instant n + 1. It is easy
to see similarities between this view and that of Pauli [43].
[S]tatements in quantum mechanics are dealing only with possibili-
ties, not with actualities. They have the form ‘This is not possible’
or ‘Either this or that is possible’, but they can never say ‘that will
actually happen then and there’. The actual observation appears as
an event outside the range of description by physical laws and brings
forth in general a discontinuous selection out of the several possibil-
ities foreseen by the statistical laws of the new theory.
The general discontinuous selection that Pauli talks about can be identified
with a state reduction u1S(n)→ S(n+ 1) ⊂ u1S(n). The fact that this process
is fundamentally irreversible is emphasized by Heisenberg [30].
The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions,
i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the
observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e.,
the transition from the ”possible” to the ”actual”, is absolutely neces-
sary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of quantum
theory. At this point quantum theory is intrinsically connected with
thermodynamics in so far as every act of observation is by its very
nature an irreversible process; it is only through such irreversible pro-
cesses that the formalism of quantum theory can be consistently con-
nected with actual events in space and time. Again the irreversibility
is - when projected into the mathematical representation of the phe-
nomena - a consequence of the observer’s incomplete knowledge of
the system and in so far not completely ”objective”.
A state reduction means that the knowledge about the observed system
increases. To avoid that our knowledge becomes more and more complete after
repeated observations, there has to be a balancing loss of knowledge. Pauli
expresses this fact as follows [45].
[E]very experimental arrangement is accompanied by an undeter-
minable interaction between the measuring instrument and the sys-
tem observed; as a result, any knowledge gained by an observation
must be paid for by an irrevocable loss of some other knowledge.
What knowledge is gained and what other knowledge is irrevocably
lost, is left to the experimenter’s free choice between mutually ex-
clusive experimental arrangements. It is on this possibility of a free
choice of mutually complementary experimental arrangements that
the indeterministic character of natural laws postulated by quantum
mechanics rests.
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In our formalism we place the loss of knowledge in the evolution operator,
meaning that u1S corresponds to a state of less knowledge than S does, for a
typical physical state S.
Heisenberg talks about the fundamental nature of the irreversibility in the
temporal evolution in quantum mechanics, and compares it with the irreversibil-
ity in statistical mechanics. In the present treatment, we have tried to identify
the ‘microscopic’ irreversibility in quantum mechanics and the ‘macroscopic’ ir-
reversibility in statistical mechanics by defining entropy as the logarithm of the
volume V [S] of the same state S that we act upon to define the ‘microscopic’
evolution. The basic lines of thought are the same as the conventional ones, of
course, as expressed, for instance, in this quote by Pauli [45].
The first application of the calculus of probabilities in physics, which
is fundamental for our understanding of the laws of nature, is the
general statistical theory of heat, established by Boltzmann and Gibbs.
This theory, as is well known, led necessarily to the interpretation of
the entropy of a system as a function of its state, which, unlike the
energy, depends on our knowledge about the system. If this knowl-
edge is the maximum knowledge which is consistent with the laws of
nature in general (micro-state), the entropy is always null. On the
other hand thermodynamic concepts are applicable to a system only
when the knowledge of the initial state of the system is inexact; the
entropy is then appropriately measured by the logarithm of a volume
in phase space.
Pauli invented the exclusion principle and made significant contributions to
the development of quantum field theory. Therefore it is interesting that he
thought that we are still lacking an understanding of both these theoretical
structures at a fundamental level. Concerning the exclusion principle, he writes
the following [43].
Already in my original paper I stressed the circumstance that I was
unable to give a logical reason for the exclusion principle or to deduce
it from more general assumptions. I had always the feeling and I still
have it today, that this is a deficiency.
I think that the approach taken in this study gives a simple logical reason for
Pauli’s principle, as discussed in Section 3.11 in relation to Fig. 3.78. The crucial
point that enables understanding is that we do not consider the formalism of
quantum mechanics or quantum field theory to be the basic layer of description.
Instead we introduce the conceptually simple object state space SO in which
object states SOO can be represented. The statement that two objects have the
same or overlapping states SOO lacks epistemic meaning.
Regarding the concept of a field, Pauli expresses the following concerns [44]:
While in the present theory there exists still a duality between the
concepts of fields and of test bodies, I think that a new mathematical
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form of the physical law is required, which makes fields without test
bodies not only physically but also logically impossible. It must also
express properly the complementarity between the measurement of a
field with an atomic object on the one hand, and the description of
the same object as source of the field on the other hand. Indeed, these
two possibilities should become automatically mutually exclusive as
a result of a suitable form of the laws of nature.
The present formalism takes a step in the direction envisaged by Pauli, I
think. Again, the introduction of the state S is crucial. It relieves the wave
function and fields from the burden to be the fundamental and perpetual carrier
of the physical state. Just as we let the wave function be defined in specific
experimental circumstances only, the same goes for the field. These matters
are discussed in Section 3.13 in relation to Fig. 3.85. More precisely, the field
represents those aspects of the specimen that are not directly observed in the
experiment, but influences the outcome of the observation. To define the field
in such an experiment, we need a priori knowledge about those objects that
create the field (sources) as well as their influence on the part of the specimen
that we observe (the test body).
It is clear from these considerations that the present formalism cannot consti-
tute a quantum field theory, since we do not let any field (quantum or classical)
survive the end of the experiment in which it is defined. From the epistemic
perspective, perpetual quantum fields that penetrate the entire universe are not
satisfying. To me, it is this unsound starting point that creates the difficulties
with infinities that plauge these theories, at least at the formal level. Pauli
expresses his concerns as follows [43].
[T]he zero-point energy of the vacuum derived from the quantized
field becomes infinite, a result which is directly connected with the
fact that the system considered has an infinite number of degrees of
freedom. It is clear that this zero-point energy has no physical reality,
for instance it is not the source of a gravitational field. Formally it
is easy to subtract constant infinite terms which are independent of
the state considered and never change; nevertheless it seems to me
that already this result is an indication that a fundamental change
in the concepts underlying the present theory of quantized fields will
be necessary.
Paul Dirac was as sceptic as Pauli when it came to quantum field theory
[16].
It seems clear that the present quantum mechanics is not in its final
form. Some further changes will be needed, just about as drastic as
the changes made in passing from Bohr’s orbit theory to quantum
mechanics. Some day a new quantum mechanics, a relativistic one,
will be discovered, in which we will not have these infinities occurring
at all.
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I am aware that quantum field theory has developed since the days of Pauli
and Dirac, where the invention of the renormalization group is the most impor-
tant step. Many scientists seem satisfied with the present state of affairs. To
me, the conceptual foundation of quantum field theory just does not look right.
I suspect that this is the reason for the computational complexity and the need
for various tricks to tame the infinities. Again, I have to stress that I do not
master quantum field theory, so the reader may very well disregard my opinions.
The above remarks by Bohr, Dirac, Heisenberg and Pauli are more or less
technical, unconventional at the most. However, at least Bohr, Heisenberg and
Pauli did not hesitate to venture into speculations about deeeper matters such
as the nature of life, the unconscious, and future transformations of physics
that will push it further away from the classical picture. Bohr stresses that the
existence of subjective experiences, the crucial quality of life, must be taken as
a primary fact that cannot be reduced to something else [8].
[T]he existence of life itself should be considered, both as regards its
definition and observation, as a basic postulate of biology, not sus-
ceptible of further analysis, in the same way as the existence of the
quantum of action, together with the ultimate atomicity of matter,
forms the elementary basis of atomic physics. It will be seen that
such a view-point is equally removed from the extreme doctrines of
mechanism and vitalism. [...] it rejects as irrational all such at-
tempts at introducing some kind of special biological laws inconsis-
tent with well-established physical and chemical regularities, as have
in our days been revived under the impression of the wonderful rev-
elations of embryology regarding cell growth and division. In this
connection it must be especially remembered that the possibility of
avoiding any such inconsistency within the frame of complementar-
ity is given by the very fact that no result of biological investigation
can be unambiguously described otherwise than in terms of physics
and chemistry, just as any account of experience even in atomic
physics must ultimately rest on the use of the concepts indispensable
for a conscious recording of sense impressions.
In the present approach we try to trace the apparent ‘white hole’ in physics
that lets us choose an experimental setup freely (without predefined probabilities
for the different possible choices) to some activity in the brain that is unknowable
in principle (Fig. 5.2). This line of thought is similar to that expressed by Bohr
[5]:
[T]he idea suggests itself that the minimal freedom we must allow the
organism will be just large enough to permit it, so to say, to hide its
ultimate secrets from us.
Also [7]:
[E]very experimental arrangement suitable for following the behav-
ior of the atoms constituting an organism in as exhaustive a way
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as implied by the possibilities of physical observation and definition
would be incompatible with the maintaining of the life of the organ-
ism. This would in fact be quite analogous to the circumstance that
all observations obtained by experimental arrangements which allow
of a space-time account of the behavior of the constituents of atoms
and molecules stand in a complementary relation to those obtained
under conditions permitting the study of the intrinsic stability of
atomic structures so essential for the physical and chemical proper-
ties of matter.
We may connect the appearance in our minds of options, intentions and
choices - and the impossibility to assign probabilities to these in advance - to
the action of the unconscious. According to Pauli [46]:
This suggests a comparison between the inner process of sense-perception,
or more generally every appearance of new content of consciousness,
and observation in physics, insofar as physical measuring instru-
ments can be regarded as technical extensions of the observer’s sense
organs. In the case of sense perception, however, new content of con-
siousness remains incorporated as a constituent part of the perceiving
subject. Since the unconscious is not quantitatively measurable, and
therefore not capable of mathematical description and since every ex-
tension of consciuousness (”bringing into consciousness”) must by
reaction alter the unconsciuous, we may expect a ”problem of ob-
servation” in relation to the unconsciuous, which, while it presents
analogies with that in atomic physics, nevertheless involves consid-
erably greater difficulties.
As a final quote, I choose a view that Pauli expressed in 1954 on the current
state of physics, and on the direction that he expects it to take in the future
[44].
There is a general agreement that present-day quantum mechanics
leaves many fundamental questions unexplained, as for instance the
atomistic character of electricity [...]. Besides that, no satisfactory
interpretation is given of the characteristic variety of mass values
and of the very different degrees of stability of the many particles,
which in a very provisional way are called ‘elementary’. The limi-
tations of the applicability of our present theory admitted, there is,
naturally, a wide divergence of opinions about the direction of further
development in future. Some physicists hope for the possibility of a
return to the classical idea of the detached observer, whose effect on
the observed system could always be eliminated by theoretically de-
terminable corrections. Others, with whom I belong myself, have, on
the contrary, hopes just in the opposite direction.
Among the unsolved questions raised by Pauli, I tentatively suggest that the
‘atomistic character of electricity’ has something to do with the discreteness of
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the values of internal attributes that follows from the requirement of temporal
identifiability of elementary particles in division processes (Section 2.16). The
perspective I offer on the concept of rest mass might give a ray of hope when
it comes to the derivation of the masses of elementary particles. However, I
have done no attempt to make actual calculations. Therefore I have to remain
humble in my claims.
In summary, my aim has been to continue along the path set out by Kant
and the fathers of quantum mechanics. It is up to others to judge if I deviate
from this path, or if I have misunderstood it from the outset.
6.2 The dangers of metaphorical modelling
In the preceding section, I quoted Pauli saying that he did not like the idea
of fields without test bodies. Intuitively, we like to imagine an electromagnetic
field as a wave that spreads, interacting with the matter it encounters along its
way, causing diffraction and interference. However, in this study we have denied
such a field any independent existence, saying that photons are just bookkeeping
devices that are used to identify two objects O1 and O2 as possibly interacting.
This means that attribtutes are carried from one object to the other, given the
relevant conservation laws and the given ratio called ‘speed of light’ between
the distance between the objects and the time difference between the changes
undergone by these objects.
Therefore, we should rather entertain the following picture. We introduce
a family C(r4) of experimental contexts or arrangements such that the spatio-
temporal distance r4 is varied between the source O1 and the detector O2 that
possibly registers a photon emitted from the source. The detector corresponds
to the test body, and we get a field C(r4) of experimental arrangements rather
than an electromagnetic field.
As I see it, nothing happens between the emission and the absorption of a
photon, since such hypothetical events are outside our knowledge by construc-
tion. The wiggly line shown in Figs. 3.70 and 3.71, indicating the exchange of
a photon, is just a mental aid for the attribute accountant. We should not be
carried away by such a picture, saying that there is ‘really’ a particle traveling
from O1 to O2, or that there is a field into which these objects are submerged.
To construct physical models that depend on such mental pictures is to fall in
the trap of metaphorical modelling, I think.
I am afraid that quantum field theory is an example of such a trap. Here,
objects are seen as excitations of a field, making the field the fundamental entity
on which the theory relies. To be able to form an image of what a quantum field
is, we have to have solid state physics in mind. We picture a lattice or medium
defined throughout space, in which the state of each lattice point can deviate
from its equilibrium position, increasing the energy of the medium, just like an
atom in a crystal may deviate from its equilibrium position in the lattice. The
quantum aspect enters simply because the medium can be in a superposition of
different states.
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What we do, in effect, is to look at elementary particles as if they were
excitations in a lattice of other particles. But how do the particles in the lattice
come about, then? The explanation bites its own tail and explains nothing. My
argument is naive on purpose. Of course, nobody expects a quantum field to
be a medium of particles, like a solid. But more generally speaking, the very
notion of ‘excitation’ requires that something is excited. As soon as we try to
imagine an excitation, we cannot avoid the picture of an exitation in a collection
of individual objects that form collective, wave-like patterns - like water waves,
or ink dots on a paper forming wiggly lines.
Of course, these interpretational difficulties do not mean that quantum field
theory has to be ‘wrong’. We may see it as a purely mathematical construction
that makes it possible to extract predictions about the nature of the elementary
particles and the way they interact. The involved mathematical objects and
operations do not need to have any intuitive interpretation. It goes without
saying, however, that such a perspective is at odds with the entire philosophy of
this study. In particular, it goes against ‘epistemic minimalism’, the idea that
all mathematical objects and distinctions should correspond to objects and dis-
tinctions that are subjectively perceivable in principle. Looked at from this
angle, quantum fields are as conceptually unsound as the aether. By exclud-
ing the existence of the aether, nature corrected the mistake that arose from
the attempts in the nineteenth century to interpret the electromagnetic field.
Maybe nature will soon correct our mistake when it comes to our attempt to
interpret elementary particles in terms of excitations of quantum fields? Maybe
the infinities that plague the theory, and the difficulties to include gravity, is a
sign that we have set out on the wrong track from the beginning?
The basic problem with quantum field theory can be expressed as follows:
We attempt to explain the fundamental layer of the objective world in terms of
something that is not fundamental - a composite medium. Since we can make a
subjective distinction between the fundamental and the non-fundamental layer,
we should, from the epistemic perspective, use different kinds of models in the
two cases; we should not use the metaphor of a phonon to explain the photon.
This mistake is analogous to that made in creation myths. The beginning
of the world is explained in terms of a metaphor describing events happening
in a world that already exists. For example, in Nordic mythology, the giant
Ymer was created in the void Ginnungagap between the cold Nifelheim and the
hot Muspelheim when the heat from Muspelheim melted the white frost from
Nifelheim. Then the Gods Oden, Vile och Ve killed Ymer and created the world
from his body. In the modern version, Ginnungagap, Nifelheim and Muspelheim
are replaced by quantum fields. The sudden hot wind from Muspelheim is
replaced by a fluctuation from an unstable vacuum state [34]. If we accept
the traditional view on quantum fields we still have to ask ourselves in what
sense these exist before the creation of the world. If we share Pauli’s view that
there cannot be any fields without test bodies, then the ‘explanation’ loses its
meaning.
String theory suffers from the same problem as quantum field theory. A
string must be interpreted as an extended object that can be conceptually di-
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Figure 6.1: Four examples of pairs of primary distinctions or ‘degrees of free-
dom’. We often try to ‘explain’ the degree of freedom represented by the y-axis
in terms of the degree of freedom represented on the x-axis. I call this strategy
‘metaphorical modelling’, meaning that we treat processes on the x-axis as a
metaphor for the appearance of the y-axis.
vided into smaller, connected parts. Nevertheless, this non-fundamental object
is used as a model for all the fundamental objects - the elementary particles.
Looking at these particles as musical notes played on a string is a beautiful
metaphor, but misleading as such, I think.
Just as for quantum field theory, we may avoid these difficulties by refrain-
ing from all attempts to interpret the string theory formalism. We may also try
to find a better picture of what a string is. Several illustrations in this study
resemble the world tubes traced out by closed strings, for instance Fig. 2.59. In
our interpretation, the surface of these tubes represents a boundary of knowl-
edge. We cannot exclude any point inside the tubes as a state of the object we
study, but we can exclude all the points outside the tube. Our tubes live in the
state space SO of objects, rather than in four-dimensional space-time. Natu-
rally, the dimension of SO is higher than four, since space-time can be seen as
a subspace of SO. The surface of our tubes has co-dimension one in SO rather
than the dimension two that results if we see them as surfaces swept out by
one-dimensional strings. Since the evolution of the state SO is not pointwise in
terms of exact states Z, the boundary ∂S can be looked upon as a membrane
possessing tension, just like a string (Fig. 2.15). The boundary of knowledge
cannot be exactly pinpointed, as discussed in Section 2.3. Therefore we should
consider superpositions of different tube surfaces, just as we consider superpo-
sitions of different string states. However, our superpositions do not correspond
to elements in a Hilbert space, since no probabilities or probability amplitudes
can be associated to each possible tube surface. Again, the reason is that the
tube surface cannot be exactly determined, so that no realizable alternative is
associated with each possible surface.
Attempts to explain the subjective aspect of the world by saying that it
‘emerges’ from the objective aspect might be fitted under the same umbrella of
metaphorical modelling as the other examples that we have discussed. I have a
hard time seeing what such an explanation could possibly mean. The distinction
between these two aspects of the world must be considered fundamental, to be
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hard-wired into our faculties of perception.
We may compare the two ends of the distinction between the subjective and
the objective to two independent degrees of freedom (Fig. 6.1). One of them
cannot be reduced to the other, or explained in terms of the other. We cannot
account for the y-axis as if it emerges from some processes taking place on
the x-axis. We have to treat the existence of both the x- and the y-axis as a
postulate if we want to use them both in our efforts to describe and understand
the world. In the same way, we should not try to explain minimal objects in
terms of composite objects, or the beginning of the world in terms of events
taking place in a world that already exists. This is so even if we take the latter
world to be a ‘meta-world’ inside which the familiar world is created, where
the meta-world may consist of quantum fields, or gods acting in mythological
realms such as Ginnungagap, Nifelheim and Muspelheim.
6.3 Minimizing mysticism
The traditional materialistic or ‘scientific’ view of the world is that it is a world
of objects that exists independent of our perception of it. The task for science
is to describe it and understand its behavior. Concerning the subjective aspect
of the world, the most common perspective is that it somehow ‘emerges’ from
the outside world. In either case, the objective aspect of the world is the fun-
damental aspect, and it is sufficent to understand this aspect in order to get a
complete understanding of the world.
This world view rests on the implicit assumption that we can make infer-
ences about the objective world in a way that is independent of the very same
world. Figuratively speaking, the implicit idea is that our senses, logic, and
mathematics ‘hover’ above the objective world. For example, people often care-
lessly assume that we can form mathematical concepts taken from a Platonic
world of ideas independent of the physical world.
In my own mind, this traditional materialistic world view is the archetype
of mysticism, at the same time as it is inconsistent. It is mystical because it
depends on a world whose existence we can never confirm. I mean here an
objective world that can be described by the categories of our perceptions even
if we do not perceive it. We may define mysticism as the belief in entities and
worlds of which we have no everyday, tangible perception, and also the belief
that these entities and worlds are necessary to account for the world in which
we live. We may therefore say that materialists in the above sense are mystics
by definition.
In addition, this world view is inconsistent for the following reason. We
noticed the implicit assumption that it is possible to hover above the objective
world, observe it and make statements about it, in a way that is not constrained
by the world which we observe. This picture contradicts the view that the
subjective aspect of the world ‘emerges’ from the objective aspect, therefore
being its slave.
In contrast, the intertwined dualism suggested in this study acknowledges
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both the subjective and the objective aspects of the world as fundamental in-
gredients in a complete world view. It is a ‘slim fit’ in the sense that everything
in the objective aspect has a root in the subjective aspect, and everything in
the subjective aspect has a root in the objective aspect. It is therefore the most
materialistic and least mystical world view that I can imagine, if we adopt con-
sistency as a basic criterion. Epistemic closure is another term that I use to
describe such a model.
It seems to me that the apparent inconsistency in the naive materialistic
world view has the same root as the failure of all attempts to construct a purely
formal basis for mathematics, as revealed by Go¨del. Namely, if we extend the
power of the formal system (explanatory weight given to the objective aspect of
the world) far enough, we finally reach a point where we bite a hole in our own
system. We can prove that there are theorems that can be expressed within the
system and are true, but cannot be proved within the system. In other words,
the bold ansatz that formal systems are a sufficient basis for reason leads to the
conclusion that there is a realm of independent mathematical truths ‘hovering’
above the very same formal system. The situation is very similar to the one
that I described above, where materialists implicitly adopt a view where we,
as investigating subjects, hover above the objective world, being able to study
every aspect of it, just like we study a picture in a book at arms length without
being part of the picture ourselves. To be a bit blunt: if you believe that formal
systems and computations are sufficient to understand reason, or if you believe
that the objective aspect of the world is sufficient to understand the whole world,
then you also believe in angels.
The Go¨delian problem arises because it is possible to formulate self-referential
statements in strong enough formal systems. Analogously, self-reference is un-
avoidable in the naive materialistic world view, and the inconsistency arises
because the adherents do not admit it, and does not properly take it into ac-
count. In contrast, in the world view suggested here, self-reference is built in
from the beginning, by assumption, in the partial circularity inherent in the
model of intertwined duality. As usual, it is a good idea to admit a problem, or
just a fact, to be able to handle it.
In the world view presented here, the analogy between the foundations of
mathematics and the ‘foundations’ of nature arises very naturally, since math-
ematical reasoning is seen as a chain of physical object states SO that are gov-
erned by physical law just like any other series of events in our own body or in
the outside world. The ‘white hole’ in physical law allows nature to choose be-
tween states permitted by this physical law without any knowable selection rule.
This means, for instance, that there may appear mathematical ideas without
any knowable cause. The assumed fundamental distinction between proper an
improper interpretations then kicks in, making it possible to judge whether the
new idea is true or not. Expressed differently, the thinking of mathematicians
is not completely restrained by the execution in the brain of deterministic or
probabilistic computational schemes. Creativity cannot always be reduced to
something else.
Many people would say that the attempts in this study to derive physics
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from philosophy, from pure thought, are misguided. We need to look at the
world to learn anything about it, they say; all knowledge about the world is
empirical. Kant opposed this view, and I agree with him. It is certainly true
that we need empirical knowledge, that we cannot learn everything about the
world if we close our eyes and just think. But we can learn something, at the
most fundamental level. I would say that anyone who does not agree with this
statement falls into the trap of believing in angels. In effect, such a person is
saying that the workings of her thoughts does not reflect the workings of the
world. Her thoughts are hovering above it and can move unrestrained by it.
She believes that she is an angel herself. This is perfectly alright if she admits
her mystic belief. But these people tend to say that they are materialists. This
is simply not true.
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